ВИКТОР СУВОРОВ

РАЗГРОМЪТ

ФАКЕЛ ЕКСПРЕС

VICTOR SUVOROV THE DEFEAT

Translation.

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Hitler was building socialism. And Stalin built socialism.

Hitler considered his path to socialism to be the only correct one and all other paths to be perversions.

And Stalin considered his path to socialism to be the only correct one and all other paths to be deviations from the general line.

Hitler had a four-year plan. Stalin - five-year.

The main holidays in Stalin's empire were May 1, November 7-8.

In Hitler's Empire - May 1, 8-9.

Hitler exterminated people by the millions. And Stalin - by the millions.

Hitler did not adorn himself with orders, and Stalin did not adorn himself.

Where then is the difference?

The difference is in the shape of the moustache.

But there is also a difference in that the world considered Hitler's actions to be enormous atrocities. And Stalin's actions as a struggle for peace and progress.

In order to prevent Hitler from holding the conquered European countries, the West sank German ships, bombed German cities, and then landed a super-powerful army on the European continent.

And in order for Stalin to succeed in taking and holding the other half of Europe, the West gave Stalin hundreds of battleships, thousands of warplanes and tanks, hundreds of thousands of the world's best military vehicles, millions of tons of first-quality fuel, ammunition, food, etc., etc.

But how was it that Stalin lost the war he had spent a lifetime preparing for? Why did the Soviet Union's entry into World War II in August

1939 was so glamorous and the end so sad? Why did the Second World War end for the Soviet Union with a so-called "great victory" that turned out be worse than any defeat.

Viktor Suvorov

"Solzhenitsyn's verdict 'Stalin is a murderer' is accepted unquestioningly. The verdict of Suvorov "Stalin is an aggressor" is not accepted. From a psychological point of view, the reaction is understandable. If Stalin is a murderer, we are victims. If Stalin is the aggressor, we are accomplices."

Dmitry Khmelnitsky

INSTEAD OF A PREFACE

Hitler's flag is red. And Stalin's
is red.

Hitler ruled on behalf of the working class, Hitler's party was called the Workers Party.

And Stalin ruled on behalf of the working class, his system of power was officially called the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Hitler hated democracy and fought it. Stalin hated
democracy and fought it. Hitler built socialism.

And Stalin was building socialism.

Hitler considered his path to socialism to be the only correct one and all other paths to be perversions.

And Stalin considered his path to socialism to be the only correct one and all other paths to be deviations from the general line.

Hitler ruthlessly exterminated his party associates who strayed from the right path - such as Röhm and his entourage.

Stalin also ruthlessly exterminated all who deviated from the right path.

Hitler had a four-year plan. Stalin - five-
year.

Under Hitler, one party was in power, the others were in prison.

And under Stalin, one party was in power, the rest - in prison.

Under Hitler, the party was above the state, the party leaders ruled the country.

And under Stalin, the party was above the state, the party leaders ruled the country.

At Hitler were The Congresses converted At Party are into grand spectacles.

Under Stalin - also.

The main holidays in Stalin's empire were 1, November 7-8.

In Hitler's Empire - May 1, 8-9.

Hitler had a Hitler Youth - young Hitlerites. Stalin had the Komsomol - young Stalinists.

Officially they called Hitler Führer, Hitler the leader. Excuse me, Stalin was called a leader and Hitler was called a Führer. In translation it is the same.

Hitler was fond of grandiose facilities. He designed the largest building in the world, the Assembly House, to be built in Berlin. The dome of the building is 250 meters in diameter. The main hall was to hold 150-180 thousand people.

And Stalin loved grandiose facilities. He designed the largest building in the world, the Palace of Soviets, to be built in Moscow. The main hall under Stalin was smaller, but the whole facility was much taller. The 400-metre-high building was a kind of pedestal, above which towered the 100-metre-high statue of Lenin. The total height of the facility was 500 metres. Work on the designs for the Assembly House in Berlin and the Palace of Soviets in Moscow was carried out simultaneously.

Hitler planned to destroy Berlin to the ground and build a new city of cyclopean structures in its place.

Stalin planned to destroy Moscow to the ground and build a new city of cyclopean structures in its place.

For Germany, Hitler was an outsider. He was born in Austria, and almost up to the time he came to power he had no German citizenship.

Stalin was an outsider to Russia. He was neither Russian nor even Slavic.

Sometimes, very rarely, Stalin invited foreign guests to his Kremlin apartment and they were shocked by the modesty of the furnishings: a simple table, a cupboard, an iron bed, a soldier's blanket.

Hitler had a photograph of his home published in the press. The world was shocked by the modesty of the surroundings: a simple table, a cupboard, an iron bed, a soldier's blanket. Only Stalin's grey blanket was striped black, Hitler's white.

At the same time, in secluded places amidst fabulous scenery, Stalin built quite cozy and well-protected residences-fortresses that did not resemble a hermit's cell at all.

And Hitler, in secluded places amid fabulous scenery, built impregnable fortress residences, sparing neither granite marble for them. These residences did not resemble a hermit's cell at all.

Hitler's favorite wife, Geli Raubal, was 19 years younger than him.

Stalin's favorite wife, Nadezhda Alliluyeva, was 22 years younger than him.

Geli Raubal commits suicide.

Nadezhda Aliluyeva - also.

Geli Raubal shoots himself with Hitler's gun. Nadezhda

Allyueva - with Stalin's gun.

The circumstances surrounding Geli Raubal's death are mysterious. There is a version that Hitler killed her.

The circumstances surrounding the death of Nadezhda Allyueva are mysterious. There is a version that Stalin killed her.

Hitler said one thing and did another. And so did Stalin.

Hitler began to rule under the slogan "Germany wants peace". It then took over half of Europe.

Stalin fought for "collective security" in Europe, he spared neither forces nor means for this. Then he took over half of Europe.

Hitler had the Gestapo.

Stalin - NKVD D[1].

Hitler had Auschwitz, Buchenwald, Dachau. Stalin - Gulag.

Hitler - Babi Yar. Stalin - Katyn.

Hitler exterminated people by the millions. And Stalin - by the millions.

Hitler did not adorn himself with medals, and Stalin did not adorn himself.

Hitler wore a paramilitary uniform without insignia.

And Stalin - in a paramilitary uniform without insignia. They will object to me that later Stalin was attracted by the military ranks, by the marshal's lampshades and golden epaulettes. That's right. But Stalin awarded himself the rank of Marshal in 1943 after the victory near Stalingrad, when it was finally clear that Hitler had lost the war. Stalin was 63 years old at the time he was awarded the rank of Marshal. He first donned the Marshal's uniform at the Tehran Conference when he met Roosevelt and Churchill. In this case, we cannot compare Hitler and Stalin simply because Hitler did not live to such an age, nor to such meetings, nor to such victories.

And everything else matches. Stalin is beardless, but with a famous moustache. Hitler is beardless but with a famous moustache.

Where then is the difference?

The difference is in the shape of the moustache.

There is also a difference in that the world considered Hitler's actions to be enormous atrocities. And Stalin's actions as a struggle for peace and progress.

The world hated Hitler and sympathized with Stalin.

Hitler had taken over half of Europe and the rest of the world had declared war on him. Stalin took half of Europe and the whole world welcomed him.

In order to prevent Hitler from holding the conquered European countries, the West sank German ships, bombed German cities, and then landed a super-powerful army on the European continent.

And in order for Stalin to succeed in taking and holding the other half of Europe, the West gave Stalin hundreds of battleships, thousands of warplanes and tanks, hundreds of thousands of the world's best military vehicles, millions of tons of first-quality fuel, ammunition, food, etc., etc.

But how was it that Stalin lost the war he had spent a lifetime preparing for? Why was the Soviet Union's entry into World War II in August 1939 so glamorous and the end so sad? Why did World War II end for the Soviet Union with a so-called "great victory" that turned out be worse than any defeat?

[1] People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs - B.pr↑

CHAPTER 1
FOR THE CANONIZED EXPERIENCE

Stalin had no intention of attacking anyone. This is my firm belief. And all that is called expansion and some military operations there, all that is connected with completely peaceful purposes, though of course by military means, naturally.

Elena Sayanova

"Echo of Moscow, 21 July 2008

1

The history of the Soviet-German war will never be written.

Archives cannot be relied upon either. They have long and thoroughly been purged. And even if something is left in them, it is inaccessible to researchers.

Therefore, the answer to the question of the causes of the Soviet Union's defeat in World War II remains to be sought in the memoirs of Stalin's marshals and generals. Above all - in the memoirs of Zhukov. Of all those who left memoirs, he is the most important. At the time of the beginning of the war he was the head of the General Staff - the brain of the Red Army. All the information, all the secrets - everything was in his hands. So Zhukov's memoirs are the most important source.

But the bad news is that in each new edition of Zhukov's memoirs, the level of nastiness steadily rises and the meanness thickens. Without getting to the most recent editions, in which the vile becomes impenetrable, let us turn to the earliest examples of
"rethinking" the already written, established and published material.

The radical revision of the original text began immediately after the publication of the first edition. So even the second edition differs sharply from the first.

The first edition, for example, states that the senior leadership of the Red Army was absolutely clear about the nature of the approaching war: 'In general, the military theory of those , expressed in works, lectures, written into statutes, was mostly, as they say, on the level of the times' *('Vospominy i razmыuulienia'. M., APN, 1969, p. 215)*.

And the second edition was supplemented by the statement that on the given issue the Red Army's top leadership was not at all clear: "I am sometimes asked why, at the beginning of the war with fascist Germany, we were practically not fully prepared to fight this war and to manage the troops on the fronts? I think before

all it would be fair to say that many of the then senior executives in the People's Commissariat of Defence and the General Staff over-canonised the experience of the First World War. Most of the command staff of the operational-strategic unit, including the leadership of the General Staff, understood theoretically the changes that had taken place in the nature and conduct of World War II. But in practice, they were preparing to conduct the war according to the old scheme" *("Vospominy i razmyшlenie". M., APN, 1975. Vol. 1, p. 319)*.

So that's where the secret of the spectacular defeat lay: "many of the executives then in the Defense Department and General Staff" turned out to be fools. Military theory was up to the times, but it existed for itself, and the Red Army's top brass canonized the experience of World War I and prepared to fight the war according to the old recipes and scenarios.

Great.

For those who do not understand.

And we will note a minor, barely noticeable stylistic discrepancy. We read the quotation again. We omit the words "not completely." In Soviet jargon this is equivalent to the expression
"individual deficiencies", which meant complete failure.

Zhukov asks: why haven't *we* prepared ourselves to lead the war...

And he answers: *they* were preparing to fight the war according to the old scheme.

2

The People's Commissariat for Defence and its main structure, the General Staff, are responsible for the country's preparations for war. And here it turns out that the war was being prepared by some mysterious "they". And the Genius General, who was the Chief of the General Staff and Deputy People's Commissar for Defence, was soaring in the heights.

The untalented "they" were preparing to fight the outdated recipes of World War I. There was unreconstructed idiocy in the higher military leadership, but the genial Chief of the General Staff had no part in all this dementia. He, the great one, angrily exposed: 'they' understood nothing.

And we will ask: did he himself adhere to the outdated recipes and schemes of the First World War, or did he not?

The honest man in a given situation must clearly establish his place in what is happening. He had to define himself.

Or to admit it bluntly and honestly: yes, I, Zhukov, did not understand anything, I clung to outdated views about the nature of the coming war. From me, the Chief of the General Staff, the misunderstanding of the essence was spreading downwards and wide. Therefore, when in the spring of 1941, under my direction, the operational plans of the General Staff were being revised, mistakes were made which led precisely to the ignominious defeat and rout of the Soviet Union in the Second World , to the so-called
"great victory", after which the degradation and extinction of the Russian and other peoples of the great country became irreversible.

Or - the opposite: I, Zhukov, understood everything correctly, but the Red Army was led by morons (, so-and-so and so-and-so) who held outdated views.

In the second case, he had to produce documents that would expose so-and-so, so-and-so and so-and-so and prove that the wise and brave Zhukov had fought with all his might against the bearers of dead concepts but had failed to defeat them.

3

There are unwritten laws in every collective. One of the unshakable rules for all groups of people, for all centuries and ages, is: no one has the right to make accusations without proof. Least of all, accusations against the majority without naming anyone in particular.

Imagine that in the barracks there is a smart guy who, way, throws in: most of you are thieves! And that's it... Or in the cell someone shakes: most of you are informers and scoundrels...

Such a one will kill him with boots. Immediately. Because among normal averas such idiocy is accepted to be answered.

So Zhukov declared his battle comrades, comrades-in-arms, commanders and subordinates to be fools who did not understand the simplest things. He did not name names. He said only that they were the majority. Thus the blame fell on everyone. Go prove that you are not a dullard like everyone else, that you are not one of the majority.

If Zhukov had named exceptions: for example, so-and-so understood everything correctly - go-go-go. Then, by subtracting the positives from the list, we would get the names of the negatives. But Zhukov throws stones in all gardens without exception - that is, why do it, everyone is like that.

Except me.

By writing "they", Zhukov crossed himself off the list of idiots.

And while we temporarily agree with the Grand Strategist that most of the Red Army's top leaders were cretins, let us try to find at least a few exceptions.

Here it is the senior leadership of the General Staff in the first half of 1941:

Chief of General Staff - Army General G. K. Zhukov; First Deputy of the General Staff - Lt. Gen. Ф. Vetutin. Deputies:

Lt. Gen. Д. Sokolovsky - on mobilization issues;

Lieutenant General F. И. Golikov - on intelligence;

Corps Commissioner S. К. Kozhevnikov - on the polytdrorene.

Kozhevnikov drops out immediately. His job in the General Staff was to supervise the generals: not to drink vodka (or to drink moderately), instead to read the classics of Marxism-Leninism.

Even if the corps commissar Kozhevnikov was an absolute cretin, even if he had misconceived the nature of the coming war, there was nothing terrible in that. He did not determine the character of the approaching war.

The Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant-General Golikov, also did not determine the nature of the future war. His job was to gather intelligence on the enemy. And how to deal with this enemy - that was not for him to decide. Among other things, remembering and reflecting on the war, Zhukov persistently forgot to name Golikov as his deputy. If Zhukov's memoirs are to be believed, he had no subordinate named Golikov at all.

Lieutenant-General Sokolovsky is also dropped. He was the deputy in charge of mobilization affairs. And he did not determine the nature of the coming war. But he did his duty: in the first week of the war, in an atmosphere of general chaos, destruction and panic, he managed to secure the conscription of over five million reservists, replacing the dismantled Red Army cadre with a new one. Over the course of the war, Sokolovsky served in senior staff and command positions, often under Zhukov's direct command. In the Battle of Moscow - Chief of Staff of the Western Front, commanded by Zhukov, in the Berlin operation - Deputy Commander of the 1st Belorussian Front, commanded by Zhukov. After the war Sokolovsky received the rank of Marshal. Zhukov never had a claim to Sokolovsky. Zhukov never said that Sokolovsky did not understand the essence of the war.

First result: the Chief of General Staff has one first deputy and three deputies. We strike from the blacklist all three deputies (Kozhevnikov, Golikov and Sokolovsky). Because even if they were stupid, even if they didn't really understand anything,

the blame for the defeat cannot be laid on them. They were not directly involved in the questions of the conduct of the war and the management of the troops on the fronts.

4

Plans for war were afoot:

— Army General Zhukov, Chief of the General Staff; Lt. Gen. Ф. Vatutin - First Deputy Chief of the General Staff;

— Lt. Gen. K. Malandin - Head of the Operational Department of the General Staff.

Let's have a look around.

Lieutenant General Vatutin was one of the most educated and most talented Soviet commanders. He graduated from a military school, besides - a higher military school, the Frunze Military Academy, then the operational faculty at the same academy and the Military Academy under the General Staff - two military schools and three academies. He has distinguished himself as a distinguished strategist, distinguishing himself in both staff and command positions.

To the post of First Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army Lieutenant General Vatutin was appointed in early 1941. At that time he had not yet reached the age of 40.

During the war he suffered no defeats. In the autumn of 1941, commanding a task force, he struck a counter-strike on Manstein's corps, saving Leningrad from capture. (And Zhukov later attributed the fame of the savior of Pieter to himself.)

During the Stalingrad strategic offensive, Vatutin commanded the Southwestern Front, and together with Rokossovsky closed the encirclement.

In the Battle of Kursk, Vatutin commanded the 1st Voronezh Front, which took one of the two German tank battering rams. And resisted. And goes on a decisive counter-offensive.

Further Vatutin successfully commanded the 1st Ukrainian Front in the Dnieper advance and the liberation of Kiev. This front operated along the main direction of the war: Stalingrad - Berlin. This front was assigned to storm Berlin. But already without Vatutin.

In February 1944, Army General Vatutin was severely wounded. Instead of him the front was headed by Zhukov, and Vatutin died in hospital. There is no doubt that as early as 1944 Vatutin would have been a marshal, Hero of the Soviet , Knight of the Order of the
"Victory." He was one of Stalin's three knights: Rokossovsky, Vatutin, Chernyakhovsky. And no one has ever accused Vatutin of misunderstanding the essence of war, of blind adoration of outdated schemes and stereotypes.

Let's look at the Chief of Operations, Lieutenant General Malandin.

Operations management is something of an assembly line. It's a huge plant, and the finished product only comes out of one shop. That is how the entire staff, in this case the General Staff, works for the interests of only one of its subdivisions, the Operations Department. The finished products - the plans of the war - come out only from here. There are other departments in the General Staff: intelligence, organization, mobilization, topographic, troop completing, and so on. But they do not determine the nature of the coming war and do not plan the war.

The whole planning of the war was in the hands of the leading troika: Zhukov, Vatutin, Malandin. All the planning of the war went through them alone. They were the main filter. Without their permission, not a single document relating to the plans for the coming war could have gone outside the walls of the General Staff.

All three proceeded to perform their duties on February 1, 1941. It is interesting to see what they were like a month before.

By 1 January 1941 Zhukov was in command of the troops of the Kiev Special Military District (KSMD).

Vatutin - Chief of Staff of the Kiev Special Military District.

Malandin - Deputy Chief of Staff of the Kiev Special Military District.

Stalin rightly believed that in the event of a change of course it was not enough to change the head of a department. His whole staff must be changed as well. When appointing a new head, Stalin usually gave the new head the opportunity to select his aides. This is precisely how

he entered on January 13, : he appointed. Zhukov as Chief of the General Staff and gave him the right to form a team. Among , Zhukov brought with him from Kiev his closest assistants Vatutin and Malandin, and they in turn - their own people.

Zhukov pulled many other generals from Kiev to Moscow. The impression is given that the entire senior staff of the KOVO has transferred to the General Staff. For example, the head of the Mobilization Department at the KOVO headquarters, Maj. Gen. Л. Nikitin took the post of head of the Mobilization Department at the General Staff. The Head of the Department for Fortified Areas at the COAF Headquarters, Maj. Gen. И. Shiryaev was appointed Chief of the Department for Fortified Areas at the General Staff. This list is long.

And if the leadership of the General Staff turned out to be composed of people who, as Zhukov states, did not understand the nature of modern warfare, we must hold the Marshal of Victory responsible, not some ignorant fools: you chose these clever men yourself and you completed the senior leadership of the General Staff with them.

Zhukov appointed his own people not only to the General Staff, but also to other key structures of the Defense Commissariat. For example, on the eve of the war, on Zhukov's recommendation, the chief of the artillery of the Kiev Special Military District, Lieutenant General N. Д. Yakovlev became head of the General Artillery Department of the Defense Commissariat. And if he canonized the experience of World War I it was only thanks Zhukov that he rose to such a high post in the Soviet artillery.

Joking aside: no one has noticed Nikolai Fyodorovich Vatutin, German Kapitonovich Malandin or Nikolai Dmitrievich Yakovlev blindly copying the experience of the First World War, nor has anyone accused them of doing so. Zhukov's declarations that anyone in the Red Army clung to the experience of World War I are a vile slander. No defender of Zhukov's genius has yet succeeded in accusing a single Red Army general of following that experience in theory or practice.

5

Let's go up another step, to the higher military spheres.
In the leadership of the Defense Commissariat.

The People's Commissariat of Defence is a grand structure. But there is still no room for a whole crowd at the top of the pyramid.

Before the war, the People's Commissar for Defence was the Marshal of the Soviet Union S. K. Timoshenko.

Marshal of the Soviet Union S. M. Budyoni was his first deputy.

In addition, Marshal Tymoshenko had four other deputies:

— Army General G. K. Zhukov - Chief of the General Staff;

— Marshal of the Soviet Union G. И. Kulik - Deputy for Artillery;

— Marshal of the Soviet Union B. M. Shaposhnikov - deputy for fortified areas;

— Army General K. И. Meretskov - deputy for combat training.

We cannot suspect the Marshal of the Soviet Union S. K. Timoshenko that he was preparing to fight the war according to the schemes of the First World War. We have no grounds.

After the Civil War Timoshenko served mainly in the Belorussian and Kiev military districts in the positions of cavalry commander, deputy district commander and district commander. It was in these military districts that the new methods of warfare were practiced. It was in these districts, including with Timoshenko's most active participation, that grand army exercises with deep tank breakthroughs and multi-thousand airborne assaults were conducted. This in no way resembles the First World War.

In September 1939, the Red Army entered World War II. Timoshenko commanded the Ukrainian Front in the composition of three armies (5th, 6th and 12th). The Ukrainian Front in conjunction with the

Belorussky strikes a blow in the back of the Polish Army, which heroically tries to stop Hitler's eastward movement. The 12th Army of the Ukrainian Front, consisting of one tank and two cavalry corps, three rifle divisions, and army aviation, was essentially a front line mobile group.

Let's leave aside issues of politics and morality. We are looking at the question of whether or not Marshal Timoshenko clung to the experience of the First World War. Well, the actions on the Soviet fronts in the autumn of 1939 had nothing to do with the First World War.

In January 1940, all the troops stranded in the snows of Finland in front of the Mannerheim Line and in other directions were, by Stalin's order, united into the Northwest Front. Stalin appointed Timoshenko as commander of the front. And he decisively changed the situation. Under Timoshenko's command, the North-West Front broke the Mannerheim Line. Timoshenko was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, and two months after the end of the Winter War he was made Marshal of the Soviet Union and appointed People's Commissar for Defense of the USSR.

A breakthrough of a line of reinforced concrete fortifications was made for the first time in world history. No one had ever had such an experience before. The breakthrough of the Mannerheim Line in no way fits in with the experience of the First World War. In that war there were neither such lines nor such breakthroughs.

After taking the post of People's Commissar for Defense of the USSR, Timoshenko prepared the Red Army for decisive and rapid breakthroughs of heavily fortified reinforced concrete defense areas and frontiers, for rapid incursions deep into enemy territories. Declassified documents attest to this. The most important of these is Marshal Timoshenko's closing speech to the Red Army's senior command staff meeting on 31 December 1940.

Here's the highlights of that speech, here's the Marshal's credo: "The Red Army and our high command must be prepared both for action in maneuver conditions and for breaches of modern reinforced concrete defensive lines from the outset of the war in order to be able to develop these breaches relatively quickly, to go out to the

maneuver space and fully exploit the advantages of mobile formations in a maneuver war... The high tempo of the operation is ensured by the massive use of motorized and aviation formations to strike the first blow and continuously develop the strike in depth" *("On the Eve of wars. Proceedings of the meeting of the top leadership of RKKA[1] 23-31 December 1940". M., Terra, 1993, 339-340)*.

He could have said: we must prepare to repel aggression, to defend the country. But Timoshenko said no such thing and apparently did not mean it.

And he could have said: we have to be ready for defense well as offense. But the narcom Timoshenko does not say that either. His position is: we must be ready for an offensive against both a weak enemy (Romania) and a strong one that has taken refuge behind reinforced concrete fortifications (like the German troops in East Prussia). Timoshenko had insisted that the troops prepare both for a breakthrough of the enemy's reinforced concrete defensive strips, which did not and could not exist on Soviet soil, and for a sweeping march to the enemy rear. This is what he has done very recently (very successfully) in Finland and Poland. Now it was someone else's turn.

That the Marshal of the Soviet Union S. K. Timoshenko did not canonize the experience of the First World War is evident from his orders, instructions and speeches delivered behind closed doors. And even more clearly by his actions. Example: on March 21, 1941, Marshal of the Soviet Union S. K. Timoshenko sent Stalin the plan for the construction of airfields in the border regions. On March 24, a decree of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR was adopted, according to which the construction of airfields for the Red Army was assigned to the NKVD. For the implementation of this decree, the General Directorate of Airfield Construction - GUAS was established within the NKVD *(Order of the NKVD №00328)*.

Construction of 254 airports was deployed simultaneously. Mostly on the recently "liberated" lands of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Western Ukraine, Moldova, Western Belarus. At each airport a concrete runway measuring 1200 by 80 meters was being built. For construction were attracted 199 674

Prisoners from ITC[2], 44,490 from camp units, 51,920 sentenced to corrective labor, 16,017 POWs *(GAR F[3], f. 9414, o. 1, ò. 1165, ë. 32-45)*.

Semyon Konstantinovich Timoshenko has definitely remembered the experience of the First World War, reminded him of Comrade Stalin and Comrade Molotov...

This example alone is enough to see that the Marshal of the Soviet Union S. K. Timoshenko was not at all preparing the new war according to the scenarios of the First World War. In the First World War there were no concreted runways. Let alone in such quantities.

It is clear that the war plans will never be discovered. Researchers have only been able to find unsigned and unconfirmed drafts. But even that is enough. These drafts speak of plans for a sudden attack on Germany, however, no one has yet been able to find plans for defensive operations. Not even drafts.

And more: even the unconfirmed and unsigned drafts of plans for an attack on Germany make us remember something simple - no commander from battalion up drew up any documents and wrote them himself. To that end, he has his staff prepare the documents. Every document prepared by the staff is first signed by the chief of staff. And only then by the commander.

Even if someone ever manages to find a document denouncing Timoshenko for clinging to the WWI experience, don't be in a hurry to gloat. Recall that Semyon Konstantinovich Timoshenko did not personally draw up any documents. He had a Chief of the General Staff for that. Try to remember his name...

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[1] Workers' and Peasants' Red Army - B.pr↥
[2] Correctional labour colonies - B.pr↥
[3] State Archive of the Russian Federation. - B.pr↥

6

So, we've cleared things up with the defense junkie.

But he had a first deputy - Marshal of the Soviet Union S. M. Budyoni, whom the Red propaganda never tired of mocking. Well, he apparently held on to the First World War experience with a dead grip.

That Budyoni did not hold on to this experience I will prove a little further down. Now I will just explain the role of the first alternate. By long-established tradition, the first deputy is the commander's double. This is also true of the first deputy to the defense secretary. The Narkom goes to the Kremlin, for a military exercise, for a test range, for a reconnaissance in the area of the state border - he leaves the first deputy to replace him. The first deputy could and was obliged to resolve emerging issues only in the spirit in which the Narkom himself would resolve them. Otherwise, there would have been dissension. Otherwise the vertical of power would have split. So the Narkom and his first deputy are something like one being, albeit with two faces. The narcom's first deputy for defense, the Soviet Union's Marshal Budyoni, could not and did not have the right to push his own line other than that of narcom Timoshenko.

We have to repeat all this over and over again, to chew on it, to emphasise it once more: the two key figures in the Defence Narcom are the Narcom himself and the Chief of the General Staff. The Chief of Staff and the head of the think tank. At that moment, it Timoshenko and Zhukov. And in no way Budyoni.

In the Red Army, seniority was determined not by military rank, but by the position held. For example, the 15th Rifle Corps of the 5th Army in the summer of 1941 was commanded by Col. И. Feduninsky, and his deputies and division commanders were generals. And nothing. They obeyed unquestioningly, gave honor to the colonel and obediently listened to his scoldings.

So, out of the five deputies of the narc, three were marshals. Nevertheless, Army General Zhukov was the most senior among them.

And here's why.

Artillery is the god of war. But the duties of the deputy defence minister for artillery were to plan the paths of artillery development, to direct the work of the design bureaus and test ranges, to award orders to the war factories, to receive the finished products, to distribute them to troops and depots, to prepare artillery personnel, to direct the selection and distribution of personnel, to prepare personnel and material reserves in case of war, etc., etc.

And it must be said that Grigory Ivanovich Kulik did his duty. At least, neither in Germany, nor in Great Britain, nor in the United States, nor in Japan, were there artillerymen equal to him, and in no country in the world at the beginning of the war was there so powerful an artillery - neither in its course, nor at its closing stage.

See, however, to the decision of the question whether the artillery of large and special power should be directed to the border or taken to the Dnieper, the Deputy Commissar of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union Kulik, had no relation. These things were decided by the General Staff: if from the very first moment of the war we plan an offensive across the frontier, naturally we direct all the artillery to the frontier.

And in matters of the local distribution of strategic ammunition stocks the decisive word belonged to the General Staff. As soon as the General Staff planned the main thrust from the Lvov bulge to Cracow and then to Breslau, it was clear to everyone that the stockpiles should be accumulated there, near the borders. In solving this problem, the Deputy Narkom for Artillery is responsible only for ensuring that ammunition of the appropriate types and calibers ends up in the quantities requested and at the times indicated in the appropriate areas.

And so in everything. If war is planned on foreign territory, if we are expected to make breaches in strips of reinforced concrete fortifications, the General Staff orders concrete-pounding shells. It is the task of the Deputy Chief of Defence for Artillery to develop

such projectiles, to test them, to provide for the distribution of orders, reception, storage, delivery, to control the correctness of use, to prepare artillerymen for the use of such ammunition. And not to forget that such a projectile has a different trajectory, so to develop for them the appropriate firing tables, and the reticles in the optical sights should be different. So on thousands of guns the whole optics should be changed...

But if we are going to stop enemy tanks, we need armor-piercing shells, not concrete-piercing shells...

By the way, the memoirs of the same Zhukov measure the thought: the war has begun, and with armor-piercing shells we are stuck. We have none. And then the Great Commander-in-Chief makes a bold decision: to shoot at the tanks with concrete shells! What a hit, eh! Only he forgot to explain who had insisted on producing concrete-firing shells instead of armour-piercing shells before the war. And who ever needed concrete-fire shells, since there aren't and can't be any enemy concrete-fire facilities on our soil?

I repeat the thought: Grigory Ivanovich Kulik was a marshal, but he did not determine the character of the coming war. And even if he had outdated views about the nature of the coming war, there was nothing terrible about that. The planning of the fighting was not up to him. These matters were dealt with by the General Staff.

The Deputy Chief of Defence for Fortified Areas (DA), Marshal Shaposhnikov of the Soviet Union, was also entirely dependent on the plans of the General Staff for all major matters. If the General Staff did not intend to defend itself on its own soil, then the fortifications along the Stalin Line were no longer necessary. Therefore, no one would allow the UR Commissar to waste the people's funds on keeping unnecessary fortifications in readiness. Besides, if Zhukov was planning to strike the main blow from the Lvov salient towards Kraków, then he didn't need many fortifications in the Lvov area. That's why they built them here in minimal quantity or not at all.

And the combat preparations depended entirely on the plans for the war, i.e., on what the General Staff had planned. As soon as the plans were offensive, in accordance with them, the Deputy-Narcom of Defence for Combat Training, Army General Meretskov, taught the troops to force rivers, break through fortified strips, make

breakthroughs with powerful tank formations, to carry out sea and air landings. And only those troops who were in the Far East and Transcaucasia were taught to defend themselves.

All the deputies of the Secretary of Defense, including the First Deputy, taken together, with all their merits, decorations, ranks, and titles, could have exercised no more influence in determining the character of the war than the Secretary of Defense and the Chief of Staff.

And here's the question: who, then, among the senior leaders of the Defense Commissariat did Zhukov accuse of not understanding the nature modern warfare? Whom does he name by the enigmatic term "they"?

7

The senior command staff of the Red Army throughout World War II consisted entirely of cavalrymen. Among them were the marshals of the Soviet Union Budyoni, Voroshilov, Malinovsky, Meretskov, Rokossovsky, Timoshenko, the army generals Bagramyan, Sokolovsky, Yeryomenko, who after the war became marshals.

And for the commanders of tank armies were appointed cavalrymen: Rybalko, Bogdanov, Katukov, Romanenko, Lelyushenko.

After the Civil War, cavalry provided the impetus for the development of Soviet tank troops not only in the direction of infantry support, but above all in the direction of creating powerful tank formations for rapid maneuver warfare.

The very development of the Red Army after the Civil War disproves the lies of Zhukov and his venal co-authors.

The Red Army did not cling to the experience of the First World War. The development of armoured troops speaks for this. The Red Army was the first in the world to form powerful armoured formations for independent rapid action, for waging not positional but manoeuvre warfare, for striking deep crushing blows.

The Red Army was the first in the world to create airborne troops as early as 1930. By the beginning of World War II, it possessed a far greater number of trained paratroopers than all other countries in the world combined. Who would dare to claim that the experience of the First World War had been followed in this country?

The Red Army was the only armored assault vehicle in the world. The purpose of this aircraft was fire support for tank wedges cutting down enemy rearguards.

The Red Army was the only army in the world to possess floating tanks in quantities worthy of mention. And is this from the First World War?

Zhukov's declarations about the complete bankruptcy of Soviet strategy on the eve of the German invasion prove only one thing: he knew nothing about Soviet strategy. He was simply not to date on our achievements.

If it was not Zhukov himself who canonized the experience of the First World War, but someone unknown whom we cannot and do not find, then the awkward question arises: why did the Great Strategist hide his assumption both from his superiors and from those around him and from his subordinates? Why has he remained silent?

In December 1940 a meeting of the senior command staff of the Red Army took place. Stalin was present but did not interfere in the work of the council. Everyone was free to say whatever he wanted. Stalin had convened the council precisely for this purpose - to listen to his commanders without interrupting them, without interrupting them. Why then did Zhukov not seize the moment? Why didn't he say that some military men were clinging to the outdated experience of the First World War? Why didn't he call for a new way of looking at things?

In January 1941, having been given the post of Chief of the General Staff, Zhukov was obliged to communicate his assumption to Stalin, to the members of the Politburo, to the Defense Commissar, to his subordinates. He should have written a memorandum to Stalin: at home the war was being prepared according to the outmoded schemes of the First World War. Zhukov should have called a new meeting of the Red Army leadership and categorically stated to all the commanders of districts, fleets, armies and flotillas that they should prepare for a new war, not for the one that had long since passed.

* * *

And here's a question for all the defenders of Zhukov's genius: where is the document?

You, gentlemen comrades, have access to all secret archives. Well, come and find Zhukov's memorandum, present his creepy talk that some people are working maliciously according to old schemes. Where are these documents?

are gone.

Simply because the genius whistleblower has gotten so much smarter since the battle. And in 1941 he kept quiet.

CHAPTER 2
FOR THE TRENCHES AND TRENCHES

The consideration of strategic defence was virtually out of sight of the military leadership, which imagined the future actions of the Soviet army and navy almost exclusively as offensive.

"History of the Second World War (1939-1945)", in 12 vols. M., Voenizdat, 1973-1982. Vol. 3, p. 415

1

Let's immediately admit that WWI was a stupid affair. Lots of mud, lots of blood, little use. Self extermination of nations. Europe's suicide.

As a result of the First World War, the Russian Empire collapsed. It was shattered into pieces. With a clang. Like a clay pot - from the cart onto the pavement.

Soon the legs of both Germany and Austria-Hungary were crossed. The war ended with ruin, famine, outrages of the mob, coups and revolutions, the fall of manners, the explosion of crime and banditry, mass prostitution, epidemics of typhus, cholera, syphilis, unprecedented breeding of rats and lice. In the three great empires the machinery of state power was completely destroyed. The streets were swarming with legless invalids, insolent street urchins, beggars, cheap tramps, pickpockets, swindlers and swindlers. Not daring to go out at night under the broken street lamps. They are not lit anyway.

Past greatness has been dishonored, spat upon, trampled in the mud and blood.

By the way, France has been very close to this as well. It has pulled off a great stroke of luck. Just before the victorious finale, American troops entered France. They were that last straw that broke the back of the German camel. After the soldiers, the American businessmen invaded the European continent. If there is demand, there will be supply. The demand has resembled a whirlpool after a sinking battleship. The dream of American business: Europe plunders everything!

It so happened that they quickly saturated France with bread, butter, sugar and meat. No famine, no revolution. Besides - the joy of the rataya: we have won! If they hadn't had the American canned meats, there would have been a revolution. They would have gone mad. For the French, there is no greater joy than the public beheading of the heads of square "Concord."

But in 1918 it passed them by.

In Britain - even better: and the joy of victory, and American canned food. Most importantly - there was no war on British soil. There was no ruin. On top of that - British troops were coming home without weapons. Before putting the soldier on the ship, they took his rifle and cartridges...

But even in Britain after the First World War it almost caught fire. Just take the General Strike, when all transport stopped, factories and mines were shut down, shops, hospitals, schools were closed, when the angry mob poured into the streets.

Russia has pulled off the worst luck. Our soldier, like millions of his fellows, leaving the trenches, has gone without forgetting his rifle and cartridges. Carrying it - inconvenient. It is long. So our resourceful soldier cut the rifle at the first opportunity. That's how it's done. With a file you cut off the stock. That's the easiest. Then you have to cut a piece off the barrel. That's harder. The steel that barrels are made of is particularly tough. Then you have to put a new muzzle on the hammer from the barrel. To do this, they melted the lead from a bullet and dripped some of it into the end of the barrel. If it hit incorrectly, as it should for a drop, it rolled down. And the one that hit right, it froze. And voila. A civil war could be started.

And it blazed so that all the horrors of the First World seemed like a beautiful fairy tale.

2

But why this result?

Why did the First World War have such a strange course, such a sad end and such horrific consequences?

It has turned out to be far from what was imagined and planned in high offices. The strategists on all sides were wrong. None of them wanted such a war, prepared for such a war. None of them supposed or foresaw that the war would degenerate into a long-dull carnage. All were preparing for another war.

The opponent can be defeated or exhausted.

Accordingly, there is a strategy of defeat and a strategy of exhaustion, of dehumanization. It's like fighting in the ring. There are two options.

Or you catch the enemy's jaw with your left - and the enemy gnashes his teeth and flies under the ropes into the far corner.

Or: the two huge sweaty smelly men lunge at each other in exhaustion. Both men's legs buckle. Here one hits the other in the back with a gloved hand. Then the other one answers him. For more they have no strength. If one of them falls, the other will not be able to stand, he will lose his footing.

Apart from these two options, a huge number of diverse combinations and routines can arise, but they are all just variations on the theme of exhaustion or defeat.

Generals love the strategy of defeat. And not just because it's beautiful. The thing is, war doesn't like duration. The wise Chinese Sun Tzu said it two thousand years ago. Protracted war exhausts the army and the population, destroys the economy, empties the treasury, leads to moral degradation, to the destruction of the foundations of society. That is why it is better to defeat enemies decisively and quickly. Without procrastination.

From the time of the Franco-Prussian War, i.e. from the early 1870s, plans for defeat had been prepared in the headquarters of all the major European countries, but the First World War was a war of attrition. Generals were preparing for decisive maneuvers, for victory marches. But after the brief period of maneuver warfare, all armies had reached a deadlock in position. The machine gun has become the master of the field. It was belching so much fire that it could stop any mass of advancing infantry and cavalry. Those who could not evade its withering fire perished.

In the name of fairness, it should be added that machine guns have been too successfully aided by magazine carbines. In its development, firearms have crossed that cursed line where it took longer to load than to aim. Now the shooter fired accurately hundreds of meters away, and it took seconds to reload the carbine. This enabled defending riflemen, even without machine guns, to destroy and stop the superior masses of advancing enemy.

In addition - the rapid-fire field guns, which with their fire broke or dispersed any unprotected clusters of troops.

Salvation was only in the earth. Without any commands and instructions all the armies suddenly stopped. Contrary to the general's plans and designs. Contrary to the dispositions and orders of the wise staffs.

Soldiers from all the warring armies, without waiting for orders, began to dig into the ground. On both sides of the fronts the same thing was happening. The process continued. They connected the trenches with trenches and the trenches with tunnels. They stretched barbed wire in front of the trenches. Behind the first row of trenches they dug a second row. After it - a third. Then a fourth...

Only howitzers could take the enemy out of the trenches. And they were ferocious. The answer to their vicious barking was the further development of the trench and trench system. The armies dug deeper and deeper into the earth, built breastworks, fortified the steep sides of the trenches with stakes, poles, planks, made water-wells, covered sections of the trenches with timbers and backfilled them

top with earth, digging new trenches, weaving new barbed nets, reinforcing the pillboxes and shelters with a second row of beams, a third, a seventh, a twelfth...

Germans, Russians, French, and Austrians all joined the First World War with the happy anticipation that they would quickly defeat their opponents. But Her Majesty's Cartel has cooled the appetites of all lovers of swift glittering victories. The Cartel has stopped all the advancing, has calmed all. The short period of maneuvering has become infinitely long, four years everyone has stayed put. Nothing new on the Western Front. On the Eastern front, too.

Magnificent strategic designs have not come to fruition, battles have broken down into thousands, tens and hundreds of thousands of drawn out insignificant battles on the ground. Strategy has degenerated into endless skirmishes in which millions have died, but no one has benefited from these skirmishes. Roughly speaking, the war has become a soldier's brawl. Talented strategists have felt like stock market tycoons on the beat: their knowledge, talent and experience have found no application here. Other scales, other rules and laws ruled here.

All this has led to years of hopelessly cruel and senseless bloodshed: who can hold out longer.

The First World War was fought by the soldiers and non-commissioned officers in the trenches, and there was no work for the generals. A situation similar to the one in which a prophet climbs aboard and calls on mankind to unite their efforts to achieve a great goal... And an indifferent crowd snores around: everyone with his worries. That's how it was in the First World War: soldiers farted and slaughtered each other, unaware that someone somewhere in a high office was drawing beautiful arrows of breakthroughs and takeovers. The war was essentially fought without the generals' participation. All the generals' calculations and plans were at first mired in the impassable mud of the pit-covered fields.

3

Already at the very beginning of the 20th century, in the course of the Russo-Japanese War, the concept of a solid front was born. It was a defensive front occupied along the entire length by troops, covered fire and engineer enclosures. The first example: in 1905 the dense front of the 3rd Russian Army stretched 155 km.

In the course of World War I, tens of miles of solid front turned into thousands. And barbed wire - into ten, twenty, even fifty rows, and behind these rows - the first trench, the second, then the third and so on ad infinitum...

In November 1915 the first trench of the Russian army could have been reached from the Baltic to the Black Sea. By the first trench of the German army on the Western Front it was possible to reach from the North Sea coast to the borders of Switzerland. And on the British-French - also. All the fighting armies had organized in deep dens command posts and hospitals, ammunition depots and churches, kitchens, bakeries, laundries, power stations and water supply points, latrines, shoemakers' workshops, communication nodes, post offices, bathhouses, brothels (more precisely, bunkers) and everything else without which a healthy army organism could not exist.

I once had the opportunity to see a photograph of the German positions taken by a French aeroplane. It was something unimaginable. A veritable spider's web of front line many miles deep. It was all smeared with the pits of years of artillery rampage. The artillery was ferocious, but it was impossible to breach these defenses.

And here's the question: why didn't anyone ridicule Zhukov after he wrote in his epochal masterpiece the obvious nonsense that the Red Army's top leadership was clinging to the experience of World War I and preparing to fight the war according to the old recipes?

Show me clearly, like a coward, this indestructible 1941 Soviet defense from sea to sea, with ten or fifteen lines each

trenches, with impenetrable barbed wire, with pillboxes and shelters, with underground command posts and communication nodes, with infirmaries and laundries, with privies under five-layer cover and dugouts for political education instead of marching-field brothels. Show me a defensive frontier that is occupied by troops all along its length, concealed by fire and engineer enclosures. Let it not be from the Baltic to the Black Sea, let it not even be 1,000 kilometers, nor 500, nor 100. Show me at least what a dense defensive frontier, at least 10 kilometers, occupied by troops who have prepared to repel an enemy advance.

In the spring of 1941 the Red Army did not entangle its defensive positions with barbed wire. Well, it wasn't building any positions either. And everything built before that had been abandoned by the summer of 1941 due to uselessness, covered with earth and overgrown with weeds. There was barbed wire only on the border, and it was not army wire, but Chekist wire. But the border guards quickly took it down and wound it into balls.

And with the trenches the picture is the same. Let one of the official Kremlin ideologues tell me the number of a Soviet rifle division that dug full profile trenches and took up a defensive position before the war. No one has yet been able to find a single Soviet army, a single corps, a single division, a single regiment that stood in trenches on the eve of war. It follows that no army commander, no corps, division, regiment or lesser unit commander, has ever dug into the experience of the First World War.

Moreover, the Field Regulations (both PU-36 and PU-39), the Infantry Combat Regulations (ICR), the Engineer Operations Manual, and all other documents that guided the troops and staffs not only did not recommend trenching, but literally forbade it. The single or double rifle trench - that is the basis of defense, but only for a short time and only on the secondary directions. Theoretically. And in practice, in most rifle units, soldiers did not even have shovels. According to combat documents and veterans' accounts, the picture is the same: when it mattered, infantry dug trenches with helmets. The sappers had shovels, but see, the infantry that had to dig in under fire - did not.

How do we connect all this to the dumb following of WWI experience?

4

In the 1920s and 1930s, the distinguished military historian and theorist of strategy Alexander Andreyevich Svechin proposed that the enemy invasion should be met with defense, the enemy's tanks destroyed, his divisions overrun, the enemy allowed to exhaust himself, to run out of reserves, fuel, ammunition, to hamper his communications, and only then to go on the counteroffensive.

Svechin's reasoning is simple: a ferocious bull is charging at you, but you have a house. Lock the door in front of him! Let him stick his horns in the door! Let it remain so - neither forward nor backward! And that's when your time comes! And to run to meet him, even with a pitchfork or an axe - you must not. You may get hurt. You can advance against the enemy if he is weak. Or sleeping. But if he is strong and advances, you must meet him with defense. Impenetrable and impenetrable.

When one thinks about it, where is the wisdom here? Do you have to be a strategist to understand such things? It was enough to watch the movie "Chapaev". More precisely, the most spectacular and most dramatic episode of it: with a mighty stride, in time with the beating of a drum comes the enemy - strong, trained, disciplined, confident in himself and in victory. Above the iron ranks spits a black banner with a silver skull. Should you rush against the enemy?

No, it shouldn't. Anka the machine gunner drops the enemy closer and closer, and then from a very short distance with a killing fire from the spot crushes the enemy's battle line. And only after the enemy is discomfited, when his plans are disrupted and the battle lines are bent, from behind the hill at the head of the cavalry's cavalry lava takes off Vasily Ivanovich Chapayev on a rampant stallion...

And the defeat begins.

Svechin has suggested that in a major war this is the way to proceed...

The untalented blusterer and careerist Tukhachevsky accused Svechin of defeatist sentiments, of aiding the enemy. Tukhachevsky is

unleashed a sadistic persecution on Svechin and all who had the courage to remember the defense. Tukhachevsky headed a savage pack of people like him - illiterate, low-life slanderers. On the wise theoretician Svechin, who dared to look the truth in the eye and have his own opinion, an avalanche of insults, slanders and denunciations to the OGPU-NKVD fell: Svechin was going to give the initiative into the hands of the enemy, this was strategic harm!

As a result, Svechin was arrested, convicted and imprisoned, then released, arrested a second time, convicted and shot.

In 1937 they also shot Tukhachevsky, but not for his harmful theories and actions, but for preparing a coup d'état. Tukhachevsky's insane theories did not suffer. His imitators and continuators of his work have emerged. Chief among them was Zhukov: offensive! offensive! offensive!

And only Hitler, having struck his crushing blow, made the warlords come to their senses.

On July 15, 1941 Smolensk fell. In this area the Western Dvina and the Dnieper flow parallel, roughly speaking - from east to west, forming a corridor to Moscow. Then the Dvina turns sharply to the north, the Dnieper - to the south. The Dvina and the Dnieper form powerful water barriers and natural boundaries, through which, with competent leadership, any invasion could have been stopped. And only in the region of Smolensk remains geographically unobstructed passage to Moscow. In the strategy this area is called Smolensk Gates. The fall of Smolensk in all ages has meant that the enemy has breached the gate and the road to Moscow is open.

That's what happened in the summer of '41. Not a month has passed since the war began, and here the enemy is at the gates of the capital, and there is no great river, no canal, no fortified area in his path, be it unbuilt or abandoned. The leadership of the Red Army reacted to this turn of events with the right decision. "A General Staff directive was issued to move to a solid defense. And if in that situation this directive had been carried out and deep-echeloned defenses had been established on the occupied lines, the enemy's great breakthrough to Moscow would not have happened. But the troops were constantly required to undertake frequent

offensive actions with which they exhausted not so much the enemy as themselves" *("Krasnaya Zvezda", 1 December 2006)*.

We have a whole set of issues here.

Why was the directive to switch to a robust defence only issued on 15 July? Why was it not issued on 22 June? Why was such a directive not issued on 21 June, , as Zhukov assures us, all doubts had been removed and it was clear that an attack was imminent? Why was no such directive issued on 1 February 1941, the day Zhukov took over as Chief of the General Staff?

And if they did, after all, issue it on July 15, who was the idiot who insisted that the troops "take frequent offensive actions by which they exhausted not so much the enemy as themselves"? And how did the Chief of the General Staff, Army Gen. K. Zhukov, after he saw that someone dared to disobey his directive?

He has not reacted in any way.

Because he himself sabotaged the implementation of his own directive. On the one hand, Zhukov's directive: dig yourselves into the ground! On the other hand, the orders of the same Zhukov: go ahead! Hooray! Forward!

Even after Stalin expelled Zhukov from the General Staff (because of his complete professional unsuitability for staff work) and sent him near Yelnya, the Grand Strategist was doing the same - sending his divisions, corps and armies into suicide attacks:

"As at the beginning of the war, all available and approachable reserves were used not to increase the depth of the defence, but to reinforce the first echelon formations and conduct counterattacks and counterstrikes, which in the conditions of the enemy's air dominance and weak fire support did not yield positive results" *("Krasnaya Zvezda", 1 December 2006)*.

5

When a fighter with a carbine or machine gun goes on the attack, his body is completely open to bullets and shrapnel. He cannot carry much ammunition with him, he staggers and drips, and he conducts fire on the move or from a short halt (i.e., aimlessly or almost aimlessly). He fires at targets that are poorly seen or not seen at all. Behind each new hill a completely new picture opens up for him, which he must cover with his eyes, evaluate and make his decision. Under murderous fire.

And he who stands in a trench has ample ammunition. His body is protected from bullets and, to a considerable extent, from shrapnel. For him the tank is not dangerous - it will pass over the trench, it will knock down the walls in one place - and that's it. The man who is in the trench is leading the aimed fire. He has a lot of strength, he breathes evenly, the terrain in front of him is familiar to him, he has estimated the distance to local objects...

The guy standing in the trench can use machine guns. He has an inexhaustible supply of ammunition and mows down whole battalions of enemy infantry. And the advancing man moves the machine guns alone. And his supply of cartridges. And they're terribly heavy. The machine gun has to be placed properly first... By the time you place it, the enemy will have you on the grid. In the Wehrmacht archives in Freiburg there are horrifying documents about numerous cases of madness among German machine gunners. Hans knocks down a hundred Ivanovtsy, a hundred more and more... And on they come, on they come. This is not war. This is madness. From Zhukov's madness the Hans' health was slamming their board.

On the Sinyavin Hills near Pieter, for example, only 128,390 Soviet fighters and commanders are buried. At first sight - insignificant losses. What is it worth to us to give 128 thousand lives? The cost to us is not terrible. Women will make new ones. But even
"Krasnaya Zvezda" (*December 11, 2001)* admits that only a small fraction of the dead were accounted for and buried. The skulls and bones of the rest have rolled around the surrounding area, polluting the environment.

Two German regiments of the 27th Light Infantry Division were defending here. The regiments under fire dug into the ground. The Germans, as in World War I, dug trenches, trenches, passages, built pillboxes and wood-and-ground firing points, lined the trenches with beams, covered sections of the trenches from above and turned them into underground galleries, camouflaged, covered the approaches with barbed wire and minefields, built false firing points and firing positions for false batteries...

And the Ivanovites were pissing, pissing. In 1941, 42, 43. And the Hansovtsy mowed them down, mowed them down. Well, that's exactly why the German machine-gunners had their board slammed from so much work.

And if it was only on the Sinyavin hills...

The paradox was that in 1941 the advancing German army was beating the Red Army through defense. As soon as they met resistance, the Germans immediately stopped, dug trenches and trenches on the principle: sweat saves blood - better ten meters of trenches than one meter of grave. And the Red Army under the leadership of the genius Zhukov was kicking against the rye.

After destroying the Soviet tanks with fire from the field, i.e., by the Anka machine-gun method, after killing the infantry, the Germans, meeting no resistance, moved on. And if they met resistance, they immediately stopped, dug in and everything repeated.

The Red Army had all the advantages of defence, but it spent two years ruining itself with offensives and counter-offensives.

6

But life has taught.

On October 13, 1941, in the face of impending catastrophe, Stalin ordered the formation of TEN sapper ARMYs, to be manned with slaves from the Gulag, with high-ranking camp bosses at their head. The 10th sapper army, for example, was commanded by the senior State Security major M. M. The 3rd Sapper Army was commanded by the famous builder of all Stalin's canals from the Belomorkanal to the Volga-Don, the deputy head of the GULAG, the senior major of the State Security Y. M. Maltsev. Д. Rapoport.

Having not yet completed their formation, the sapper armies buried themselves in the ground. They built innumerable bunkers, firing facilities, artillery positions, hidden observation and command posts, made wire and mine blast fences of unprecedented length, dug hundreds and thousands of kilometers of trenches and anti-tank ditches from Arkhangelsk to Astrakhan in many lines. This is what allowed them to stop the Germans at the walls of Moscow in December 1941.

And then began the Soviet counter-offensive, which again ended in a bloody finale for the Red Army. Even Krasnaya Zvezda *(December 1, 2006)* is forced to admit: "Unfortunately, in the subsequent winter offensive in January-March 1942, our hasty, unprepared offensive operations did not produce the necessary results and caused unjustifiably heavy losses."

It is a pity that "Krasnaya Zvezda" has left in the dark the name of the Greatest and Most Genial Commander-in-Chief, who sent hundreds of thousands of fighters and commanders to their deaths through these "hasty, unprepared offensive operations that do not produce the necessary results and cause unjustifiably heavy losses."

And if for such actions the Genial Commander-in-Chief was pushed by the stupid Stalin, where in this case was the vaunted

Principled by the Genius of Strategy in question?

In the spring of 1942, another spectacular offensive operation in the Kharkov area failed with a roar and much blood. As a result, the southern flank of the Soviet-German front received a gigantic gap unoccupied by the Red Army troops. Through this breach the German armies invaded. The way to the Volga and the North Caucasus was opened.

Life again forces the Red Army to remember the defense. In the late summer of 1942, four defensive lines were built on the approaches to Stalingrad: outer, middle, inner and urban. In the exhausting fighting, the Soviet troops exhausted the enemy and only then went on the counter-offensive. And won a spectacular victory that will not fade over the centuries.

The following year, on the Kursk arc, the Central and Voronezh fronts built 5-6 defensive lines, one after the other. Behind the Steppe Front troops erected another defensive frontier, and behind it on the left bank of the Don was built the State Defensive Frontier. The total depth of engineering equipment of the locality reached 250-300 kilometers. To break through such defenses (with competent leadership and resistance of the defending troops) was impossible even theoretically.

Would that in 1941 we could have had at least half or even a third of such a defense!

The experience of war has proved Svechin right. In 1943, the Soviet command deliberately ceded the initiative to the enemy: advance, boys, we'll see what you do. As you advance, we will tear you apart, as Anka the machine gunner did, then we will break you for good.

Zhukov after the war used to fume: it was I who told Stalin in 1943 how to act! To meet the enemy with defense!

A wise decision indeed. But where was that wisdom in 1941? It has manifested itself too late. Two years of foolish offensives against a strong enemy had bled the country and the army dry, then by the third year some people had to think with their heads. Only then did Zhukov (and more likely someone in the General Staff) remember Svechin's theories: why not

stand on the defensive, not give the initiative into the enemy's hands, not destroy his tanks, not bleed him with exhausting fighting, and only then we go on the offensive?

So they did. As a result, the backbone of the German panzer troops was broken once and for all, and they were taught to attack.

And Zhukov presented Svechin's wisdom as his own.

7

WWI was a horrific, dumb, unenlightening meat grinder.

But the experience of creating impassable defensive lines has been invaluable. In the 1930s, these defences had to be studied and conclusions drawn. What was unnecessary had to be discarded and what the times demanded added. The trenches and ditches of the First World War stood the test of strength. It was only necessary to cover the approaches to them with anti-tank and anti-personnel minefields, to add more anti-aircraft and anti-tank artillery to the troops. And there was nothing wrong with the rest of that experience (if we intended to defend our land). Tsar Nicholas, however stupid they paint him, did not let the Germans get close to Moscow, Kiev, Smolensk and Pieter.

But even if in the course of the Second World War the infantry suddenly ran out of mines and anti-tank guns, it was by no means easy to get them out of the trenches, trenches and pillboxes. What had changed in 1941 compared to the time of the First World War? Aviation had risen to a new stage of development, large numbers of tanks had appeared. But neither tanks nor aviation were able to inflict any particular damage on troops who dug in.

The defeat in 1941 did not happen because the Red Army clung to the experience of the First World War and followed it blindly, but because the experience of the First World War, the experience of defence on a strategic scale, was rejected, ridiculed, spat upon and forgotten.

If the warlords had used this experience, the soldiers in the summer of 1941 would have had shovels. This was precisely the tool of labor on the great works of our socialist fatherland was in abundance.

If they had used the experience of the First World War, if they had canonized it, the German army on 22 June 1941 would have

meet an unbreakable defense. And the Ivanovites were to subdue the Hansovites as the Hansovites had subdued them on the Sinyavin hills.

In 1943, the Red Army in the middle of a bare field under enemy fire for three months created defensive lines and, leaning on them, was able to repel the overpowering blows of the German troops, who had heavy tanks. Let us make an account of what defenses could have been built not in three months but in twenty years, from 1920 to 1941.

At war the enemy sees everything, notices everything, with fire interferes with the works, and on the front line it is impossible to use engineering equipment. But if they had not abandoned the experience of the First World War, the military leaders would have built defenses in peacetime, far from the enemy, using the most advanced engineering equipment. And there would have been two solid fronts from sea to sea - along the old frontier and along the new.

If in 1943 the German army could not break through defenses built in three months even with heavy tanks, how could in 1941 break through defenses built with hard work over 20 years? Without having heavy tanks?

On the eve of the German invasion of the Soviet Union, no defensive operations on a frontal or strategic scale were prepared or even planned. Moreover, this question was not even considered theoretically.

In 1940 in the Soviet Union there were only three generals with five stars in their nickels: Zhukov, Meretskov, Tyulenev. Stalin had known Tyulenev since the time of the Civil War. And it was in December 1940 that Army General Tyulenev stood up at the senior command staff meeting and declared that we had no theory of defense *("On the Eve of War. Materialy совещания высшего руководящего состава RKKA 23-31 grudnia 1940". M., Terra, 1993, p. 209)*.

Two weeks after that, Stalin appointed Zhukov Chief of the General Staff, after another two weeks Zhukov took office. Fate had given the Grand Strategist a unique opportunity.

According to Zhukov, Stalin was terribly afraid of war. Moreover, Stalin's old battle comrade Army General Tyulenev

stated openly, in the presence of the Red Army's senior command staff, that defense on a strategic was not even theoretically considered in the Red Army.

Wow, if only Zhukov could have seized the moment.

Ah, if only Stalin had been told what to do, where to look for salvation.

Wow, if only Zhukov had done something! Both theoretically and practically.

If only he had ordered his subordinates in the General Staff, in the headquarters of the military districts and armies to prepare options for defensive operations and counter-strikes.

Wow, if only they had announced a competition among the teachers and students of military academies for a simple, clear and clever theory of defensive warfare.

Wow, if only they had ordered the troops to dig trenches and trenches. From February 1941 until the German attack they would have dug where-more than on the Kursk arc.

But what did Zhukov do?

For the defence of the country - nothing.

And after the war he accused the entire senior command of misunderstanding the nature of the war: 'they' had prepared the war badly.

The Red Army has been spat upon by charlatans of all categories and hues. The Red Army has been mocked by scoundrels of all breeds and ranks. But no one has thought of ridiculing it because, blindly following the experience of the First World War, by the summer of 1941 it had entangled Karelia, the Baltic, Byelorussia, Ukraine and Moldavia with barbed wire like a spider's web, dug thousands of kilometres of trenches, built hundreds of thousands of firing points and pillboxes.

Because nobody cared!

This only occurred to Zhukov. But Zhukov's accusations are baseless and stupid. Zhukov obviously did not know what the First World War was like, he did not listen to the accounts of battle comrades, he did not watch newsreels. And he had not read Remarque.

A proposal to adopt a law to protect the historical truth about World War II from

any attempts at distortion, perversion and falsification.

A correct and timely proposal. It is time to use power. It is time to strike with the law at the miscellaneous creeps and miscreants who slander their army and their people. Of course, we should start with Zhukov's memoirs. The declarations by Zhukov and his many co-authors that "the majority of the then leading cadres in the People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff over-canonized the experience of World War I" is a distortion of historical truth and a vicious slander against the Red Army.

* * *

Army General Gareyev, a fierce defender of Zhukov and Tukhachevsky, reported on 1941: 'Not even the most important engineering works were carried out. For as early as the 1930s these same ideologues raised the slogan that the trench system was an obsolete feature of the First World War. The revolutionary soldier does not need trenches' *('Krasnaya Zvezda', 1 December 2006)*.

It is annoying that General Gareyev has not named the names of the

the "ideologues" of the revolutionary-offensive strategy. Some fools with no names or titles gave up on the trenches and that is why the defeat happened.

Here is the Tukhachev-Zhukov-Gareyev school in all its beauty. The most important thing for this scientific-strategic rabble is to present us as fools.

It appears that before the war and in its first phase, the Red Army, through the fault of some unknown cretins, had completely abandoned the trenches, i.e. had completely rejected the experience of the First World War. Conclusion: oh, how stupid these Russians are!

Everything here is correct. This is how it was. But this same Gareyev is praising Zhukov, who declared to the whole world that the Red Army, through the fault of some anonymous cretins, had a death grip on the experience of the First World War and in no way wanted to give it up.

And the conclusion is still the same: oh, how stupid these Russians are!

CHAPTER 3
WELL, WHO WAS CLINGING TO THE FIRST WORLD EXPERIENCE THEN?

The main point - There must be suddenness.
Й. Stalin
Speech before the meeting of the senior commanders of the Red Army at the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on 16 April 1940

1

As early as the autumn of 1914 the question was before the generals on all : what was to be done?

In order to break the war out of the positional stalemate, it was necessary to somehow break through the enemy's front and get into operational space.

But they couldn't break through the front.

They had to get the enemy infantry out of the trenches. To do this they had to concentrate a huge amount of artillery on the bottlenecks of the front and dig trenches for weeks, sometimes months. But the enemy was not stupid either. If we attacked his defenses in a given area, then beyond that spot he started digging new and new trenches and trenches and filling them with fresh cannon fodder. We have dug one line of trenches, a second, a third, and the enemy behind the positions we have taken has managed to dig ten more lines...

Among the few exceptions is the Brusilov breakthrough. In the summer of 1916, the Southwestern Front under the command of Cavalry General A. A. Brusilov broke through the enemy's defenses on a 550-kilometer front at a depth of 60-150 kilometers.

Brusilov found a way out: he broke through the Austro-Hungarian front not in one direction, but in four simultaneously. And in each direction there were 2-3 breakthrough sections located in space. These sections were all eleven. In addition, there were six false ones. The enemy did not know which of them was the main one. By the way, this was not known by Brusilov himself. He had assumed that all eleven sections were the main ones! To strike simultaneously at all of them and if the enemy threw all his reserves into one place

- Brusilov will develop success in another. And so it happened. Brusilov broke through the front. And in several sections at once. Therefore, the enemy, in order to avoid encirclement, was forced to take his troops to the huge front of five hundred kilometers.

However, another problem arises: huge masses of mobile troops must be immediately inserted into the breach that has formed. Figuratively

said, Brusilov had punched a hole in the enemy's armor, now something sharp, stabbing or cutting had to be inserted through that hole to pierce the enemy's entrails. Preferably all the way through. And it had to be done quickly, or else the enemy could liquidate the breach.

In those times only infantry and cavalry could fight independently. The other troops supported and secured their actions. Numerous cavalry were needed to enter the breach. It could penetrate deep into the rear of Austria-Hungary and Germany. But Brusilov had limited cavalry. The fault was not his. Powerful mobile formations should have been taken care of by higher commanders.

The High Command did not have a sufficient amount of strategic reserves in the given direction, which it could throw into battle and go into the operational space. Moreover, the breakthrough on the Southwest Front was not supported by the other fronts.

Having exhausted its offensive options, the Southwest Front reaches a new chain of fortified positions and is forced to dig in again.

But even without the introduction of large mobile masses into the fray, Brusilov's breakthrough ended in crushing success. The Austro-Hungarian Empire was dealt a mortal blow from which it never recovered. And Germany, too, felt the end approaching. In December 1916, the German Kaiser made an offer to his adversaries to end the war and make peace.

However, his proposal was rejected by both the Russian Tsar and his Western allies.

2

Brusilov's breakthrough could have brought the war to a victorious end, but the Russian Empire was already rotten. Half a year after this brilliant success, the monarchy collapsed. Without any outside influence. Russia became mired in chaos and soon dropped out of the world war. It fell not because its forces were few, but because its head was rotten. One knows where the rot begins...

In accordance with Lenin's dreams, plans and designs, the war turned from imperialist to civil.

In its spatial extent, the number of victims and destruction, and the ways in which it was fought, the Russian Civil War differed sharply from the First World War. For the countries of Central Europe, the First World War was a terrible disaster. In all countries, including Russia, as many as 10 million people died.

But the Russian Civil War overshadowed all this and put it on the back burner. After the Civil War, the people of Russia remember the First World War as a wonderfully peaceful time when everything was just fine. They were slaughtered in the war, but it was minor, almost zero casualties. If 10 million is divided up between all the belligerents, it's not clear there's any reason for this war to be remembered at all?

Civil wars are marked by extreme cruelty. In ordinary wars, the parties, when they tire of fighting, have the option of dispersing to their own lands. But in a civil war there is no way for the opponents to disperse. The land is one for all. So for one power to win, all other powers must be exterminated or thrown out of the country. In the course of the Civil War in Russia, everything that could be destroyed was destroyed and annihilated, from factories and bridges to families, schools and state power.

But if we consider the Russian Civil War not as an attempt at national suicide, but in terms of military science, we

we inevitably come to the conclusion: in its forms it was a giant step forward.

It so happens that in November 1918 all (except Russia) belligerents ended the war in a positional stalemate. On virtually the same lines where the armies had been entrenched in the autumn of 1914. From the experience of the First World War, a seemingly single and undeniable conclusion followed: the next war would also be a positional war, impossible to break through modern defenses. The generals of the First World War decided: they must prepare for a new positional war, a static, trench warfare. The experience is referred not to the rules but to the exceptions, and forgotten.

In a number of European countries, such as France, the experience of the First World War is recognised as the only correct one. From this experience the conclusion was drawn that "defence is stronger than offence". The whole preparation of the country for a future war was reduced to the maximum possible strengthening of positional defences along the frontiers.

But there was nothing like it on the expanses of the collapsed Russian Empire. No one recognized the experience of the First World War and canonized it. Simply because, as a consequence of the First World War, Russia experienced the utterly brutal Civil War, which was nothing like the First World War in its character and scope.

And if we are to speak of the attachment of the Red commanders to the old experience, we must speak of the experience of the Civil War, and in no case of the experience of the First World War.

3

Wars are positional and manoeuvre wars. Between these extremes there are innumerable different combinations, when manoeuvre actions change to positional ones, and vice versa.

The First World War is the most striking, idealised and utterly absurd example of positional warfare.

The civil war in Russia is the most dazzling counterexample. Where else can one find an example of a land war extending from Warsaw and Lvov to Omsk, Khabarovsk, Vladivostok and Nakhodka, from Arkhangelsk, Kotlas and Murmansk to Odessa and Kherson, from Riga and Pieter to Baku, Tashkent and Bukhara?

World War I was a stomping ground. The First World War generally did not affect the territory of the main participants in it: Russia, Germany, Austria, France, Britain. The fronts stabilized around the areas of state borders. There was practically no destruction in the rear areas. Millions of armies were tearing each other apart. And beyond the front line - normal peaceful life: factory chimneys smoking, locomotives whistling, shop windows on Nevsky Prospekt sparkling in lights, the Moulin Rouge - the Red Mill - flapping its wings on the Pigalle, and pretty girls stomping the cancan.

The symbol of the First World War, its essence and visual expression is the trench.

And the symbol of the Civil War is the machine-gun tachanka of Nestor Ivanovich Makhno, on the back of which with silver nails was inscribed the cheeky motto: "You will catch up with me, but another time!", on the front.
- "You'll get me, but another time!".

We have to admit: The Civil War was maneuverable not because ours were smarter than everyone. But because the country was the biggest in the world and the whole thing was turned into a field skirmish. It is impossible to cover such a country entirely with trenches. We don't have that many people. And since it is so, the defense could not have been dense. So the opponents have penetrated into rear, surrounded

are the nodes of resistance and the flanks. The civil war in Russia is a lack of solid fronts. It is the rapid maneuver of colossal mobile military masses. It is envelopment and encirclement, headlong marches to enemy flanks and rear.

There were trenches, there were trenches. But that is not the main thing. The main thing is open rear and flanks, both ours and the enemy's. The main thing is a swift sudden manoeuvre, a blow where the enemy least expects it.

The civil war in Russia has shown the way out of the positional impasse, has revived in all its beauty and splendour the secret of manoeuvres which was seemingly lost for good and for ever on the fields of the First World War.

4

As we have already made clear, prior to the advent of tanks (in quantities worthy of mention) only two types of troops were capable of independent ground combat - cavalry and infantry.

Infantry is versatile, but leans more towards the low-movement forms of warfare.

And cavalry is maneuvers and movement.

All other branches of the army, starting with the artillery, are very important, but they are not capable of waging war on their own.

Now we are not talking about war by sea and air. If we come down on the wrong ground, World War I was an infantry war. Not a word, with the massive involvement of artillery, sappers, binders, chemists, etc.

In this war the cavalry wasted its time in the rear and had no decisive influence on the course and outcome of the war.

And in the far more violent, destructive and bloody Civil War in Russia the decisive force was the cavalry. It naturally and inevitably gained in weight. Cavalry was most consistent with a war of manoeuvre. Cavalry formations and alliances grew and expanded. Small cavalry detachments were merged into squadrons, and these into cavalry regiments, brigades, divisions, and cavalry corps.

The crown of manoeuvre warfare became the creation of the corresponding instrument - the mounted armies. Let us forget that picture that the red propaganda painted for us: the Budyoni galloping and waving his sabre... Let us pay attention to something else: only movement brings victory. Sun Tzu said it, and Guderian repeated it two thousand years later.

There's your movement - the horse army! It is a mobile strategic mass, capable of appearing suddenly where it is not expected, capable of moving rapidly for hundreds of miles. Let us remember the regrouping of the 1st Cavalry Army from the area of

Maikop in the region of Uman. So that's 1200 kilometers. This is a strategic span.

And the fighting of mounted armies is not just a massacre with sabres, but a deep rushing manoeuvre, when the mass of troops affects the enemy not with fire, but with their movement.

Each mounted army possessed enormous firepower for those times. It was saturated and even oversaturated with machine guns. In addition, mounted armies had artillery, armoured vehicles, armoured trains, their own aviation and even tanks.

The combat composition of mounted armies was not constant. These armies were invariably in combat. Their numbers have increased and decreased. Usually in a cavalry army, besides the purely cavalry units and compounds, there were up to 50 guns, 30-40 armored cars, 10- 15 planes, from 3 to 7 armored trains, 200-400 machine guns, which were mounted not only on tachanks, but also on trucks and cars.

The mounted army is precisely the instrument which, not so long ago, Brusilov lacked. Had Brusilov in 1916 had either the 1st or the 2nd Cavalry Army (or both) at his disposal, the near-fatal blow to the German-Austro-Hungarian coalition could have become lethal. And then history would have taken a very different path...

But Tsar Nicholas did not care to set up massive mobile compounds, Brusilov broke the gate, but there was no one to enter through it.

With the creation of powerful mobile compounds was engaged comrade Stalin. The 1st Cavalry was his brainchild. Other people created this army, but without support in the higher echelons of power this idea could not have survived. Stalin appreciated the idea and supported it.

It is interesting that Tukhachevsky did not create anything like this and did not support such ideas. But the fact is that Tukhachevsky saw that powerful mobile formations played a major role in maneuver warfare, and he demanded: give me the 1st Cavalry! And I want to consider myself to some extent a commander in chief and win victories!

5

Zhukov had declared that the Red commanders were clinging to the experience of the First World War, that is, in the trenches and trenches. In the long years of wasting time in one position. In the positional forms of combat.

This is a vile slander against his own army, against his fighting comrades. For the spirit of manoeuvre warfare has dominated the Red Army from the first day of its birth... The mounted army can neither be associated with the First World War nor fit into it.

The mounted army is a manoeuvre. This is a blitzkrieg!

And why should the experience of the First World War have been placed above the experience of the Civil War?

What was Stalin like in the First World War? Did he spend a day or an hour in a trench? Well, exactly. And in the Civil War Comrade Stalin was a member of the RAF[1] of the Republic, a member of the RAF of the Southern, Western and Southwestern Fronts. Stalin held military leadership positions in both Tsaritsyn and Pieter, and advanced to Lvov. There were successes, victories, mistakes, failures, disasters. In a word: there has been experience. Well, which experience should Stalin have remembered: someone else's or his own? Which experience was closer to Stalin: the forgotten First World , in which he did not participate, which he
ended in the ignominious surrender of the country, or the unforgettable
the experience of spectacular victories and bitter defeats, the experience of the war which ended in victory over numerous enemies, which raised him to the heights of a single and unlimited power unprecedented in history?

For three years fate had been tossing Stalin around the fronts of the Civil War. He has advised and guided, shot and rewarded, demanded, proved, quarrelled not only with the commanders of the fronts, but also with Lenin, with Sklyansky, even with Trotsky. Well, which experience should Stalin use: the experience of that war in which he did not participate, or the experience of the Civil War in which he did participate?

Here is Stalin's attitude to the First World War: "Already during the war, the treason of the Tsarist War Minister Sukhomlinov, who turned out to be connected with German spies, was revealed. Sukhomlinov had been carrying out tasks set him by German intelligence - to sabotage the supply of shells to the front, to keep the guns from the front, to keep the guns from the front. Some tsarist ministers and generals had personally and quietly contributed to the success of the German army: together with the tsarina, who was connected with the Germans, they had given military secrets to the Germans. No wonder the Tsar's army suffered defeats and was forced to retreat."

These are lines from Comrade Stalin's brilliant creation, which came to light at the moment of the victorious finale of the Great Purification of 1937-1938 and became holy writ for every Bolshevik. The title of the book is "History of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks). A Short Course" *(M., OGIZ, 1938, 167-168)*. A step away from this canonical text was considered an escape. The convoy fired without warning.

Who would dare, after the Great Bloodletting, to even mention the First World War with a kind word and crow about the necessity to adhere to its experience, to study its lessons?

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[1] Revolutionary Military Council 1918-1934) - B.pr↕

6

And it was not only Stalin who categorically rejected the trench-trench attempt.

Chairman of the Defence Committee of the SNK[1] Voroshilov took no part in World War I, but in the Civil War he commanded a partisan detachment, a division, three armies in succession (5-A, 10-A and 14-A), the Ukrainian Front, and was a member of the Military Council of the 1st Cavalry Army. A mounted army was something that did not exist in the First World War.

In the First World War he was a private, in the Civil War - a private, a platoon commander, a commander of a machine-gun squadron, a regiment, a brigade. He finished the war as a division commander. And not an ordinary one, but a cavalry one in the mounted army. Could he have put the experience of the First World War above the experience of the Civil War?

The First Deputy Commissar of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union Budyoni, in World War I was a senior non-commissioned officer, a platoon commander. And in the Civil War, Budyonny had made his way: commander of a partisan detachment, of a regiment, of a brigade, of a division, of a corps, commander of an army. Moreover, he commanded not an ordinary army that rolled into the trenches, but one that with crushing maneuver solved not only operational, but sometimes strategic tasks. I repeat the question: which experience was dearer to Budyonny - the experience of commanding a cavalry platoon in the First World War, when cavalry under compulsion did nothing, or the experience of commanding the world's first mounted army since Genghis Khan, whose thundering hooves made the walls of European capitals tremble?

The Deputy Commissar of Defence, Marshal Kulik of the Soviet Union, was a platoon non-commissioned officer in the First World War and Chief of Artillery in the Civil War. And again, not of an ordinary army, but of the most mobile in the world.

The Deputy Chief of Defence Staff, Army Gen. A. Meretskov, in the First World War also did not rise higher than a non-commissioned officer, and in the Civil War was assistant chief of staff of a division.

Slightly differing from this line was the Deputy Commissar of Defence, Marshal of the Soviet Union B. M. Shaposhnikov. In the First World War - a tsarist colonel. But he, too, in the Civil War experienced an exciting take-off to the top: head of the intelligence department at the headquarters of the Supreme Military Council of the Republic. That Shaposhnikov did not canonize the experience of World War I anyone can see for himself by reading The Brain of the Army.

Well, who then in the leadership of the Defense Department was extolling the experience of World War I?

What about the General Staff? Check the biographies of Vatutin, Malandin, Golikov, Vasilevsky, Sokolovsky, read their works and memoirs. No hint of attachment to the WWI experience, either before or after the war.

You can check the commanders of both the border and interior districts. Same picture. In 1941, the Red Army command staff, even if they remembered the experience of WWI, it amounted to feeding the lice in the trenches, sluggish skirmishing and chaotic bayonet attacks. And in the maneuver Civil War they led companies, battalions, squadrons, regiments, divisions, and even corps and armies into great battles.

Who, then, of them canonized the experience of the First World War?

All the propaganda of the Soviet Union until 1941 was imbued with the spirit of the Civil War. Books, films, articles, poems, songs - everything was about it. We have already remembered the film
"Chapaev." And there were films about Kotovsky, Shchors, Frunze, Parkhomenko, besides about Voroshilov and Budyonsky and not much - about comrade Stalin. Even if they showed the First World War in films, they did it only in sombre tones. Military history textbooks have clearly divided the subject into two unequal parts - everything, starting with the Pharaohs, which was until ; the bulk - the Russian Civil War.

In the Soviet Union, World War I was subjected to devastating and vicious criticism: talentless Tsarist generals, chaotic carnage, etc., etc. Soviet military science took from World War I only those episodes for imitation and study which were exceptions to the general rule, which were in their nature contrary to the whole spirit of World War I. Among these episodes was the Brusilov breakthrough.

Brusilov himself has passed on this experience, has himself drawn conclusions from the mistakes and omissions. He had broken through the wall, but who should have broken through the breach? Brusilov's conclusion was: in a future war we must have powerful mobile formations that could push for a breakthrough and get into the operational space. If at the of the war there is an opportunity to invade the enemy's territory before he has managed to deploy his army and create a solid front, this opportunity should be seized, i.e., without much hanging about, to bring the whole force into battle at once.

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[1] Council of People's Commissars 1917-1946) - B.pr↑

7

Now let us turn to the "many executives the time in the Defense Commissariat and the General Staff" who, in Zhukov's words, canonized the experience of World War I. Who were they?

The top leadership of the Narcomat on Defence is the Narcom himself — Marshal of the Soviet Union S. K. Timoshenko, and his deputies. We have already spoken about the narc and his deputies. Let us move on.

The composition of the Defense Commissariat included: the General Staff, the seven General Directorates and the thirteen separate directorates.

NK Headquarters O[1]:

— on political propaganda;

— tanker truck;

— Artillery;

— AIR FORCE;

— AIR DEFENSE;

— military-engineering;

— Intendant.

But which of the leaders of these structures might have canonized the experience of the First World War?

The Chief of the Main Armoured Tank Department, Lieutenant General Ya. H. Fedorenko? It can't have been him. Simply because there were no tanks in Russia during the First World War. Accordingly, there was no experience of using tank troops. There was nothing to canonize.

And none of General Fedorenko's subordinates could have drawn on this non-existent experience. They had to invent something new and of their own. Whether they were right or wrong to invent it is another matter. But unequivocally it may have been something that did not fit the canons of the First World War.

Perhaps the Chief of the General Directorate of Air Defense, Colonel General of Artillery N. H. Voronov, canonized this experience?

And he isn't. Because he and his subordinates had nothing to canonize.

Surely Lt. Gen. Ф. Zhigaryov, the head of the Air Force General Staff, canonized him? But even he could hardly. For the Air Forces of 1914 and 1941 were as different as earth and sky. At the beginning of June 1941 Zhigaryov had 79 air divisions. And there hadn't been a single one in Russia for the entire First World War. So Zhigaryov and his subordinates could not have gone back to 1914 and looked there for answers to the problems that arose. There were no answers there. Aviation generals couldn't cling to that experience. There was nothing to cling to.

The Air Force of 1941 was at a very different stage of . As was the artillery. And the engineer troops were completely different, they were oriented to perform completely different tasks, their structure, armament and special equipment were sharply different from those in the First World War.

Even the General Intendant's Office under the NCO operated according to different principles and standards. The whole system of the Red Army's material, food, financial, and every other provision differed radically and fundamentally from the corresponding systems in the Russian army.

Only Army Commissioner 1st Rank A remains. И. Zaporozhets, head of the Main Department of Political Propaganda. But we do not suspect him of canonization at all. During the First World War, political propaganda in the Russian army was handled by the regimental sergeant. It urged its children to shed their blood for the faith, the Tsar and the fatherland. And comrade Zaporozhets firmly defended the precepts of Marx: the proletarians have no fatherland! Our fatherland is the whole world. And let anyone try to doubt the rightness of the only correct...

If we go down one step further, to the individual NCO commands, we see the same picture here: the head of the fuel supply management, Major General of the tank troops P. B. Kotov, could have canonized the experience of the First World , because in the First World War there was no system of

centralized supply of the army with hundreds of thousands of tons of fuel and lubricants.

And the head of the liaison department, Major General of the liaison troops N. И. Gapich, could not have canonized him, for the same reason.

Go on listing departments and departments - and I will tell you the result in advance.

In 1941, the leadership of the Red Army consisted of people who had risen and grown in the course of the Civil War. And if we are to accuse them of adherence to an old experience, we must speak of the experience of the Civil War. And in no case about that of World War I.

* * *

Zhukov's memoirs praise generals and marshals, doctors science and academics.

It follows that they:

— or not its imagine even approximately what World War I was;

— or haven't taken the time to familiarize themselves with the lauded masterpiece.

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[1] People's Commissariat for Defence - B.pr↑

CHAPTER 4
FOR THE UNWINDING

Poland ceased to exist after 17 days. The operation in Belgium and the Netherlands ended after 15 days. The operation in France, before its surrender, ended after 17 days. Three very characteristic figures, which cannot but lead me to accept them as some possible number in the calculation of our offensive operation.

Colonel-General of the Tank Forces D. Γ. Pavlov, Commander of the Western Special Military District

27 December 1940

"On the eve of war. Proceedings of the meeting of the highest of the leadership of the Red Army on December 23-31, 1940". M., Terra, 1993, p. 255.

1

In the early period of World War II, Germany thundered its opponents with deafening crushing blows.

The blitzkrieg is not just a quick war. It's a sparking blast of an overpowered electrical charge that instantly kills on the spot.

The whole of Central Europe was subdued and paralysed by just such crushing blows, when suddenly all the available fighting power of the vast army and air force was thrown into the fray.

During the first two years of World War II, the Soviet Union was left out of the great battle. Soviet generals and marshals watched from the sidelines. They witnessed Hitler thundering through Poland, Belgium, France, and other countries. They have all seen: Hitler seizing the countries one after the other, suddenly bringing all the forces into action at once. On the first day. In the first hour.

In 1939, 1940 and the first half of 1941, Soviet strategists had further opportunity to convince themselves: August 1914 was not repeating itself, Germany no longer intended to waste the most precious days and hours at the outset of the war, Germany struck a crushing death blow in the first minutes.

So the question is: did the Soviet generals in the first two years of World War II manage to understand how Hitler's army operated, or did they not?

The answer is given by the greatest commander of all times and nations, Marshal of the Soviet Union G. K. "When I visited the Academy of the General Staff, which was under my command, I could once again convince myself that on the eve of the war, in the military departments, in the literature, in the curricula and in the elaborations of the students, modern military theory was being presented, taking into account to a considerable extent the experience of the Second World War that had begun. Students were led to believe that in the present age wars are not declared, that the aggressor seeks to have on his side all the advantages of sudden attack. It was accepted as normal from the very beginning in the operation that the main forces of the

opposing adversaries with all the strategic and operational peculiarities arising therefrom" *("Vospominy i razmыulenie". M., APN, 1969, p. 215)*.

Zhukov states quite clearly and definitely that in 1941 everyone was aware: in the event of war, the main forces of the opposing sides would come into conflict from the first moment. No unwinding. No loss of precious hours and minutes in the initial period.

Under Zhukov's direct control, the Academy of the General Staff came under his control on 1 February 1941, at the time when he assumed the post of Chief of the General Staff. The passage in question therefore refers to the period between 1 February and 21 June 1941. Prior to this the Academy had not been subordinate to Zhukov. After 21 June it was not up to him to run the Academy.

But in that period of time it could have been about the war between Germany and the Soviet Union, not about some abstract clash between armies. At that time the Red Army had no other opponents in Europe. And war was not yet foreseen in Asia - divisions, corps and even whole armies were transferred from the Asian part of the country to the European part in the first half of 1941.

And so Zhukov himself understood perfectly well that the war between Germany and the Soviet Union would begin immediately after the clash of the major powers. Zhukov's subordinate leaders of the General Staff also understood this. And outside the confines of the General Staff this thought was clear to all. The professors in the academies understood this; they instilled this thought in the listeners of the lectures and practical classes. It was accepted as normal, nobody argued with it. Zhukov personally checked, supervised and firmly knew: on this issue there is complete clarity at all levels.

Yeah, but...

2

However, 9 pages into his "truest book on war", The Greatest Commander in Chief makes a sudden and equally decisive 180 degree turn. He changes his mind to the complete opposite: 'In revising the operational plans in the spring of 1941, practically no full account was taken of the new ways of warfare in the initial period. The Defense Commissariat and the General Staff thought that the war between such large countries as Germany and the Soviet Union could be started according to the previous scheme: the main forces would enter the battle a few days after the frontier fighting" *("Vospominy i ponyshlenii". M., APN, 1969, p. 224)*.

This is the usual Zhukovian doublethink. Marxist dialectic: Zhukov thinks both ways. And at the same time - neither one way nor the other.

On the one hand, it was absolutely to Zhukov himself, to the senior military leadership of the Red Army, and to everyone else, up to and including the teachers and listeners at the academies, that "from the very beginning the main forces of the opposing adversaries would enter."

On the other , the Defense Commissariat and the General Staff believed that

"the main forces enter the battle a few days after the border fighting".

On the one hand, "the military theory of those years was on the level of the times".

On the other hand, at the end of the second year of the Second World War, the Soviet strategists of the spring of 1941 did not understand the simplest things, which the generals of all armies had made clear to themselves in August 1914, in the first month of the First World War: do not waste the opportunity, fight to the death, you might lose!

Suppose that some villains had cut out everything "best" from Zhukov's memoirs. So be it. But did anyone force Zhukov to write on one page one thing, and after 9 pages - exactly

the opposite? Did any of the obscurantists require Zhukov to refute himself?

And don't tell me that after the great obscurantist's death they put this nonsense in his "most truthful book". It was all published in the first edition, during Zhukov's lifetime.

3

In the second edition of Reflections, the key phrase has disappeared: *'It was accepted as normal from the outset that the main forces of the opposing adversaries should be involved in the operation, with all the strategic and operational peculiarities that this entailed'*. The meaning has been changed to the opposite. It turns out that future strategists studied quite different scenarios: 'When I visited the General Staff Academy, which was under my command, I could once again see that on the eve of the war in the military departments, in the literature, in the curricula and in the elaborations of the students, modern military theory was being presented, taking into account to a considerable extent the experience of the Second World War which had begun. *The irreconcilability, the fierceness of the armed struggle, the possibility of its being prolonged and the necessity of mobilizing the efforts of the whole people were emphasized" ("Vospominy i reflections". M., APN, 1975. Vol. 1, p. 230. In the new sentence the italics are mine. C.)*.

From this text is dropped the thought that wars in the present age are not declared, that the aggressor seeks to have on his side all the advantages of a sudden attack, and that from the outset the main forces will be involved in the operation. Instead, it appears that academy students have been indoctrinated with the thought of the possibility of a protracted war.

This is a lie. Any reader can find a refutation in any edition of Zhukov's memoirs. And many refutations. Zhukov himself repeatedly says that the war was not expected to last long. In late December 1940, Stalin convened a meeting of the Red Army's senior command staff. Some materials of the council were declassified. Half a century later. Some would be declassified after another half century. And some will never be declassified because it was destroyed in October 1941.

But even what has been declassified is quite sufficient for a clear understanding of the mood that prevailed in the higher echelons of the Red Army command.

The colonel-general of tank troops D. Г. Pavlov, for example, believed that 15-17 days would be enough to defeat Germany. No one, including Zhukov, argued with Pavlov. Then what kind of unwinding was he talking about, since after two and a half weeks of rapid tank advances we were supposed to be out in the Rhine valley?

By the way, Comrade Stalin not only fully agreed with this, but also fully supported such an opinion. One month after the meeting Pavlov received the fifth star in the five-pointed star. At that time there were five marshals of the Soviet Union and three army generals in the Red Army. By honoring Apanasenko and Pavlov with the rank of army general, Stalin made them equal in rank to Zhukov and placed them in the top ten military leaders of the Red Army. This could only have been done if Stalin fully shared and approved of Pavlov's sentiment for the decisive and swift defeat of Germany in a fast-flowing crushing war.

And they all thought so: 'Perhaps we were all agreed on only one thing: if war broke out, it would be short and end in the complete defeat of the enemy. It was just the way we were brought up" *(Army Gen. И. Kazakov. "Above the map of former battles". M., Voenizdat, 1971, p. 6)*.

Lieutenant General of the Air Force L. V. Zholudev spoke to the

"the natural confidence of every Soviet soldier and patriot in a quick and decisive victory over the enemy." Along with the millions of Soviet soldiers and officers who were secretly being transported to the war in mid-June 1941, Zholudev heard of its beginning in a wagon:

"We must hurry so that we can at least take part in the final battles to defeat the enemy" *("Stalnaya eskadrilya". M., Voenizdat, 1972, p. 45)*.

Anyone can find as many such testimonies as he wants. But nowhere could anyone find traces of preparation for a prolonged war. Neither the newspapers, nor the radio, nor Stalin himself, either in open speeches or in top secret meetings

have not spoken of a prolonged war. Zhukov invented it after the war. Or the people who wrote the book on his behalf.

4

Let's turn to the history of this issue.

In the First World War, all the major belligerents missed absolutely priceless chances for a brilliant victory, for a swift, complete and crushing defeat of the enemy. War had been declared, neither side had a mobilized army. Front and covering troops clashed on the frontiers. And the main forces were not ready!

For the German army the road to Paris was open. The Germans could have bypassed the fortresses, and swept away the small shelters like they were nothing. The German army could have reached Paris in the first weeks of the war, if not in the first days, and taken it. The only problem was that the German army was not mobilized.

Mobilisation was carried out in record .

But it's still 17 days... And the French didn't sleep during those days either. And they have conducted a mobilization. And the German army was ready, but the situation was not the same. The situation was cardinally changed. The moment had been lost.

And the Russians had the same splendid chance, and the Austrians, and the French. All have had opportunities and all have failed to seize them.

The First World War - it was a short period of maneuver actions, after which all the armies of the European countries were stopped from mutual shelling. The armies buried themselves in the ground, and so they sat in their holes for four years, sending clouds of poison gas at each other, wearing each other down with furious but useless bayonet attacks, with avalanches of artillery fire. The First World War was a stalemate.

Back in the autumn of 1914, the generals of all the armies were shivering: ah, if on the first day of the war I had more troops at hand, I would have... Wow!

The first lesson of World War I has been learned by many: don't miss the moment! Never again allow yourself to be unwound in

the initial stage of the war! Make it so that on the first day of the future war the strategist has in his hands if not the entire mobilized army (this is an unattainable ideal), at least enough forces to guarantee the strategic initiative.

5

Beginning in the 1920s, the unfortunate experience of the early period of World War I was carefully studied by the Red Army leadership. Soviet theorists and practitioners of strategy have given paramount importance precisely to the very first days and hours of the coming war. Ah, next time we will not miss the moment!

Former Colonel of the General Staff of the Russian Army Boris Mikhailovich Shaposhnikov in the late 1920s published the book "The Brain of the Army." The main idea is stated in its third part: no unwinding! Not to waste the most eventful, the very first moments of the war! Mobilization to be divided into two parts. The first secret part to take place before the war. All the best in the country, even before hostilities commence, to be secretly, under cover of exercises and petty flank conflicts, called into the army, concentrated along the frontiers, and at the very first moment of the great war to strike the enemy with such force as will decide, or at least prejudge, the issue of the whole campaign. The cadre army deployed before the war must invade the enemy's territory, and these actions will be a cover for the general mobilization. Millions could then be called up and new divisions, corps, and armies could be brought into the fray according to their degree of readiness...

The whole pathos of the final part of The Brain of the Army is: to secretly mobilize the army and suddenly bring all its crushing power to bear. Shaposhnikov has rebelled against any attempt to waste precious seconds in the opening period.

Stalin appreciated Shaposhnikov's book. He fully shared his views. And this is confirmed by the entire development of the Red Army, especially starting from August 1939. Stalin had elevated Shaposhnikov to the very heights of military power, appointing him Chief of the General Staff and giving him the rank of Marshal of the Soviet . (After the Winter War in the

Finland, Stalin demoted Shaposhnikov to Deputy Chief of Defence for the Fortified Areas, but reinstated him as Chief of the General Staff as early as July 1941.)

Shaposhnikov was even above the other marshals. Stalin made Shaposhnikov a kind of personal adviser on the war. Both officially and in private, Stalin singled out Shaposhnikov and demonstrated his special respect for him.

Shaposhnikov's ideas were shared by all Soviet military theorists and practitioners. I emphasize: ALL. In World War I, the belligerents missed strategic opportunities so callously, the strategists' mistakes were so obvious, that it was impossible and foolish to argue with Shaposhnikov's ideas.

Triandafilov, Iserson, Krasilnikov, Melikov, Lapchinskii, Shilovskii, Ventsov and many other Soviet theorists of war preached the same ideas, refining them and complementing each other.

These ideas were openly published by the communist press:

"Particular importance in the outbreak of war is attached to strategic suddenness, to initiative in the opening of hostilities, which gives enormous operational advantages to the attacker... The outbreak of war is seen as a sudden attack by heavy bomber aircraft from the air on vital centres in the country, combined with the invasion of large motorized or mounted masses, supported by the action of light combat aviation. The strikes in a future war must spread over almost the entire territory of the hostile country" *("Pravda", May 20, 1932)*.

Sometimes such declarations were disguised with fig leaves - that's how our treacherous enemies are preparing to act. But even in this brief excerpt, there are moments that show that it is not the treacherous enemies that are at stake after all, but the honest and pure intentions of the Red Army.

Let's read the quote again. Who is he talking about here? After the First World War nobody in Europe had large horse masses. The exception was in the 1930s: Poland and the Soviet Union. But Poland drops out, since all the rest of the text in no way

can contact Poland. In Poland, for example, there was no heavy bomber aviation. Therefore, only the Red Army could have acted in this way.

Second, it is about the very first hours of military strikes to spread "almost over the entire territory of the hostile country". With all the power and perfidy of the enemy, he could by no means have extended his strikes over the whole of the Soviet Union. And the Soviet Union could.

Incidentally, much more often than not, such treatises have been published without any fig leaves:

"Our defense is the offense. The Red Army will not remain an hour on the frontiers, it will not trample on the spot, but like a steel avalanche will invade the territory of the warmongers... The enemy will not be able to cross the Soviet frontier... Our Red Army will overtake him... We will not wait for his blow, but ourselves with all the strength of our might will be the first to deal a crushing blow to the enemy" *("Krasnaya Zvezda", November 17, 1938)*.

And the books talk about the same, and the cinema. Here is the "red count" Alexei Tolstoy writing Stalin's favourite novel The Union of the Five: "... The law of history is the law of war. He who does not advance, striking deadly blows, perishes. He who waits to be attacked perishes. He who does not anticipate the enemy in the vastness of military design perishes... Even children know that after war drags revolution..."

For such stories, Comrade Stalin honoured the "Red Count" with the highest honour - to be his personal biographer.

Soviet newspapers were filled with such declarations.
Only such slogans were shouted from every platform.

Well, but this is propaganda...

Maybe the open press said one thing and the secret documents said another? Nothing like that. And in the secret ones it was the same. And in the top secret ones. From 1918 right up to 1941. And in the military academies that's what was taught. And only that. And in the Soviet headquarters only such plans were worked out.

Already on April 20, 1932 the USSR Revolutionary Military Council, after hearing the report of the Headquarters of the Red Army A. И. Egorov, the future Marshal of the Soviet , decreed that the mobilization be

carried out by invading the enemy's territory. The main idea of the report is: not to leave the enemy the opportunity to mobilize his army, to fight him when he has not yet prepared to fight, that is, to attack first.

And here is the official "Instruction on Deep Combat" issued in 1935: "Suddenness consists in the choice of time, techniques, and means of which permit a blow to be struck when the enemy is least prepared to meet it, and so paralyze his will to organized resistance. Suddenness is achieved: by anticipating the enemy in delivering a blow...".

In 1940, the book of co mbriga[1] G. C. Iserson "The new forms of struggle." The central idea of the book is:

"It is necessary that the effect of surprise should be so startling that the adversary should be deprived of the material opportunity to organize his defense. In other words, involvement in the war must take on the character of a stunning crushing blow."

In the same year, at the end of December, a meeting of the senior command staff of the Red Army was held. There they talked only of a sudden crushing offensive. For example, the Chief of Staff of the Baltic Special Military District, Lt. Gen. C. "These will be operations of the initial period, when the enemy's armies have not yet completed their concentration and are not ready for deployment. These are invasion operations to solve a whole series of special tasks... This is an impact with large air and perhaps mechanized forces while the enemy has not prepared for decisive action... Mechanized units will have to be used independently, even despite the presence of large engineering facilities, and they will solve the tasks of invading the enemy's territory" *("On the Eve of War. Materialy sovetschania vysshego rukovodyashchego sostava RKKA 23-31 grudnia 1940". M., Terra, 1993, 153-154)*.

The Chief of the General Department of the Red Army Air Force, Lieutenant General of aviation P. V. Richagov delivers the report "The air force in the offensive operation and in the fight for

dominance in the ". The basic idea: "The best way to defeat aviation on the ground is a simultaneous strike on a large number of airfields with a possible basing of the enemy's aviation" *("On Wartime. Materials of the meeting of the highest leadership of the RKKA 23-31 December 1940", pp. 177)*.

At the same time, a top-secret meeting of the fleet command staff is being held. A speech is given by the First Deputy Navy Admiral I. Isakov. In our history, only three people have received the title of Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union. Isakov was one of the three who was destined to receive this title a little later. His credo: " wins who overtakes... beats the enemy by trying to overtake him... by not considering himself bound by old doctrines and treaties" *(CVMA[2], f. 1, d. 40243, l. 44)*. This, by the way, is also related to the question of how Comrade Stalin, his marshals, generals and admirals intended to continue to observe the non-aggression pact with Germany.

Stalin himself spoke of the same. In April 1940, he convened in the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (b) the senior command staff and announced: there must be suddenness! These words are not propaganda. This is not for enemy ears. This is speaking it in his own circle, in an atmosphere of extreme secrecy. The materials of this meeting were declassified only after 59 years, and only because the Soviet Union rotted and collapsed.

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[1] Brigade Commander. - B.pr↥

[2] Central Naval Archives. - B.pr. ↥

6

Everything that our chiefs, generals, admirals and marshals have said in the top secret councils, I had already read as a child in the books of my favorite writer A. Tolstoy. Except that in the books of the 'red count' the words about a sudden attack were spoken by bad people who wanted to seize power over the whole world, and in the secret meetings these same words were spoken by our own, good Soviet people who wanted to seize power over the whole world.

In Pravda the revelations about a sudden attack, about the beginning of the war without its official announcement, are somewhat abstract, they apply to all countries in the world - that is to say, it is accepted all over the world. Look, in the secret documents it applied exclusively to the actions of the Red Army: the possibility of a sudden attack on us was ruled out, but our sudden attack on the enemy was considered the only option for the beginning of the soon and inevitable war.

Some historians are still waiting for the doors of the archives to open to them. And I advise them not to wait for that bright day - in the journal "War and Revolution, which has been published since the early 1920s, has ample material for a full understanding of the causes of the war, its course and outcome. For it is with us as with Hitler: everything contained in the secret directives of 1941 was shouted in advance by sonorous voices from every lantern and every roof, was written on every stoop, printed openly, reproduced in millions of copies, and thrown into the crowd of flying aeroplanes....

And here is the former deputy head of the KGB, Army Gen. "Every General Staff can and should develop various options for combat actions..." *("Krasnaya Zvezda", March 10, 2005)*.

Such a statement, Citizen Chief, would be very persuasive. Provided...

In the Soviet Union there were such "different variants". For example, if a plan was developed for the defense of the country. If on the night of June 22, 1941 it was put into action. If on June 22 the Red Army had met the enemy roughly as it met the German advance on the Kursk arc two years later.

Only then, Citizen Chief, could you say: plans were developed to reflect the aggression, and besides them, there were "a variety of options for combat actions" just in case.

But in the Soviet Union there was no diversity. Just in case, only a detailed plan was developed to crush Europe. And look, no one has been able to find any other plans.

Now, Citizen General, flip through Zhukov's memoirs, all 13 editions, and try to find anywhere that it mentions that on June 22, 1941, Zhukov asked Stalin for permission to put the war plan into action.

There is no such thing. Dig, you will not find!

Try to find somewhere to mention that Zhukov issued orders to commanders from all degrees to open "Red packets".

And there is no such thing.

There was nothing to put into action - there were no "a variety of combat options" in the command safes. Zhukov knew this, which is why he didn't ask Stalin for permission to put pre-developed plans into action.

7

Zhukov stated that all the senior military leaders of the Red Army (except him) were idiots. After two years of World War II, they had failed to take into account even the experience of the initial period of World War I. That's a generous gift to the high minded foreign compilers. They have appreciated this on its merits and have written on the covers of Zhukov's masterpiece: the greatest document of the age!

From Zhukov's creation it appears that the Russian idiots did not understand in 1941 what was clear to everyone in August 1914. This revelation of Zhukov is repeated by Western fast writers with a feeling of deep satisfaction. They are delighted: there you see how stupid Stalin's strategists were. It is clear that they did not plan any invasion! Where do you at such backwardness! They didn't fight for anything! What invasion of yours, since the Red Army clung to outdated views just as a blind man clings to a wall!

And the paid friends abroad howl, howl: if Zhukov himself declares that the Russians did not fight them for anything, then that is how it was. Their foolish strategists thought that the war against Germany would be fought according to the same scheme as the First World War. They were in thrall to outdated concepts, views and ideas.

The whole is laughing at us. In 1914 time was lost not because the generals were stupid. They just didn't have enough troops on hand. But didn't things stand differently in 1941. Germany's army was fully mobilized and its rearguards were deployed. The Soviet General Staff knew this. Did these Russian fools, the Western reader wonders, think that the fully mobilized and deployed German army would strike first with the little finger, then with the forefinger, then with the whole palm of the hand on the cheek?

Behold, it is in this light that Zhukov paints the Soviet leadership: there were only fools in the leadership who believed that not all German divisions would strike with their armored fist, but as a start they would drop one platoon per division. And then by company...

But wasn't the Red Army of '41 also a force.

The best study of the Russian army in the First World War is, in my opinion, by Gen. H. Golovin, Russia's War Effort in the World War *(Paris, TOI, 1939)*. According to him, in the autumn of 1914 the number of the Russian army after the completion of mobilization reached 4.7 million soldiers and officers.

And Stalin, who had virtually the same population size as Tsar Nicholas, had 5.7 million fighters and commanders armed on June 21, 1941 BEFORE official mobilization began *("Krasnaya Zvezda," June 20, 2000)*.

These are the official numbers. And that's without counting the NKVD troops and NKGB[1]. In reality there were more soldiers in Stalin's army.

The gigantic masses of Soviet troops were maximally stationed near the borders. We have already seen this from the Brest example. Anyone can collect many such examples for themselves.

And here are the foreigners reading Zhukov. They wonder how naive these Russians are. So they only had three divisions in Brest, including a tank division. Did they really think that at the beginning of the war 10-15 men from each division would be fighting, and the rest would be sunbathing?

But this is exactly how Zhukov portrays us.

In August 1914, military aviation played no role: he who dominated the air dominated the ground. In the first two years of World War II, Germany had defeated Poland, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Norway, France, Greece, Yugoslavia, and the British forces on the Continent. And everywhere the same scenario was repeated: a sudden strike on the airfields.

And Zhukov paints this picture for us: in the Defense Commissariat and in the General Staff sat fools who thought that at first a German plane would come, bomb and fly away. Then - two. The next day - five. And only after a few days would the main air force come into action.

As usual, Zhukov himself remains aloof. He does not tell about his views on the beginning of the war. Look, the marshals and generals surrounding Zhukov, if his fabrications are to be believed, imagined the beginning of the war in this way.

* * *

The well-fed foreign supporters of this find it very pleasing to admire themselves amid our stupidity. They are especially delighted that the strategic underdevelopment of the Red Army is being recognized by the Greatest of the Great Strategists of all times and nations.

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[1] People's Commissariat for State Security - B.pr↥

CHAPTER 5
ON PERSONAL LIABILITY

Strategic planning, the organization of the management of the troops, is primarily the responsibility of the General Staff, its chief, but now no one likes to think about that. Now, of course, it is easy to dump everything on Stalin, Timoshenko, Budyonin and Voroshilov.

Admiral of the Navy of the Soviet Union N. Г. Kuznetsov

"Krasnaya Zvezda, 24 July 2004

1

We should pay attention to the following.

Zhukov was told that in the Red Army the problem of the initial period of the war was correctly understood. In doing so, he has emphasized that he personally understood the matter correctly, and he personally made sure that not the generals and officers of the General Staff understood everything correctly, but also that the future generation of strategists was on the right track. Zhukov had personally visited the Academy of the General Staff, he had the opportunity to see for himself that everything was fine there too. The professors and lecturers are second to none; they are teaching the future generation of General Staff officers and generals, bearing in mind the most recent experience of the blazing Second World War.

After a few pages Zhukov has changed his mind to the opposite. He told of the extreme misunderstanding of the same problem on the part of our strategists. And here we are talking not about teachers and listeners in the academies, but about the top military leaders in the Defense Commissariat and the General Staff, those who were reworking the war plans - it was they who had not made the simplest principles clear. They have not mastered the most elementary things.

Zhukov has demonstrated to the whole world the terrible underdevelopment of Soviet military science and military art... "... In the revision of the operational plans in the spring of 1941 practically no was taken...". Some unknown types with no names, ranks or titles in the spring of 1941 revised the plans of the General Staff... These disembodied idiots did not take into account the most important thing... These cretins thought that the war would begin with mutual insults, then in the middle of the field the Agarian youth and our bogatyr Peresvet would meet, then - ten against ten, a hundred against a hundred, and only then, after two weeks, or even after a second month, the main forces would gradually join the fighting.

"The Defense Department and the General Staff thought...".

Abe we don't care what the inanimate narcomat and the equally inanimate General Staff thought. Who exactly was reworking these plans? Give details!

But there is nothing definite in Zhukov's text. Zhukov is swinging like a gergine in a thermals: neither this way nor that. The plans were being revised in the spring of 1941. Zhukov was Chief of the General Staff at that time. Why didn't he confess: I didn't understand anything, I didn't foresee, I didn't think of, I didn't follow up, I didn't take into account. But there is no such thing. Someone is to blame, but only not the Chief of the General Staff, whose main duty is to develop the plans of the war.

2

There are thousands of people in the General Staff. And just as many opinions and ways of thinking. Even more. Because one person can have different opinions on an issue. These opinions are discussed, refined, crystallized into some ideas, plans and thoughts. The Chief of the General Staff listens to the advice and opinions of his subordinates
— heads of departments, directorates and divisions. Some advice and opinions he rejects and rejects, others he accepts in part or in full.

But the Chief of the General Staff cannot and should not differ from the opinion of the General . He has no right to : those idiots in the General Staff understood nothing.

The General Staff cannot believe one thing and the Chief of the General Staff another. If such a thing has happened, the Chief of the General Staff must either acquiesce in and recognize the superiority of the collective wisdom of the Army Brain, or he is obliged to impose his will upon it, to expose the bearers of wrong opinions and tendencies, to defeat them theoretically, and to throw them out of high offices so that they may not interfere with the work.

Either you lead the collective, direct its work and are fully responsible for the results, or you leave this job, not take someone else's place.

Let's mentally shrink the situation a thousand times. For example: a young lieutenant prepares his platoon for combat. There could be two situations here:

— he assessed the situation, made a decision and issued an order, so the platoon fought in accordance with that order;

— or war-baked sergeants have told the boy with the yellow mouth that you can't fight the way you were taught in school - you'll kill the platoon, you won't complete the task, you'll face a tribunal... if you come back alive from the battle.

The lieutenant can choose:

— or knows his own;

— or, having thought a little, agrees with his more experienced subordinates.

He does not put the leadership in their hands. In any case. He simply listens to their opinion, evaluates it, agrees with it, and commands the unit entrusted to him in his own name. And there is nothing wrong with that. Because that's how it should be done: don't speak your mind before you've listened to your subordinates. And after you have listened to them, weighed them up and assessed the wisdom of your subordinates, announce: you and I think alike - that is what I wanted to propose.

But there cannot be a situation where the foolish platoon fights according to its own plans and the wise lieutenant fights according to his own. And after the defeat, on top of that, to make fun of his sergeants: what fools.

And this is how the Chief of General Staff G. K. Zhukov: some idiots, whom he led, did not understand the essence of the war and made wrong plans...

The stupid General Staff, without rudder and sails, created idiotic plans, while the super-wise Chief of the General Staff lived apart, that and sneered, did not approve of their stupid fuss and did not interfere with it.

Now let's go to another level. Let us imagine that the chief designer of bombers, for example Andrei Nikolaevich Tupolev, after a crash announced: well, I understood everything, but in my design bureau some types with unidentified names have come, they do not understand a thing about aerodynamics, engines, or control systems, so they have done these
— this is the reason.

Question: and where were you looking?

It is clear that Andrei Nikolayevich Tupolev never stooped to such a , never went to such stupidity. The plane was his and he was personally responsible for all the crashes and takeoffs. The glory and the disgrace, the great honors and the terrible revilings are for him.

And with Zhukov - please: someone there in the General Staff had made bad plans.

3

Only a few of the thousand General Staff officers are allowed to develop the most important plans. In 1941, the most important documents of the General Staff were written by the hand of Maj. Gen. Ф. Anisov and A. M. Vasilevsky. There were no typists, stenographers, draftsmen, or cipherers around.

Besides the two contractors, these plans were accessed by Lt. Gen. К. N. Ф. Vatutin - First Deputy Chief of the General Staff, and Zhukov himself - as Chief of the General Staff. That is all. The Magnificent Five. As many as the fingers of one hand. All the work is conducted under the personal leadership of Zhukov. He is the chief designer.

Zhukov brought Vatutin and Malandin with him personally to the General Staff, and Vasilevsky and Anisov could have been replaced at any moment by other generals or colonels, by people who, in Zhukov's opinion, could cope with the task at hand.

In the most responsible cases, in the development of the most important strategic plans from the chain of command fell Lieutenant Generals Vatutin and Malandin. The circle of the initiated was narrowed to two people. Executive Anisov - head Zhukov. Executor Vasilevsky - head Zhukov.

And if the contractors and Bukel didn't understand, why didn't the genius leader replace them with people who understood? Let's say, among the professors or even listeners of the Academy under the General Staff, where, according to Zhukov's statement, absolute clarity reigned on the questions of the nature of the initial period of the future war.

And Vasilevsky and Anisov, if they did not understand the essence of modern warfare, should have sent a certain alma mater decisively.

To gather savvy.

4

When it comes to victories, according to Zhukov, two personalities create the plans.

.

And Wasilewski.

They stand over the map, discussing. But mostly he does everything, even without Vasilevskiy. He glances at the map, anticipates the enemy's insidious designs, and presents the finished plan. And no thousands of generals and officers took part in this work. No departments, directions and commands.

And in the first half of 1941, it was something else: the Defense Commissariat and the General Staff were thinking wrong...

Now let us once again recall Zhukov's accounts of the strategic games on the maps in January 1941. Zhukov, according to his accounts, fought for the Germans and struck the main blows without any uncoiling. On the eighth day of Zhukov's operation on the maps, guessing the designs of Hitler and his generals, defeating several armies of the First Strategic Echelon of the Red Army, he went out at Baranovichi to the rear of the Western Front. Had the strategic game's leadership not artificially slowed the pace of his unstoppable advance, Zhukov would have defeated the Western Front even faster.

Let us believe the story: the Grand Strategist had foreseen quite clearly that in the first hours and minutes of the war the Germans would bring their main forces into battle. And it was Stalin, admiring Zhukov's talent, who elevated the Grand Strategist to the post of Chief of the General Staff with the task of preparing the plans for repelling the aggression that Zhukov had guessed in advance with all its details. From this account it follows inexorably that Zhukov not only understood everything correctly, but also managed to convince Stalin: at the beginning of the war there would be no unwinding, the Germans would overrun the Western Front in a few days.

And here's your situation:

— Zhukov (if we believe him) clearly understood that the German army would strike the main blow at once with all its might without any overture;

— Zhukov has perfectly accurately determined the direction of the main blow of the Germans;

— Zhukov's ally and patron was Stalin himself;

— his superior was his old battle comrade Marshal Timoshenko, with whom they had no disagreements;

— his assistants were people he chose personally;

— Outsiders, even with the titles of Marshal of the Soviet Union and deputy to the Commissar of Defence, were not allowed to develop the plans for the war, i.e. they could not interfere with the fruitful work of the Grand Strategist.

And here's the thing, after all that, there were no plans in the General Staff for the defense of the country. None. And in the lower headquarters - neither.

And the blame for this lies with some unnamed types who have stupidly canonized the experience of the First World War, who expected sluggish action from the Germans in the initial period of the war, who did not have Stalin's support, were not allowed to develop the plans for the war.

5

The meanness of Zhukov's memoirs hardens with the years.

Forgive me, but I am compelled to reiterate what I wrote in the first edition:

"In the revision of operational plans in the spring of 1941, practically no full account was taken of the new ways of warfare in the initial period. The Defense Commissariat and the General Staff thought that the war between such large countries as Germany and the Soviet Union could begin according to the previous scheme: the main forces would enter the fray a few days after the frontier fighting" *("Vospominy i ponyshlenii". M., APN, 1969, p. 224)*.

And here's what happened in the second one and the ones that followed. Read carefully:

"In the revision of operational plans in the spring of 1941, practically no full account was taken of the new ways of warfare in the initial period. The Narkom on Defense and the General Staff thought that the war between such large countries as Germany and the Soviet Union could begin according to the previous scheme: the main forces enter the battle a few days after the frontier fighting" *("Vospominy i reflections". M., APN, 1975. Vol. 1, p. 319)*.

Compare! Did you feel the difference!? Did you appreciate it!?

The devil is in the details! Pay attention to the little things! Watch your hands! Don't miss the devil! The text of the second passage has been cardinally revised! Two letters have been taken out!

It was the Narcomat on Defence, i.e. the structure of many thousands.

It has become: the Narcomat of Defence, i.e. one man.

If Zhukov had had even a vague notion of honour, he would have written: 'I confess, I understood nothing of strategy, so in revising the plans in the spring of 1941 I exposed myself.' But honesty was not on Zhukov's list of virtues, so in the first edition the blame for the complete lack of plans was

was divided fraternally between two structures. The culprits included two huge collectives - the Defence Commissariat and the General Staff. No personalities named. No personal elephants handed out.

But as early as the second edition, the guilty parties are:

— of the entire Narkomat of Defence, only one particular person was to blame - the Narkomat of Defence, i.e. the Marshal of the Soviet Union S. K. Timoshenko;

— and no specific culprits have been found in the General Staff - everyone is guilty.

In the Defense Commissariat, Marshal Timoshenko bears personal and individual responsibility; in the General Staff under Army General Zhukov, responsibility is collective and impersonal.

In this apportionment of blame, the Genius Strategist left no room for himself.

6

The lack of plans for the defence of the country is not an oversight, nor an oversight. It is a particularly serious state crime. It is treason against one's own army, one's own people, one's own country, one's military duty and oath. It is treason.

And here is the Grand Strategist pointing a dirty finger at his commander, his battle comrades personally the Defence Narkom is to blame for everything! Hold him personally responsible! And with me in the General Staff, everyone is responsible, including the draftsmen, the ciphers, the typists, the guards, the firemen and the cleaners.

The villainy is that the Defence Narkom has a colossal range of responsibilities, from the parterns in the divisions in the Far East to the development and acceptance for issue of the latest weapons, from the discipline of officer staff in the Siberian garrisons to the ordering of a new range of munitions to industry, from the political education of the senior command staff of the mountain-cavalry divisions to the provision of housing for military pensioners, from the financial report of the last quarter to the forward-looking plans for the development of the armed forces.

He is also in charge of plans for the war. But this is one of his many duties.

And the Chief of the General Staff primarily responsible for them - for the plans. He prepares them for the defense secretary. And if the defense narcom is guilty, let him write for himself. And let the Chief of the General Staff be responsible for himself.

* * *

If Zhukov was an honest man, he as Chief of the General Staff should have personally taken the blame for the lack of plans for the defense of the country, and therefore the blame for the defeat of the Red

Army in the summer of 1941 and for the defeat of the Soviet Union in World War II.

If Zhukov had been a petty third-rate scoundrel, he would have shared the responsibility: it was my fault and the fault of the defense narcom...

If Zhukov had been a second-rate scoundrel, he would have pushed ahead of himself: it's not both of us to blame, it's him and to some extent me.

If Zhukov had been a first-rate scoundrel, then (as in the first edition of his memoirs) he would have shirked personal responsibility and hidden behind the vast collectives of the Defense Commissariat and the General Staff: they stupidly understood nothing...

But starting with the second edition, Zhukov's endless insolence and meanness oozes from the pages. In the Defense Commissariat he admits no collective responsibility. One particular man is to blame - Marshal Timoshenko. And in the General Staff it is the fault of some obscure fuzzy person who has neither name, nor rank, nor anything to do with the Greatest Commander-in-Chief of All Times and Nations.

Everyone is to blame for the lack of plans for the war.

Except the chief planner.

CHAPTER 6
SOCIALISM IN A COUNTRY?

The USSR lives in a capitalist environment. The clash between the world of socialism and the world of capitalism is inevitable... Leninism teaches that a country of socialism, taking advantage of a favourable international situation, is obliged and will have to take the initiative in offensive military action against the capitalist surroundings in order to extend the front of socialism... Under these conditions the Leninist slogan
"on foreign soil to defend our own soil" can at any moment be translated into practical action.

Directive of the General Department of Political Propaganda of the Red Army of 15 May 1941

(RCIDNY[1], f. 88. o. 1., d. 898. l. 21)

The world of socialism has scattered its metastases all over the world, gifting the USSR with decades of grueling "donorism." The last thirty years of Soviet rule represent, in fact, a classic embodiment of the "frozen shit" policy - support and preservation of an unviable system at the expense of a monstrous waste of Russia's national wealth.

"Literaturnaya Gazeta"
20 November 1996

1

Under capitalism, man exploits man. And under
socialism it is the other way around.

For thousands of years people have dreamed of equality, brotherhood and happiness. But the attempts to realise these dreams have always ended in ruin, in general confusion and debauchery, in mob violence, in rivers of blood, in the triumph of the wicked.

In 1917, Russia took up the search for the paths to universal happiness.

The problem is that on this road, like on an icy height, it is impossible to stop. You fly to the end. To universal happiness.

The leaders of the socialist coup, Lenin and Trotsky, understood quite clearly, quite definitely and categorically, that it was impossible to build a happy life in a single country. Building universal happiness is only possible on a global scale. The socialist state must either perish or make the whole world take the socialist road.

Irrefutable logic: once the workers and peasants have taken power in a country, once they enjoy a happy life in their country, it becomes an example for the workers and peasants of the rest of the world. They too will try to overthrow the power of capital in their countries. But the bourgeoisie will not for the world be willing to part with their power, to give up their palaces and their prized treasures.

In order to prevent revolutions in their own countries, the bourgeoisie will be forced to destroy the Soviet Republic, the first islet of workers' happiness in a world ocean of sorrow and tears.

"The existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with the imperialist countries for a long time is unthinkable. In the end either one or the other will win" *(V. Lenin.*
"Eighth Congress of the RCP(b). Protocols". M., 1959, pp. 17).

Both Lenin and Trotsky saw the way to save Soviet Russia only in a World Revolution: if socialism spread

all over the world, workers and peasants all over the world will no longer have enemies, then no one will encroach on their freedom, on their better destiny.

This is why both Lenin and Trotsky made repeated attempts to foment revolutionary wars in both Europe and Asia. They created the Comintern, the headquarters of the World Revolution. They believed that war between Soviet Russia and the rest of the world was absolutely inevitable, they prepared for this war, they fomented it and they fanned it.

Some leaders of the revolution never recovered from the revolutionary romance. In the heads of other leaders this romance evaporated too quickly. And others have never suffered from this disease. They have only pretended.

But the first, the second and the third faced the same problem: socialism cannot exist in a country for long. And in a group of countries - neither. They had to somehow spread it all over the world.

There were many reasons for this.

One of them: in a normal country, the economy is driven by fierce competition. Only those who are able to produce the best goods in any quantities required at the lowest prices survive. That is why every factory owner is forced to halt the production of very nice irons and pots, trousers and suspenders, cars and tractors that has just come on stream, and instead organise the production of goods of even higher quality. Whoever is one day late is finished. Moreover, every owner of a factory or a factory is forced to fight not only against his competitor in the next town, but also against the one who implements his thing there on the island of Hokkaido, and against the one who sets up his thing in his new factory on the outskirts of Milan.

And in a socialist state the whole economy is under the control of the state, i.e. under the control of the government, i.e. under the control of government officials, i.e. under the control of the bureaucracy. In such a state of affairs, there can in principle be no competition. And nobody is needed here.

If there is not a fierce struggle within the country for constant renewal, for the quality of , for the reduction of

, then the goods "Made in DDR" and "Made in USSR" do not excite international market either. Then the socialist state has to sell either resources or its poor and shabby production at a loss to itself.

And more: the owner of the plant risks his money, his plant. One mistake or just bad luck (a world crisis or natural disaster, for example) - and you're out of business to make room for smarter, more practical, more resourceful people or just people with more luck. No one wants any explanations and accepts none.

In socialism the bureaucrat does not risk his money. Everything belongs to the state, i.e. to no one in particular. The bureaucrat may be criticized for a wrong decision, or may be forgiven without noticing the mistake. Or they may try not to notice it. The important thing is to be accountable to superiors. The wrong decision may be presented as the right one or even the only possible one. Superiors will also be held accountable for the mistakes of lower superiors. Well, then it is to their advantage, the superiors, not to notice the mistakes of the inferiors. And if they notice them, to cover them up.

If we produce goods that cannot even measure up to world standards in quality and sell them at a loss, then we cannot provide a high standard of living for our workers. And then the working class in the socialist state begins to pay attention to how the unfortunate oppressed proletarians live in decaying capitalism. Very soon they are surprised to discover strange things and start asking irrelevant questions...

What is the poor rural artisan to do if he can only produce expensive junk, but is unable to rise to the level of the neighbor who works well, quickly and cheaply?

There are two ways out here.

The first: to declare bankruptcy and try to learn a new profession, be it a pig farmer.

The second: to somehow harm the neighbour so that his production becomes just as bad and expensive. In the extreme case - to set fire to the competitor's workshop. It is not bad to knock him out in the woods and quietly chop him down with a hatchet.

What to do the wise leaders of the great state who created the unviable economic system of socialism? What are they to do if their economy cannot with the developed countries, if it is unable to provide the population with an acceptable standard of living?

The chiefs have two exits.

The first: to admit their way is wrong, to declare bankruptcy. And become pig farmers.

The second time...

The only problem is that the whole world is a competitor.

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[1] Russian Centre for Preservation and Study of Documents of Recent History. ↥

2

There are call girls. There are
boys on call.

And there are academics on call. Academics with mild manners. They ply their trade in the area of the Alexander Garden and Lubyanka Square. This is one of the breeds of Kremlin minions.

And here the academics on the call amicably agree that Lenin and Trotsky were fanatics of the World Revolution. Not just theorists, but practitioners.

This is , add, but in the early 1920s Stalin seized power in Soviet Russia. He concentrated vast power in his hands. Stalin had given up the idea of a World Revolution. He was building socialism in one country... Therefore, he was not going to attack anyone.

Sounds convincing.

For those who have not read Stalin.

But one can think without reading Stalin that the argument for socialism in a country is lame. Stalin did build socialism in one country. And he did build socialism in the early 1930s. Stalin fulfilled that point of the program. But what did he intend to do next? That's where the question is.

Here I object that there was no socialism in the Soviet Union. There was total power of the bureaucracy and the secret police. There were concentration camps. Mass extermination of people. Locked borders. Hordes of informers. Famine. Shortages of everything. Five-kilometre queues. Is this socialism?

This is socialism.

Real.

Socialism - if we follow Comrade Marx - means equality. Marx pointed the way to equality clearly and distinctly: the destruction of private property.

Stalin continued the great work of Marx-Lenin-Trotsky, he destroyed private property. He has made all property

communal. He put it under the control of the state. That is - under the control of state structures. That is - under the control of bureaucrats. That is - under the bureaucracy.

And the five-kilometre queues are a direct consequence of the bureaucratic (i.e. socialist) method of managing the economy. And concentration camps are an inevitable consequence of the same causes. Where, pray tell, are we to put those worthless little men who speak out against the arbitrariness of bureaucrats, i.e. against state management of the economy, i.e. against socialism, against justice and equality?

We will re-educate them. With hard work. That's what the camps were called - correctional labor camps.

By the way, Marx did not promise the people a life without the domination of the bureaucracy, without shootings, hunger, cold and queues. Read his writings. Look for such promises. Dig, you will not find! He promised concentration camps. And he has strongly recommended them. Stalin followed the testaments of Marx and Lenin. Having secured a happy life for the peoples of his country, he looked ahead. The main thing for him : how to preserve the acquired freedom and happiness received?

Here is Stalin's plan: 'The project raises, instead of the slogan of a United States of Europe, the slogan of a federation of the Soviet republics in the developed countries and colonies which, in their struggle for world socialism, have fallen away and are falling away from the imperialist system and are opposed to the capitalist system' *(Speech to a meeting of the party activists of the Leningrad organisation of the All-Union Communist Party (B), 13 July 1928)*.

3

For Stalin, Europe alone was not enough. He needs socialism on a global scale. The road to happiness is direct: you break away from the capitalist system both the developed countries (not only European) and the colonies, you set them on the road to socialism and unite them in a federation that will fight for victory on a world scale.

Here I am forced to think again of the academics on call and their explanations of the causes of the Second World War. The academics in question refer us to a phrase in Hitler's book, from which it follows that he was terribly keen to steal land from the East.

Such a phrase is indeed in Hitler's book. But let's ask the highbrows: have you read Marx by any chance? What about Lenin and Trotsky? What about Bukharin and Frunze? What about Sklyansky and Zinoviev? It would not be a bad idea to get acquainted with the works of Comrade Stalin.

And what was Hitler like in the , when he composed
"Mein Kampf"? Who knew him? Who then could have guaranteed that one day he would come to power?

And Stalin was already in the mid-1920s the dictator of a huge country. Under Stalin's control were untold resources, incalculable riches, a fully militarised country, an industry geared only to arms production, 170 million slaves. In addition, Stalin had the Comintern, an international organization of venal scoundrels and rogues, ready to act against the interests of their own countries and peoples at the behest of the Kremlin, conducting subversive work against every country in the world.

And Stalin's above statement was nothing other than an explanation to his subjects of the Comintern's fighting program and its ultimate goal - the establishment of power over the whole world.

Let's agree: the dream of lands in the East is one thing, the whole world is another. The scale is another.

The prisoner Hitler dreamed of lands in the East while he was rubbing the peoples, having absolutely no means to translate his dreams into life.

And the main goal of the communists to subjugate the whole world was stated by the absolute dictator of the Soviet Union, who had under his power the people, the industry, the inexhaustible resources, the army of the great country and the many thousands of subversive agents in all other countries of the world.

We are not going to argue whether Stalin had the ability to bring Europe, Asia and the whole world into the path of socialism. What is the use of our arguing? The important thing is that Stalin himself believed in this possibility. The important thing is that he completely and categorically subordinated the national interests of his country to international interests.

4

Stalin had spoken of the need to build socialism on a global scale as early as 1917, when Ephraimite Hitler could not have dreamed of any lands in the East. Back then Hitler was bicycling supplies from the rear to the front and back, and Stalin was a member of the government of Soviet Russia.

Well, maybe Stalin then changed his attitude towards the World Revolution?

No. He didn't change it. Right up to his death he remained true to the ideals of socialism.

But right now we are interested in the run-up to World War II. Open Stalin's volumes, read his speeches of that period. Stalin insistently repeated in all his writings, speeches and speeches the main thought: the complete victory of socialism in one country is possible! The Soviet Union is a shining example of this. In the Soviet Union, socialism was completely built.

But complete victory is not yet final victory. We are surrounded by enemies who will surely try by force of arms to destroy our most progressive system in the world.

"The final victory of socialism in the sense of a complete guarantee against the restoration of bourgeois relations is possible only on an international scale" *(Y. Stalin. Pravda, February 14, 1938)*.

That Stalin did not retreat a single step from the ideas of Marx and Lenin must be judged by his deeds.

Since 1918, Stalin, as one of the leaders of Soviet Russia, had taken an active part in attempts to establish socialist regimes in Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia, Finland, Germany, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Austria, Italy, Mongolia, Argentina and other countries.

In 1924, over Lenin's coffin, Stalin made a solemn vow to expand the Soviet Union. And he kept his word.

In the second half of the 1930s, after becoming the full master of the Soviet Union, Stalin tried to impose socialism on Spain.

In 1939, Stalin used force for the second time to try to steer Finland on the path of socialism.

In 1940 he brought Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Moldavia, Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia, Northern Bukovina into this path. He insisted that Bulgaria, the Danish straits leading out of the North Sea, the Black Sea straits of Bosphorus and Dardanelles, bases in the Persian Gulf, the territories south of Baku-Batumi, i.e. Eastern Turkey, Northern Iran and Iraq, be placed under his control.

In August 1941, Stalin took half of Iran under his control.

Hitler disrupts Stalin's plans. But as soon as he repulsed the attack, Stalin began to turn with renewed vigour
"liberated" countries to the path of socialism.

In 1944 - Bulgaria.

Then - Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia, Albania, East Germany...

And it would have continued. Except the Americans got a bomb. That alone stopped the Red Army's victory march.

There was also an "Iranian Azerbaijan". And here only the presence of a nuclear bomb has saved millions of people from a happy collective farm life.

Despite the bomb, Comrade Stalin puts CHINA in the path of socialist development! This is no joke job. That and North Korea and North Vietnam.

In 1949 the NATO military bloc was established. The purpose was purely practical - to protect Greece and Turkey from Stalin's onslaught.

And Stalin is putting a blockade on West Berlin, i.e. trying to get it on the right track too.

Does all this look like socialism in one country?

5

After killing Stalin and exposing his crimes, Stalin's accomplices continue the great work of Marx, Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin.

A fanatic of the World Revolution and the conquest of the whole world was Marshal Zhukov. Before him, nuclear weapons were seen as weapons of coercion for peace, deterrence or retribution. The targets of nuclear weapons were hostage cities. The first example is Hiroshima.

The offensive, the defence, and the war in general have lost their meaning in this situation: what good are victories on the front if the enemy will turn our cities into radioactive dust?

But here in the Soviet Union, nuclear weapons also appeared. And then Zhukov comes on the scene: let the enemies burn our cities, we will still attack! We will use our nuclear weapons not only to deter the enemy, not only to destroy his cities and exterminate his people, but also to solve the most difficult task of offensive war - to break his front. We will drop special munitions on his defenses and immediately drive hundreds of tanks, thousands of vehicles, tens of thousands of our soldiers right through the breach into the epicenter of the blast!

Impossible? It is even very possible! Look, I'll show you!

And it shows. He organized exercises in 1954. Builds enemy defenses. Puts dogs, sheep, rams, cows, horses in the trenches. Drops a bomb on the defensive area. The radioactive cloud creeps slowly over the horizon, the dust will settle for hours. Does it make sense to wait? There is no point. The enemy can close the breach. In war, time is most precious of all. Forward, boys! Under the black cloud!

The great strategist turned 40 thousand young healthy Soviet men into impotents. In the name of experiment. So he proved that nuclear weapons could be used on the battlefield to drill

On Defense. It's even very simple. You don't have to collect hundreds of artillery batteries in one place, you don't have to carry tens of thousands of tons of ammunition. That's how you reveal your design, you lose the suddenness with that. What's it all for if we can do it with one bomb. Shit! And forward! In the name of happiness all over the earth!

After these teachings, fighters for national happiness are encouraged: all is not lost! We will continue to tear off pieces of capitalism. Where through conspiracy. Where through bribery. If necessary, by a liberation march!

And is starting... Algeria. Egypt. Libya. Syria. Congo. Indonesia...

What do we need Indonesia for?

And after them - all kinds of lands to the east, west, south. Only to the north we have not gone. Because there is nothing north of the Soviet Union. The North is inhabited only by short-legged bears.

The Zhukovskii-Andropovskii-Gorbachevskii are so deployed, so firmly taking over the lands to the south, east and west, that the brilliance of Hitler's masterpiece is dimming. Where's your pathetic little book?
"Mein Kampf" will be measured by the Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, adopted by the XXII Congress of the CPSU!

This Adolphus thing was no stretch. It wasn't. Nor was he thinking of plans and deeds as vast as ours. Nor did he think. Did Adolph dream of the lands of Cuba? There, you see! And ours have dreamed. And they have turned the fairy tale into reality. How much has Cuba alone cost our people! What resources!

Comrade Khrushchev was ready to turn the whole world into uranium pollen for the sake of socialism in Cuba. And what was Cuba for? Was it national interest? In our country, in half the schools the necessities are out. It takes a girl 7-8 winters between lessons to get to such needies - then she is barren all her life. It is national interest to make indoor toilets in schools. So that the nation does not die out. And we cared more about the victory of socialism in Venezuela. That and Chile, if we can, to tie to our cart. So that happiness may be complete.

"In support of the national liberation and communist movement during 1950-1980 the year we "plowed" hundreds of billions of

dollars without any ultimate positive results for the growth of the welfare of the Soviet population" *("Krasnaya Zvezda", 11-17 March 2009)*.

We have not forgotten our main enemies. The Communist Party of the United States of America has been filling its own mouth with the funds that have not reached the Soviet hospitals and schools. And many others like it. After the collapse of communism, some accounts were published: one million dollars to the French brothers, one million to the Brazilians... The list is long, long. And the millions are many, many. And this banditry - every year. For decades. And the signatures under the lists are of comrades Andropov, Gorbachev and other comrades.

Explain, wise men, how do we connect this kyorsophra with socialism in a country? If we had built it in one country, the whole world would be torn with envy. Yes, but no. We have been giving away treasures left and right.

And those who did not want socialism, we gassed with tanks. In our native Novocherkassk, working class demonstrations were doused in blood. And in Budapest. And in Prague. And in Warsaw. And in Berlin.

If it's about socialism in one country, they should have bloodied one country. Why Poland and Hungary?

But for the sake of universal happiness our chiefs have spared neither sticks nor carrots. Those who have not yet gassed them with tanks, have enticed them with sweets. Here is an example. Once in Britain the miners went on strike and our Soviet miners sent them fraternal aid. In currency. Millions. In the name of victory for the working people. In the name of the doom of cursed capitalism.

Furthermore, Soviet civilian diplomats took five vetted comrades from the British Communist trade unions and took them to a Soviet rest station for the working class: admire. They came back literally clothed. On all the BBC channels, they talk enthusiastically about how the victorious working class lives in the Soviet Union: gorgeous beaches on the Black Sea, hem and haw, and nobody on them in August - just rest, gather strength. Boats and yachts - available. With crews. With women. Everything - for free. Apartments - only super luxury, five rooms

per person. Champagne is being poured. And whiskey to your heart's content - and whiskey is plentiful. And more. And dancing till dawn. With thoroughbred women. And flowers, flowers - a sea of flowers. And if only you could see how the children of the USSR workers rest! How they are cared for. And doctors, and psychologists, and nurses, and aunts, and coaches, and guides...

Wow, if only we in Britain could make life like that for the miners!

And the comrades in the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China have shuddered with work for the glory of happiness for all mankind. In 1979 the Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU Comrade B. Ponomaryov publicly boasted that in recent years we had additionally brought Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, South Yemen into the Soviet barn.

He forgot to mention Afghanistan. He forgets because Afghanistan's turn has not yet come. It is only after a month that we have set out to liberate the Afghan homeland.

And here the academics tell us that Stalin had given up on the idea of a World Revolution. Only they don't provide any evidence.

6

Now let's recall the main point.

On June 22, 1941, Hitler dealt a deadly blow to the Soviet Union. He broke the back of the Soviet crocodile. After that blow, the Soviet Union's struggle to take over the whole world was only the rearguard action of a defeated army that had ignominiously lost the war. The whole post-war preoccupation of the Kremlin chiefs and strategists is but a powerless gnashing of the broken crocodile jaw. The Soviet Union's forces are at an end, its industrial potential has been destroyed, hundreds of thousands and millions of the most talented, hardest-working, cleverest, bravest and honest people have died in a war that our people did not need at all. Had the Kremlin leaders not instigated this war, all these millions would have remained alive, toiling for the good of their country, would have left viable offspring.

But they have fallen. Therefore the chiefs were forced to continue the struggle to conquer all the countries of the world, leaning only on the strength of the living.

After World War II, Stalin and all who ruled the Soviet Union after him were deterred by American nuclear power, the combined economic, political and military might of the entire world from Turkey to Norway, from the United States to Japan.

Look, there was no American nuclear power in the spring of 1941. To deter Stalin. Nor was there the combined might of all the countries. On the contrary, the world was immersed in the chaos of World II. Moreover, America was an ally Stalin. On May 27, 1941, President Roosevelt declared in a radio message to the American people that the United States would help any country that fought against Germany. The Soviet Union was not yet at war with Germany, but supplies of strategic materials from the United States to the Soviet Union had been coming in at an increasing rate since the fall of 1940.

Here it was the moment for Stalin to carry out victorious liberation marches.

Taking this into account, I suggest that we mentally multiply the deeds of Zhukov, Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Andropov, Gorbachev and the other fighters for peace by Stalin's criminal grip and Stalin's appetite.

In the name of celebrating socialism throughout the land, the benevolent Zhukov has maimed tens of thousands of his own soldiers and contaminated thousands of square kilometers of his own land with radiation. Again, it was for this that the peace-loving Andropov assassinated the legitimate leaders of Hungary and Afghanistan, threw Soviet tanks over the Afghan ridges. For the sake of the happiness of the working people, the meek Gorbachev organized collectivization in Ethiopia, knowing in advance that it would end in corpse-eating and child-skeletons just like on Ukrainian soil at the time of collectivization.

All the rulers after Stalin rested on the shaky power of the Soviet Union. They were deterred by the united power of the West. Including the nuclear one.

Let us consider how far Comrade Stalin could have gone, leaning on the fresh strength of a great country. No one deterred Stalin. America supported Stalin and urged him on a liberation march to Europe, guaranteeing him unselfish and unstinting economic, political and military aid...

7

In the Soviet Union, the Marx-Lenin-Trotsky-Stalin thought that the victory of the proletarians could only be secured through a World Revolution was clear and understood by all. It has been repeated by leaders of all ranks, ideologues, agitators, writers, poets.

In the second half of the 1930s, the idea of defending our happiness by helping our class brothers in their struggle for a brighter future dawned with new force over the Soviet Union. And over the country thundered verses and songs about how we would reach the Ganges, about the Last Republic, about the Last Pillar on which our fighters would plant a red flag, about the Last Frontier which our soldiers would sweep away:

Destiny deprives us of peace,
our brothers' grief. Oh, how I envy you,
my son!
Thou shalt see their free order,
you will hear the songs in which there is no sorrow.
The earth will be a sunny garden,
descendants - blessed, wise.
And in some - two-thousandth - year,
they'll reread these volitional du my...[1]

And so on in the same spirit. This is the creation of Valentin Lozin *("Stikhi o budou". L., Politizdat, 1937)*. The Volnyi poet envies his son - for he is about to see with his own eyes the happiness of all the peoples who are destined to live as one socialist family without borders and frontiers. But the future generations, when they read the free verses, will also envy the poet who had the good fortune to live in the wonderful epoch of 1937 and to be a contemporary of the great leader who prepared the liberation of mankind.

* * *

Strategy is the handmaiden of politics.

Politics has issued an order to strategy: to prepare in theory and ensure in practice the transformation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics into the World Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

First up is Europe. Then Asia. Next - everywhere.

The Red commanders had no choice. All the rest of the world is not taken over with exhaustion. Only the strategy of defeat remained.

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[1] The poems were translated by Nadia Popova. ↑

CHAPTER 7
THE DEEP OPERATION: THE SPRINGS

When the last border sign is
weeded out by our warriors -
everywhere will shine a scarlet
flag,
the flowers will generously dissolve the cups.
The world will follow you cheerfully, with peace,
O sixth the earth, to thee shall he look, the
victorious people shall come to feast
to herald the great victory.
Valentin Lozin
"Poems of the Future", 1937

1

Just before the victorious finale of the Civil War, the Red Army suddenly encountered a previously prepared almost impregnable deep-echelon defense. The Whites had taken refuge and fortified themselves in the Crimea, and the entrance to the Crimea was through a narrow isthmus, 30 km long, only 8 km wide at its narrowest point. Crimea has had many rulers over the long centuries. Each new lord of the peninsula fortified the narrow strip of land along which new conquerors could invade his domain, erected fortifications and enclosures here. Over the long centuries, the isthmus has been dug out entirely. That is why it is called Perekop. The Mongols built the fortress of Or Kapi here. Two hundred years after them the Turks created a powerful defensive line, which was called the Turkish Wall. After another three hundred years Catherine the Great conquered the Crimea. On her orders in 1783 Russian generals built the Perekop Fortress.

Perekop is the natural frontier of Crimea's defense. The defender does not have to scatter his forces over hundreds of kilometres - he can concentrate them on the narrow stretch prepared for centuries for defence. In 1920 the Crimea was defended by the troops of the whites, who had long military experience. Both officers and rank and file soldiers knew that there was nowhere to retreat to, the sea abyss was behind them, and they had better not even think about captivity under the Red commanders.

And so it was that in late autumn the Red Army conducted two successive deep-front offensive operations, united by a single design: a one-week counter-offensive in northern Tavria, a three-day pause, followed by an offensive to break through the fortifications of Perekop and seize the entire Crimea. This operation lasted 11 days.

The road to Crimea was protected by an 11 km long, 10 m deep ditch. Beyond the ditch - an earth embankment, 30-50 m wide at the base, 10

meters. The moat was covered with wire fencing. Firing points were organized in the earth mass of the shaft. The entire area was riddled with multiple layers of machine gun and artillery fire.

20-25 kilometers behind the first line of defense was the second strip - six lines of trenches and trenches.

In the rear, behind the two defensive lines, was concentrated a powerful reserve, which, in addition to infantry, cavalry and artillery, included 14 armored trains, 45 armored cars and tanks.

Apart from the road through Perekop, one could enter the Crimea through the Sivash water barrier, which translates as the Rotten Sea. The width of the most accessible place is 7 km. The depth - where up to the knee, where up to the waist, and somewhere three meters. The shores - sloping, wet, the bottom muddy, sticky. Ships have nothing to do here
- shallows everywhere. All the boats along the coast had been previously driven away by the whites or seriously damaged. There was nothing to make rafts of: it was bare steppe all around. But there was no gassing either: there are many quite deep places along the long miles, which are not marked in any way and not plotted on maps.

The Reds were to force Sivash, gassing under fire from the enemy coast. The problem was compounded by the fact that in November a cold biting wind blew and raised waves, the temperature dropping to minus 10-12 degrees.

The Reds broke through Perekop's defenses in three days, then inserted mobile groups into the breach - the 1st and 2nd Cavalry. In addition, on the auxiliary direction, Sivash was forced, the defenses were breached, and on this direction the 3rd Cavalry Corps was introduced into the breach.

The three mobile groups, without getting into combat, have swiftly rushed to the Black Sea ports...

2

From the very first moment of the First World War, Lenin sought to "turn the imperialist war into a civil war." Sadly, history is going down precisely the bloody path dreamed of by the syphilitic with the peculiar speech. Without any interruption, Russia rushes from the First World War into the Civil War. For Russia, the Civil War became a consequence and continuation of the First World War. That is why the Red commanders who had victoriously ended the Civil War had, in their vast majority, also gone through the First World War.

They have seen two wars.

And they obviously felt the difference.

The vast majority of them in the First World War were all privates, non-commissioned officers, field marshals or ensigns. The First World War for them was a dull hopeless carnage that led Russia to a "dirty peace", to surrender, national disgrace, general desolation and disillusionment, to the disintegration of the army and the state, to drunken soldier mobs fighting over their commanders. And they themselves have picked up these quarrels, have personally raised their generals on their bayonets...

And in the Civil War they rose straight from the mud to the sky - they got battalions, regiments, brigades, divisions, corps, armies and fronts under their command. In the course of the Civil War they had tasted the taste of unbridled and unchecked power. They ended the war with victory. They have become heroes.

Now try to guess three times what type of warfare the red commanders preferred after all the storms had subsided. The trench-warfare that ends with the ignominious surrender and extermination of the commanders by the enraged soldiers? Or the victory-strike one with the defeat and crucifixion of the warlords and atamans? The one that ends with a rout of the commanders, or the other - that which elevates them, the commanders, to the heights of power and glory?

Zhukov says that after the victorious end of the Civil War the Red commanders never understood anything. That they were still attracted by the trenches, that they liked positional warfare, which could not end in anything good. They had seen the future war only in the light of the experience of the First World War, and their experience of victory marches to Black Sea ports and then all the way to the Pacific had been forgotten at once - quickly and completely.

But on this point, as on a number of others, I do not take Zhukov on faith.

And I don't advise others to take his word it.

3

The question of the character of a future war was not before the Red commanders. They had no choice. Strategy, as we have already established, is the handmaiden of politics. Politicians set the tasks, generals seek the ways to solve those tasks. The leaders of the Soviet Union set the Red commanders a task that could only have been solved by a determined offensive, only by a determined march to the oceans. The road to the Last Republic is like Genghis Khan's road to the Last Sea. It is impossible to solve such a task either by standing or sitting in trenches.

Serious historians tell the gullible crowds about the "socialism in one country", that Stalin had given up the idea of a World Revolution, that he had rejected the idea of the Last Republic. But who, explain to me, in 1937 would have allowed freewheeling poets to write poems about "the last frontier"? Who would have allowed some sell-out Konstantin Simonov in 1939 to trumpet about "the last fascist city, where the last fascist will raise his hands in front of the tank, over which a red flag, precisely a red flag, will fly"? Who would decorate free verse poets with Stalin awards for such compositions?

On the one hand - socialism in one country, on the other - but we are yet to reach the Ganges!

Too many serious scholars who talk about Stalin's designs have bothered to read Comrade Stalin's works. According to the accounts of serious scholars, Stalin was once a revolutionary, but then, when the war came, he ended up on the side of the revolutionary road.

But here's a nut to crack: "To destroy the danger of capitalist intervention it is necessary to destroy the capitalist milieu, and to destroy the capitalist milieu is only possible as a result of a victorious proletarian revolution in at least a few countries."

This sculpted formulation is from Comrade Stalin's great creation, The History of the All-Union Communist Party (b). A Short Course" *(M., Gospodolitizdat, 1938, 261-262)*. This book was published at the end of . Where closer to the war? And its first printing was 1,000,000. Millions and millions followed.

Among all the other books, this one was the most important. Just as Comrade Stalin stood above all other comrades, however high their ranks, positions and merits. The chapter on the capitalist milieu in this book is the final and key chapter. All the preceding chapters are about the great road traveled, and at the end, what remains to be done.

4

But how can we link socialism in a country with the liquidation of the capitalist environment?

It's even very easy: first we will win in one country, then in the neighbouring countries, replacing the capitalist environment with a socialist one.

Not a year after the publication of this great creation of Marxist-Leninist thought, Comrade Stalin proceeded to implement the plan for the liquidation of the capitalist encirclement. In 1939 he annexed a piece of Poland, securing for the workers a happy life. In the same year he tried to liquidate the encirclement in Finland. It didn't work for him. Instead, in the following year he destroyed cursed capitalism in Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Bessarabia. But look at your trouble: we are still surrounded - now Germany is our neighbour...

Stalin did not give up his ideas until the end of his life. But even after Stalin's death, his ideas were alive and victorious.

"Only with the disappearance of the imperialist states will the attempts at military interventions and the associated restoration of capitalism disappear. And the capitalist encirclement will disappear only as a result of a socialist revolution in all the main capitalist countries" *(Academy of Sciences of the USSR. "Historical Materialism." M., Госполиздат, 1954, p. 267. Circulation - 1 000 000)*.

The situation: in 1954, the Soviet Union was surrounded by workers' Korea, brotherly China, heroic Vietnam, people's Poland, the First Socialist State on German soil, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, which had taken the path of socialism... But we were still surrounded. And this encirclement be crushed in all the major capitalist countries. There is no other way. Until we bring socialism to California, we will not settle down.

After the Second World War, although they had China and a dozen other countries as allies, surrounding the Soviet Union on almost all sides, the Soviet leaders still could not sleep easy. And what was Comrade Stalin like before the war when he was lonely? Clearly what: he was preparing the defence of the country, which could only be secured by spreading socialism to neighbouring countries, and this could only be done by offensive.

So the Red commanders had no choice: they had only to advance, only to bring happiness on their bayonets for all the neighbouring peoples. And they didn't have to invent anything. They clearly understood that the most important thing in the initial period of the war, in its first days and hours, was not to repeat the scenario of the First World War, i.e. not to allow the enemy to form a solid front.

For this purpose they should have had at the very first moment of the war a powerful army ready at the first signal to cross the frontier. And they should have had large mobile formations to move out from the border areas into the open, where there were and could be no impregnable enemy defenses. In other words, their task was to rapidly move the areas of fighting as far as possible into the rear areas of the enemy, thus disrupting his mobilization, disrupting strategic transports, seizing the areas that the enemy was preparing for defense and, at the same time, his repositories of strategic supplies, his important administrative, industrial and transport centers.

But Soviet strategists did not lose sight of the possibility that a powerful pre-prepared defense like in World War I or even stronger - like at Perekop in 1920 - might suddenly appear before them. That's why they all believed that very powerful artillery was needed. It must be said that in all countries of the world before the Second World War the role of artillery was definitely underestimated. The exception was the Soviet Union, which entered the Second World War with the most powerful artillery in the world, both in quantity and quality.

Alongside the work of creating powerful artillery, i.e. the main tool of the breakthrough, is being led intensively

research work to search for the ways that would make it possible to break down any, even theoretically impenetrable defenses.

5

Red commanders knew from their own experience that powerful cavalry formations and formations were capable of solving not only operational, but sometimes strategic tasks. The combat application of cavalry corps and mounted armies in the Civil War had shown clever men the further, only possible direction for the development of operational art and strategy.

The mounted army of the Civil War was almost the tank army of World War II. Between the mounted and tank armies, for all their differences, there is much more in common: charging into a breached section cut off from one's own rearguards, neighbors, and the slow mass of infantry, advancing lightning-fast in depth, seeking to outflank strong defenses, to defeat not by fire but by movement. And most importantly, speed: to do everything so fast that the enemy is constantly late.

In the Civil War, cavalry corps and mounted armies were the true instruments of the blitzkrieg. The term was not widely known then, but Red commanders used cavalry masses exactly as they later used tank masses: suddenly, massively, in narrow stretches, swiftly, and at maximum depth.

Cavalry commanders understood much better than their infantry counterparts the importance of suddenness, deep range and flank and rear.

The nature of the actions of cavalry divisions, corps and mounted armies in the Civil War, the very style of thinking of the commanders of these mobile formations, corresponded perfectly to the nature of the actions of mechanized corps and tank armies in World War II: raiding the enemy rear, paying no attention to their exposed flanks, not in prolonged fighting, bypassing the foci of resistance with decisive maneuver.

It is far from a coincidence that the best commanders in World War II were born in the cavalry. From the cavalry corps and mounted armies, replete with machine guns, mobile artillery, armored cars, armored trains and aircraft, there is half a step to the mechanized corps and tank armies. The amount of horses to be cut, armoured vehicles to be increased. And the principles of combat application need not change. They are the same.

* * *

In the Red Army, commanders who came from the cavalry dominated those who came from the infantry. They did not need to be told that only movement brings victory. They knew it without reading strategy books.

There were fools among the cavalrymen. But where are they? We, however, have been taught to regard all cavalrymen as idiots. And starting from the top, from Voroshilov and Budyoni. But Voroshilov and Budyonny understood maneuver warfare much better than the French, British, and German generals who spent the entire First World War in remote headquarters away from the fronts and had no experience of maneuver warfare.

CHAPTER 8
WHO INVENTED THE BLITZKRIEG?

It was the Russians who first gave the idea of massing rolling compounds.

Colonel-General F. Halder, Chief of the General Staff of the German Army

Service diary. Entry from 23 June 1941

The complete demoralisation of our troops also came about because Stalin's plans were the people's plans. At any rate - of a considerable part of it... It was the immoral-aggressive complex of the people's soul that caused that impotence of will which in war always leads to defeat if the campaign from a "big walk" turns into a weary confrontation. The nation intended to fight in the enemy's territory; our military leaders, no less than the German ones, dreamed of a blitzkrieg. And things have turned out not so cheerful... The unexpected for the troops and the people defense has turned into a total retreat along the entire front.

A. Б. Zubov

"Continent", 1995, №84

1

After the war, the undefeated Hitlerites invented many amazing stories about the war. Among them there is this one: it was we, the German generals, who invented the blitzkrieg, and the Russian fools adopted our idea. It is normal for monkeys to do monkey things.

The stories that the idea of the blitzkrieg was born in Germany have been picked up by thousands of experts from Britain, the US, France. For the British, the American, the French, the German, though a former enemy, is still a man of the West, he is his own man. That is why the inhabitants of Western Europe and North America regard the achievements of the Germans (but not their crimes) as their own achievements: you see, it was we civilized people who invented the blitzkrieg, and the ignorant Ivanovites are only capable of copying.

For example, one of the most chilling and fearsome of Hitler's soldiers, Field Marshal General E. von Manstein, talks about the Stalingrad strategic offensive and Soviet tank corps that were brought into the breach. Manstein spoke highly of the actions of the Stalinist tank corps. And adds: the Russians learned this from us *("Manstein", p. 357)*.

What is astonishing is not the audacity of the stupid Hitlerite scumbag, but the reaction of the commentators. I have leafed through Manstein's memoirs in English and French: no remarks about this declaration. Manstein's memoirs have also come out in Russian. The explanations, appendices and addenda prepared by the Russian historians contain more interesting information than Manstein's own text. But here Manstein states that the Red Army learned to use tank corps from the Germans, and our wise experts do not object to this... They agree with this statement. Russian serious historians (and not only historians), listening to this talk, submissively shake their heads.

And here is not the tacit agreement, but the active defense of Hitler's strategic wisdom: 'Powerful tank wedges in the

coupled with massive air strikes... these techniques were among the undisputed innovations, which we should talk about directly, without prevarication." Thus one Grigory Axelrod praises Hitlerism *(Rossiyskaya Gazeta, August 7, 1995)*.

The editorial board of the so-called "Russian newspaper" is staffed by people who hate everything Russian, who slander Russia and its people. In any normal country such a 'newspaper' would have been banned long ago. The criminal police would have long ago investigated who is behind its editors and who is ordering such articles.

And in Russia it can.

The same praise for Hitler and his strategists is heaped by one Joseph Kosinski: "Unlike Soviet concepts (if there were any), Hitler's blitzkrieg was not only worked out on paper, but also implemented on the field in Poland, France, Norway" *("Novoe Russkoe Slovo", 26 June 1989)*.

Some Hitlerian bluedolier named Karem Rash shouts with foaming at the mouth, "In the name of justice, let us remind you that before the war, in the whole world, only the Germans knew how to properly use the tank in battle" *("Krasnaya Zvezda", July 31, 1999)*.

Because of such revelations, both "Krasnaya Zvezda" and "Voenno Historicheskii Zhurnal" simply adore the Rash in question. "Krasnaya Zvezda" gives him whole pages: tell her some more nastiness about those Russian idiots.

Such statements will be found in abundance both in the Russian Marxist-Hitler newspapers and in foreign ones.

2

To clarify the issue of copying, let us turn to the facts.

Red commanders had experience in maneuver warfare over vast spaces. They had participated in such a war from early 1918 to late 1920. In Siberia, in Central Asia, in the Far East, the war continued after that.

German officers and generals before the start of World War II had no experience of maneuver warfare.

In the course of the Civil War, powerful mobile formations and formations were created in the Red Army: cavalry divisions, cavalry corps and armies, the principles of the combat use of which differed practically in nothing from the principles of the proper use of mechanized corps and tank armies in the Second World War.

There were no such mobile compounds in Germany. Accordingly, there was no attempt to use them.

In 1926, Vladimir Triandafilov's book The Scope of Operations of Modern Armies was published in the Soviet Union. After it, Triandafilov published the book The Character of Operations of Modern Armies.

These books formed the basis of the theory of the Deep Operation, the essence of which was the simultaneous overwhelming of the enemy's defenses by means of strikes throughout the depths, in the breakthrough of a chosen direction with the subsequent rapid development of tactical success into operational success by the use of airborne assaults and the introduction into battle of the EPD (Echelon for Developing the Breakthrough), i.e., of a powerful mobile group whose main strength was tanks.

The books of Triandafilov even then contained all the future wisdom of the remarkable strategic offensive operations: the Stalingrad, the Lvov-Sandomir, the Belorussian, the Yashko-Kishinev, the Vistula-Oder, the Manchurian.

Triandafilov was not only a great military theorist, he served as Chief of the Operations Department at the RKKA Headquarters and Deputy Chief of Staff of the RKKA. His books are not the exercises of a cabinet thinker, but the fundamental studies of a commander who was personally responsible for searching for promising directions for the development of the Red Army, for plans for its combat realization in future wars.

Nothing similar, equal, remotely resembling the works of Triantafilov appeared in Germany or in any other country at that time or later.

In 1929, at the exercises of the Belorussian Military District in the presence of foreign military attaches, including the German one, the principle of massed use of tanks to strike a strike in depth after a breakthrough in the enemy's defenses was verified for the first time in world practice. The exercises were led by K. E. Voroshilov, B. M. V. K. Triandafilov.

At that time in Germany there was neither a theory of the combat use of tanks, nor tanks in general. Not one.

Since Khrushchev's time, it has been customary to attach Tukhachevsky to Triandafilov as a patron or consultant, if not co-author, of the Deep Operation theory. But Triandafilov's books represent a conceptual debunking of Tukhachevsky and his wild fantasies. Triandafilov's books were written as "our answer to Tukhachevsky." And many contemporaries judged Triandafilov's death in a freak plane crash as revenge on Tukhachevsky's part. To this day, that crash lies like a shadow over the biography of the "star in the pleiad".

On August 2, 1930, during the exercises of the Moscow Military District, for the first time in world practice, a parachute landing was used to solve a combat problem in the rear of a conditional enemy. This day is considered the birth date of the B DV[1] and the beginning of their rapid development. Neither Germany nor any other country in the world had airborne troops at that time.

Well, who copied whom then?

On April 20, 1932 the Chief of Staff of the Red Army, the future Marshal of the Soviet Union A. И. Egorov, presented to the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR (RMS) the report "The Tactics and Operational Art of the RKKA at the New Stage". Although the title spoke only of tactics and operational art, the report also addressed fundamental issues of strategy. One who is interested should read the report all the way through. However, in order not to make my book dull and dishonest, I will confine myself to a minimum of quotations from this epoch-making document:

"Large motorized units in conjunction with mounted masses and aviation, supported during the early days of the border fighting by infantry units, invaded enemy territory. The main objectives of the advancing groups were:

(a) destruction of cover units;

(b) Failure in the border areas of the mobilization and of the new formations;

(c) seizing and destroying the enemy's stocks formed for warfare and maintaining the operational importance of the areas specified in the task as one of the main objectives of the deep offensive in the enemy's territory (...)

In organizing the operation, in targeting the troops, we must strive at the end of the first or, at most, at the beginning of the second day of the operation to attack by ground troops such a depth of the enemy's operational disposition, the overcoming of which would lead to the complete defeat of the enemy front (...)

Depth of penetration during the first day - up to 80-100 km".

As we can see, the basic idea is a sudden attack on the enemy who has not completed his mobilization and is not ready to reflect the offensive. No mopping up, no waiting - a complete smashing of the enemy front and an 80-100 kilometer advance of groups to invade enemy soil on the first day of the war!

On April 20, 1932, when the Chief of Staff of the R.K.K.A. was delivering his report to the members of the R.V.S.R. of the USSR, Adolf Hitler was celebrating his birthday. It was a sad day. For 1932 was

was for Hitler a year of constant failures and cruel defeats. From day to day things went from bad to worse. On December 6, 1932, Goebbels wrote in his diary, "There is a severe depression in the organization. We are all very depressed, above all because of the danger that the party will disintegrate."

In that year the German army was quite tiny. There were no reservists at all. In case of war there was no one to call upon. Such breakthroughs on the first day of war the German generals had not even dreamed of. At that time they had neither tanks, nor aviation, nor heavy artillery... And both their infantry and cavalry were insignificant.

Let us read a few sentences from the report of the Chief of Staff of the RKKA and think. Everything here is all too familiar to us. Where have we seen this picture before? Ah, yes. On June 22, 1941...

Remove the name of the Chief of Staff of the RKKA from the document, then the whole text without changes can be used to describe what happened on the Soviet western borders one fine summer morning.

The Red commanders were plotting against Europe exactly what Hitler did against them in 1941.

The Red commanders planned such actions in the years when Britain was preoccupied with preserving its overseas and overseas possessions, and this was the focus of its armed forces. France then adhered exclusively to a defensive strategy. And in Germany Hitler had not yet come to power. And he didn't have high hopes.

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[1] Airborne troops. - B.pr↑

3

In February 1933, the headquarters of the RKKA sent out to the troops as an official guide "Provisional Instructions on the Organization of the Deep Battle".

In September 1935, exercises were conducted that have gone down in the history of the Red Army under the name of the Great Kiev Maneuvers. On both sides took part 65 000 fighters and commanders, 1012 tanks, 608 aircraft, 305 guns. The documentary film The Battle for Kiev was made about these manoeuvres. In the course of the manoeuvres, a breakthrough defence practised by an Rifle Corps reinforced with tanks for close infantry support (CAP) and artillery of RGC[1]. The conditional enemy's defenses were broken, a mobile group was introduced into the breach, which contained 754 tanks. The strike was
was mapped at a depth of over 230 kilometres. For the first time in
world practice, an airborne assault by an entire parachute regiment (1,188 men) and a commando assault by two regiments with artillery and light tanks were used.

Triantafilov's theory has been tested in practice. Troops and staffs were given a go at conducting a Deep Operation.

In September 1936, exercises of the Byelorussian Military District were conducted, in the course of which the troops not only broke through the enemy's defenses and struck in depth, but also forced a large water barrier - the Berezina River. In the exercises on both sides took part 71 000 fighters and commanders, 1320 tanks with the corresponding amount of artillery and aviation. In the course of the manoeuvres a 200-kilometre march of a tank brigade (310 tanks) was carried out, a parachute landing (1,808 men) and a hitchhiking landing (5,700 men) with artillery and tanks were used.

Similar exercises were conducted in the Moscow, Volga, Leningrad and other military districts.

And this is what the situation was in Germany.

"At the last prewar command and staff exercises, held in the spring of 1939 under the direction of the Chief of the General Staff of the Army, the question of the massed battlefield employment of motorized divisions and corps was considered for the first time. In the autumn of 1939, under the direction of the Chief of Mobile Troops, large autumn field exercises of motorized formations were to take place..." *(B. Müller-Gillebrandt. "The Land Forces of Germany". M., Vol. 1, p. 157)*.

I explain what command and staff exercises (CSEs) are. Commanders and staffs take to the field and do battle, commanding imaginary troops: here I will move one division, here another. But there are no troops. A training apiary without bees. The nice thing about big CSMs is that they can be held in the spring as well as the summer: we learn to manage the troops, but the troops don't trample the fields. See, after the harvest, when the birds have flown south, the woods are bare and the fields are deserted, we can play in the open with real troops.

The first manoeuvres with large formations of mobile troops in Germany were planned for the autumn of 1939, but were prevented by the war.

So that means - in Germany theoretically on the maps the actions of large mechanized formations were first practiced in the spring of 1939.

With real troops - never.

I have repeatedly stated that Germany entered World War II without preparation. Do not accuse me of exaggeration. Here is your proof.

In August 1939, on the steppes of Mongolia, Red Army formations carried out a lightning defeat of the Japanese 6th Army: a sudden crushing artillery barrage, an air strike, infantry with tanks for close support following the fire wave, broke the defenses and powerful mobile groups of fast tanks rushed in depth.

Citizens owners of "Rodina", "Rossiyskaya Gazeta", "Krasnaya Zvezda", you consider the peoples of the Soviet Union to be cowards who are only capable, like monkeys, of using the experience of others. Explain then, not to me, but to your readers, how in

In August 1939 the red monkeys managed to copy the experience of the superior race, since in Germany the first exercises with powerful tank formations were planned to take place only in September and October ? Although such maneuvers were conceived, they never took place.

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[1] Reserve of the General Command. ↥

4

On the basis of the exercises and manoeuvres in the Kiev, Byelorussian and other districts in 1936, the Provisional Field Regulations of the RKKA (PU-36) were adopted. Deep operation was the essence and main content of this statute.

And again I will say: neither in Germany nor in any other country at that time was such a theory established in statute.

But here I will be countered: well, the statute is temporary! Right. But then there was no other. The statute is temporary,

but mandatory for implementation. And it is long past time to see why it was temporary.

This was a period of rapid development of the army. There was a fierce struggle of opinions. Everybody thought his point of view was the only right one, everybody defended it. In the midst of the struggle, not altogether honest methods were used. Sometimes the ideological opponents made very heavy accusations, quarrelling over trifles. Therefore, everyone insured themselves by using the terms

"preliminary", "provisional", etc.

In the event of attacks, you could always get out by announcing that this was not the final option. It got to the point that the Field Regulations for 1941 (PU-41) were printed and sent to the troops, under the heading of which was written: Draft.

By the way, comrade Stalin himself gave such an example:

"History of the All-Union Communist Party (b). A short course". Stalin had many opponents. Both overt and covert. They could say: well, you have not illuminated this and that. And the Genius of all times and peoples had a ready answer: so this is a short course!

But where is the full one? That's the thing, there was no full one and there was not supposed to be. You have a short one, make do with it.

That is how things have been with statutes, instructions and precepts - they are provisional, they are preliminary, they are drafts. But they are binding and there are no others.

And the most important thing was that all these statutes, instructions and precepts were quite similar. All of them oriented the Red Army towards conducting rapid offensive operations. Look, there were no statutes at with recommendations on how to build a defense on a strategic scale, how to repel the aggressors' blows and counterstrikes, how to retreat in case of failure. Neither in preliminary form, nor in draft form.

5

Speaking of copying, let's look at the differences in the German and Soviet approaches to conducting strategic offensive operations.

Blitzkrieg means an effort to take the fighting from the front line into the enemy's deep rear. A blitzkrieg is a drive into a space where there are no enemy troops. Blitzkrieg is securing victory primarily not by fire and combat, but by maneuver: an instant advance to such lines and in such areas that the enemy is forced to surrender without resistance... On this point the views of the Soviet and German generals coincided completely.

But the coincidences end there. And

the differences begin.

Soviet commanders decided thus: it is not bad to catch the enemy off guard. But you can also run into solid defenses. What will happen to the tanks if we launch them against a previously prepared defense? Right. They will suffer huge losses without causing much damage to the enemy who has hidden in trenches and trenches. In the First World War neither the Americans nor the Austrians nor the Germans nor the French or the British were able to actually break through ordinary trenches, and what will it be like in a new war when they have to break through lines of trenches reinforced with reinforced concrete defences?

Without losing sight of such an opportunity, the Red commanders simultaneously developed a theory of breaking through impregnable defenses along with the theory of the rapid march deep into enemy territory. The theory of breaching had become an integral part of the theory and practice of Deep Operations.

It has been determined and verified by numerous maneuvers: if the enemy is on the defensive, then the place of powerful mobile tank formations is not in the first, but in the second echelon. The defense of the

The enemy is not broken through by them, but by the army units. The main crushing force is the artillery, the breakthrough is made by the infantry, which has both its own tanks and tanks from the reinforcements. And the powerful mobile formations wait. They don't waste their breakout forces or lose them only as a last resort at the very last moment to complete the breakout.

In accordance with these conclusions, the Red Army literally on the eve of the war, as a breakthrough tool, received in its armament the world's best 122-mm howitzer M-30 model of 1930, the world's best 120 mm mortar of the 1938 model, the 152 mm howitzer-cannon ML-20 of the 1937 model, the 203 mm howitzer B-4 of the 1931 model, known among the people as "Stalin's war hammer", and many other wonderful artillery guns.

The German army had no breakthrough theory, paid attention to the development of field artillery. Field artillery has remained mostly at the level of World War I.

Having powerful field, mostly howitzer artillery, the Red Army demanded first-class artillery tugs. And it got them. The light armoured Komsomolets, a 45mm anti-tank gun tractor, and the Voroshilovets, a tractor of the heaviest artillery systems, were the two extremes of the range. Both tugs, and all the others in the range in between, were remarkable machines for their time.

In accordance with the breakthrough theory, a special T-26 infantry tank was created for the Soviet infantry and the infantry was well equipped with these tanks.

In the German army the infantry had no tanks of their own.

To reinforce the attacking infantry on the main lines in the Soviet Union were created special tanks for breakthrough, tanks for qualitative reinforcement of infantry, at first T-28 and T-35, then they were replaced by KV and KV-2.

There were no tanks to break into in Germany.

Possessing both the theory and the instrument of breakthrough, the Red Army always (if sometimes with effort) eventually broke through every theoretically insurmountable defense from the Japanese field in the sultry steppes of Mongolia and the snow-covered Mannerheim Line to the

the fortified strips of the Seelow Heights on the approaches to Berlin and the Japanese fortified areas in Manchuria.

And one more fundamental difference. The tank armies in the Soviet Union were really tank armies because at their base were tank formations and units with the necessary means of reinforcement and support.

In the army of Germany, the term panzer group, then panzer army, meant a huge grouping, at the base of which were infantry divisions. In the composition of such a group or army there were also tank divisions, but as a rule considerably fewer.

6

Let us now endeavour to perceive the difference in the ways in which rolling compounds and unions are used.

Each German panzer group or army was given an independent strip of offensive. Thus the actions of any such group or army were stiffened by this strip. On the one hand - don't go outside it, on the other hand - you are responsible for everything that happens on your strip!

In the Red Army cut stripes on the fronts, all-army armies, rifle corps and divisions. After breaking the enemy's defenses with the forces of the all-army formations, Soviet commanders brought the mobile formations into a clean or almost clean breakthrough. The Soviet mobile formations, i.e., the mechanized, cavalry, and tank corps, the cavalry-mechanized groups, and the tank armies, did not cut independent strips for the offensive.

If the mobile group was acting in the interests of the general army, it could manoeuvre independently along the entire belt of that army's advance. If it acted in the interests of the front, it was given even greater freedom of action. The commander of a Soviet mechanized corps or the commander of a tank army was given freedom to maneuver over vast spaces. His concern was to break through faster and farther. He did not care to gas small and large pockets of resistance that remained in the rear. After the mobile panzer groups, the all-army armies, the rifle corps and divisions, would move in to clear.

The German commander of the same rank in the same situation had to break forward, but at the same time not to forget about the rear: to extinguish the remaining foci of resistance, to clear the forests, to catch partisans, to convoy prisoners, to organize camps for them, to rebuild bridges and roads, to leave garrisons in captured towns and smaller villages, to organize the commandant's service...

Simply put, he had to dissipate his attention and strength on a mass of different tasks, somewhat neglecting the main one.

Not to be envied.

In the German army tank troops were the main striking force in the offensive. They were used in the first echelon to make a breakthrough of the defense. This brought success, but only as long as they were able to cook the enemy unprepared, while there was no solid deep-echelon defence in front of the advancing German tanks.

In the German army there was neither a theory of the breakthrough nor a corresponding tool for its implementation. Therefore, when it has encountered solid defenses, the German army has invariably buckled. This had begun as early as July 1941, when German tanks encountered the concrete firing points of the Kiev fortified area heroically defended by Major General A. A.'s 37th Army. A. Vlasov, newly formed from paratroopers, reservists and retreating units.

After that, that's how it went - they met the German tank defenses and stopped: Leningrad, Moscow, Tula, Voronezh, Stalingrad, Kursk arc.

7

A high-ranking German general in the position of Chief of the General Staff of the Army on the second day of the war against the Soviet Union recorded in his working diary, i.e., in an official document, that the idea of massed mobile formations was first born in the Red Army.

Citizens Rush, Kosinski, Axelrod, repeat these words a hundred and ten times and try to remember them.

The diary was not intended for publication, that is its value.

The hardened Hitlerite admits to himself that "it was the Russians who first gave birth to this idea"... To this we must add: not only did they give birth to the idea, but they put it into practice.

And here there are people who don't like the history of the war. They reshape history to their taste, they distort it mercilessly. The aim of the falsifiers is to revise and rewrite the history of the war. For Hitler's benefit.

In their suspicious zeal they have long surpassed Goebbels and Hitler's other propagandists.

To make a brief summary, I state: the Red Army did not copy the actions of the various Manstein and Guderian. If it had copied them, it would have ended the war with the result with which they ended it.

* * *

Now a business proposal.

When accepting new students into the General Staff Academy, why not ask everyone the question: why do you want to in the Academy? Is it to defend the homeland? Well, why don't you defend it? Illiterate, unscrupulous, venal Hitlerite bluedolizers and dreadlocks are waging a targeted ideological war

against Russia. Come on, defend her! Where is your answer about the slanderers from the so-called "Russian newspaper"? You lack knowledge? Have you never read about Triandafilov, the Deep Operation and the breakout tanks? Then you don't have a job at the Academy. You're not grown up. Or you don't have the courage to defend the Motherland. Then you have no job at the Academy.

They express one concern: with such an approach we will not find enough listeners. So what to do then? Should we close the Academy?

I answer decisively: then close it.

CHAPTER 9
WHY WAS COMMODORE PAVLOV AN OPPONENT OF LARGE TANK FORMATIONS?

Motorized masses that have limited defensive capabilities must act extremely offensively.

"Pravda 20
May 1936

1

In the autumn of 1932 in the Soviet Union, at the suggestion and insistence of the Deputy Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs, the Chief of Armaments of the RKKA, M. H. Tukhachevsky for the first time in world practice two mechanized corps were formed. One in the Leningrad Military District, the other - in the Ukrainian.

In 1934 two more such corps were formed - in the Moscow Military District and in Trans-Baikal.

In 1938 they changed the names of the corps. They began to be called tank corps. But their structure and substance remained the same
- these were powerful strike formations, the main core of which were tank units and units. These corps were created to strike sudden crushing blows, to conduct independent rapid deep operations away from weakly moving infantry masses. At the time, no one in the world had anything like it. We were the first in the world. We have much to be proud of.

Except...

On November 21, 1939, the General Military Council of the Red Army decided to disband the tank corps. The decision was taken on the basis of the findings of a commission, the chairman of which was Commander 1st Rank G. И. Kulik. The commission included Marshal of the Soviet Union S. M. Budyoni, Commander 1st Rank B. M. Shaposhnikov and S. K. Timoshenko, commanders 2nd rank K. A. Meretskov and M. П. Kovalyov, Commodore D. Г. Pavlov.

In military rank Pavlov was the most junior, but it was he who instigated the defeat of the powerful tank formations. Kulik had supported Pavlov. Pavlov and Kulik succeeded in proving their point and the decision to disband the tank corps was taken unanimously.

For decades, official Kremlin propaganda portrayed this decision as a victory of brainless, ignorant cavalrymen over progressive tankers, a rejection of progressive views of

the role of tank troops in the war as one of the tragic mistakes and omissions that led to the defeat of the Red Army in the summer of 1941.

The motives for Pavlov's actions are explained very simply: he had fought in Spain, and there tanks were used in small groups. The experience of fighting in Spain has been misinterpreted. In Spain Pavlov had shown himself to be a literate, clever, brave and determined commander. Among the very first, as early June 22, 1937, he received the rank of Hero of the Soviet . In August 1939, a special decoration was introduced for the Heroes of the Soviet Union - the medal
"Gold Star". Pavlov received a "Gold Star" with№ 20. (The first
Zhukov's "Gold Star" is #435.)

And so the valiant commander Pavlov, drawing on his experience of the war in Spain, proposed to disband the tank corps. But that war was local. Was it permissible to use the limited experience of a small war as a recipe for the combat application of tanks in the coming world war?

After his return from Spain Pavlov was appointed to command all Red Army tank troops. Stalin awarded him the rank of corps commander, skipping the rank of division commander. For his skillful leadership of tank units during the Winter War in March 1940, Pavlov was awarded the rank of Army Commander 2nd Rank.

In 1940, general ranks were introduced in the Red Army. The entire senior command staff was completely reattested. Commander 2nd rank Pavlov became colonel general of the tank troops. After half a year, Stalin awarded him the rank of army general. Well, it was he, the windbag Pavlov, who ruined the whole thing.

There were plenty of tanks in the Red Army, they just scattered them to the smaller units. And the tanks were supposed to be gathered into shock fists!

It so happened that we had large tank formations, but Stalin destroyed Tukhachevsky, and then destroyed the great work begun by the Genius of Strategy.

This is how the Kremlin ideologues describe the fate of the tank corps to us. Here for an example one sample of solo

statement on this topic. The writer Yevgeny Nosov: "We marched against the enemy tank armadas poorly armed, not always with cartridges in the palisades and shells in the artillery forwards. We were marching without the undeveloped tank corps that Marshal Tukhachevsky had insisted on developing, without rocket fire support, also proposed by him but rejected as an idea of the 'enemy of the people', without the Marshal himself - the brave innovator, the educated and clever commander, the expert on the tactics and strategy of German militarism" *("Literaturnaya gazeta", 1988, No. 16)*.

Such claims have been published for half a century. These revelations do not embarrass or outrage anyone, no one objects. We would not like to call Tukhachevsky an enemy of the people in tune with the Lubyanka accusers, but neither can we call the man who poisoned his own people with poison gas, who massacred whole villages, who introduced an occupation regime in his own country a friend, and did not shrink from the term. See, however, "brave innovator."

"the educated and clever commander in chief", "the expert on the tactics and strategy of German militarism" should no doubt be put in quotation marks. And if the occupier Tukhachevsky had a dirty finger in the creation of powerful tank formations, why not show vigilance? Why not turn a discerning eye to the enemy creation?

2

Only four mechanized corps were created according to Tukhachevsky's recipes. He wanted more, but there were clever and daring people who did not allow this to the "brave innovator".

In each of Tukhachevsky's corps there were three brigades (two tank, one rifle) and corps units: a reconnaissance, flame-thrower and sapper battalion, an antiaircraft artillery division, a traffic control company, a technical base, and an aviation detachment.

Each of the two tank brigades in the Mechanized Corps included three tank, rifle and sapper battalions, an artillery division, and an antiaircraft company.

The Rifle and Artillery Brigade in the Mechanized Corps included a battalion of armored cars, three rifle and artillery battalions, two artillery divisions, and an antiaircraft company.

In addition, there were liaison units, a chemical protection unit, medical, business, transport, repair, administrative, etc. units in the corps and brigades.

In all, each corps had 560 tanks, 215 armored vehicles, 410 motorcycles, 60 guns, 12 aircraft-scouts, 207 trucks.

From the very first moment of the appearance of mechanized corps, the commanders of the corps have sent objections and protests to various authorities: such a corps is not capable of fighting.

Every reader can see this for himself. For this purpose, he should find a black leather cap with a red star, put it over his forehead andtry to that he is in the place of the sworn commander who has had the bad luck to command a corps created according to the recipes of the "connoisseur" and the "brave innovator".

First question: how do you manage this host? There are 560 tanks in the corps, and the total number of tank battalions is six. How many per battalion? A certain number of tanks are not in the battalions, but in the management of the corps and brigades. But this does not change the picture.

The battalions are still monstrous in the number of tanks, so they are unmanageable.

By comparison, Nikita Khrushchev in his memoirs gleefully reports that during the bloody fighting near Stalingrad, as luck would have it, Stalin threw them a helping hand - two tank corps with 100 tanks in each!

Let's think: there are 100 tanks in the corps. There is a general in charge. Who has the appropriate staff. And with a company to manage. In addition, there are three brigades in the corps. At the head of the brigades, which enter into this corps, stand colonels. Which also have headquarters, means of communication and management, all the necessary units for combat support. And Tukhachevsky in each battalion has almost a hundred tanks. So how can one battalion commander handle such a horde!

There are 215 armored cars in the corps, and they are assembled in two battalions: a corps reconnaissance battalion and an armored car battalion of the rifle brigade. The question is the same: how many per battalion and how to manage this battalion?

And if battalion commanders have it hard, brigade commanders have it no easier. Even the ancient Romans definitely established that there could be no more than five major combat units under any one commander. For two millennia the Roman experience has been confirmed thousands of times in all wars by all armies. But Tukhachevsky apparently did not know what every company sergeant major should know. In Tukhachevsky's formations there were six huge unmanned battalions and divisions under each brigade commander, not counting individual companies.

"Exercises conducted with the mechanised corps have shown that they are cumbersome and weak in their composition. Because of the weak means of communication, especially radio communication, the corps commander was not coping with the management of his subordinate units. The corps moved slowly on the offensive and when introduced into a breach." *("VIEW"[1()], 1968, no. 108)*.

Powerful tank formations are instrumental in conducting striking operations. But Tukhachevsky's mobile formations have lost their main quality - mobility.

[1] Military-historical journal. - B.pr↑

3

The task of the mechanized (tank) corps in war is: by breaking through the enemy's defenses, to come to the operational space and, by moving forward rapidly along the enemy's rear, to develop tactical success into operational, sometimes into strategic.

It's beautiful in theory. In practice, Tukhachevsky's corps was extremely vulnerable to air attacks.

Each brigade has one anti-aircraft company. There are 12 M-4 antiaircraft gunners in the company. The "M" stands for machine gun. "Maxim." And the number denotes the number of barrels. Four Maxims in one block. The block is on a podium. The podium is in the body of a ton and a half truck. The minesweeper leads the firing with all four barrels at once. Thus is achieved a considerable density of fire. A nice thing is "Maxim", but fired ordinary rifle cartridges. For shelling aerial targets, the caliber is minor. 20mm automatic cannons would be just what is needed. Except that the chief of arms of the RKKA, Comrade Tukhachevsky, was an implacable opponent of these guns. He was fond of the good old Maxim. And if he did, at least he'd given enough of those "Maxims". One of two things: either you reinforce the air defenses of the brigades and corps as a whole, or you reduce the number of tanks.

12 PSU[1] M-4s were able to conceal the brigade commander's command and observation post and the command post housing the brigade's main staff, as well as the liaison units that supported the operations of these command and control authorities. But what will be used to cover the battle lines of the troops and rearguards?

I'll be reminded: there are anti-aircraft machine guns on tanks.

I object: only to some. To very few. Anti-aircraft machine guns were fitted to all T-28s and T-35s, from the second half of the 1930s anti-aircraft machine guns were fitted to a number of T-26s. But Tukhachevsky's corps were designed for rapid action, they were armed with BT tanks. The BT-2 and BT-5 did not

is possible to establish because of the construction of the hatches of the dome. The hatches were square, and there must have been a ring for the anti-aircraft machine gun round to turn the machine gun in the required direction. The BT-7 was also not designed to seat an anti-aircraft machine gun. Its hatches were oblong in shape with rounded corners. Something between a rectangle and an oval.

The "brave innovator", the head of the armament of the RKKA, not interested in the question of how an anti-aircraft machine gun could be mounted on the turret of the BT. And only after Tukhachevsky left the post of chief of armaments, the designers were ordered to make one hatch on the turret of the BT-7 round and to fit a round P-40 with a DT machine gun. 1,170 BT-7 tanks were produced on which it was possible to fit an anti-aircraft gun - i.e. a quarter of all BT-7s. But such tanks were entering not only the tank corps, but also the individual tank brigades, and the tank regiments of the cavalry divisions.

The M-4 was able to provide high density fire: four barrels, belt loading, water cooled barrels. A tank turret DT had none of that: neither four barrels, nor water cooling, nor belt loading. The DT is a nice machine gun, but it wasn't designed to fire at aircraft. In short, having a number of tanks with anti-aircraft machine guns didn't solve the problem.

In addition to anti-aircraft companies in three brigades, the corps commander had his own anti-aircraft artillery division - 12 76-mm anti-aircraft guns. The division was capable of covering the corps' command posts and communications nodes. Not much more. And only in place, because anti-aircraft guns are not self-propelled, but towable. On the move and in combat, the corps' brain and nerve centers were not protected by anything from air attacks. And wasn't the Corps designed precisely for movement and combat. Nor were the battle lines of the units and the vast rear areas of the corps and brigades covered in any way either on the ground, in movement or in combat.

Tukhachevsky imagined the beginning of the war only in the form of a sudden treacherous attack of the Red Army on a sleeping enemy, in the form of a devastating Soviet air strike on the

enemy airfields and a mighty march of tank armadas to the ocean, when the tanks move like an armored stream and do not need to be steered at all. And only in this situation could the hulls created according to his recommendations and designs have been used.

In every other situation, such a corps organization has become a trap. Imagine a huge herd of tanks, poorly managed or not managed at all, unprotected by anything. If the enemy had superiority, or worse, air dominance, the life of such a corps would be short. The enemy's aircraft would easily detect such a herd. Once detected, they would shoot it down almost with impunity.

Tukhachevsky's corps also had its own reconnaissance aircraft. They themselves were not capable of air combat and were not designed for it. But they needed a field, albeit small, but still an airfield. It was in any case unprotected from air attacks.

Small tank units can easily hide in groves. When the units are many and they are all small and mobile, go looking for them and attack. And when all the tanks are gathered in packs, like sardines, it's a feast for the cormorants and seagulls. So let's not mourn the fate of Tukhachevsky's corps. For the situation created on June 22, 1941, they were not at all adapted. If, in the course of the defensive war, someone had thought of the idea of using Tukhachevsky's corps to conduct counter-strikes, he would have lost men and equipment in vain, because for the enemy's aviation there is no better target than endless unprotected moving tank columns. Aviation would crush these columns even before they were brought into battle.

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[1] Anti-missile installation. - B.pr↑

4

The amount of anti-aircraft assets in Tukhachevsky's corps was, to say the least, bizarre. No less strange was the quantity of artillery. For fire support of 775 tanks and armored cars - 60 guns. Not much. For every 13 tanks and armored cars - one cannon. And this is only at first glance. Let's not forget that 12 guns are anti-aircraft. And the field artillery in the whole corps is 48 barrels. And half of these barrels are in the rifle and machine gun brigade. The other half of the field guns is divided into the two tank brigades. In each brigade there are 12 guns to support 280 tanks. But this too is an illusion. Because the tank brigades had rifle-cartridge battalions, it is to them in the first place that fire support must be provided. And we must not forget the scouts, the motorcyclists and the work of the sappers must also be secured. In short, the tanks in Tukhachevsky's corps were left without artillery support.

The Tukhachevsky Corps had no means of forcing water barriers of its own. They didn't have much else either. But the strangest thing is the amount of vehicles - 207.

Let's try in the place of the corps commander to allocate these vehicles. What is the most important? Well, everything is most important.

First of all, 60 cars should be given to the artillerymen and anti-aircraft gunners. These will be tractors for the guns, howitzers and anti-aircraft guns. Because there is no other traction in the corps. Another 36 cars - for the platforms of the anti-aircraft guns.

But artillery cannot move forward with only tugs. The artillerymen need many cars besides the tugs.

If we gave the cars to the artillerymen and the anti-aircraft gunners, the corps commander, his staff, all the lower commanders and staffs would have to ride horses... and horses were not due to the corps.

All right, let's throw the corps into the attack and leave all the artillery and anti-aircraft assets in the rear. Cannons, howitzers, anti-aircraft guns are already few, but let's try to pass

without them at all. What to do when cars are needed for a more important purpose. The hull must be managed. It cannot do without cars.

The management and the corps headquarters should be given several cars. Otherwise, the tanks will go ahead, and the commander and staff will stay put. In addition, a few cars should be given to the liaison units that provide the headquarters work. Otherwise, the corps commander and staff will go on the offensive with the tanks, but will not be able to operate such a mass of combat equipment. The liaison units are not so few. Let's do the math: they provide the contact with the higher command, with the neighbors, with the brigade headquarters that make up the corps, with the attached reinforcement units, with the own aircraft, and with those who act for the interests of the corps. Reconnaissance groups, frontal detachments, frontal, flank, and rear marching detachments, and movement support detachments are sent forward. All must be kept under control, all must be communicated with. And radios were heavy then. In Tukhachevsky's corps, two types of radios were mainly used: 71TK
- tank, and 5AK, which was mounted in the body of a truck.

A certain number of cars should be given to the headquarters and staffs of the three brigades and to the liaison units which secure the transmission of messages from the brigade headquarters to corps headquarters and to subordinate units.

The corps has all one anti-aircraft artillery, four artillery divisions and 17 battalions. They all need cars for the commanders, staffs and liaison units. In addition, there are over a hundred companies and batteries in the corps. And the traffic control company cannot be left without transportation.

So if we give 207 cars to the commanders, to the staffs, to the units for control, liaison and traffic regulation, then we will have to leave the bomb squad, the repairmen, the flamethrowers...

Let's not forget that in the corps we have an artillery brigade, in addition, in each tank brigade - one artillery battalion. These units and units are designed to consolidate the success of the tankers. Without rifle-cartridge units and units, tanks have nothing to do in the enemy's rear.

Tanks alone cannot hold captured sites and frontiers. And rifle-cartridge units are valuable only as long as there is ammunition for the greedy machine guns. With infantry it's easy - you get it on the tanks. Or have the infantry run after the tanks. Eight or ten marathons to complete exhaustion. But where to put the machine guns? And the huge stocks of ammunition, without which machine-gun units are meaningless?

The corps has three sapper and one flamethrower battalions. The bombardiers are always carrying all sorts of baggage. They have to mine, and clear mines, and repair bridges, and dig wells, clear collapses, clear the road. And flamethrowers have to carry a lot of flammable liquid with them. They might take cars in the rifle brigade and give them to the sappers and flamethrowers, then the medics and cooks would be without cars. You could come up with many more different options for allocating the cars, but all the options would be ridiculous.

But the funniest is yet to come.

5

The corps was designed for independent action, detached from the main forces, in depth of the enemy's defenses. The key words are "independent" and "detached." In such a situation, there must be at least 3 charges of G CM[1] for 775 tanks and armored cars.

The main tanks in Tukhachevsky's corps were BTs. One refueling of a BT-5 is 500 liters. 360 in main tanks, 140 - in auxiliary. You also need oil. A load of BT-7 is 790 liters (650 + 140). Vehicles of that time were a ton and a half and three tons with low off-road capability. If all 200 cars of the hull are loaded with gasoline only, without taking lubricating oils, and in this case we will not be able to take with us 3 refills. And don't the 200 cars have to fuel not only the tanks and armored cars, they have to fuel themselves as well. And you can't get away with three refuels here. The calculations showed that each vehicle had to have five refuels.

What about ammunition?

OK, we won't take gasoline, we'll still somehow conduct the rapid tank march without gasoline. Let's load all 200 cars with ammunition. When going out into the operational area, the corps should have at least two spare ammunition kits in addition to what is loaded in the tanks and armored cars.

One ammunition package for the BT-5 is 115 rounds and 2,709 rounds. BT-7 - 172 shells and 2394 rounds. One ammunition for 560 BT-5 tanks is 64,440 shells and one and a half million rounds. Let's multiply that by two. And if we have BT-7 tanks, we get an even bigger number. Let's add to that 215 armored cars. Let's not forget that most of them carry the same tank guns and machine guns. Let's add to that the field and anti-aircraft artillery. It is not much, but the calibers here are more solid: 76-mm guns and 122-mm howitzers. Let's add the voracious anti-aircraft companies, the rifle and machine-gun brigade and the battalions.

Let's calculate how much all this can weigh. Let's add the weight of the solid wooden crates. And the cartridges are also soldered in zinc boxes and only then placed in the chests. Any way you calculate it, neither 200 one-and-a-half ton trucks nor 200 three-ton trucks will carry that many rounds and shells.

You can not feed people during an operation, you can not evacuate the wounded, but just dump them in the ditches - they will somehow crawl to the rear, but tanks want repairs and maintenance. And if you load the 207 cars with ammunition or fuel, the corps will go on the offensive, and the repair units and the stock of spare parts will remain in the rear. Besides, you've got the planes. And for them you have to drive and fuel, and spare parts, and what not.

In the course of the exercises for the securing of a tank battalion, they collected all the cars of the corps and everything worked out perfectly. But to secure an entire brigade, let alone an entire corps, with transport-that did not and could not work.

Sometimes the whole corps was brought out into the field for a show, and, pouring fire, it would rush brilliantly on a furious march... The spectacle was fascinating. In our country, at all times, our booing has been up to the mark. It has been bewitching, because aside from the attention of the plumed foreign observers и of our engineers of human souls has been left with one small detail. Namely, that before the demonstration the tanks and cars had been repaired and refueled. So, for the short time of the show, it was possible to get by with a minimum of repair units or at all.

As for the spectacle, one charge was quite enough on the tanks. As well as one munition set for its sound design. During this spectacle, neither spare parts, nor fuel and lubricants, nor food, nor ammunition had to be supplied to the hull. And most importantly: the hull hardly needed to be operated. Several months were devoted to the preparation of such spectacles at home. In the army they used to call demonstrations of power of this nature a ballet. As every soldier knew his manoeuvre, it was not necessary for commanders to make any effort to manage the units...

[1] Fuel and - B.pr↕

6

The thoughtlessness of the organization of Tukhachevsky's corps was so obvious that the tank men whom evil fate had sent to serve in these strange compounds created by the "brave innovator" overwhelmed the high command, the party committees, the control bodies and the special departments of the NKVD with reports, applications, addresses and denunciations: there was obvious harm!

To all this, the "brave innovator" unmovedly replied: if war breaks out, we will give the corps enough cars, we will reinforce them with artillery and anti-aircraft guns, we will insert a pontoon-bridge regiment into the corps... With such declarations, the "innovator", without asking, has admitted: in peacetime the corps are incapable.

They objected to Tukhachevsky: if there are no cars in peacetime, where will they come from in wartime? Moreover, Tukhachevsky himself insisted that all cars and tractors in the Soviet Union be converted into "tanks".

But even if the corps were given enough vehicles, tugs, artillery, anti-aircraft guns and machine guns, means of overcoming water obstacles - how long would the columns of such a corps get? And with what will these columns be covered, with what will they be protected and defended? And how will the corps commander deal with this reinforced holding, since he is already unable to control the troops under his command?

On December 28, 1935, changes were made in the organizational structure of the Corps. The number of vehicles in each corps was increased from 207 to 1,444. The antiaircraft artillery division, one sapper and one flamethrower battalion, the technical base, and the aviation detachment were excluded from the corps. Only 12,710 fighters and commanders remained in each corps.

But even these changes do not solve the problems. Calculations show: in large mobile formations, each combat vehicle should have no less than 4-5 transport vehicles. On 560 tanks, 215 armoured cars, 10 fire artillery batteries with corresponding

number of infantry, scouts, bombers, liaison officers, medics and others should have at least 2000 vehicles. The columns of such a corps were stretched 250 kilometers. And that was if the distances established by statute were not maintained between units and units.

In keeping with the statute and listening to common sense, the columns of the corps in no way fit into either the 300 or 350 kilometers. Such an amount of machinery made the Corps weak, conspicuous, and marginally vulnerable. "The available means of communication did not provide the corps commander with continuous and reliable control on the move and in combat" *("VISION," 1968, No. 8, p. 108)*.

Powerful tank formations are a nice idea. But when overdone, the opposite happens. If 500 tanks are put on a route, the road becomes impassable for the vehicles following the tanks. Tanks break up any route.

Tukhachevsky's mobile compounds suffered from a congenital flaw: they were not mobile.

The impossibility of using such unwieldy armadas in combat was unquestioned, so after the creation of four corps their further deployment was discontinued.

This in no way contradicted the principle of massing tanks in combat and operation. In addition to the corps in the Red Army there were a considerable number of separate tank brigades. Depending on the type of tanks in service, a brigade could have 148 to 278 tanks. And this was obviously the limit that was not to be exceeded.

The tank brigades were powerful enough, but this power was not excessive, was not detrimental to mobility, did not undermine the main advantages of mobile compounds.

But what to do if in a given situation not 150, not 250 tanks, but more are needed to solve a specific task? No problem. In such a case, not one but two tank brigades should be used. Or three.

* * *

The lion is a fearsome predator. But a pack of wolves is perfectly capable of performing any "job" a lion is capable of. Wolves can destroy anyone. The difference is that a heavy lion is not capable of running long and fast. And even the lighter lioness is capable of a swift attack, just at a short enough distance.

See, strong wolves are able to overcome incredible distances. Tank brigades were capable of solving all sorts of tasks in both local and all-out war. Only they had to be used as a wolf pack: very strong predators against one beast.

Both Sun Tzu, Bonaparte and Guderian knew that only movement brings victory. And you and I know that legs feed the wolf.

Dmitry Grigoryevich Pavlov, who strongly opposed the idea of Tukhachevsky's corps, also understood this.

CHAPTER 10
WHAT IS THE BIG TANK?

There remained sufficiently powerful tank and motorized formations (brigades and divisions) in the Army, which had 250-260 combat vehicles. These formations, both individually and in various combinations with each other, could solve all tasks within the framework of a deep offensive operation.

"Soviet Armed Forces. History of construction". M., Voenizdat, 1978, p. 239.

1

For the first time for real action the two hulls, created according to recipes of the "brave innovator" Tukhachevsky, were used in Poland in September 1939.

Two Soviet fronts enter Poland. The 15th Tank Corps of the division commander M. П. Petrov. In the Ukrainian front - 25th Tank Corps of Colonel I. O. Yarkin.

Both corps have performed woefully inadequately. Their movement was slow, and the corps commanders constantly lost control of their brigades and battalions. The tank corps clogged the roads and prevented their support units from supplying the tanks with everything they needed for the march and the fight. The tank corps had fallen behind even the cavalry divisions. The tanks had broken the road. The fuel and lubricant and ammunition trucks could not follow the tanks.

At a meeting of senior command staff in December 1940, Soviet Marshal S. M. Comrade Pavlov rightly suggests that the roads be cleared, because if this pile is let go and everything is jammed with troops, they will soon stop and I will not be able to move... I had occasion in Belorussia (Comrade Kovalev knows) to drive fuel for the 15th Tank Corps by air. It was good that there was no one to fight with there. On the roads from Novogrudok to Volkovisk 75 percent of the tanks were stopped for lack of fuel (...) Comrade Pavlov raised the question of the need for 2-3 refuelings in the echelon to develop success. In my opinion, four should be provided... Two ammunition kits seem small to me. We should provide three ammunition sets. When you go out of the breach into the open, you don't have to chase all the sites and waste time. You should, if possible, penetrate deep into the rear to get a large room for maneuver" *("The War Ahead. Materials of the meeting*

of the senior leadership of the Red Army on 23-31 December 1940". M., Terra, 1993, p. 273).

Semyon Mikhailovich understood things correctly and thought soberly.

2

The Red Army struck a sudden axe blow at the rear of Poland, which stood like a wall in the path of Hitler's eastward movement. The Red Army had it easy in Poland because the main forces of the Polish Army were fighting against the German Army. By the time the Red Army entered Polish soil, Poland had already suffered enormous losses. Moreover, the command of the Voiska Polska had issued orders not to resist the Red Army. Individual fighting and clashes were exceptions to the rule.

The Polish command hoped that the Slav brothers were coming to the rescue, because there was no organized resistance against the Red Army. That was the only reason why the roadblocked grandiose, corps created according to the recipes of the "brave innovator" were not ignominiously defeated by the Polish cavalry.

Tukhachevsky's corps did not live to see 1941. But it is not hard to imagine their sad fate, had they met the German panzer divisions, had enemy aircraft been hovering over roads jammed with Red Star tanks that had run out of fuel.

Look, the individual tank brigades acted in Poland quickly, decisively and daringly. And it is no coincidence that the decision to disband Tukhachevsky's corps was taken in the autumn of 1939: the "liberation march" had been completed, the assessments had been made, and the conclusions were unambiguous: the corps should be disbanded, period!

I insist: the conclusions were timely and correct. They could have been reached earlier. And the experience of Spain has nothing to do here. There was the more visible, fresher experience from Poland.

By the way, Dmitry Grigorievich Pavlov has also interpreted the experience of Spain very correctly. In Spain, Soviet T-26 tanks, armed with a powerful 45-mm cannon, ruthlessly shot down German Pz-I and Pz-II tanks. Pavlov has taken into account that in

the approaching war, the enemy may in its development reach the level of Soviet tanks and create something similar to Soviet tank guns. Proceeding from this, Pavlov insisted on creating tanks with diesel engines, with anti-submarine armour and with such guns that could penetrate the anti-submarine armour of enemy tanks, in case the enemy also succeeded in creating something similar.

The result of Pavlov's foresight and persistence: in December of the same year, 1939, the KV and T-34 were taken into service with the Red Army. And the Germans never learned anything from the Spanish experience. They stayed with the old. The German wise men, the various Guderians and Mansteims, had seen that their tanks burned like matchboxes when they met the oldest Soviet tank, the T-26, but they never grasped that the time had come to create tanks with anti-sniper armor and to put powerful guns on them.

3

In November 1939 the existence of the tank corps was strongly opposed, except by the head of the Autobronetank Department, Commodore Pavlov:

— the Deputy Chief of Defence, the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army Commander 1st Rank B. M. Shaposhnikov, he had planned the "liberation campaign" in Poland and had seen the results;

— Commander 1st Rank S. K. Timoshenko, commander of the Ukrainian Front, under whose command was the 25th Tank Corps;

— Commander 2nd Rank M. П. Kovalyov, commander of the Belorussian Front, under whose command was the 15th Tank Corps;

— the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff, Commander 1st Rank G. И. Kulik, who coordinated the actions on both fronts.

It is no wonder that the commanders of these corps themselves spoke out against the existence of the tank corps - the division commander M. П. Petrov and Col. O. Yarkin. It was they who understood best: if a real war started, the corps would perish without causing any harm to the enemy, and the guilty would be found quickly. And it would be they, the corps commanders, who would be the first to be blacklisted. And rightly so. If it is impossible to use a corps so organized in war, the question will inevitably arise: why then did you, Defendant Yarkin, and you, Defendant Petrov, remain silent earlier?

Well, they didn't keep silent, they said everything that hurt them and thus protected themselves from future questions of a pedantic prosecutor.

The corps has been disbanded. But nothing terrible happened. Let us compare the previous situation with the new one.

Before the reorganization, each Soviet cavalry division had one tank regiment. There are no changes here.

There was one tank battalion in each rifle division.
Here everything has remained like that.

There were 4 separate heavy tank brigades in the Red Army. And here nothing has changed.

In addition, in the Red Army there were 32 tank brigades with tanks BT and T-26: 8 brigades in the composition of four tank corps and 24 separate. After the reorganization in the Red Army there remained the same number of tank brigades with T-26 and BT - 32. Only they all became separate.

What has changed then? *The headquarters* of the four tank corps were liquidated. Pavlov had eliminated an unnecessary management unit that was in the way, which was already incapable of managing.

By the way, the headquarters and control bodies of the tank corps have not disappeared without a trace. In August 1939, Stalin had begun a secret mobilization of the Red Army. Among other things, the number of rifle corps had increased from 25 to 62 in less than two years. And the number of armies - from 2 to 28. Staff officers and senior unit commanders (as indeed all other units) were badly needed. The commands of the four disbanded corps were immediately directed to form the commands of the new all-army armies.

4

Now let's understand something: with you we will not pay attention to the name, we will pay attention to the essential.

And the essential point is that in the autumn of 1939 Hitler, unwittingly, got into a Second World War for which he was not at all prepared.

It had 6 panzer divisions and one formation equal in strength to a panzer division. The strength of each division was 324 light tanks. In the fall of that same year, 1939, Pavlov 32 brigades of 278 GTs or T-26s each.

I agree: division sounds proud. But the difference in the number of tanks between the German division and our brigade is not significant. Moreover, for every German division there were 4-5 of our brigades.

The overwhelming majority of German tanks in the autumn of 1939 were the same Pz-I and Pz-II, which were no match for the T-26, let alone the BT. Therefore, with smaller numbers tanks, Pavlov's brigades equipped with T-26s were decisively superior to the German panzer divisions in firepower, and the brigades with BTs in both firepower and mobility.

Well, who then dared to reproach Pavlov for giving up the big tank formations?

He had, moreover, 4 heavy tank brigades, in which there were, depending on the type of war machine, from 148 to 183 tanks, while no Hitler tank in 1939 reached 20 tons. Even at that time he had not only heavy but also medium tanks.

And more: the Soviet infantry and cavalry had enough tanks of their own, and there was no such thing in Germany.

Let's also not forget that immediately after the war in Poland, the number of tanks in German panzer divisions was reduced. In numbers of tanks they at first equalled Pavlov's brigades, and then fell quite behind.

This process was never stopped again until the end of the war. In the course of each new reorganization the number of tanks in the German panzer divisions decreased until in 1944 it reached 70. But this was according to the states. It's according to as normal. But in the course of the war, you don't always get as many as you'like, as they should have given you. In the actual situation, the tank divisions were constantly short of what they should have had.

And now the propaganda assures us: in Germany they understood the role of large tank formations, and in our country Pavlov misinterpreted the experience of Spain.

5

Mad academics have been telling stories decade after decade about the "brave innovator" and the foolish cavalrymen who had ruined great schemes. But they forget to tell what Pavlov offered in exchange for the disbanded corps administrations.

And he had proposed to retain the separate tank battalions in all the rifle divisions and the tank regiments in the cavalry divisions. To keep all the separate tank brigades. To form 3 additional tank brigades and 10 training tank regiments to be deployed in brigades in the event of war. In addition to all this, the 15 best rifle divisions in the Red Army, starting with the 1st Moscow Proletarian, to be reformed into motorized divisions. 8 - in 1940, another 7 - in the first half of 1941.

Pavlov's motorized divisions were powerful, agile, compact, controllable, and, surprisingly, gracefully balanced. In each such division there were four regiments (tank, artillery, two motorized rifle), three battalions (reconnaissance, signal, light engineer), and two divisions (PTO and anti-aircraft). In all, there were 257 tanks in the division. In addition - 49 armored cars in the units for control, reconnaissance and liaison, 98 guns and mortars (excluding 50-mm) and 980 vehicles.

Most importantly, the entire reorganisation involved a minimal number of organisational and staff changes and relocations. Motorized divisions did not need to be formed. They already existed in the form of the best rifle divisions in the Red Army. It remained to deploy the division's individual tank battalion into a regiment, remove one rifle regiment from the division, and put the two remaining rifle regiments on vehicles and give them more tanks.

In addition, one of the two artillery regiments was to be withdrawn from the rifle division, which had been converted to motorized. To

take out is always easier than creating a new one. And it wasn't always necessary to subtract. Before the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was signed, Soviet rifle divisions had one artillery regiment each. And only from the autumn of 1939 in their composition they began to introduce a second artillery regiment. At the time of the beginning of Pavlov's reorganization, a second artillery regiment had not yet been introduced into all the rifle divisions. And even if it had been, it was in the formation stage.

The 36 tank brigades remained the same as before, only the number of tanks in each was reduced by twenty. Three new tank brigades were to be created, which, with such a number of existing brigades, was not difficult.

And to create 10 tank training regiments. Here, too, no particular problems could have arisen, because each tank brigade had its own tank training battalion. Pavlov had suggested that they be taken out of the brigades and merged into training regiments. And that's it.

In any case, the training tank regiments had to be located far from the borders. In the event of a sudden outbreak of war, they were not in a combat zone.

Tukhachevsky's highly literate defenders remember that at Pavlov's insistence the commands of the four corps were disbanded, but they forget that 15 divisions were created in their place, which were superior to the disbanded corps in number of tanks, in combat power, in mobility, and in ability to fight.

In addition to the organizational changes, Pavlov also prepared a qualitative rearmament of the tank troops. As early as February 21, 1938, three years before the 1941 catastrophe, the head of the Autobronetank Department under the RKKA, Commodore D. Pavlov sent a report to the USSR Defense Commissar, Marshal of the Soviet Union Voroshilov, on the need for a radical revision of the tank armament system.

In this document, Pavlov requested that the T-26 infantry escort tanks be left to the infantry and in no case be taken away from them. Pavlov wants the T-28 and T-35 tanks to be rearmed with a gun with a shaving trajectory and an initial speed of

projectile at not less than 560 m/s. In addition, as a replacement for these two types to develop a new heavy puncture tank.

These proposals of Pavlov have been implemented. For the T-28 and T-35, a 76 mm gun with an initial velocity of 555 m/s was created; in addition, as a replacement for these tanks, the heavy breakthrough tank KV was developed and put into serial production.

But that's not all. The same document of February 21, 1938 contained requests to develop a tank to replace the GT.

"The test specimens should be developed in two variants: caterpillar and pure caterpillar to finally resolve the issue of type selection (caterpillar or caterpillar). On obtaining a chassis (including the track) of a purely caterpillar tank that runs not less than 3,000 km, we will be able to abandon the wheeled-caterpillar type of tank" *(RGVA, f. 4, o. 19, d. 55, l. 1-2)*.

We've all been brought up with the beautiful legend: the stupid military got hooked on wheeled-track tanks and so ordered one to be developed. But the designer Koshkin, the great creator of the T-34, took the risk of developing two variants simultaneously: both a tracked and a wheeled-tracked one. Tests have shown the advantages of a purely tracked machine, and that is how the best tank of all times and nations was born. It has been alleged that Koshkin had created the T-34 "sort of semi-legally, as a self-initiative, in his spare time from his main job" *("Krasnaya Zvezda", 3-9 December 2008)*.

It would be fair to point out that the Red commanders really insisted on wheeled-track tanks. But we should not explain this attachment by backwardness and stupidity. The wheeled-tracked tank presents a whole bunch of problems in design, production, operation, repair, training. A purely tracked tank is more reliable and simple. But Soviet commanders faced the strategic task of liberating entire continents. Their range was from the taiga to the British seas. It was no accident that Comrade Stalin was the cutthroat poet composing poems about the last frontier pillar, the last fascist city and how "we will reach the Ganges too".

The Red Army was being prepared to conduct deep offensive operations, but the tank caterpillars, which weighed over

15 tons, have not withstood prolonged mileage, much less high speed. If the science and engineering of the time had been able to produce a caterpillar that could withstand several thousand miles of cross-country travel at high speed, the Red commanders would have resolutely and unanimously abandoned the wheeled-caterpillar inconvenience.

This is exactly the kind of tank Pavlov wanted to create. He wanted it after he returned from Spain in 1937. He wanted it when he was still in Spain. When Koshkin's design bureau did not yet exist. The T-34 was created on the order and at the request of the head of the Avtobronetank Department, Commodore Pavlov, which is confirmed by documents and the most authoritative testimonies such as those of the country's chief metallurgist, Academician V. C. Emelyanov and Marshal of the Soviet Union K. A. Meretskov, who stated that "the T-34 was Pavlov's dream embodied in metal".

Well, who and why then is making up and spreading legends that Koshkin created the T-34 semi-legally, on his own initiative and in his breaks from his main job? Who needed to distort history and why?

This must be in order for Pavlov to be trampled in the mud.

For if everyone admits that Pavlov was not an idiot, that he proposed things that were perfectly reasonable but radically opposed to what Tukhachevsky and then Zhukov did, the halo of both the
The "brave innovator" Tukhachevsky, and the "marshal of victory" Zhukov, will fade.

By the autumn of 1939, the KV and T-34, developed at Pavlov's request, were built and their trials began.

Pavlov had planned to rearm with the KV tanks the heavy tank brigades for the breakthrough.

With the T-34 tanks - the motorized divisions.

According to Pavlov's conception, there should be 258 tanks in the light tank brigades and 257 in the motorized divisions.

Tank brigades consist almost entirely of tanks with a minimum of support and support assets, while motorized divisions are formations that organically combine tank units with motorized infantry, artillery, air defense assets, etc.

This was done for the following purpose.

In a combat situation we sometimes need tank units and formations in almost pure form, i.e. tanks with the minimum of supporting units required. Example: in the standard rifle corps of the Red Army there are three rifle divisions. The total number of regiments is 9 rifle and 8 artillery (two artillery regiments in each division and two under the corps commander). If the Rifle Corps had not three divisions but only two, then the total number of regiments was 6 rifle and 6 artillery. In short, there was enough infantry and artillery in the corps. If the corps was operating on the main line, then it had to be reinforced with tanks. Tank brigades served for such cases.

At a higher level, i.e., at the army and front level, mobile groups designed for rapid marches into the enemy's deep rear were created in preparation for offensive operations. Here were needed formations in which there were not only tanks, but also motorized infantry, mobile artillery, scouts, antiaircraft gunners, etc. For such organization were needed motorized divisions.

The organization of tank troops by Pavlov's method was simple, orderly, clear, the new formations were powerful, mobile, manageable. Tank brigades and motorized divisions could have been incorporated into rifle corps, all-army armies and fronts, as well as held as a reserve of the General Command.

Pavlov's principle is: not to load one route with thousands of machines, but to distribute this power in space, to

acts in different directions, but with one purpose, according to a single plan and design. In case of necessity these compounds, like cubes, could have been used in any combination.

The role of the deputy commanders of the Soviet fronts and armies in the event of war was to head the army and frontline echelons for the development of the breakthrough (EDF). The possible composition of a frontal ERP was: a deputy of the front commander with a small staff, means of liaison and control, 2-4 tank brigades and 1-3 motorized divisions. That's a strike fist with a strength of 1000-1500 tanks with infantry, artillery and all other supporting and supporting forces and assets. How much more? Besides, according to Pavlov's conception, such a fist should be created only where, then and to the extent that, where and when the need arises. If there is no need, the tank brigades and motorized divisions operate separately.

Before the advent of Pavlov's motorized divisions, their role had been filled by cavalry divisions. The division commander Zhukov was the deputy commander of the Belorussian Military District for cavalry. Here is his message: 'In peacetime, my functions consisted of directing the combat training of the cavalry units and individual tank brigades designated by the operational mobile plan for joint actions with the cavalry. In the event of war, I was to take command of a mounted and mechanized group consisting of 4-5 divisions of cavalry and 3-4 separate tank brigades."

There could have been 1000-1300 tanks in such a group. Who said it was small? Who declared that Soviet commanders did not understand the role of large tank formations?

Pavlov has only suggested that the cavalry divisions in such groups be replaced by motorized ones. He understood that the communications of the time did not permit the management of a complete tank mass of 500-600 tanks and several thousand vehicles. He therefore proposed to organize tank formations of smaller size but mobile and manageable.

In the case of the action of several such formations in one direction, they had to be managed not so much by a single system of liaison, which was then impossible, as by linking their actions in a single design.

And these were not just theoretical considerations. In Pavlov's hands was the result of a brilliant experiment. In August 1939, Soviet troops on Halhyn Gol had for the first time in world history employed the tactic the Germans had called blitzkrieg. There were no mechanized corps in the Soviet force. But there was a motorized rifle division, 2 tank and 3 motorized armored brigades. They were operating at a considerable distance from each other, but under a unified conception. The result was strategic.

This, Pavlov has proved, is what we .

Did we have to defend ourselves - the motorized rifle division and tank brigades in conjunction with the infantry, artillery, sappers fully coped with this task on Halhin Gol. Moreover, in a war against a very strong enemy, in very difficult climatic conditions, in a situation of huge detachment from supply bases.

If they had to counterstrike - they did that too.

Did they have to step in and create mobile groups for this purpose

- Please. No problems. Two mobile groups were formed on Halhin Gol in exact accordance with the task they were to solve. They had solved it successfully. What more?

Zhukov was victorious at Halhin Gol, among other things, also because the right tools of warfare, not created by him, were in his hands.

He didn't understand that. He didn't appreciate it.

7

After Stalin, Tukhachevsky was ordered to be praised. Anything in which the "brave innovator" took part was declared ingenious. The ideological cretins, without going into the heart of the matter, have been shouting at the top of their voices: a giant of military thought! A star of the first magnitude in the ranks of the distinguished! An incomprehensible genius! A lost genius!

The armchair people don't pay attention to the essentials. The term is more important to them. If Pavlov has proposed brigades, then it is something very small. Look, the Germans have panzer divisions. If they are divisions, then they are large formations, so the Germans understood the role of large panzer formations.

But wasn't it very rare that a German panzer division of 1941 and all subsequent years could match the quantity (and quality) of tanks of Pavlov's panzer brigades and motorized divisions.

Here is information on the number of tanks in some German panzer divisions as of 22 June 1941:

1-a - 154;
3-a - 198;
4-a - 169;
9-a - 157;
13-a - 147;
14-a - 163;
16-a - 158.

Come on, compare that to Pavlov's tank brigades and motorized divisions!

Incidentally, we are told that the divisions and corps of the Red Army were not fully manned. But let's turn our attention to the German mess. Which of these divisions was fully complete?

They object to me that the German panzer divisions were assembled in four groups. Correct. And who prevented the brigades and divisions of the

Pavlov to gather in groups? That is what he was proposing to do. And he insisted.

Let's look not at the name, but what lies behind the name. Here are some examples.

On November 1, 1942, the commander of the German Panzer Army Africa reported in that there were 409 tanks in the Panzer Army, including 321 serviceable tanks.

A huge number of books, articles, dissertations, and films have been devoted to the Africa Tank Army. And come to think of it, it was the same as Pavlov's two tank brigades, and not fully manned.

Another example. Marshal of the Soviet Union A. И. Eryomenko describes the most terrible day of the Second World War - August 23, 1942. It is clear that it is about the defense of Stalingrad. The Volga was the main oil aorta of the Soviet Union. The Volga carries oil from the Caspian Sea upstream. It's a line from south to north. At each major river port, some of the oil was transferred to rail tankers and transported west and east. It was enough for this aorta to be cut, for the Germans to go up the Volga and put a few guns on the coast, for the Red Army to be left without air, for industry to stop and for the Soviet Union to collapse. The most convenient place to go out on the Volga was near Stalingrad.

Eryomenko was then a front commander with the rank of colonel-general. "It was clear that the Hitlerites had gone on the offensive directly to Stalingrad. The report from the headquarters of the 8th Air Army spoke of the same. The airmen had seen two enemy columns with about 100 tanks in each. After them - dense columns of trucks with infantry. All this was advancing towards Stalingrad" *("Krasnaya Zvezda", October 12, 2002)*.

Critical situation. The fate of the Soviet Union hung in the balance. The Germans had enormous forces at their disposal. Their strength consisted in the fact that the tanks were not alone - after the columns of tanks came countless trucks: control, liaison, sappers, repairmen, infantry, artillery, anti-aircraft gunners, medics, ammunition, fuel and everything else. And the tanks themselves...

If you look closely, in terms of the number of tanks it was as if it was just one brigade of Pavlov. And not fully manned. И

it torn in two. And the tanks - only light and medium.

It appears that with compounds of the type of Pavlov's brigades it was possible to solve both operational and strategic tasks. And the example given shows that it was possible to get through even with smaller formations: the enemy had introduced two battle groups (call them regiments, brigades, divisions - the question is not the name) with 100 tanks in each. They are advancing along different routes anyway, but they are linked by a common design, a common goal. Most importantly, they are under the unified control of a superior commander and are fully equipped with everything they need to live and fight.

And here we have it drilled into our heads: oh, the Germans understood that tanks should be assembled in powerful groups. Well, two groups of 100 tanks with all the necessary support and support troops almost decided the outcome of the entire Second World War.

And since we are talking about the big tank formations, we cannot under any circumstances overlook the spectacular tank battle on the Kursk arc in the summer of 1943.

Among the German troops, the SS units and formations were the best equipped: there were 163 tanks in the Greater Germany Division at the beginning of the battle, the SS 3rd Panzer Division
- 139 tanks.

Wehrmacht panzer divisions were less well armed: the 3rd Panzer -
90 tanks;
9-a - 83;
12-a - 82;
18-a - 72;
19 - 81, etc.

I am quoting official information from the Military Historical Journal. The direct interest of both Soviet generals then and official historians now is to exaggerate the enemy's forces. In the given case, for example, among other techniques of lying, the following is applied: Soviet tanks are divided into two categories - "all" and "including serviceable", and of German tanks they divide so only those that fought in Africa. Our serious historians do not divide into serviceable and unserviceable those tanks,

who fought against the Red Army. As if the Germans only ever had serviceable tanks.

By the start of the Battle of the Kursk Arch, each German Panzer Division had an average of 78 tanks. Who then would argue that, in proposing to have tank brigades and motorized divisions with a strength of 257-258 tanks, Dmitry Grigorievich Pavlov did not understand the role and importance of large tank formations?

Another example for comparison. In December 1944, the 6th Guards Tank Army struck a bypass of Budapest. It had 220 tanks, 9 self-propelled artillery pieces, 16 RS pieces, 390 guns and mortars, and 1956 vehicles *("VIEW", 1973, No. 12, p. 65)*.

Colossal power. Here is the proof that at the final stage of the war the Soviet commanders had risen to the highest level, correctly understood the role of tank troops and correctly used them.

And I object again: call the 6th Guards Tank Army by another name and you will get what Pavlov proposed.

* * *

100 tanks, 200 tanks - that's a huge force. But only if they are provided with fuel, ammunition, spare parts, if they act together with the artillery, infantry, scouts, anti-aircraft gunners, sappers, medics, repairmen.

The corps, which had been deployed to Tukhachevsky's recipes, had 560 tanks and 215 armored vehicles in one herd. But they are provided neither with fuel, nor with ammunition, nor with means of control and communication, nor with artillery and anti-aircraft guns, nor with scouts, nor with infantry. Such an organisation is nonsense and a sick fantasy. And if we measure it with a prosecutor's eye - treason and harm.

Komkor Pavlov has understood this. He has stood up against this nonsense.

CHAPTER 11
AND HE WILL BREAK HIS HEAD

The measures taken, especially the formation of mechanized corps and artillery regiments by the RGC, were subordinated only to the interests of the offensive, without taking into account that they would also have to lead the defense.

Colonel-General L. M. Sandalov
"The First Days of War", p. 44

1

It is normal to think that to break stones, a stone breaker is needed. The heavier the better.

But there are limits to that too.

If you can't lift the hammer, then light is preferable to heavy. Tukhachevsky's hulls were unliftable. That is why Pavlov insisted on giving up the hulls.

The advantage of the structure proposed by Pavlov was that it was flexible. It was designed for offensive warfare. But in case necessity, the formations created according to Pavlov's prescriptions could have been used for defence, for counter-strikes, for counter-offensives against what was becoming a general offensive.

In defensive battles Pavlov's divisions and brigades could have been used in ambushes on the roads the enemy was moving along. In the event of a retreat, Pavlov's brigades and divisions could have been left as an arerguard: the main force retreated and stood on a new frontier, their retreat covered by units with fast-moving tanks, which deterred the enemy for some time, then quickly joined the main force.

Pavlov has insisted on his own.

But they didn't let him enjoy it for long. The Mechanized Corps had fierce supporters. The fight to get the Mechanized Corps back was fierce. Thanks to the efforts of terribly progressive strategists, on June 7, 1940, Commander 2nd Rank Pavlov was removed from his post as head of the Autoborne Tank Department (ABTU) under the Red Army and sent to command the Belorussian Special Military District, which a few days after Pavlov's appointment as commander was reorganized as the Western Special.

Pavlov has been removed from ABTU so as not to interfere with the path of doom.

On June 9, 1940, the Defense Narkom approved the plan for the formation of eight mechanized corps. It was decided that the tanks would be assembled in unwieldy, unmanageable herds. On July 4, 1940, the Council of People's Commissars of USSR passed a decree
No. 1193-464ss, which approved the new staff organization of the Mechanized Corps. In each corps - two tank and one motorized division, a motorcycle regiment, several separate battalions, an aviation squadron.

The supporters of the mechanized corps finally win. Their basic idea is: there should be not four corps, as under Tukhachevsky, but twice as many! And in each corps - not 560 tanks, but also twice as many!

And the deployment of the eight mechanized corps with this monstrous organization begins all over again. Then they added a ninth. In each such corps there are 36,080 commanders and fighters, 1,031 tanks, 266 armored vehicles, 352 tractors, 12 aircraft.

All in all there were 13 regiments in such a corps: 5 tank, 4 motorized rifle, 3 artillery, 1 motorcycle.

Five thousand vehicles to service a thousand tanks was clearly not enough. The corps was therefore supplemented with more vehicle battalions.

In case such a hull was driven in a single column, its length was 400-450 kilometers. That's without the . But it was intended to reinforce the corps with two corps artillery regiments, in addition to the three already in its strength, with engineer and pontoon-bridge regiments and battalions, and other means.

And the implementation of all this began. For example, the 441st and 445th Corps Artillery Regiments were additionally introduced into the 4th Mechanized Corps, the 467th and 578th into the 5th Mechanized Corps, and so on.

Commanders who had the bad luck to command such corps grumbled a bit. At the December meeting of the senior command staff, the commander of the 6th Mechanized Corps, Maj. Gen. Г. Hatzkilevich stated. How can such a mass of tanks get into a breach? We calculated in our exercises

(we were even throwing away 2500 machines from the combat composition, taking only the most necessary for life and combat) and again in the offensive with us involved 6800 machines, almost 7000. How can such a mass of machines fit into such a narrow front?" *("On the Eve of War. Proceedings of the meeting of the top leadership of the Red Army 23-31 December 1940". M., Terra, 1993, p. 275)*.

They tell us the reasons for the German victories: the whole point was that the Germans were concentrated in narrow areas. Oh, if only they could have gotten to the 6th Mechanized Corps exercises, so they could learn how to focus on narrow areas...

As a matter of fact, the Germans saw this without inviting them across the border. Hatzkilevich's 6th Mechanized Corps was on the very edge of the Bialystok bulge.

General Hatzkilevitch continues, "One ammunition kit represents 100 wagons. Well, imagine what kind of rear it takes to drag all that behind you, especially if we have three and a half ammunition kits."

But we shouldn't forget about the three refuels they also had to carry with them...

The power of such a corps may perform slightly differently. Let's stand at the end of the road and admire the mechanized corps passing by. One tank or car a minute. They are not moving closely one after the other, as on Tverskaya, but keeping the distances prescribed by the statute. Besides, moving in a column reduces speed. And the tanks in our columns are not only fast, but all sorts. They alternate with tractors, which drag behind them extremely heavy guns, up to and including 152-mm howitzer-guns. And our roads are Soviet.

Theoretically 60 machines per

hour. 1440 per day.

But distance must be maintained not only between individual machines, but also between companies. And this is no longer 35-40 meters, but 200-300. And there are distances between battalions. Slightly larger. And between regiments. And between divisions.

There are also breakdowns on the machines that slow down movement. There are also breaks. Theoretically, the mechanized corps should have gone past a point in 7 days. Of , if the personal

stock sleeps less, eats less, wastes less time refueling and repairing machines. Let's not forget that the tank needed repairs after 50 hours of running *("The day before yesterday. Materialy совещания высшего руководящего состава RKKA 23-31 grudnia 1940". M., Terra, 1993, p. 298)*.

7 days is the scientifically based norm. Indeed, they have not always been able to fit into it.

In the course of the December meeting of the senior Red Army leadership, the commander of the 1st Mechanized Corps, Lt. Gen. JI. Romanenko reported how he intended to act in war. He is interrupted by the Narkom of Defence, Marshal of the Soviet Union S. K. Timoshenko. *Proceedings of the meeting of the top leadership of the Red Army 23-31 December 1940". M., Terra, 1993, pp. 155)*.

Let's agree: when Dmitry Grigorievich Pavlov opposed *such* mechanized corps, he had good reason.

2

To use *such a* corps in defense is impossible: the tanks can quickly dig into the ground, but what to do with the thousands of vehicles? They are a wonderful target for enemy aircraft. And without vehicles, i.e. without fuel, spare parts and ammunition, tanks are useless.

Such a hull cannot be used for a counterstrike either. If we drive the mechanized corps along the front to the point of the enemy breakthrough, these 1,000 tanks, 1,500 motorcycles, 350 tractors, 5,000-7,000 vehicles will clog all the roads and will not allow the other formations operating nearby either to resupply or to make maneuvers with the reserves or to retreat.

Such a hull was intended only for breaching enemy territory. Only there could its columns be dragged. Only there could its colossal power have been realized. But only on condition that we had complete air supremacy.

In other words, the creation of such corps automatically implied a sudden strike by Soviet aviation on enemy airfields to gain air dominance from the first moment of the war. In other conditions it was impossible to use such a corps, it was too vulnerable from enemy aviation.

But even in the offensive a corps with such a composition could be only on condition that it acted completely suddenly, that the thousands of tanks at once broke into enemy ground and advanced without swerving for minor skirmishes, bypassing outbreaks of resistance, and had before it a clear objective known in advance to the commanders.

Just as the columns of German tanks in 1940 had rushed to the Atlantic coast.

Just as the 6th Guards Panzer Army in August 1945 had rushed forward to the Pacific.

But any unplanned deviations from the original plans could have ended in defeat, because

The momentum of this mass was colossal, and to manage it was almost impossible.

A salutary idea occurs to us: why not send such a corps on three or four routes?

Great idea. But this is exactly what Commodore Pavlov was suggesting - not to assemble the tanks in unmanageable masses and move them in a column, but to have tank formations of smaller size, and to bring them into battle along different routes, but towards a common goal and a common design.

I'm reminded that at the war's closing stage, Soviet commanders were running tank armies. Right. But there were only five tank armies. At the very end of the war - six. They were brought into battle with a composition of 500-600 tanks. Rarely - 800-900. But in a tank army there were also 200-300 tanks. The tanks were Soviet, but the use of tank armies became possible after we received from America hundreds of thousands of off-road vehicles and a corresponding amount of means of communication. We didn't have that in 1941, so it was impossible to operate such corps in the rapidly changing environment. Nor was it possible to provide them with everything they needed to live and fight.

3

In January 1941 Army General G. K. Zhukov and he declared. We should have THIRTY such corps in the Red Army!

Zhukov has insisted on their formation. Subsequently, the management of one mechanized corps was disbanded before its creation was completed.

But 29 is also so much that after the war they were shy to talk about it to Stalin and even to Khrushchev. In official history it was reported that several mechanized corps were created *("Istoriya Velikой Otechestvennой wojny Sovetskoi Unii 1941- 1945". M., Voenizdat, 1961. Vol. 1, p. 457)*.

When one reads this, one calculates: three... let's make it five...

Here once more it is well to recall "the truest book on war." Zhukov reports that the Germans had 3,712 tanks. And this was 5-6 and more times more than in the Red Army. And a little earlier, in the same book, he says that at the beginning of he insisted on creating 30 mechanized corps of 1000 tanks each, and the stupid Stalin, who knows why, hesitated...

The decision to deploy 9 mechanized corps was clearly wrong. The decision to increase their number to 30 was a crime against the Red Army. No one will succeed in pushing the blame for this crime on Stalin. "И. В. Stalin apparently had no definite opinion on the matter and was vacillating. Time passed and only in March 1941 it was decided to form the requested by us 20 mechanized corps*"* *(Zhukov, G. K. "Memories and Reflections." M., APN, , pp. 197)*.

It was categorically impossible to complete it all. In the command of each mechanized corps and corps units (motorcycle regiment, aviation squadron, liaison battalion, etc.) according to the 10/20 states, there should have been 346 command and control personnel, i.e. officers according to modern terminology. For

10 034 officers were needed to complete the 29 corps commands and corps units.

Maybe it's with the sergeants? No. The junior command staff in each mechanized corps command and in corps units, according to the same 10/20 statute, should have been 434. 12,586 total in the 29 corps.

For each new armoured division 1,334 officers and 2,437 NCOs and sergeants were needed. All in all, 61 tank divisions were created at Zhukov's request. To complete them 81,374 officers and 148,657 NCOs and sergeants were needed.

In addition - 31 motorized divisions. State 05/70. Officers in the motorized division - 1093, sergeants and sergeants - 2276. About
31 divisions required 33,883 officers and 70,556 junior commanders.

A total of 125,291 officers and 231,799 enlisted men and sergeants were needed to man the 29 mechanized corps, 3 separate tank and 2 separate motorized divisions.

In all, the 29 mechanized corps and 5 separate tank and motorized divisions were to have 1,101,110 combatants and commanders. The number is obtained as in a computer program - ones and zeros.

That , not counting the two motorized rifle divisions, the motorized armor brigades, the tank regiments of the cavalry divisions, the tank divisions of the mountain-cavalry divisions, the individual tank battalions of the airborne corps, some rifle divisions and brigades, tank units, and NKVD units.

It was impossible to manage such masses of tank troops using the old management apparatus. The decision to deploy mechanized corps entailed a decision to reorganize the command apparatus.

On 26 June 1940, the ABTU under the RKKA was transformed into the Main Armoured Vehicle Directorate under the RKKA, consisting of four directorates. It needed the most experienced and knowledgeable tankers with the highest ranks.

In addition, the Combat Training Directorate of the People's Commissariat of Defense included the Inspection of Armored Troops. (The Inspector General was Maj. Gen.

from the tank troops B. Г. Vershinin, Deputy - Major General of the Tank Troops P. E. Shurov.)

In addition, directly under the People's Commissar for Defence was the fuel supply management (Major-General of the Tank Troops P. V. Kotov).

In each military district and on the Far Eastern Front, the troops were led by the head of the Motor Tank Department - ABTU. There were all 17 such directorates. The Chief of ABTU and his deputy were general posts.

In each all-army army, the leadership of the tank troops was carried out by the head of the armoured tank department - ABTO. This was also a general's position. For example, the Chief of ABTO at the 17th Army was the Major General of Tank Troops M. И. Pavelkin, at the 18th Army - Major General of the Tank Troops N. Д. Goltsov, at the 21st Army - Major General of the Tank Troops V. T. Volsky, at the 23rd Army - Major General of the Tank Troops V. Б. Lavrynovych. As of June 21, 1941, the Red Army consisted of 28 all-army armies and 3 armies in the stage of preparation for deployment. And each general had a corresponding management apparatus...

Due to a shortage of tank generals, colonels were also placed in the positions of chief of ABTU and ABTO, but they had both general privileges and general authority.

It took generals, generals, generals to staff all these commands and departments. And colonels, and majors, and captains.

For this tank horde, cadres had to be prepared. The Stalin Military Academy and the 21st Tank School prepared them. Each military school meant one general's post. And many general posts in the academy. In addition to generals and academies, military schools needed many colonels, lieutenant colonels, majors, etc.

There were two tank schools in Kharkov. In Ulyanovsk - also two. And in Saratov - three tank schools! Not counting all the other types.

In other branches of the army the same thing was happening. In Chkalov there were two Air Force schools. In Kiev - two, and in Leningrad - three artillery schools. That's what they were called - 1st LAU, 2nd LAU, 3rd LAU.

The retraining of tank officers took place at the Leningrad Armoured Tank Courses for the improvement of command staff. The head of the courses was Major General of the Tank Troops N. A. Bolotnikov.

But it was not only officers who had to be trained, but sergeants as well. For tank troops, training centers were organized with simply incredible productivity.

Tanks need to be repaired and resupplied. In addition to combat and training units, depots for fuel and lubricants and armoured property, repair plants and bases, including mobile ones, had to be organised.

In the first half of 1941, tank troops were deployed in the Soviet Union, which was to have a strength of at least one and a half million men, which included the management apparatus, the academy, military schools, retraining courses, training centers, and supporting structures.

Aviation, airborne troops, artillery and all other components of the war machine were deployed at the same rapid pace.

4

Stalin hesitated for a reason. There was a risk. There was a terrible risk. If they brought such corps across the border, no one would be able to stop them. Even if they transferred not all of them, but only a dozen, not even fully complete, no one would be able to hold back this armored mass.

But in the event of an enemy attack, this entire mass of troops is incapable of fighting. Simply because of the length of the columns. Simply because of the dust raised. Simply because of the inability to shelter these masses from aerial reconnaissance and air strikes. Simply because of the unreality of the task of supplying and managing it all.

Because of the creation of the mechanized corps, all tanks had to be taken away from the Soviet infantry. Zhukov took them away and the infantry was left without tanks. In case of offensive war - no big deal. The infantry will victoriously march forward after the mechanized corps. But if the enemy strikes first, the infantry without tanks may well flee...

This is exactly what happened.

The result of this endeavor: almost all of the rifle divisions had their T-26 tank battalions taken away and thrown in to form the Zhukov Mechanized Corps. With this, the sustainability of all Soviet rifle divisions was sharply reduced. And the tanks were assembled in monstrous unmanageable masses. Soviet rifle divisions were not fully equipped with anti-tank guns, but did have T-26 tanks. And it's still a cannon, only self-propelled. Again a cannon, but armoured. Again a cannon, but also equipped with machine guns.

The T-26 tanks were seized from the divisions and thus sharply reduced their resistance in the event of an encounter with enemy tanks.

The formation of mechanized corps meant that from a higher level of understanding of the role of tanks, the Red Army was

has fallen to a lower level: overstrength compounds are there, and tanks to support infantry are not.

Pavlov had proposed to have relatively small but mobile brigades and divisions. And Zhukov had gathered into giant tank masses everything that existed in the Red Army. And here in one column are the superheavy KVs - speed 34 km/hr, movement reserve 240 km, and the BT-7Ms - caterpillar speed 62 km/hr, caterpillar movement reserve 600 km. And here again - T-26 with a speed of 30 km/h. And the T-34 with a speed of 55 km/h.

In addition - tractors "Stalinets" and "Voroshilovets" with super heavy guns behind and speed 10-15 km / h.

Zhukov inserted fast tanks in slow columns, which in addition included low-clearance vehicles and hundreds of tractors with superheavy guns and howitzers. Thus the Grand Strategist has deprived the fast tanks of their chief advantage. He has tied up the legs of runners, turning the maneuvering mass into a protracted, low-mobility one. In so doing, he has nullified the sacrifices, efforts, and suffering of the nation throughout the pre-war years.

The people have given the army first-class weapons in quantities unseen in the world. It remained for these quantities and qualities to be cleverly used. But a brainless soldier has turned out to be at the head of the Brain of the Army.

5

In June 1941 there were 40 mechanized corps in the whole world. Including:

IN THE USA - 0;

In the UK - 0; In Japan - 0;

In Italy - 0;

France did not exist as an independent state at that time;

In Germany - 11, including 9 - on the Soviet-German front, 1 - in Africa, 1 - in reserve;

In the Soviet Union - 29.

Three-quarters of the mechanized corps in the entire world were Soviet. But this is only at first glance. If we look more carefully, we find that each of at least eight Soviet mechanized corps was superior in strength, in quantity and in quality of armament to all the armored armor troops of Germany and to all the armored armor troops of the world . Such corps were:

1-and mk of the Northern Front, major-general of tank troops M. Л. Chernyavsky;

2-and mk at the 9th Army of the Southern Front, Lt. Gen. B. Novoselsky;

3-and mk at the 11th Army of the North-Western Front, Major General of the Tank Troops A. B. Kurkin;

4-and M.C. of the 6th Army of the Southwestern Front, Maj. Gen. A. Vlasov;

6th Mk of the 10th Army of the Western Front, Maj. Gen. Г. Khatskilevich;

8th Mk of the 26th Army of the Southwestern Front, Lt. Gen. И. Ryabishev;

15th Mk of the South-Western Front, Maj. Gen. И. Carpezo;

16th Mk, 12th Army, Southwest Front, Division Commander A. Д. Sokolov.

By 22 June 1941, the vast majority of German tank troops had been thrown against the Red Army: 3,712 obsolete, worn-out tanks. And the Red Army had 25,000 of them, including over 3,000 state-of-the-art BT-7M, T-40, T-34, KV-1 and KV-2 tanks, equaled by none in the world. And here the writer Nosov tells about the German tank armadas and their complete absence in the Soviet Union...

But, Citizen Nosov, we too have had corps better than Hitler's.

Well, what then? Where is the cause of the crash?

The study of the question leads every researcher to the paradoxical conclusion: the terrible defeat in 1941 did not happen because there were no mechanized corps in the Red Army. The defeat happened precisely because there were, because they were too powerful, because they were too many.

Dmitry Grigoryevich Pavlov was absolutely right in speaking out against their creation, but they did not believe him, deployed the mechanized corps contrary to his opinion, and thus destroyed the cadre Red Army.

On February 21, 1938, three years before the catastrophe in 1941, the head of the ABTU under the RKKA, Corps Commander D. Pavlov, had sent to the USSR's Commissar of Defence, Marshal of the Soviet Union Voroshilov, a report on the need for a radical revision of the tank armament system. Pavlov warned, "The different tactical and technical characteristics (in speed, traversability, armor, and armament) of these combat vehicles operating in a single formation lead to their improper combat use" *(RGV A[1], f. 4, o. 19, d. 55, l. 1-2)*.

Pavlov has insisted on forming powerful compounds, but without stepping over the line beyond which they become unwieldy and unmanageable. He also insisted that each formation should have tanks of one, at most two types: for example, the main mass in the formation - heavy tanks for breaching, in addition - a certain amount of light mobile tanks for reconnaissance and security.

And the illiterate Zhukov mixed into his mechanized corps everything that fell to his lot. Look at the composition of any mechanized corps of 1941 and you will see in each corps the whole spectrum of armored equipment, from our first tanks to the latest examples, from light and ultralight to the heaviest, from breakthrough tanks to tanks for developing success, from reconnaissance tanks to tanks for close support of infantry.

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[1] Russian State Military Archive. ↥

6

Someone H. Yakovlev wrote the book "Marshal Zhukov" *(M., Izvestia, 1995)*. Admirable creative method. Comrade Yakovlev has painstakingly transcribed Zhukov's memoirs, adding to them his comments: behold, here he is right! And here too! And here! Ah, how nice! Ah, what a wise decision. And how brave!

Here Yakovlev gets to the mechanized corps: 'Not at once and not instantly did he succeed in convincing Stalin of the correctness of his opinion. The decision came only in March 1941. Right decision, but the resources! To complete these hulls needed 16.6 thousand tanks of new model, and all - 32 thousand tanks! Our industry gave them... But the course taken was the right one, the formation of the corps begun then definitely affected the course of the war" *(p. 60)*.

The story of Tukhachevsky repeats itself here. Our kind propaganda wrote about him that his proposals for the production of 50-100 thousand tanks a year were absolutely correct, only the numbers needed to be clarified.

But if the numbers were specified, if they were compared with the possibilities of the country's economy, there would be nothing left of Tukhachevsky's proposals.

Here's another Genius Strategist set on the right course: let's make mechanized corps! Except for the resources... The country didn't have that many tanks, vehicles, and communications equipment, and industry wasn't going to be able to produce that many in the next few years. Nor were there as many officers in the country. And no country was able to support as many officers, provide them with equipment, rations, money, housing.

Not because our industry has been so weak. If in the spring of 1941 all the tanks from all the countries of the world had been collected, and then Zhukov's mechanized corps could not be completed.

In defense of the Strategist's wisdom stands Krasnaya Zvezda *(March 25, 2006)*: 'Zhukov was therefore right, and the incompleteness of motorized and tank units by the beginning of the war had reached 50-60 percent'.

This is the logic in the Russian Ministry of Defense. Zhukov had insisted on forming an incredible number of mechanized corps, tank and motorized divisions, which under no conditions was it possible to complete with tanks, nor with vehicles, nor with communications, nor with personnel. Stalin had long resisted this. But Zhukov had insisted. The war broke out and here was Zhukov's excuse: well, that they were not complete!

And who comes out guilty? It is known - Stalin.

Now a question to citizen N. Has he seen an inter-village road on which a column of 100 tanks has passed? And there were 300, 500, 700, 800 and more tanks in Zhukov's incomplete corps! He would have liked to have 1,000 in each corps. In the first days of the war, heavy tanks were smashing roads and bridges, followed by hundreds of other tanks and tractors with guns. And already after them - on the already impassable roads - thousands of cars. They lagged behind, and sometimes stopped altogether. But then the tanks stopped too. Because the cars were carrying the repairmen, spare parts, fuel and lubricants. Where are the tanks without them?

On the roads (especially ours) such titanic concentrations of machines have created gigantic traffic jams. In defensive warfare, when air dominance belonged to the enemy, clusters of tanks became a wonderful target for German bombers: hit, there was no way not to hit.

The simultaneous formation of 20 mechanized corps, when the creation of the first nine had not yet been completed, led to the complete destruction of the already well-matched combat mechanisms and stabilized military collectives. Under Zhukov's designs, 92 tank and motorized divisions were simultaneously formed in the country. Platoon commanders became company commanders and were immediately promoted even further to battalion commander. Not because Stalin in 1937 had exterminated "40,000 strategists," but because in the

the country a mind-boggling number of aviation, tank, airborne and other divisions and corps were being created.

Have you ever overlapped into a position at a new place? In the early days all officers and soldiers look the same to you. Go that you remember who here is the commander of the first battalion and who of the third, who is the chief of intelligence and who is the deputy chief of staff of the regiment, who is your soldier and who is not yours.

Again, fine if there are only a few new officers in the regiment who haven't gotten used to the environment yet. What if the whole regiment is ? If all the officers and soldiers are new? If no one knows anyone? The 20 new mechanized corps that began to form in March 1941 represent 60 new divisions, 260 new regiments, thousands of new battalions. But to complete them, it was necessary to take fighters and commanders from previously established formations and units...

In the spring of 1941 Zhukov, who had received approval to radically reorganize the Red Army, shuffled all the commanders of all the tank troops. All were new in their places. They all looked at each other in consternation: well, brother, who are you?

7

Zhukov never studied the history of military art. And there are lessons there for centuries. Here you have the Macedonian phalanx, for example. 8, 16, and sometimes 25 lines of 800-1000 fighters in each line. No one could stand before the phalanx. It had one drawback: it could not deploy.

The Romans have taken a mighty step forward. They have dismembered the monolithic phalanx into separate detachments - maniples. The dismemberment into tactical units made the army more mobile, manageable, capable of fighting in any terrain, manoeuvring into battle and striking from depth.

At first glance, the monolith is a force, an impenetrable fortress. And dismemberment is weakening. In fact, it was the opposite. Dismemberment has meant amplification and a sharp increase in combat capabilities.

Once a Roman clever man named Terentius Varon decided to abandon the dismemberment of the fighting units and to gather the Roman army into one. To make it stronger, you see. The Roman army had become a huge phalanx that had lost its flexibility and maneuverability. It was then that Hannibal, with a smaller force, defeated them. The name of this battle became a byword - Cana. And the lesson for all strategists throughout the centuries and millennia is this: a huge lumbering mass is extremely vulnerable.

Pavlov understood this.

The illiterate Zhukov did not understand it. He had heard somewhere that large tank formations were something progressive. And he rushed to form large tank formations. Make the great strategist prepare for war, he will break his head too. And not only his own, but the whole army, the whole country.

The declaration that the right course has been taken does not correspond to reality. A foolish and criminal course has been taken. "We must admit that our mechanized corps have proved really

cumbersome" *(Marshal of Armored Troops Poluboyarov. Proceedings "On the Northwest Front," pp. 128)*.

Do the Kremlin nightingales sing, they sing: "the formation of corps then begun noticeably affected the course of the war." Precisely: the formation of corps begun then led to the instantaneous loss of twenty thousand tanks and the entire cadre of tank troops. The consequence was also the defeat of the entire remaining Red Army, the defeat of the war and the doom of the Soviet Union after a long and painful agony.

As early as July 15, 1941, it was decided to disband the mechanized corps. But there was nothing to disband. The tanks were either burnt out by air strikes or abandoned due to lack of fuel and very minor damage.

In a defensive war, one has to react to the enemy's actions, and for this purpose small easily manageable mobile formations and units are convenient: individual tank battalions, regiments and brigades. And it is these that they have begun to use.

And Pavlov was named as the culprit for the defeat.

* * *

From 1942, the Red Army revived tank and mechanized corps. By staffing in the tank corps should have been there:

in 1942 168 tanks,

in 1943 - 257,

from 1944 to the end of the war - 270.

The mechanized corps in those years by staffing was to include 175, 229, 246 tanks respectively.

The war has shown that a mobile armoured unit must be powerful, yet flexible. In striving to make it as reinforced as possible, the limit should not be crossed beyond which such a compound loses its mobility and becomes unmanageable. The optimum number of tanks for such a compound is 230-270.

This is confirmed by the experience of the greatest war. And it is precisely what Dmitry Grigorievich Pavlov proposed back in

autumn of . Only he called these formations not corps, but tank brigades and motorized divisions.

If someone didn't like that, they only had to change the name.

CHAPTER 12
FOR THE 160 DIVISIONS AND 2 BRIGADES

We had calculated that the Red Army had 200 divisions before the war started. Six weeks after the war began we were forced to find that there were 360.

Colonel General Alfred Jodl Minutes
of Interrogation on 17 June 1945

1

So, Stalin's plan was simple and ingenious: to pit European countries against each other, and at the final stage to show as peacemaker, benefactor and liberator.

But the question arises: did he have enough strength for all this?

By Khrushchev's time, it was announced that there were 170 divisions and 2 brigades in the western border districts of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941.

In every textbook, in every official book on the war, we will find the familiar 170 divisions and 2 brigades. "The History of the Second World War *(vol. 3, p. 425)* says the same: 170 divisions and 2 brigades. This is signed by all those who were connected with official historical science: the Institute of Military History under the Ministry of Defence, the Institute of General History under the Academy of Sciences, etc., etc.

In every military school, in every military academy in the Soviet Union, all cadets and students were asked to know these numbers. He who could remember that there were 170 divisions and 2 brigades in the western military districts on June 22, 1941, passed for a connoisseur of military history, could take examinations and not doubt his success.

For those who have not been able to master this number, a relaxed course has been made. In all armies of the world, two brigades are traditionally equated to one division. For those who have not been able to memorize the two numbers, they have come up with one: 171 divisions. Those who mastered this number also passed for connoisseurs. They were awarded the rank of colonel and taken on as teachers at the Frunze Military Academy.

The tales of the 170 divisions and the 2 brigades have been repeated so often and for so long that they have become truth of the last possible resort. Before the very collapse of the Soviet Union, in a speech by the Minister of Defence of the USSR, Marshal of the Soviet

Union D. T. Yazov *("VIZH", 1991, No. 5, p. 7)*, mentioned the same 170 divisions and 2 brigades and nobody laughed at him. On the contrary, some heads nodded in : that's how literate a minister we have, look at the heights he has achieved!

After the overthrow of Gorbachev, it was to be expected that, lo and behold, at last the country would be publicised, that some of our generals and official historians would get greedy and start telling the truth. But not a single one grew...

The result: the Rossiyskaya Gazeta on 22 June 1993 reported... the 170 divisions and 2 brigades. This was signed by senior research fellow of the Institute of Military History of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation G. Ivanitsky. Allegedly communism had collapsed and now the truth could be told. But no.

The Minister of Defence should have reacted somehow to such publications: recommend to the senior research fellow to look for a new profession and disband the Institute of Military History. But the Secretary of Defense did not react. It turned out that he himself had graduated from the Frunze Military Academy.

Exactly a year passed and the central organ of the Ministry of Defence, the newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda, on 22 June 1994 reported on the 170 divisions and 2 brigades...

And so he left. Years and decades pass and every year on June 22 we learn again and again...

2

There was a time when I used to say: 170 divisions and 2 brigades...

But in 1969 the Academy of Sciences of the USSR and the Institute of Military History under the Ministry of Defense published the collection "On the Northwest Front". Among the authors are the marshal of armored troops P. П. Poluboyarov, Army General P. A. Kurochkin, Colonel-General F. П. Polinin, Lt. Gen. Ф. Zotov, F. Я. Lisitsyn, R. C. Tersky and other not less worthy comrades. The editor is the chief military historian of the Armed Forces, the corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, Lieutenant General P. A. Zhilin.

The collection is amazing. Here, for example, is what is reported on page 112a: 'By the beginning of the war the Baltic Military District had two mechanised corps and three separate tank brigades'.

This was reported by the Marshal of Armoured Troops P. П. Poluboyarov. He described in detail the two mechanized corps.

The 3rd Mechanized Corps was commanded by Maj. Gen. B. Kurkin. The corps included the 2nd Panzer Division of Maj. Gen. H. Solyankin, 5th Tank Division of Col. Ф. Fyodorov and the 84th Motorized Division of Maj. Gen. И. Fomenko.

The commander of the 12th Mechanized Corps was Maj. Gen. M. Shestopalov. The corps included the 23rd Panzer Division of Col. C. Orlenko, 28th Panzer Division of Col. Д. Chernyakhovsky and 202nd motorized division of Col. K. Gorbachev.

In addition, there were three separate tank brigades in the tank forces of the Baltic District:

6-a to Col. И. Gorshkov; 22nd to

Colonel I. П. Ermakov;

27-a to Lt. Col. M. Mikhailin.

I knew about the two mechanized corps in the Baltic District at the time, but the announcement of the three brigades was a stunning blow to me. There's a quibble: we all claim about 170 divisions and 2 brigades in all five border districts, and here it's reported that there were THREE tank brigades in the Baltics alone.

A mistake? Doesn't look like a mistake. The Marshal of Armoured Troops Pavel Pavlovich Poluboyarov in 1941 was only a Colonel, but he held the very high post of Chief of the Armoured Troops of the Baltic Special Military District. Two mechanized corps and three separate tank brigades were subordinated to him. He could not "remember" tank brigades that were not subordinate to him, and commanders who did not command these brigades.

When the collection On the North-West Front was published, P. П. Poluboyarov was no longer a colonel, but a marshal of armoured troops. He held the highest post in the Soviet tank troops - he was their commander. The marshal had access to all documents related to the tank troops. What he wrote was verified by the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, the Institute of Military History under the Ministry of Defense, the accuracy of all information was certified by the signature of the chief military historian, Lt. Gen. A. Zhilin.

One of the authors of the collection, Army Gen. A. Kurochkin, in the summer of 1941 was a lieutenant general, representative of the VGC[1] Staff on the Northwest Front. Who, if not he, knew about the troops he commanded. Tank troops were his trump cards. They were the most valuable thing he had.

If the announcement about the three tank brigades was someone's mistake, Kurochkin should have corrected it. Such a mistake is not in his favor. They will reproach him: you had so many tank troops, and you let the Germans into Pieter... So if someone reported such a thing by mistake, he should have been the first to protest: I didn't have any brigades!

But Kurochkin didn't object. Therefore, there were three tank brigades in the Baltics.

Other sources confirm the presence of three tank brigades in 1941 in the Baltics (in addition to the two mechanized corps).

For example: *"The Struggle for Soviet Baltic in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945". Book One. Riga, Liesma, 1966, p. 39, with reference to CSAMO, f. 140, o. 197659, ∂. 5.*

The most powerful study of the troops of PribOVO[2] has been presented to the reading public by Ruslan Sergeyevich Irinarkhov *("Pribaltiiskiy Osoby". Minsk, Harvest, 2004)*. On page 56 he confirms the existence of three tank brigades in the PribOVO as of 21 June 1941. One cannot argue with this source, because no one else has been able to provide a more complete and objective description of the Baltic Special Military District on the eve of the German attack.

After the publication of the collection On the North-West Front, official historians had only two options.

The first: to admit that the talk about the 170 divisions and the 2 brigades, to say the least, does not correspond to reality.

The second possibility: to refute the reports of the chief Soviet tanker, Marshal of the Armored Troops Poluboyarov, and the chief military historian of the USSR Army, Lt. Gen. A. Zhilin, and at the same time - the German archival documents.

But our official historians have chosen a third option: to ignore the documents, the facts and the evidence. Decades pass, and they keep repeating: 170 divisions and TWO brigades.

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[1] Supreme High Command - B.pr↥

[2] Baltic Special Military District - B.pr↥

3

Then, in 1969, I, of course, had no access to the archives. But I decided to somehow clarify the truth: how many troops did Stalin have on the western borders on June 21, 1941?

I started by looking for a reference book that listed all those 170 divisions and 2 brigades. I quickly found that no such directory existed. Who knows why, no one has taken the time to compile it.

And then started to compose it. Personally for . Carrying an archive with me - not going to happen. This is not the life of a Soviet officer. A young officer to drag with him folders of clippings to the garrisons - it does not work. There was one thing left for me - to remember. For example, I came across information about the 125th Rifle Division in the Military Historical Journal, I remembered it. They are not many, just regimental numbers: three rifle regiments - 466th, 657th, 749th, and two artillery regiments - 414th gun and 459th howitzer.

And then somewhere a name of a commander popped up - Major General Bogaichuk, Pavel Petrovich. After another year or so, if I'm lucky, the system of subordination in this division becomes clear: it was part of the 11th Rifle Corps under the 8th Army on the Northwest Front.

In the meantime, data is accumulating for many other divisions. And everything is being out. And every thing finds its right place... The neighbour on the left is the 90th Rifle Division of the 10th Rifle Corps. On the left is the 48th Rifle Division under the 11th Rifle Corps. Here it becomes clear the birthday of the 125th Division. Order of formation dated August 19, 1939.

Somewhat too familiar date. You remember other divisions, and this day is repeated here and there: and here this one has the same birthday, that one too...

You think memorizing regimental and division numbers, commanders' names and deployments is the same as memorizing a phone book? Nothing like that. It's the same as a football fan

remembers the composition of his favorite team. The football, as well as hockey, fan remembers thousands of details: who scored the goal, when, in what minute, who passed it to him and from what position it happened. He remembers the line-ups of dozens of teams and the results of hundreds and thousands of matches. Hem remembers all this without any effort. If you're wondering, he remembers by himself...

And this was the conclusion that was being pushed: nobody in the Soviet Union at the state level studied war. For many decades no one tried to reconstruct the picture of what happened. Open my eyes and point out to me that general, that marshal, that military historian, that group of experts, that establishment, who unfolded the map and stuck flags on it, marking Soviet brigades and divisions. The official historians not only did not try to arrange the Soviet troops on the map, but they did not even bother to check the reported numbers of brigades and divisions.

And it should have. An amazing picture is emerging.

4

The grouping of the Soviet troops (figuratively speaking, the position of the pieces on the chessboard) on 22 June deserves a book of its own. Now we are talking not about the placement of the pieces, but only about their quantity on the Soviet western borders.

They will object to me: is it worth mentioning such a trifle as tank brigades? I think it is worth it. In Africa Hitler had two, then four divisions. Countless books have been written about the actions of these divisions. In general, the entire British military historiography of the second half of the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries is confined to the study of the actions of the two German panzer divisions in Africa and the landing operation conducted in Normandy in the summer of 1944.

In 1941 Hitler had on the Soviet-German front only 17 panzer divisions. And we have already discussed the number of tanks in these divisions as of June 22, 1941: an average of about 150.

If we consider Soviet tank brigades a trifle and don't put them in the account, what about German tank divisions? Are we also to consider them a trifle and not put them in the account? Hitler had only two panzer divisions on the Eastern Front (6th and 7th), comparable in number of tanks to the Soviet brigades.

Why then do we not declare a trifle and throw out of the accounts the German panzer divisions with equal or fewer tanks?

5

In that same Baltic on 22 June 1941 were three separate Air Defence Brigades:

10-a of Col. И. Udovichenko in Riga,

12-a of Col. Я. Drozhinin in Vilnius, 14th to Col. M.

Barsky in Kaunas.

Each air defense brigade included an antiaircraft artillery regiment, several separate antiaircraft artillery divisions, and machine gun battalions. The air defense brigades were armed with the world's finest 85-mm anti-aircraft guns, as well as quad M-4 antiaircraft machine guns and large-caliber DSK[1] machine guns. The brigades could have been used against both air and ground adversaries. In 1941 there was nothing better in the whole world for firing at tanks than our 85mm anti-aircraft gun, and the quad and large caliber machine guns were good for firing at
infantry. But official historians are unwilling to put into account these
Brigades. We will not argue. We continue.

Again, in the Baltic, by 22 June there were two separate anti-tank brigades: the 9th in the 8th Army, the 10th in the 11th Army. So much is known about the 9th Anti-Tank Brigade that a separate book could be written. It was located in Shaulyai, commanded by Colonel Nikolai Ivanovich Polyanskiy. The brigade consisted of the 636th and 670th artillery regiments (six divisions in each regiment), a minesweeper battalion, an automobile battalion and other units. If anyone is interested, they can find enough material on the 10th Anti-Tank Brigade as well.

In each brigade by staff there are 5322 men, 883 vehicles and tractors, 24 107-mm and 48 76-mm guns, 48 55-mm and 16 37-mm anti-aircraft guns, 165 machine guns.

The numbers of the anti-tank brigades are not taken from the sky. In the western frontier military districts we find a number of numbers of anti-tank brigades: the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 5th in the Kiev, 4th in the Odessa, 6th, 7th, 8th in the Western and the two we know - the 9th and 10th in the

The Baltic district. The Marshal of the Soviet Union K. C. Moskalenko in those times was a major-general of artillery, commanded the 1st Anti-tank Brigade in Western Ukraine. The brigade was not only fully manned, but it had 600 men over-staffed. Here is how the marshal described his brigade, "The senior and middle command positions were staffed with well-trained officers who had great command experience. In a word, the fighters, the commanders, the polittrabotniks, almost all the six thousand men who made up the brigade, were elite... And during this time new and new echelons arrived with men and combat equipment" *("On the South-Western Direction", p. 19)*.

What kind of commanders stood in 1941 at the head of anti-tank brigades can be judged by the following fact...

The commander of the 1st Anti-Tank Brigade later became Marshal of the Soviet , the commander of the 4th Anti-Tank Brigade, Col. И. Nedelin - Marshal General of Artillery, first commander-in-chief of the strategic missile troops. The commanders of the other brigades also proved worthy of their high positions.

Now try tying the ten Soviet anti-tank brigades to the famous "and two brigades...". By the way, at that time all the other countries in the world did not have a single anti-tank brigade that powerful, nor did any army in the world have anti-tank guns with a caliber over 50 millimeters. But our official historians, amidst the shrill cries of patriotism, have erased all this power from our history. Well, de. Let's hurry forward.

The 9th, 10th, 201st Airborne Brigades were located in that same Baltic. All three - in the 5th Airborne Corps (VDC), commanded by Maj. Gen. C. Bezugli. The corps was being prepared for landing in the Königsberg area. Preparations for the landing had gone so far that it was now impossible to countermand the order issued. To ensure the simultaneous transfer of the three brigades to 5 and VDC, a temporary assembly plant was set up, where the aircraft designer Oleg Konstantinovich Antonov supervised the assembly of the landing gliders. All this was going on so close

to the frontier that on the morning of June 22, 1941, Antonov was awakened by the roar of German artillery. "One of the engineers in the plant literally flew into the room: 'War! The Germans are already near the town!" *(Author's Group. After in the Sky, p. 220)*.

At dawn the attack took place, and as early as six o'clock in the morning the German infantry came out at the workshops of the airborne glider factory. Well, how close to the border must they have built the airborne glider factory, so that in the first two hours of the war it found itself in a combat zone? Serious historians admit that Stalin was preparing an invasion of Europe... but not in , but in 1942. If so, why did he have to mount landing gliders alongside the border in 1941? Where were they going to store them until the following summer to protect them from rain, winds, snow? There were no hangars near the border to store gliders for an entire airborne corps. If indeed, as the serious ones admit, the invasion was being prepared for 1942, the mass installation of gliders should have been done at the very last moment, not a year earlier.

(By the way, Antonov's glider was called that -
"Mass-4" - and was not intended for long-term storage at all.) But we digress: about all this - next time. And now let's get back to the 5th VDC. In the defensive war, this corps has turned out to be absolutely unnecessary, it was necessary to abandon parachutes and paratroop gliders near the borders, and the corps was not used for direct (liberation) purpose. And this having been so, serious historians have omitted from their statistics both the corps itself, and the brigades comprising it, and the same such corps in other counties and the brigades composing them.

Here again, in the Baltic, was the 1st Marine Brigade, commanded by the experienced Soviet saboteur Colonel Terentiy Parafilo (from October 1941 - Major General). By 22 June 1941 the brigade was located in Libau.

By 22 June there were two rifle brigades in the Baltic: the 3rd (Colonel P. M. Gavrilov) and the 8th (Colonel N. P. Simoniak).

And is it worth remembering the rifle brigades? It is worth it. In each of these brigades there was one artillery and two rifle regiments, in the 3rd Brigade - a separate anti-tank division, and in the 8th - a separate tank battalion and other units and subdivisions *("Fighting for the*

Soviet Baltic in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945". Book One. Riga, Liesma, 1966, pp. 144).

3rd Rifle Brigade with reinforcement units - that's 15,000 men.

8th Rifle Brigade with reinforcements, aviation and coastal artillery - 27,000 men *(ibid)*. Approximately the same number is given by the official "History of the Second World War" *(Vol. 4, p. 70)*: "The garrison of the base headed by Gen. И. Kabanov consisted of the 8th Separate Rifle Brigade (Colonel N. P. Simonyak, commander), coastal defense units, a frontier detachment, two air squadrons, and a force of water area guards. The total strength reached 25 thousand men".

In quantity and quality of artillery our rifle brigades were superior to the German divisions. Only we are counting all the German divisions and omitting our brigades.

We have tried to count Soviet brigades only in the Baltics. And let me be forgiven if I have missed any. I haven't remembered much: the Soviet railway troops who were preparing to rework the narrow gauge western track for the broad Soviet standard had a brigade organization. About providing the preparations
"liberation march" on the western borders were 10 Soviet railway brigades.

Apart from the Baltics, Soviet troops were preparing for the "liberation march" in Karelia, in Byelorussia, in Moldavia, in the Crimea, but the main mass was in the Ukraine. And here there were more brigades than in the Baltics. Example: in the Baltics there was only one railway brigade (the 15th in Kaunas, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel P. A. Morozov), while in the Ukraine there were six such brigades. And again I am drawn to digression, drawn to tell about the 5th Railway Brigade of Col. A. Kabanov (later - Colonel-General), which in Peremyshl was preparing to force the frontier river, draws me to tell about the 18 thousand narrow-gauge wagons that were prepared at the Soviet frontier stations, and about many other things. But now we are counting brigades and divisions, so we will not digress.

I think that if we count the brigades only in the Baltics, the formula "170 divisions and 2 brigades" no longer sounds like absolute truth.

[1] Krupnokalibrena of Degtyaryov and Shpagin - B.pr↑

6

Serious historians say: and two brigades, and there were 15 of them in the Baltics alone. Of course, if we don't count the NKVD brigades. Serious historians say: 170 divisions, and we can calculate how many there really were. A whole expository treatise of a thousand pages would not suffice here, so for now I show only the three simplest ploys of the Kremlin deception.

Approach one. There were brigades (which were smaller than divisions) and corps (which were larger than divisions) in the Soviet airborne forces, but there were no divisions as such in the airborne forces. If , all airborne troops don't enter the account.

In the First Strategic Echelon of the Red Army there were five airborne corps (in each three brigades, artillery and tanks) and one separate airborne brigade. In addition, the creation of five more airborne corps was being prepared. It is clear that all this was being created not for defense, it did not come into operation in the defensive war. If that's the case, say the serious ones, then all the airborne troops are simply not noticed and not counted in the statistics.

In the composition of the air defense troops there were three corps (1st Moscow, 2nd Leningrad, 3rd Baku), two divisions (3rd Kiev, 4th Lvov), 9 brigades (all in the western regions of the country). But neither the corps, nor the divisions, nor the brigades are counted in the statistics. Meanwhile, the antiaircraft artillery regiments that comprised these corps, divisions, and brigades were of two types: 60-gun (three divisions of five batteries each) and 100-gun (five divisions of five batteries each). All this has been thrown out of the Soviet statistics.

In addition, there were units within the air defense forces that were called brigade air defense areas. These compounds were not called brigades because there was no standard organization for them. Based on the importance of each particular defended site, the possible threat to it and the availability of

forces and resources, in each case its own organisational structure was envisaged. But as a rule, each air defense district included in its composition one antiaircraft artillery regiment and several separate antiaircraft artillery divisions and machine gun battalions, antiaircraft searchlight and other units. In the western border districts were located 20 brigade areas of air defense. But all this is also thrown out of the statistics.

Take two. In Germany there were army divisions and SS divisions. Just like in the Soviet Union there were army divisions and NKVD divisions. The SS and NKVD are twin brothers, elite, select, solid, vetted, fanatical compounds. SS and NKVD troops were better armed than ordinary army divisions, better equipped and better trained and equipped. When we count German divisions, we count all of them, including the SS divisions. And we leave out the Soviet NKVD divisions.

In the meantime, we have something to remember. "The NKVD troops consisted of 14 divisions, 18 brigades and 21 regiments of various purposes. (...) In addition, there were 8 border districts, 49 border detachments and other units on the western border" *(Beshanov, V.*
"The Tank Massacre of 1941." M., AST, 2000, pp. 159).

The NKVD divisions were close enough to the border.

In the course of the war, the troops of the Active Army, unlike the units and formations that were in the rear or in the reserves, received a number of substantial privileges, ranging from the other mode of feeding and daily hundred-gram portions of transparent warming liquid to the accrual of monetary pay and the calculation of seniority under a completely different system. Therefore, for each unit and compound, it was determined with meticulous precision in a written order from what point it counted in the Active Army and from what point it did not.

Well, the 21st, 22nd and 23rd Motor Rifle Divisions of the NKVD were counted in the Active Army from 26 June 1941. From the same day the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th and 20th divisions of the NKVD on the guarding of railway facilities were counted in the composition of the Active Army *("Военная istorija государства Российского в 30-ти томах. Великая*

Domestic. The Active Army." M., Kuchkovo Pole, 2005, pp. 518-519).

We should not think that if a division is not included in the Active Army, it does not yet exist and does not fight. "The Military Historical Journal *(2001,№ 5)* published a document entitled

"Brief Description of the Combat Operations of the 5th Motor Rifle Regiment and the 22nd Motor Rifle Division under the NKVD Troops for the Period from 22 June to 13 July 1941", From this document it appears that the 22nd Motor Rifle Division of the NKVD on 22 June existed, was manned, had tanks and was engaged in combat operations. Only in the rear. Col. Golovko reported that "every shot fired from a window, a tower or a bell tower was answered by machine gun and tank cannon fire...". During the first three days of the war the fighters of the division "shot 120 captured scoundrels". The Soviets not only did not want to fight for the people's power but, who knows why, fired on its representatives and defenders from windows and attics. And on June 26 the 21st, 22nd and 23rd Motor Rifle Divisions of the NKVD met the German troops...

8-and the NKVD Motor Rifle Division was included in the Active Army even earlier - from 24 June.

9-and the 10th NKVD Division for the Protection of Railway Facilities and the 13th NKVD Convoy Division were in the Active Army from 22 June 1941 *(ibid.)*.

The NKVD's rifle divisions, as we established earlier, had all types of ground troops' weapons, including tanks, guns, howitzers, and mortars.

And the NKVD divisions guarding the railway facilities are not some guards with bernards. "By the beginning of the Second World War there were over fifty divisions of armored trains in the armament of the NKVD's internal troops. The number of Chekist armored trains even exceeded the number of army ones" *(Drogovoz, I. Г.*

"Fortresses on wheels. History of armoured trains". Minsk, Harvest, 2002, 226-227).

The NKVD divisions guarding the railway facilities had not only armored trains, but also artillery, mortars, and heavy armored car guns. And they were staffed far from the inhabitants of Central Asia.

In this list, only the convoy division of the NKVD disturbs me. I'm trying to find out and I can't - what were a few thousand defense cops doing on the western border of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. Who sent them there and for what purpose?

Earlier I had come across references to convoy battalions, regiments and brigades near the borders: for example, the 132nd separate convoy battalion of the NKVD in Brest, the 109th convoy regiment of the NKVD in Lvov, the 5th convoy brigade of the NKVD in Minsk. But an entire Chekist division, and on 22 June to find itself in the area of the fighting - this is a discovery for me.

We have only taken a step to the side, and have at once discovered a whole dozen new divisions, and with these we shall supplement our known 170.

Third technique. "170 divisions and 2 brigades" - this is only the First Strategic Echelon of the Red Army. But under cover of the TASS message of June 13, 1941, the Second Strategic Echelon of the Red Army - seven armies, which had more tanks and artillery than the entire Wehrmacht - was loading, moving, unloading in the border districts.

Farther back was the Third Strategic Echelon, an entire reserve front.

Serious historians compare the first echelons of Soviet and German troops. Is this comparison justified? Yes. But only at first glance. German troops were built in one strategic echelon, behind which was a small reserve. All German troops were drained along the borders of a thin thread, behind which there was practically nothing. And the Soviet troops were built in three strategic echelons, behind which were located powerful reserves.

Imagine, reader: you have one apartment, and a serious historian has three apartments, or even a villa. Is it fair to compare your single apartment with one of the serious person's three apartments and draw conclusions?

But this is what the serious ones do: the Germans have one strategic echelon, we have three. But they compare one echelon of the Germans and one of ours.

Example: in 2005 came out the grandiose "Military History of the Russian State in 30 volumes". These volumes were prepared by countless groups of experts under the command of the Actual State Counsellor of the Russian Federation 1st Class, Doctor of Historical Sciences V. A. Zolotaryov, who earlier with the rank of major-general held the post of chief military historian of the Armed Forces of the USSR. In the volume on the Soviet-German war *(pp. 536-537)*, there are accounts of how few forces there were in the five western frontier districts. For example, in the Kiev Special Military District, which on 21 June 1941 was transformed into the Southwest Front, there were only 907,046 combatants and commanders on 21 June.

The rifles and carbines at the front were 1,035,420. (This on the matter of one carbine for three men.)

Pistols - 15 483. Hand and heavy machine

guns - 35 267.

Field artillery guns and mortars - 14 756. Anti-aircraft guns - 2221.

Tanks - 5465. In this number serviceable - 4788.

Combat aircraft - 2059. Including serviceable - 1759.

True, not many forces. Especially compared to the 631 German tanks in all the German armies that were operating not only against the Southwestern, but also against the Southern Front.

A well-known strategist has called such a ratio of forces many times the numerical superiority of the German troops.

We will not argue. We will only point out that groups of our enlightened experts have calculated the forces of the South-West Front without taking into account the troops of the NKVD and the armies of the Second Strategic Echelon. By that time, the 19th Army, which had arrived from the North Caucasus, had already completely unloaded in the Belaya Tserkov - Cherkasy area *("Kommandnyi i начальствующий состав Красной Armii v 1940-1941 g. Struktura i кадры центрального аппарата NKO CCCP, военный okrugov i общевойсковых армий. Documents and materials". M., 2005, p. 246)*.

And the 16th Army, which had arrived from Transbaikalia, was unloading in the Shepetovka area. In it, among other things, there were a thousand artillery barrels and almost one thousand five hundred tanks (1059 in the 5th

Mechanized Corps, 356 in the 57th Separate Tank Division, 32 in the 46th and 152nd Rifle Divisions). All tanks were serviceable. The unserviceable ones were forbidden to be loaded into the echelons.

If we take these armies into account, the forces of the South-West Front present themselves to us in a different light. And this is just one example of the reinforcement of just one district.

The legend of the 170 divisions and 2 brigades is a national disgrace for Russia.

This legend has been circulating for over 60 years. Such longevity brings sad reflections. It appears that Russia's Ministry of Defense has not been studying war at all. The General Staff also knows absolutely nothing about the war. In Moscow alone, so many books and monographs have been written about the war that one could lift the dike of the Brothers' Hydroelectric Plant from these volumes. But all this is paper rubbish.

What is a dissertation on the war worth if the author hasn't even bothered to count the divisions? What is a memoir by a Victory Marshal worth if he simply didn't know how many divisions he had in 1941?

* * *

Colonel-General Y. "The clarification of the truth... given the particular complexity of the problem, requires careful, sober judgments, strict reliance on documents (...) And history must be studied, figuratively speaking, not from forged copies, but from originals" *("Krasnaya Zvezda", October 21, 1995)*.

Right. That's how it should be.

But thousands of generals of the Soviet and now Russian army, who have in their hands all the documents of the Ministry of Defence, of the Main Operational and Main Organisational Departments of the General Staff and of all the other General Departments of the General Staff, all the archives of the State, including the most top secret, for 60

years of hard work have not bothered to count to two and find that the brigades were not two, but more.

Because I am aware of the complexity of the situation on the war-history front, I am forced to write a history based on those scant snippets of information that have been published openly.

As you can see, even this is enough to accuse the Grand Strategists of appalling ignorance.

CHAPTER 13
FOR THE COLLECTIVE MIND

Two loot armies have successfully gone the way of international banditry. But on this broad road it is narrow for two gangs at the same time if each of them pursues the goal of world domination in perspective. And one rattled the other. He shook him hard, timing the moment well, knocking him down and thinking he had killed him. But the sturdy one was fooled and didn't realize it right away. The wind sown in September 1939 has returned like a storm on our towns and villages.

The "invincible and legendary", led by an areopagus of semi-literate chieftains headed by the mustachioed cunning man, surrounded by semi-literate bluedollar strategists like himself, was destroyed in a matter of days. Because they do not want to admit that it is their fault that a catastrophe has befallen the country, that the army is broken, the Muscovite strategists, who have no military plans other than aggressive-offensive, send to the non-existent army inadequate to the situation orders for a counter-offensive, thus deepening the catastrophe and the confusion.

Joseph Komarowski

"Vzglyad, No. 535, 21-27 December 2002

1

And here's Colonel Morozov, a lecturer at the Frunze Military Academy, speaking in the newspaper Den. (A very pretty name - almost Den M.) To begin with, Colonel Morozov, demonstrating his knowledge of things, reports that there were 171 Soviet divisions in the western border districts. (Not everyone is able to remember the formula "170 divisions and 2 brigades," so for some colonels a simplification has been introduced.)

After demonstrating to the people his own erudition, the colonel proceeds to expose: is there not a group of experts behind my back?

Speaking of groups of experts, let's remember, Citizen Colonel, what it means to have a group of experts behind you. Numerous groups. More accurately, countless groups. Crowds of experts.

It was almost dark before your eyes when at the end of the working day flocks of colonels poured out of the doors of the Frunze Academy. They were all experts. All of them have been put on guard by the same version that you, citizen colonel, defend. All of you have been ordered to vigilantly guard and firmly defend... All of you are a learned army. And not only you. In the hero-city of Moscow alone there were more military academies than in the United States, Britain, Germany, Japan and France combined. In the hero-city of Moscow alone there are more generals than in the US Armed Forces. And if we talk about generals with three stars and above, there are more of them in Moscow than in the rest of Europe.

At the very height of the stagnation in the Soviet army there were 18 military academies, one military university, 74 higher military schools, 4 military institutes, 4 secondary military schools, 6 military faculties at civilian higher educational institutions.

In addition - 32 higher education institutions under the Ministry of the Interior.

Let's forget about the KGB, although they were very persistent with military history there too.

So just you, Colonel, don't complain. Your troops are startling the enemies.

Moscow alone has more military experts than the deer in Chukotka. Whole herds. Or perhaps, Citizen Colonel, you believe that serious experts here in the West are smarter than those in Russia? Don't believe that. And here they are the same as in our country. Only they are more serious.

But if you really believe in collective reason, form a group and at least count the divisions of the Red Army in 1941. Only I tell you in advance: you will not succeed in a group.

2

Doesn't it seem strange to you, Citizen Colonel, that for 60 years attempts have been made to write a history of the war, but who knows why nothing comes of it? The regime threw hordes of experts to write a history of the war, but they could do nothing. I wonder, why?

Well, because, citizen colonel, you have been trained to think chorally. And here's the result: for 60 years not a single listener, not a single graduate, not a single teacher at the All-Union Military Academy (Frunze by father) found time to count the divisions and brigades of the Red Army in the border districts at the time the war began.

You assume I have a group of experts behind me, but anyone who can count to two could have deduced that the military science of the USSR and modern Russia is lying to the masses. You don't have to have a group of experts, a research institute, or an entire academy to do that at all.

You, Citizen Colonel, believe in the collective wisdom of experts, and I commend to you a book written more than a hundred years ago by the great Gustave Le Bon. The book has made him famous throughout the world and for many centuries. The book is entitled "Psychology of the Crowd." In Russia it was published in the last century, in 1896, by Pavlenkov. Among the admirers of the great Gustave were a cohort of distinguished practitioners of crowd management, from Lenin to Mussolini to Hitler. Naturally, Comrade Stalin knew this book almost by heart and used its recommendations masterfully.

Gustave Le Bon has explained with many examples that the intelligence of a group is not the sum of the intellects of the individuals in it. On the contrary, the person in the group becomes stupid and loses the ability to see, to hear, to understand, to think independently: 'The crowd need not be numerous... As soon as a few individuals are gathered together, they already constitute a crowd, even in the case of remarkable scientists...'

The capacity for observation and criticism that exists in each of these scholars individually is immediately lost in the crowd."

Colonel O. Ф. Suvenirov 100 years later expressed the central thought of "Crowd Psychology", only now in connection not with some abstract group of experts, but concretely with our native military science, with the Institute of Military History under the Ministry of Defense: "One of the important reasons giving rise to the definite malaise of many military historical works of the Institute is the almost total preoccupation of the Institute's leadership with the preparation of collective works (...) In their preparation, everything original, truly creative is always cut off, rejected (...) According to the opinion widespread among historians, the editors of collective works are fraternal mounds for talents. It is a kind of collective farm system for science, which kills any incentives for personal interest and responsibility of the scientist" *("VIEW", 1991, №11, p. 90)*.

3

A crowd is a crowd, whether it is in Moscow, Paris or London. Here's a sample of the collective wisdom of Washington's overseas experts.

In the course of the Second World War and its immediate aftermath, groups of Western pundits must have assumed in their calculations and conclusions that not all of what the Genius of All Times and Nations said in public was pure truth. It was not difficult to expose Comrade Stalin.

Already on July 3, 1941, in his first public statement since the German attack, Comrade Stalin lied outright.

His speech began with the famous words, "Comrades! Citizens! Brothers and sisters! Soldiers of our army and navy! I address you, my friends!"

That's the kind of brother our nation has got. Splashed to the ears with the blood of his brothers and sisters.

After the address - the first sentence. And it is true: the war continues.

And from the second sentence, the commander unleashed, "Despite the heroic resistance of the Red Army, despite the fact that the best divisions of the enemy and the best units of his aviation have already been defeated and found their grave in the fields...".

If Comrade Stalin is to be believed, not two weeks of the war have passed, and the enemy's best divisions and the best parts of his aviation have already been defeated...

Further, throughout the war Comrade Stalin and other comrades knew the same. And after the war was over, they took stock: we fought in accordance with the most progressive Stalinist science in the on how to win, so the Soviet Union's losses were minimal.

And here at American Aviation University, a research group has been established to collect, process and verify information

for human losses in the war. They worked for 10 years. The group of experts was led by US Air Force Brig. Gen. O. Smith, who in 1955 had published the book U. S. Military Doctrine in New York.

The book was immediately translated into Russian and published in the Soviet Union, because the conclusions of the high-minded Americans appealed terribly to our responsible comrades. Here the old trick of the two mirrors, in which one mirror, reflecting itself in the other, creates an illusion of infinity, was manifested. The insidious wisdom of Moscow's Agitprop has been reflected in the research of numerous groups of American specialists and has returned to home soil in the form of the conclusion of independent experts: you see, they, too, have come to the same conclusion there, across the ocean.

After gathering information from all sides, carefully processing and verifying it, the groups of American scientists made a summary: "The analysis conducted shows that 9.5 million soldiers and officers were killed in the course of World War II" *(Smith, D. O. "U.S. Military Doctrine. Studies and Assessments." M., Foreign Literature Publishing House, 1956, p. 217)*.

4

Considering that World War II was the most spectacular cataclysm in human history, that hundreds of millions of people were directly and indirectly involved, and that post-war statistics have been sketchy, contradictory, convoluted, if not altogether lacking, such accuracy of calculation by groups of American scholars is admirable.

To the losses of soldiers and officers, groups of superhuman American bison have added the losses of civilians, and have obtained a strange result: 'World War II, which lasted only one year longer than World War I, involved a more significant proportion of the globe's population, but the number of casualties was not much greater' *(p. 216)*.

Weird.

The First World War lasted from 1 August 1914 to 11 November 1918, i.e. just over four years. And World War II - from September 1, 1939 to September 3, , i.e. a full six years. Even if the composition of the participants, the spatial extent, the intensity of the fighting, and the weapon systems had remained as before, even then the losses in the Second World War must have been one and a half times greater than in the First.

And the total duration of the war doesn't tell the whole story. Russia dropped out of World War I, or more accurately, knocked out, a year before it ended. And in World War II, the Soviet Union fought officially from June 22, 1941 until its conclusion. But to judge fairly - from the very beginning to the very end.

The United States did not become involved in World War I until the end, and fought in World War II from December 1941 to September 1945.

Why, then, did the losses in World War II turn out to be only slightly greater than in World War I?

The spatial extent of the Second World War cannot be compared at all with that of the First World War. In the Second World War, fighting took place all over Europe, from northern Norway to the Caucasus mountains, from southern France and the islands of the Mediterranean to the walls of Murmansk, Pieter, Moscow and Stalingrad. And beyond Europe, from North Africa to the jungles of South Asia and the wild islands of the . Hundreds of millions of civilians found themselves in the combat zones. Even just as a result, a sharp spike in casualties was to follow. For in the First World War the fighting, generally speaking, did not go beyond the confines of Europe, and the fronts were stabilized around the areas of the state frontiers of the great empires. The civilian population retreated a hundred miles from the front line and did not even hear artillery fire.

And the means of combat in the Second World War cannot be compared with those in the First World War. The massive use of tanks and aviation must have brought with it an increase in the number of casualties.

The Second World War differed sharply in character from the First.

In the course of the Second World War a mass partisan movement was born, i.e. the war was fought not only on the front lines, but everywhere. Let us remember the Warsaw Uprising. In the First World War there was nothing like it.

In the course of the Second World War, huge spaces appeared where everyone fought against everyone: Yugoslavia, Western Ukraine, all of Belarus.

In World War I, prisoners were mostly treated in accordance with international rules of warfare, and in World War II, they were exterminated by the millions.

In World War II, the extermination of the civilian population was carried out by industrial methods. The First World War knew nothing like Auschwitz, Buchenwald, Babi Yar, Reichichschlag, the mass murder of prisoners from prisons and camps in the retreat of the Red Army.

In World War II, strategic aviation swept entire cities along with their populations and ended up using

nuclear weapons.

And here's the question: how is it that the number of casualties of World War II turned out to be so insignificant?

There were two paths before the groups of American experts.

The first: to question the official Soviet figures and then the number of war casualties would have risen sharply.

The second: to seek an explanation for this so strange outcome of this so horrific war.

It did not even cross the minds of the groups of experts to doubt the Soviet version. As long as there is an official document from Moscow, it must have been so...

They were left with only the second way: to somehow explain the suspiciously low number of victims. This required a theoretical conclusion that turned the millennia-old experience of all civilizations on its head: "It is therefore historically meaningless to conclude that an increase in the power of the means of defeat is the cause of an increase in the number of casualties of war" *(Smith, D. O.*
"U.S. Military Doctrine. Studies and Assessments". M., Foreign Literature Publishing House, 1956, p. 217).

In simpler terms, whether or not we use strategic aviation to destroy cities, whether or not we drop atomic bombs, whether or not we have any at all, whether or not we suffocate people in gas chambers - the number of casualties does not depend on that.

Very few years passed and the President of the United States John Kennedy, who had not read the theoretical justifications of the groups of enlightened experts, asked Nikita Khrushchev the question: well, and how many people died under you, twenty million, right?

And got the comprehensive answer: well, yes, twenty.

Groups of experts, both Soviet and overseas, justified this number.

If Curious John had said "10 million", he would have got the same answer: well, yes, exactly...

Again, the expert groups would immediately theoretically justify this number. They, the experts, don't care whether it is 10 or 50, very important.

And if the curious John hadn't asked his question, the think tanks would still be arguing that increasing the power of the

means of defeat does not affect the number of casualties.

5

If you want a more fresh example.

The economy of the Soviet Union, as is well known, was completely parasitic. The country was extracting oil and selling it abroad. Our exports consisted of oil, gas and weapons for the Third World War. Colossal masses of these weapons were filling the arsenals of the Soviet army and the armies of the subordinate brotherly countries. In addition, the Kremlin chieftains sent arms in unlimited to all sorts of Indonesians and Algerians, Syrians and Libyans, Angolans, Cubans and Egyptians. All this - at well-discounted prices. All on credit, with the clear understanding that no one would ever bother to repay the multi-billion debts.

Play the news on any Russian, American, British, German, French channel and try to find one in which you don't see a Kalashnikov assault rifle. Even if you succeed, instead of "Kalashnikov" you will see a DShK, T-54, PKM[1] or RPG-7[2]. No news passes without them. We are even proud to have "Kalashnikov" on the coats of arms of four different countries.

Filling and overfilling the world with weapons, the Soviet Union was turning the planet into a battlefield and was itself slowly entering the war. At first in the remote provinces, and then everywhere, the supply of the population began to be carried out with coupons. As in wartime. And just as slowly but inexorably, financial disaster was settling into the country. Comrade Gorbachev printed a lot of 50 ruble banknotes (at that time - an awful lot of money), with them they paid the salaries of the entire population, and then he declared these papers invalid. Any normal person, looking at this, clearly understood: there is nowhere else to go. This is the end.

Meanwhile, one Ronald Reagan decided to shake the Soviet Union a little, to test its strength, to shake it up. Reagan had an opportunity to influence Saudi Arabia. He influenced her. On September 13, 1985, Reagan uttered five words: we will increase

oil production. It was the Soviet Union's death sentence.

Oil production in the hot deserts of Arabia was sharply increased. But it was also increased in the United States. Prices around the world have fallen. All other oil-producing countries have suffered from the fall in prices. The damage could only be compensated for by increasing production. Everyone rushed to increase production. And prices collapsed.

For Russia, however, the price collapse is not scary now. Mass production of matryoshkas is organized in the . If oil prices fall, we still have product to export. And Gorbachev was not at all concerned with developing industry. The five-year plan did not envisage mass production of matryoshkas... That is why the unbreakable Soviet Union began to creak.

And so it was that at the very end of 1990 a model of the collective work of a group of erudites was published and in early 1991 appeared in the windows of American and British bookshops: a major work on the prospects for the development of the Soviet Union. This intellectual feat was accomplished by a group of remarkable American and British experts whose authority on both sides of the Atlantic is unwavering.

I will not talk about its content. The title is enough:
"Soviet Union". St. Martins Press. New York. 1990.

The best experts of the West, huddled in a herd, discussed the question of the prospects of "perestroika" and painted pictures of the Soviet Union's heyday by the year 2000.

Did you need to be an expert to understand: oil prices are going down like a sledge on a hill of ice, therefore there will be no Soviet Union...

I must say that each of these experts individually is a smart, understanding person, an interesting interlocutor. But it is enough for serious experts to cluster in a group to change instantly. All their knowledge and abilities instantly disappear.

Too bad that the American people (and not only America) have come to believe groups of experts. Even a second printing was ordered... But just then the Soviet Union split.

And one of the main reasons was: the Kremlin leaders relied too much on the collective wisdom of the party and its Leninist Central Committee. And every boss, from the very bottom to the very top, leaned on the collective wisdom of groups of experts. In simpler terms, the chiefs had learned to think independently...

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[1] Kalashnikov-Maxim. - B.pr↕
[2] Rocket anti-tank grenade launcher. - B.pr↕

6

And now closer to our sheep, that is to say, to our groups of experts.

A man hiding his name under the pseudonym *Viktor Suvorov* published a scientific work. He hid his name, but announced the composition of the group of experts who guided him on the path of truth. The members of the group were Army Gen. A. Gareyev, Colonel-General Y. Gorkova, Maj. Gen. Solnishkova, academician V. Anfilov, G. Baranovsky and other responsible comrades.

On p. 105 they have published data on the enormous numerical superiority of German aviation over the Soviet Air Force. It appears that the Luftwaffe's combat aircraft on the Soviet-German front numbered 4,950 as of 22 June 1941, while the Red Army's number was only 1,540. True, to the Soviet number is added in parentheses: "new obj.".

Come on, explain to me why all Hitler's planes are counted, but only "new" ones from Stalin's planes? Where is this love of various Gareevs and Baranovskis for Hitler?

Is it known to groups of super-wise experts that not all Hitler's planes were "new obr." either? Are they aware that a German Hs-123 bomber existed? Do they know that the top speed of this plane was 345 km/h and its bomb load was 200 kg? Did they know that cavalry stirrups hung on the fuselage sides of this marvel of engineering?

And where did that number 4950 come from? And who announced that the Red Army had only 1540 aircraft of the new model, since there were only 1363 MiG-3? Well, did you count the DB-ZF, citizens? They, if I'm not mistaken, were 972. And did you forget the Er-2 and the Ar-2? Add to them LaGG-3 and Yak-1, Su-2, Il-2, Pe-2 and TB-7.

But even more interesting is the situation with tanks. On the same page, our expert groups have stated that on June 22, 1941, Hitler had 3,712 tanks on the Soviet-German front and Stalin had 1,800. And this last number is without any comment, without any clarifications and additions of the type "new obr.". No, it is simply that in the Red

army had 1800 tanks. And this is done in the XXI century! And these are our luminaries! And the same people, denouncing me, stated that only T-26 tanks in the Red Army on June 22 were 3000 more than BT tanks.

On p. 177 of this masterpiece the group of best Russian experts has stated that "we had a few floating tanks, and only specimens, while the Germans had considerably more".

I exposed this horror many years ago in the book "Suicide." But groups of experts headed by the head of the Academy of Military Science continue to repeat these fabrications. Well, open any reference book! As of June 22, the Red Army had 2,331 T-37A floating tanks, 1,129 T-38 floating tanks, and 277 T-40 floating tanks.

3700 test specimens?

I once already disgraced army general Gareev by telling about the "38-ton" tanks. It was a little bit for him. He remembered talking about German floating tanks.

So here's the thing: Citizen General, there were no floating tanks in Germany. Some had pontoons attached to them. But it does not follow from that that the tanks were floating at all. I can attach pontoons to a locomotive and declare myself the creator of a floating locomotive. I can put an axe in a basin and demonstrate the world's first floating axe. Or an iron.

The whole book is filled with all such foolish revelations. Messrs. Gareev, Gorkov, Baranovsky should have protested and demanded that their names be deleted from this disgraceful creation. But they did not object, so the shame of the collective stupidity is also for each of them personally.

* * *

But let's get back to our divisions.

The universal fanatical faith in the wisdom of groups of experts, i.e., in the wisdom of the crowd, has penetrated under all doors, through all crevices of the Soviet state machine.

Military science in general and military history in particular seem to have been infected by the infection of collective creativity more than any other science.

The result is there. I agree, not every colonel at Frunze Academy is trained to count to 170. But for 60 years the mighty groups of serious military historians have been able to count to two and grasp that the brigades were not two, but more...

Could they have? No. They couldn't. Now this has been established experimentally. Three generations of experts, working in groups, never bothered to count to two.

Because they are a crowd.

And the crowd is not capable of creation.

Only destruction.

CHAPTER 14
FOR THE SKELETON DIVISIONS

Human resources are always abundant with the Russians.
Chief of the General Staff of the German Army Colonel-General F. Halder
War Diary. Entry of 23 July 1941

1

Tank divisions are the main instrument of aggression. In 1941 there were three times as many tank divisions in the Red Army as in all the other countries of the world put together. Comrade Stalin also had enough other divisions. It is impossible to hide this. But if it is not hidden, the whole world will understand the liberating nature of Stalin's preparations. What is to be done then? How to blur the picture?

And a way out has been found: we admit that the divisions were many, but we declare that they were not full combat formations, but only skeletons, only commanders with flags, only numbers in the flaming heads of the generals of the General Staff. It was decided to announce that the Soviet divisions were skeleton divisions, that no Soviet division was complete.

Thus they declare, "As of 1 June 1941, of the 170 divisions and 2 brigades located in the five border districts, not a single unit had been completed to full strength" *("50 лет Vоогиженных Сил СССР", p. 235)*.

And so it goes. A group of experts from the Military Academy of the General Staff conducted a comprehensive study of the problem and came to the same conclusion: 'By 1 June 1941, of the 170 divisions and 2 brigades located in the five border districts, not a single unit had been manned to full strength' *('The Initial Period of the War', p. 209)*. The author's team was personally headed by the head of the academy, Army Gen. П. Ivanov. The group of experts from the Military Academy under the General Staff had not only come to the same conclusion as the authors of the work 50 лет Вооруженных Сил СССР (50 Years of the USSR Armed Forces), but had also expressed their thoughts in the same words, to the comma.

Many more marshals, generals, academicians, doctors, professors, associate professors, and candidates have considered this question, and all have come to the same conclusion, and all have expressed their thought with the same

phrase. Word for word: "not a single compound was complete...".

The groups of Western experts have backed them up: that's the way it was... As soon as the Russians themselves admit that they were not ready for the war, as soon as Army Gen. П. Ivanov says that no division was fully manned...

And they publish sumptuous volumes: magnificent paper, huge photographs, sonorous names of world-famous authors and in every version of the story: "... no Soviet division was fully complete...". They rewrite history, publish new books with even more colorful covers, with even more loud names of authors, and the phrase is repeated.

This truth is sacred and undeniable: this is the way they teach at the Military Academy of the General Staff and at all other military academies, and at all military schools...

After once again reading the unbreakable formula in yet another sumptuous tome, I pack up my folders, load them in the car, and make an appointment with yet another author - a famous Western historian who, for some reason, has repeated this phrase. A heavy load: 443 folders for each rifle division, 62 for the rifle corps, 29
- for the mechanized corps, 61 - for the tank divisions... in addition for the motorized, motorized and cavalry divisions, for the airborne brigades and corps, for the anti-tank brigades... In short, a lot. I meet with the famous author, arrange a few folders (the rest I just show them - there is no space for them all) and suggest that we check our information: you claim that not a single division was completed, well, take out your materials on the 1st Moscow Proletarian Division, on the 2nd, on the 3rd... 100- a... 200th... Let's compare our information. Show me what you have, and I'll show you what I've managed to find, cut out and paste on cardboard.

And my interlocutor fades away: it is customary among historians with world names to make general judgments, to go into details they have not studied. I search, but have yet to find a single professional historian who has kept a folder on every Soviet general, every military district, every army, corps, division, brigade, every fleet, flotilla, squadron.

The most important things in science are diplomas, awards, titles and ranks. How beautiful it sounds: professor of St Anthony's College at Oxford University, laureate... or head of the Military Academy of the General Staff, army general, doctor of military science, professor, meritorious figure, cavalier, laureate...

No, I will never be able to rise to such heights, to stand in those ranks. And how am I to argue with the deeds of the laureate-knights? I bow before titles and ranks. I envy. I have no titles, no titles, and no one honors me with awards.

But I have something the St. Anthony's College professor doesn't have that Army Gen. П. Ivanov.

I have scissors.

And folders.

2

If the head of the Military Academy under the General Staff, the Army general, professor, laureate, cavalier, doctor, had a pair of scissors and an interest in the subject under study, he would cut out everything published in the open press and shelve it. Then he would not have been conjuring up 170 divisions and 2 brigades. Then he would not have insisted that not a single division was complete.

The general has not found a pair of scissors, has not shown any interest in the subjects studied, has not taken an interest in the war, has not brought his folders. I therefore invite my reader to see my collections. Let's start with the first division.

Army General Y. Kreiser in 1941 was a major general, commander of the 1st Moscow Proletarian Motorized Division. This is how he described it: 'The tank regiment was equipped mainly with BT-7M tanks. There were all around 225 tanks in the division. Subsequently, being in the Orsha area, the division received 30 T-34 tanks and 10 KV tanks. The artillery regiment had 54 122-mm caliber howitzers. The antitank division had 18 guns of 35-millimeter caliber. The numerical strength of the division was about 12 thousand men" *("VIZH", 1966, No. 6, p. 58)*.

I would remind the reader that a motorized division, according to wartime staffing (staffing 05/70), should have had 11,534 men and commanders.

Consider: in 1941 Hitler had not a single tank in all the motorized divisions combined, not a single tank in all the infantry divisions combined. In all the SS divisions - not a single one. In the only cavalry - not a single one. The 1st Moscow Proletarian in our country is called infantry, and in it there are more tanks than in all German infantry, motorized, security divisions combined, because the number of tanks in them is round zero.

In the German army tanks were only in the panzer divisions. Therefore we can compare our 1st Motorized only with the German tank divisions. And the comparison is in its : each of the

The seventeen German panzer divisions on the Soviet-German front as of 22 June had an average of fewer than two hundred tanks. Our 1st Motorized had more than the average of the German panzer divisions. This is according to the number. Let us also pay attention to quality. In the artillery regiment there are 122-mm howitzers M-30. There were no such howitzers in the Wehrmacht or in any other country. (But if we look on the other side, we must admit that such howitzers did appear in the German army. And as early as 1941. The Red Army had abandoned them en masse. There were plenty of shells for them too. Why should they go to the wind? The Germans loved the M-30 and used them extensively.)

The tanks of the 1st Motorized Division are BT-7M. With 500 horsepower diesel engines. The engine is the heart of the tank. In our infantry the engines were such as were not in the German infantry, and in the German tank troops. It wasn't until the end of the war that anything like it appeared in the German army. Nor has it appeared anywhere in the world. No country had such engines at the beginning of the war, at the end of the war, or in the first post-war years.

The 1st Motorized even before entering the first battle receives reinforcements: 30 T-34 and 10 KV. All in all the division had become 265 tanks. In all German tank armies there was not a single tank equal to the KV and T-34. And in number of tanks it was stronger than any German panzer division.

We have addressed only one division, the first by number, now to evaluate the statement that "no division was fully manned."

After the former commander of the 1st Motorized Division, Army General Kreiser, published his article, and then a book, Kremlin historians had to either expose the general as a liar and declare the archival material invalid, or abandon the "no Soviet division..." formulation. But no, the laureate-candidates calmly read (or maybe didn't read) the memoirs of Army General Kreiser, didn't protest and... kept repeating "not a single Soviet division...".

3

Let's move .

Lt. Gen. П. Rosli at the Victory Parade commanded the assembly regiment of the 1st Belorussian Front. In 1941 he was a colonel, commander of the 4th Rifle Division "German Proletariat".

Let's hear from the general. Here's what he says about this division. We were supplied with small arms according to . To all types of weapons there was one combat ammunition kit" *("The Last Landing in Berlin", p. 32)*.

Here's what's interesting about the organization of this division: in each Soviet rifle division there was its own reconnaissance battalion. In this battalion, among other things, there were 16 reconnaissance tanks. There were more tanks in the reconnaissance battalions of the Soviet Rifle Divisions alone than in the entire Wehrmacht. In addition, some Soviet Rifle Divisions retained one separate tank battalion in their composition - 54 tanks. We see this in the example of Colonel Rosley's 4th Rifle Division. The long bony paw of Zhukov's reform has failed to get to this division. As well as some others. Any history buff can effortlessly find documents on the individual tank battalions of the 13th, 24th, 100th, 104th, 132nd, 140th and some other Rifle Divisions. I recommend, for example, VIEW, 1987, no. 2, p. 51.

In the German infantry divisions, as we already know, there were no tanks at all.

The 4th Rifle was fully manned and had tanks. But even if we imagine that the 4th was not fully equipped with infantry, but had tanks, then it was stronger than either

is a German infantry division. Ask the frontrunners how it is easier to fight: with an incomplete set of infantry but with tanks, or with a complete set of infantry without tanks?

The 4th Rifles also had tanks, and it was fully manned with soldiers, sergeants and officers. Most of them had the experience of breaking through over-strength fortifications in Finland. Indeed in defensive warfare such experience was not required and did not come into play...

4

Army General K. H. Galitsky was a major general, commander of the 24th Samara-Ulyanovsk Rifle Division, three times awarded the title of Red Banner. The general testified, "In April, our division, like many other units, was brought up to full strength and well equipped. It now had 12 thousand men, 78 field guns, about 50 antitank and 12 antiaircraft guns, 66 mortars 82-120-mm caliber, and a large amount of other armament. The field artillery was made up of two artillery regiments, a cannon and a howitzer. They were rearmed - the first with 76-millimeter guns of the 1939 model, the second with 122-millimeter howitzers of the 1938 model and 152-millimeter howitzer-guns of the 1937 model with tractor thrust" *("Годы суровых испытаний", p. 18)*.

In this excerpt, let's note the phrase, "in April was brought on a wartime staff." They were not expecting a German attack, so why did they bring the division on a war footing? Could it be that they intended to engage in the war without being attacked by the Germans? And it wasn't just the 24th Division that was brought in on a war footing. Let us note the words of General Galitsky: "as well as many other formations".

Let's pay attention to both artillery regiments in the division. All rifle divisions in the summer of 1941 had two artillery regiments. Hitler had fewer infantry divisions than Stalin had rifle divisions, there was only one artillery regiment in each German infantry division. The basic caliber of German field artillery was 105 millimeters, the Soviet's was 122. The German field artillery represented slightly modernized guns developed in the course of the First World War. The slogan

"Guns for butter" is stupid propaganda. Hitler failed to complete at least one artillery regiment in each German infantry division, even with obsolete German artillery. That is why the German infantry divisions used trophy artillery,

captured in Czechoslovakia, Poland, Yugoslavia, Greece, Belgium, Holland, France, Denmark, Norway. The field artillery of the German army in World War II was numerous, only in comparison to other armies. Compared to our artillery it was obsolete, varied, and few in number, even if we include all the trophy-worn barrels.

Let us try to imagine the problems of the German artillery supply service, which had to supply the troops with ammunition of twenty-eight different calibers. None of the belligerent countries of the world has been able to create or repeat in the field of field artillery what Stalin had at the beginning of the war. The Red Army ended the war possessing the most powerful and most advanced artillery in the world.

The field artillery guns that Stalin had at his disposal in 1941 are still in service in dozens of countries around the world at the beginning of the new millennium and can be used in combat.

But let's go back to General Galitsky's 24th Rifle Division. In addition to the two artillery and three rifle regiments, the division had all the necessary separate battalions as well as a separate tank battalion. In February 1941, the reorganization began, according to which separate tank battalions were removed from the composition of the rifle divisions. But not everywhere this reform was completed. The 24th Rifle Division was out of luck. Its separate tank battalion was retained.

5

Army Gen. Beloborodov was a colonel, commanded the 78th Rifle Division. In addition to the three rifle regiments in its composition were two artillery regiments: the 159th gun and the 210th howitzer. The division was located in the Far East, but in the critical situation, like dozens of others, appeared at the front. Stalin could have tossed fresh divisions near Moscow, but Hitler, for whatever reasons, did not. Stalin was pulling fresh divisions from the far eastern frontiers and throwing them into combat. Stalin had nowhere to take from, and Hitler had no such endless reserves. That is where the difference lies.

General Beloborodov describes the 78th Rifle Division: "In the division there were all over 14,000 soldiers and officers, 23 light tanks, 3 45-millimeter guns, 35 76-millimeter guns of the regimental and divisional artillery, 18 122-millimeter howitzers, 59 50-82-millimeter mortars, 6 37-millimeter anti-aircraft guns, 441 trucks, and 3,400 horses" *("VISION", 1962, No. 2)*.

Let's pay attention to the 23 light tanks. In the reconnaissance battalion of each rifle division there were supposed to be 16 of them. Here they are one and a half times more than the staff's entitlement. The general confirms his words by referring to the archives of the Ministry of Defence *(f. 208, o. 2511, d. 1011, l. 13)* and summarizes: 'The division as a whole was a serious fighting force. But we did not have our rightful set of anti-aircraft and anti-tank artillery".

It is here that we must look for some of the hidden truth. Just before the war, on the orders of Comrade Stalin, the production of anti-aircraft artillery was curtailed and the production of anti-tank artillery completely stopped. If the Red Army made a strike in Romania and cut off the oil from Germany, German planes would be left on the airfields and tanks would freeze in place. What good would the Soviet divisions have a fourth echelon of anti-aircraft and anti-tank artillery in that case? And Comrade Stalin was not so scared of Hitler, since on the eve of the war he did not waste resources on

purely defensive types of armament, and has thrown resources into the production of howitzers and concrete-pounding shells for them.

For offensive warfare Colonel Beloborodov's 78th Division was fully manned, but in defensive warfare it was too hampered. Try going against advancing tanks and dive-bombers without anti-aircraft and anti-tank artillery.

Lt. Gen. H. Rusyanov was a colonel and commanded the 100th Rifle Division. This was one of the best divisions in the Red Army. It was with it that the list of the Guards compounds began. In September 1941 it was transformed into the 1st Guards Rifle Division. Much has been written about it. I recommend the book

"First Guard. The general conclusion is: the 100th was fully completed. Moreover: it had more than its share of men and weapons. It included the 317th Separate Tank Battalion - 54 tanks. In all, there were 70 tanks in this division.

And the 127th Rifle Division became the 2nd Guards Rifle Division. "In mid-August 1940 the division was fully manned with personnel and combat equipment (...) At the beginning of May 1941, according to an order from the district headquarters, the units of the 127th Division received a complement of reservists and marched out of their barracks for training near Kiev - in the Rzhishchev camps" *("Gvardeyskaya Tamanskaya". M., Voenizdat, 1972, pp. 9-10)*.

Marshal of the Soviet Union S. C. Biryuzov in 1941 was a major general, commanded the 132nd Rifle Division. All in all, it was a serious fighting force" *("When Guns Rattled," p. 10)*.

Col. Gen. M. Shatilov was a major, chief of staff of the 196th Rifle Division... He reports that the division entered the first battle with a strength of 17,000 *("На земле Украины", p. 179)*. Let us remember that each Soviet rifle division was supposed to have 14,483 men. And here the soldiers were more. And on p. 10, the general reports that the 17,000 men in the 196th division were bayonet infantry only, and that in addition to the soldiers armed with rifles, there were hundreds and thousands of machine gunners, mortars, scouts, tankers, artillerymen, bombardiers, medics, officers'

personnel, . Incidentally, the general also mentions his neighbors: "The 116th Division was fully manned" *(p. 96)*.

Colonel-General Lyudnikov was a colonel and commanded the 200th Rifle Division: 'Our division was manned according to wartime staffs and had all the means of armament' *('VIEW', 1966, No. 9)*.

From the rifle divisions we can move to the cavalry. Army General A. C. Zhadov was a major-general. A few days before the war he had surrendered the 21st Mountain Cavalry Division in Central Asia and had taken over the 4th Airborne Corps in Byelorussia. Zhadov had gone to receive the Airborne Corps (we will come back to him), and during this time the 21st Mountain Cavalry Division was also being transferred to the West. Here is how the former commander assesses it: 'Yes, the division was fully manned with well-trained personnel. Everything was fine with the horses, with the rifle and artillery weapons, with the ammunition" *("Четыре года войны", p. 25)*.

"The Soviet cavalry units were maintained in peacetime according to staffs that hardly differed from wartime ones, and were relatively well equipped" *(Horkov, A. G. "Grozovoi iyun", p. 43)*.

With tank regiments in their formations, Soviet cavalry divisions were superior in striking power to any of the German infantry, cavalry, and motorized divisions.

The Soviet mountain-cavalry divisions, which were secretly transferred to the Romanian border, posed a particular danger to Germany. In conjunction with airborne, mountain-rifle divisions and corps, they could have seized the absolutely undefended passes in the Carpathian and Transylvanian Alps, which would have meant a victorious end of the war for Stalin.

Hitler thwarted these plans and the 21st Mountain Cavalry Division, and others like it, were thrown into the swamps of Belorussia, where its skills at seizing passes were not needed.

Special mention should be made of the degree of completeness of the NKVD parts and compounds. Because they never remained incomplete. An example of this is given by Maj. Gen. C. Antonov:

"The separate motor rifle regiment of the NKVD represented rather

Wartime Rifle Brigade. The regiment included four separate motorized rifle battalions, a tank company, an artillery division, and other units" *("Put'k berlinnu". M., Voenizdat., 1975, p. 4)*.

There is quite a difference between a battalion and a separate battalion. And here's the thing: the separate motorized rifle battalions of the NKVD were not ordinary motorized rifle battalions, but separate ones. Even that alone, without taking into account the tank company and the artillery division, essentially made the regiment a true brigade.

6

If we are bored with the descriptions of rifle, motorized rifle, motorized and cavalry divisions, let us turn to tank divisions. We can start straight from the first one.

Lt. Gen. И. Baranov was Major General, Commander of the 1st Panzer Division. The division entered the war not just fully manned, but manned with experienced, combat-ready personnel. As of 22 June, the division had 24 Heroes of the Soviet Union and 400 officers and soldiers awarded decorations. In those days medals were not handed out by the kilo as in our time and hero stars were not hung on anyone. There were 370 tanks and 53 armored cars in the 1st Armored Division *("VISION", 1988, No. 9)*.

Let's evaluate: the German 46th Motorized Corps was part of Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group. The corps included the 10th Panzer Division, the SS motorized division "Das Reich" and the most distinguished regiment of the SS "Greater Germany". The total number of tanks in the 46th Corps was 206. In his best corps, Guderian had one and a half times fewer tanks than were in some of our divisions. And there were no such divisions as our 1st Panzer in Germany at the beginning of the war, in its course, or at its end.

The 7th Soviet Tank Division (Major General S. V. Borzilov) had 368 tanks as of 22 June *("VIZH", 1988, No. 11, p. 33)*. It makes no to compare such a division with the German ones. We can only compare with the corps. For example, with the 56th. This is the famous corps of E. Manstein. At the time of crossing the border in its composition there were 223 tanks.

In our divisions there are sometimes one and a half times as many tanks as there are in the German corps.

And the quality?

Please: in the 7th Soviet Panzer Division, among other things, there were 52 KVs and 150 T-34s, and in Manstein's corps, and in all the other corps, and in all the other armies of the world there was not a single

tank, which by its characteristics even approximately yes resembled the T-34 and KV.

In the 8th Panzer Division (Colonel P. S. Fotchenkov) there were 325 tanks, including 50 KV and 140 T-28 *(ibid.)*.

In the 10th Panzer Division (Colonel S. Y. Ogurtsov) there were 365 tanks, including 63 KV, 38 T-34 and 61 T-28 *(ibid.)*.

7

In order not to trouble ourselves with a consideration of individual divisions, we may turn our attention to whole clusters of them. Here, for example, is what is known about the Soviet divisions in the Leningrad Military District:

"The district included 21 divisions, including 4 armoured and 2 motorised. The units that immediately occupied the border areas were manned and equipped according to wartime staffing" *(Colonel B. N. Petrov. "VIZH", 1998, №1, p. 45)*.

Let's unfold the map, let's plot on it the position of the divisions of the Leningrad Military District - so we will see that they were all located in the border areas, i.e. all the divisions of the Leningrad Military District were not only fully equipped with men and combat equipment, but were already brought to wartime status.

Or this about the Ural divisions, "In 1939-1940, five fully manned rifle divisions were sent to the border districts from the Ural Military District. Before that, three well-trained rifle divisions and the 7th Motorized Brigade went to the Far East" *("Krasnoznamenny Uralsky", p. 95)*.

To this we will add that under cover of the TASS message of June 13, 1941, from that same Ural Military District to the western regions of the country had begun the movement of the 22nd Army, consisting of an Army and two Corps headquarters with the entire complement of Army and Corps units. There were six fully manned divisions in the 22nd Army. In the other districts the same process was being followed.

* * *

How was it, then, that by 22 June so many fully complete divisions had become incomplete?

CHAPTER 15
FOR INCOMPLETE HULLS

Via first eight months From War over 10 million people were mobilized.

Army General M. Moiseev, Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces

"Pravda, 19 June 1991

1

We have already gone down to the brigade level. We can go down further: "The 747th Rifle Regiment of the 172nd Rifle Division... like the rest of the division, was manned. At the beginning of the war, only a certain number of the soldiers came from the reserves, and many of them had participated in the Soviet-Finnish war" *("VIEW", 1963, No. 12, p. 88)*.

We are talking about one regiment, but from the description it follows that the whole 172nd Rifle Division was also completed.

We can go up from the regimental, brigade and division level to the corps level. For example, the 41st Rifle Corps of Maj. Gen. C. Kosobutsky. In the corps, as is proper, there were two corps artillery regiments and three rifle divisions: the 111th, 118th, 235th. Like many other divisions in the Red Army, they met the war in echelons. For these three divisions it is reported that "at the time of the dispatch, the divisions were almost fully manned" *("VIZH", 1993, No. 6, p. 18)*.

Colonel-General Boldin reports on the 6th Mechanized Corps:
"The personnel of the corps was superbly trained, half the tank fleet consisted of T-34 and KV machines" *("Pages of Life", p. 95)*. Let us specify: in the 6th Mechanized Corps there were 1021 tanks, including 114 KV and 238 T-34, 229 armored cars, 127 of which - heavy gun BA-10. There were 335 guns and mortars in the corps *("VIZH", 1989, No. 4, p. 25)*.

Lt. Gen. Ryabishev was a Major General and commanded the 8th Mechanized Corps. The corps included the 12th and 34th Panzer Divisions and the 7th Motorized Division, a motorcycle regiment, an air squadron and other units. The general reported, "The corps was almost completely manned, there were 932 tanks" *("VIZH", 1978, No. 6, p. 67)*. True, the general also reports weaknesses: the corps' air defense assets were 4 37-millimeter anti-aircraft guns and 24 anti-aircraft machine guns.

In the event of a sudden massive Soviet air strike on German airfields, the corps and divisions did not need many anti-aircraft assets. But in the event of a sudden attack by the enemy such a corps was doomed to destruction, despite all its remaining strength.

If a German attack was about to be repulsed, and anti-aircraft resources were insufficient, masses of tanks had to be withdrawn from the frontiers, these masses had to be broken up into small tank units and units, hidden in the forests, ambushed, trenches cut for them, camouflaged. On the one hand - it would be very difficult to destroy them. On the other - the Red Army's defenses would have been impenetrable.

But on the orders of the Grand Strategist, the tanks were kept along the borders of convenient firing herds, without secured anti-aircraft cover.

It was like that everywhere.

The list could go on forever: there were many tanks. Infinitely many.

We will not continue. Let's stop. Let's compare.

To compare with the German motorized corps makes no : at home many tank divisions are stronger than the German corps. We should compare with German tank groups. All German armoured troops were grouped into four groups - the groups consisted of corps, the corps of divisions.

The overall picture looked like this:

1-and tank group - 699 tanks, of them of a new type - 0;

2-and tank group - 953 tanks, of them of a new type - 0;

3-and tank group - 1014 tanks, of them of a new type - 0;

4-and tank group - 631 tanks, of them of a new type - 0.

That's all.

And with us!

2

And we had 29 mechanized corps. As we have already made clear, it was not possible to complete them completely. But not fully complete, they still represented a certain strength.

Without repeating those already mentioned, here are a few:

2-and mechanized corps - 489 tanks, including 60 brand new ones;

3-and mechanized corps - 669 tanks, including 51 brand new ones;

4-and mechanized corps - 892 tanks, including 414 brand new ones;

11th Mechanized Corps - 241 tanks, including 31 brand new tanks;

15th Mechanized Corps - 733 tanks, including 131 brand new tanks;

22nd Mechanized Corps - 647 tanks, including 31 brand new tanks.

And so on and so forth.

Stalin also had mechanized corps without brand new tanks: the 1st Mechanized Corps - 1011 tanks;

12th Mechanized Corps - 806 tanks; 14th Mechanized Corps - 534 tanks; 16th Mechanized Corps - 680 tanks.

And under Hitler all the corps were without brand new tanks.

There were also very weak mechanized corps in the Red Army. In the 17th, for example, there were 36 tanks. But it does not follow at all that the Red Army was weak. The existence of such corps speaks only of the remarkable mental abilities of a Very Great Commander in Chief, who insisted on forming new and new corps, who wanted to have three times as many mechanized corps as all the other countries in the world put , knowing

in advance, that for them there are neither men, nor tanks, nor trucks, nor means of communication.

Summing up, the picture looked like this.

Hitler had on the Eastern Front 9 motorized corps and one in reserve. An average of 329 tanks per corps. In this number brand new - 0.

Stalin had 20 mechanized corps in the western border districts, each with an average of 519 tanks, including 66 brand new tanks in each.

In addition, 7 more corps are being transferred westward in echelons, with an average of 537 tanks in each corps, including 7 brand new tanks in each corps.

In addition, Stalin was able to transfer tanks from the Far Eastern Front, the Trans-Baikal, Transcaucasian and some other military districts. There were 877 tanks in the Transcaucasian Military District. In the Trans-Baikal Military District, even after the departure of the 5th Mechanized Corps and the 57th Panzer Division, there were still 1,232 tanks left. The Far Eastern Front had not fought, but had 3,203 tanks on hand.

Hitler had no such reservations.

Among other things, we have already established that Stalin had tanks in the rifle and cavalry divisions. For example, there were 3,945 tanks in the mechanized corps in the Kiev Special Military District, but the total number of tanks in the district was 5,465, because there were them in other units and formations besides the mechanized corps.

We had more tanks in one county than Germany and all her allies put together, on all fronts from Norway to North Africa and from Brest to Brest.

But that's not all. Stalin had divisions of the NKVD. The number of tanks in these divisions was never published. But there were many. In 1941 Hitler had no tanks in the SS troops.

And among other things, Stalin had airborne corps. With tanks.

In 1941 Hitler had no tanks in the airborne troops.

By the way, we should also remember about airborne hulls.

The official history of the Airborne Corps says: "The manning of the corps was completed by 1 June 1941" *("Sovetskie Vozdушно-desantные". M., Voenizdat, 1986. p. 51)*.

And here's something about the air defense: "The six artillery regiments of 2nd Air Defense Corps, which was covering Leningrad, had about 600 new 8 5-millimeter guns at their disposal, 59 artillery batteries of the corps by combat organization were considered on duty with readiness to open fire within one minute. In addition, the corps had 16 37-mm guns, 76 large-caliber machine guns,
175 quad machine guns and 246 76 mm guns not provided for in the staff schedule. The corps also had 12 companies for air observation, warning and liaison (VNOS), a radar battalion, three regiments of aerostat fencing, two searchlight regiments and six searchlight battalions under the artillery regiments" *("Istoriya Leningradského военного округа", p. 179)*.

Imagine six regiments of 100 85mm anti-aircraft guns in each! And on top of that, almost 250 76mm anti-aircraft guns.

The 1st Air Defense Corps, which was covering Moscow, was about the same strength. But with the start of the war they immediately reinforced it. "The total number of antiaircraft artillery weapons as of July 22, 1941 - at the beginning of the air raids on Moscow - was: 564 85-millimeter antiaircraft guns, 232 76-millimeter, 248 37-millimeter, 336 antiaircraft machine guns" *("Voiska противовоздушной обороны страны". M., Voenizdat, 1968, p. 101)*. To this add the 6th Fighter Aviation Corps, composed of 11 fighter aviation regiments.

We have yet to talk about aviation specifically. As you leaf through the memoirs, note the composition of the aviation divisions and the complaints of the commanders that they did not have two sets of aircraft.

3

Let's go back to the wrong ground, but let's go to a higher level.

Marshal of the Soviet Union A. И. "By the beginning of the war, when the enemy was in close proximity, the leading units and formations of the 16th Army - the 5th Mechanized Corps (about 1300 tanks), the separate tank brigade (300 tanks), the 32nd Rifle Corps
- began to concentrate in the aforementioned areas" *("At the Beginning of the War", p. 215)*.

Colonel-General Sandalov: "By June 1941, the compounds and units comprising the 4th Army were mostly manned and equipped with combat equipment within the staff norms" *("Pervye dni woj". M., Voenizdat, 1989, p. 55)*.

"Rifle divisions located in the border were almost fully manned and had the armament that was due according to the state" *(Irinarkhov, R. S. "Zapadnyi Osoby". Minsk, Harvest, 2002, p. 30)*.

Lieutenant General of Artillery G. Д. "The 53rd Division, in which I was chief of artillery, was stationed on the Volga. They summoned the senior command staff to the headquarters of our 63rd Corps. (...) The corps commander A. Г. Petrovsky, usually calm, unruffled, was obviously excited.

- 'Comrades,' he said, 'we have been ordered to mobilise the Corps. We have to complete the units according to the wartime staff, for which we are to use the inviolable reserve. (...) We have never once taken the full set of combat shells on exercises. We have not called up men from the reserve..." *("Under the Rumble of Cannonade", p. 125)*.

The 63rd Rifle Corps, like the entire 21st Army, was fully manned according to wartime staffs and transferred to the western frontiers.

Lt. Gen. Ф. Zotov (at that time Major General, Chief of the Engineer Troops of the North-West Front):
"Sapper battalions were mobilized according to wartime

states... the ten battalions that arrived from the Far East were fully armed" *("On the North-West Front (1941-1943). A collection of articles by participants in combat operations", pp. 172)*.

In addition to her divisions, Stalin also had reserve and training brigades, regiments and battalions. Let's not ignore the trivia.

Marshal of the Soviet Union S. Biryuzov says that at the very beginning of the war he met near Gomel a reserve regiment "numbering over ten thousand men" *("When the Guns Rattled", p. 33)*.

Colonel-General Sandalov: "From the three machine-gun battalions, numbering 350-400 men each, a deployment of five battalions of 1,500 men each was under way" *("VIZH", 1988, No. 11, p. 7)*.

It's a small touch, but it's been like that everywhere.

But this is not even the main thing. All Soviet divisions, fully or not fully manned, could have become full-blooded at any moment. The idea of the Soviet strategy was precisely this: not to scare the beast - to strike the first blow with what we had and immediately begin the open stage of mobilization. And to replenish all the undermanned regiments and divisions.

Each division could have suffered any number of losses, but they would have been promptly made up with reserves of men ready to replace their fallen comrades. "To give a clear idea of how great was the concentration of reservists at the division muster station, we quote from the combat log of the 2nd Rifle Corps, into which the division had entered. The log shows that "more than 1,500 officers alone appeared at the assembly point of the 100th Division on June 25" *("Pervaya gvardeyskaya", p. 67. With reference to the archive TsAMO[1], f. 202, o. 2159, d. 29, l. 15)*.

The 100th Rifle Division (as well as all of its neighbors) was not just fully manned, but had fighters and commanders overstate. And there were many thousands more reservists here. Where to fuck them? The same source reports that three more regiments had to be formed of fighters and commanders who had nowhere to be billeted. There were three rifle and two artillery regiments in the division, followed by three more regiments of reservists. The reservists were so numerous that the division, and not only it, could have been boldly deployed in corps or thrown into intense fighting with the assurance that any losses would be immediately made up with reservists.

Recalls Col. И. Isakov: "Brovary was crowded with troops... I do not presume to say how many hundreds or even thousands of cadre commanders, mostly reserve commanders, there were in the reserve, called KUK C[2], at the South-Western Front" *("Kommandiry muzhayat v boyakh". M., Voenizdat, 1968, p. 5)*.

In the Red Army, compensation for losses was carried out with methods and at a pace never seen anywhere.

Here are just two examples.

"The 14th Reserve Rifle Brigade under the Moscow Military District in August 1941 alone prepared and sent to the North-Western and Central Fronts 19 marching battalions and 8 companies with a total strength of 19,112 men... All in all, in 15 months the 14th Reserve Rifle Brigade prepared for the active army 250,000 fighters and commanders" *(Major General V. Yatsenko. "VIZH", 1985, No. 2, p. 34)*.

On 23 August 1942, the 21st Separate Tank Training Battalion "numbered about 2,000 men, 500 of them officers - tank commanders" *("VIZH", 1976, № 99)*. 500 officers in one battalion!

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[1] Central Archive of the Ministry of . - B.pr↕

[2] Courses for the improvement of the command staff - B.pr↕

5

Lt. Gen. B. Vladimirovsky was a lieutenant colonel, deputy head of the operations department at the headquarters of the 5th Army under the KOVO. He wrote a textbook for the army he joined in the war on June 22, 1941. For many decades the textbook was secret, but before the very collapse of the USSR it was published under the title Na Kievskom направлении (On the Kiev Direction) *(M., Voenizdat, 1989)*.

The difference from ordinary memoirs is that the general does not write about himself, his actions, thoughts, experiences. This is a sprawling account of the 5th Army's combat actions from the beginning of the war to September 1941.

The book is replete with statistics that have not only been gathered from the archives, but have also been confirmed by a special committee in order to present to future generations of officers and generals a secret, inaccessible to outsiders, but to some extent truthful picture what happened.

5-and the Army of the KOBO was a completely standard unit, which did not stand out with any particular power against the background of the other armies of the First Strategic Echelon. It could not compare with either the 10th Army, let alone the 9th Army, which were clearly superior to it in strength.

On p. 28 is given the numerical strength of the Fifth Army as of 1 June 1941 - 142,570 men and commanders. On p. 24 there is a note: "Excluding the added Reserve personnel called up for training muster in May 1941." And such added, as we shall see later, numbered many thousands.

On p. 29 we find the number of guns and mortars in the 5th Army - 2044. This is without counting the 45mm anti-tank guns. The table is good in that it clearly and distinctly describes where, how many and what kind of guns there were. For example, 122mm howitzers in the 5th Army were 260, 152mm - 235.

Information on the 45 mm anti-tank guns is given separately on p. 25. They were 338.

There were 1503 tanks in the 5th Army. Not counting the heavy gun armoured cars.

How then, pray, are we to believe the Academy of Military Science, with the assistance of whose leadership the booklet was published claiming that there were only 1,800 tanks in the entire Red Army as of June 22, 1941?

How, please, are we to believe the compiler Zhukov, who declared that the top leaders of the Soviet Union "could see no farther than their noses, with the result that our leadership was unable to create powerful armoured troops in time, and they were created already in the course of the war."

1500 tanks in one army! In the course of the war, no Soviet TANK army ever had that number of tanks at any time, day or hour. And here we are talking not about a tank army, but a regular army.

No German TANK army in the course of the war had such a number of tanks either.

On 22 June 1941, all German tanks on the Soviet-German front were concentrated in four tank groups. There were one and a half times fewer tanks in the 2-A Tank Group than in our most ordinary 5th Army. And in the 3 a tank group were also one and a half times less.

If we take the 1st and 4th Panzer Groups together, and then they in the number of tanks can not measure up to our 5th Army. Moreover, they cannot be measured at all.

But even if in the summer of 1941 the Soviet units, compounds, unions were not fully completed, does that prevent the war? In war, regiments, divisions, corps and armies practically always fight undermanned in terms of personnel and weapons. Is this an obstacle on the road to Berlin?

* * *

I don't have titles or ranks. I am not a historian. But I have an interest. I have the passion of a collector, the passion of a greyhound, if you will.

So, you don't have to wear titles and ranks at all to collect material that every regimental library is crammed with. You don't have to be a historian, or even an expert, you just have to take an interest and collect information about the divisions the way boys collect stamps.

Everything is accessible.

Only you have to tear many pairs of pants...

CHAPTER 16
HOW JUKOV PREPARED THE WAY FOR GUDERIAN

An army that has learned to advance but is not trained in the art of retreat will be defeated.

Й. Stalin

Reception at the Grand Kremlin Palace, 20 January 1938

1

Zhukov explained the reason for the defeat simply: we did not have enough troops not only for defense, but even for the defense of the borders.

And we will turn to the recollections of a German aviator. His name was Hans-Ulrich Rudel. He flew the Ju-87, did 2530 combat sorties. Here's his impression of the beginning of the war against the Soviet Union.

"By the evening of the first day, I had made four flights beyond the front line in the area between Grodno and Volkovisk. We found huge masses of Russian tanks along with super-long barges. These were mostly tanks of the KV-1, KV-2 and T-34 types. We bombed the tanks and anti-aircraft batteries, machine-gunned vehicles and supply carts for the tanks and infantry. The next day we made the first flight at 3 o'clock in the morning and the last one at 10 o'clock in the evening. We had to forget about a normal night's rest, so we used every spare minute to collapse in the grass under the plane and immediately fall asleep. (...)

Off the road to Vitebsk, along which our troops were advancing, we saw one of the half-finished airfields, packed with Martin bombers. They had either no fuel or no crews, I don't know. As we flew over the numerous airfields, over the branching network of fortifications, we kept thinking, "How nice that we struck first"... It seemed the Soviets were frantically preparing a base to attack us. That which other of the Western countries could have attacked Russia? If the Russians had completed their preparations, we would not have had the slightest chance of stopping them. (...)

We made numerous strike sorties against Russian troops on the great highway that leads from Smolensk to Moscow. It was literally crowded with countless Russian machines. Tanks and trucks were practically glued to each other, often in parallel columns. If this mass of machinery had descended on us... (...)

Attacking this tempting target was nothing complicated. After a few days, the highway remained crowded with piles of pieces" *(Rudel, H.-W., a dive-bomber pilot, in the book "Bombs dropped!" M., AST, 2002, pp. 30-35)*.

Anyone can convince himself that the German is not lying if he looks at the chronicle of those days: the fields and roads were clogged with broken, burnt Soviet fighting equipment, and the roads were clogged with untold crowds of captured Red Army men.

Everything said by the German airman can be confirmed by the official statistics on the losses of the Red Army. I will not spoil the reader's mood with what has become a hateful number. Anyone can find for himself information how many millions of Soviet soldiers were captured in 1941, how many guns, tanks and planes were lost.

I think that with the quantitative and qualitative superiority that Zhukov had, there was something to defend the border with. It is a sin to complain about a shortage of forces. The defeat in 1941 was due to another cause. Let us remember: his first order the future Marshal of the Soviet Union G. K. Zhukov received on August 31, 1922. For what? The official explanation is: "for the Civil War". Wait, citizens. What war in 1922? In the European part of the former Russian Empire, the Civil War ended in November 1920. And in the Asian part Zhukov did not fight in those years.

The thing is very simple. On the fronts of the Civil War G. K. Zhukov did not distinguish himself with bravery, did not earn medals. But he distinguish himself in the brutal punitive operations against the Russian people already after the Civil War. His first order was for crushing a peasant uprising in the Tambov region.

The Russian people resisted the communist occupation with all their might. That's why the mercenary Zhukov had his health blown out in one of the fights. A Russian fighter almost cut Zhukov in two. The future Victory Marshal himself described this fight thus, "I had barely raised my sabre, and he had already swung" *("VIEW", 1987, No. 12, p. 41)*.

Again, I repeat that I did not invent the term "occupation". Zhukov fought against the Russians in Tambov province. A commander

of all the punitive detachments was Zhukov's idol Tukhachevsky, who without embarrassment called in the open press his way of ruling Russia an occupation.

Then two circumstances saved the occupier Zhukov.

First, it was winter. He was wearing a half-jacket and many other thick clothes. Also, a couple of straps on his right shoulder. That's what softened the blow. Secondly, another occupier came to Zhukov's aid and cut down the Russian fighter...

I think the most appropriate image to describe 1941 is this one: with a whistling flourish, Stalin had raised his shiny checker over Europe... and Hitler had already struck.

The date of the Soviet strike by my calculations should have been the day of July 6, 1941.

Independent historian Mark Solonin has concluded, based on a careful study of archival documents, that Stalin's strike was being prepared for June 23, 1941. It turns out that Hitler was ahead of Stalin not by two weeks, but by 24 hours.

Solonin's evidence is compelling. He may be right.

I quote the famous prediction of Admiral Richardson, the former commander of the US Pacific Fleet, not from any foreign publications inaccessible to the Russian reader, but from the text of Krasnaya Zvezda *(November 19-25, 2008)*. In May 1941, speaking at a seminar in San Diego, the admiral had stated that there was no doubt that a war between Stalin and Hitler would soon begin, and he had said the following: "Undoubtedly, great success will be achieved by whoever first launches an offensive, since both the Wehrmacht and the Red Army are trained with the idea of a blitzkrieg (...) If Stalin unexpectedly throws 200 divisions and 10,000 tanks against Hitler, the Wehrmacht will be crushed and in two months Stalin's army will be on Gibraltar. But if Hitler starts, only the Almighty knows where he will end up in two months' time, because he will inevitably get bogged down in the vastness of Russia and Stalin will have to waste a lot of time to drive him out of there."

The admiral had underestimated the seriousness of Stalin's preparations. Stalin's tanks were twice as many. And everything else is exactly right: if Comrade Stalin had struck first, he would have run Europe all the way to Gibraltar.

He raised the checker, but Hitler swung first...

2

One of my critics has expressed the sober thought: defending is easier than attacking.

Many people picked up the idea. From a common-sense thought, some drew the seemingly logical conclusion: if the Red Army was not even ready for defence, there could be no question of an offensive.

Is so?

No, citizens, is not. I

explain with an example.

On 13 April 2006, Italian carabinieri captured Bernardo Provenzano. Nicknamed the Tractor. Or Binu. Or the Ghost of Corleone. The capture operation passed without a single shot being fired. Uncle Binu offered no resistance. None. He wasn't ready to defend himself at all, therefore...

Therefore... In Corleone alone, he personally committed 52 murders and 22 attempted murders. Not counting the unsolved ones. But these are trifles. The tractor was declared wanted in 1963, 43 years ago. For the last 13 years, he's been running the Sicilian Mafia. And he wasn't ready to defend himself.

Another example.

On April 21, 1997, at 8 hours and 12 minutes, Viktor Pavlovich Kulivar was killed in Odessa. Nicknamed Karabas. Karabas was not shot at with some superweapon with a fantastic aim. An ordinary assault rifle was enough, more precisely - a machine gun. They were shooting at close range. At five paces. It wasn't a gang of thugs that attacked him. A young man calmly came around the corner and mowed him down with a machine gun.

Karabas lived almost in the open, without impregnable residences, without a brigade of fighters, without armored limousines. On the day of his death there was not a single bodyguard near him.

Simply put - no defence, the attack on Karabas was carried out with the minimum possible force. I wouldn't be surprised to learn that he didn't even have a gun on him that day.

Viktor Pavlovich was not at all ready to defend. Because he never prepared for it. And he didn't need a defense. Therefore...

Therefore, nothing follows.

Karabas had Odessa under his control. I repeat: Odessa!!! This is not taking some Manhattan under your warm wing. Karabas' opinion has been taken into account by very serious people far beyond the borders of Odessa, from Khabarovsk and Nakhodka to Naples and Barcelona, from Tashkent and Omsk to Chicago and Vancouver. His power was so great that he simply did not care about his defenses. Who would dare to go up against Carabas?!

And it ate his head.

This is precisely how the Red Army did not prepare for defense, because the leaders of the Soviet Union had no one to fear. That is why Hitler's strike with a small amount of aircraft and tanks became almost lethal for the Motherland of the world proletariat - like firing a machine gun from five paces. Viewed in historical perspective, Hitler's blow ultimately proved crushing to the Soviet Union.

But if the Red Army was not at all ready to repel the German invasion, absolutely nothing follows from this.

There is another argument: the Red Army tried to invade Finland three times, in 1939, 1941 and 1944, but never made it to Helsinki. When one looks at it, if the Soviet tanks didn't get to Helsinki, where are you going to try to take Berlin!

But contrary to logic, the Red Army, which failed to capture the capital of Finland, captured the capitals of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bessarabia, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Germany. Here we can also add China.

We are not ready to defend our own land, but to seize someone else's - please.

3

It really is easier to defend than to attack. But only if we are determined to defend ourselves and have prepared our troops for defence.

If Viktor Pavlovich Kulivar had addressed the issue of his own safety - it would not have been so easy to meet him in a quiet street.

But he has not dealt with this issue. Just like Comrade Stalin.

Stalin knew that for Hitler war against the whole world was suicidal. By the summer of 1941, Hitler was in a situation where the war was already lost. He already had so many enemies that under no conditions could he have defeated them all. Would he even go against the Soviet Union when he was unable to defend even his own capital from British bombers!

Understanding this, Stalin did not prepare the defense, but destroyed it. He was preparing the offensive.

But the more attention you pay to offense, the worse it gets for your defense.

The troops preparing for defence are scattered along the front and in depth. They have buried themselves in the ground, that and have camouflaged themselves. Make an experiment: place targets in the middle of the field and shoot at them from a hundred or two hundred yards. Now dig a trench, hide your plywood enemies in it, and repeat the experiment...

If the troops stand on the defensive, dive bombers are no threat to them. One bomb, one shell cannot do much damage. Because the troops are not massed. The tanks are not formidable either. Piss that iron towards you, and you maneuver - bounce along the trench three meters away from it. And voila. It's even if it's coming straight at you. You drop it over you, then - incendiary bottle in its stern. Tanks advancing towards a prepared defence are extremely vulnerable.

If we are preparing our army for an offensive, the degree of vulnerability of the troops is constantly and rapidly increasing. Troops should be assembled in tight groupings, preferably along roads. This is precisely the picture that the German pilots cooked up on 22 June: combat and transport vehicles practically close together, often in parallel columns.

The higher the Red Army's readiness to strike, the easier it was to strike, the more terrible the defeat.

4

Recalls Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Sergeyevich Voronov. I have enough stories similar to his for several volumes. By the way, anyone can collect no less himself if he wishes.

On June 22, 1941, Lieutenant Voronov, in the 14th Separate Railway Battalion of the 17th Railway Brigade, found himself at Gorodeya Station. This was between Minsk and Baranovichi. If we take a broader view, this is the main railway highway of the coming war: Moscow-Smolensk-Minsk-Baranovichi-Brest-Warsaw-Poznan-Berlin. Maybe further: Hanover-Cologne-Liege-Paris.

In Brest, where the highway crosses the state border, there was an enormous accumulation of troops, which, as Zhukov tells us, was not enough to protect the border. And behind this mass of troops, the 17th Railway Brigade was carrying out work to upgrade the strategic highway that led straight to Warsaw, Berlin and beyond.

On the evening of the first day of the war the retreat began. Here is the account of Alexander Sergeyevich Voronov: "We moved all night. At six in the morning, already on June 23, we reached the old frontier. A group of generals and colonels stopped the battalion, quickly said something to our commander, and we were given a section to defend. We were ordered to dig trenches... The next day eight civilians came to us and said that they were from the Kopilyan District Council, they were staying here to wage guerrilla warfare. And now they needed people to open the reinforced concrete firing points. And here I am with six fighters, accompanied by these people, going where they show me. We break the locks with crowbars, open the DOT and leave. Those of the council stay behind to guard them.

On the evening of June 24, the military engineer 1st rank Orlov came to our battalion from the headquarters. He gave us the order of the senior commander: the battalion was to move to secure the train traffic in the Timkovichi-Slutsk-Osipovichi section. As we walked through the town, we met the people with whom the previous day

we found the firing points..." *("На frontov магистралях". Rybinsk, 1995, pp. 9-10)*.

What do we see here?

On the second day of the war, they sent the ironworkers to dig trenches. Although it is smarter to send them to destroy the highway in question. Without it, there could have been no offensive towards Moscow.

But someone suddenly thought of a defense. And what were they thinking earlier? Why didn't they dig trenches before the German attack?

True, soon the plan : don't dig trenches, you have to secure the removal of strategic supplies from the border strip. Correct decision. But why were these supplies driven there and piled up near the border? And why did a bunch of generals and colonels order the military railroad men to dig trenches, even though there were nearby reinforced concrete fortifications unoccupied by anyone?

And which idiot ordered the permanent garrisons of the fortified areas to be disbanded and the fortifications locked up without leaving keys to anyone?

The petty party chiefs of the district scale, civilian people with no connection to the army, decided on their own initiative to bring the ironclad firing points to readiness. It is clear that inside there are no weapons, no ammunition, no medicine, no food, no water. Still, this is better than facing the advancing tank avalanches in shallow trenches or in the middle of the field altogether. And nearby, generals step from foot to foot and try to set up their own defences, since they apparently have no idea that there is an abandoned fortified area nearby and in it - not occupied by anyone - reinforced concrete facilities.

By the way, the district scale comrades did not stay long in these facilities. Having grasped where the work was going, they did not persist in their quest to stop the enemy. And they have taken to the sun, repeating...

5

Now again, for once, let's remember the ballad of how the Grand Strategist in January 1941 brilliantly predicted the direction of the main blow of the German troops: "The leadership with its game artificially slowed the pace of movement of the "blue", deterred it. But the 'Blues' on the eighth day moved to the Baranovichi area, and, I repeat, at an artificially slowed pace."

Zhukov (if we believe him) knew that the enemy would make his main strike along the extension of the central strategic railroad to Baranovichi, and would therefore continue on to Minsk and Smolensk. Zhukov knew that the enemy would break into the Baranovichi area not on the eighth day, but even earlier. And here in the area of Baranovichi, according to Zhukov, there was a whole railway brigade in the regiment, two separate battalions and supporting units. In the brigade there are more than four thousand fighters-railwaymen. Well, order them to dismantle the line! Let the German panzer wedge drive forward - but supplying troops on a strategic scale at that time and in that particular situation was only possible via the railways.

But the 17th Railroad Brigade did not dismantle the highway. Good. Then order the brigade to do nothing! Let the boys kick a ball. Let them bathe in the creeks. Let them harvest on the collective farms. Let them sing and dance in the evening.

Zhukov, however, with the forces of the 17th Railway Brigade was preparing the road to Guderian. And with the forces of the other nine brigades he was also preparing the roads for the aggressors along the entire western frontier into Soviet territory.

They will object to me that the Western Special Military District was commanded by Army General Pavlov... That's right. But the modernization and development of the railway network, especially along the main strategic direction of the war, did not fall within the competence of the district commander. For this a government decision is needed. A

The General Staff presents its own considerations of what should be done, where and when.

In the summer of 1941, Stalin laid his blame on Pavlov.

After the war, Zhukov laid his blame on this same Pavlov. Now there are clever people who accuse Dmitry Grigorievich Pavlov of treason. Citizen accusers, but didn't ten military railway brigades with a total strength of over 40,000 men carry out reconstruction and new construction not only in Byelorussia, but along the entire western border of the USSR from the White Sea to the Black Sea, i.e. this was not a local initiative, but a purposeful, Moscow-led flurry of activity. Why don't you call Zhukov a traitor?

6

On June 22, 2001, the day of the 60th anniversary of the German attack, the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Army General Kvashnin, spoke clearly and understandably about the reasons for the defeat: "As a result of a not quite correct assessment by the General Staff and the Supreme High Command of the complex situation on the fronts, a decision was untimely made to switch to strategic defense, which became one of the reasons for the serious defeat of the troops of the border military districts in the initial period of the war" *("Krasnaya Zvezda", June 22, 2001)*.

Admirable.

It appears that our strategists assessed the situation correctly. But not quite.

They were slightly wrong. They fell just short of being recognized as right.

This is the most bottom-up Soviet type of approach. Total failure in the Soviet Union was called individual shortcomings, the seizure of foreign lands was called fraternal aid, and the extermination of millions of fellow countrymen was called the overreach of individual leaders on a regional scale.

The Kremlin leaders were preparing a crime against Europe, but the preparations for the liberation march turned into a crime against their own people - the death of millions more and monstrous destruction.

And it is long past time to say so openly.

* * *

I explained Zhukov's actions by the thesis that he was preparing the Red Army for an attack on Germany. In response, a hurricane of protests arose which has not subsided for more than 20 years.

Good. I agree. But in that case Zhukov's actions can only be explained by treason to the Motherland, harm and betrayal.

What other explanations can we come up with?

CHAPTER 17
ONCE MORE FOR THE 186TH RIFLE DIVISION

From the autumn of 1939 the deployment of the Soviet armed forces began.

"Soviet Armed Forces. History of construction".
M., Voenizdat, 1978, p. 234

The intensified deployment of all types of armed forces and troop companies began in the autumn of 1939.

"Party and Army." M., IPL, 1980, pp. 161

1

On August 19, 1939, Stalin extended a hand of friendship to Hitler: send a messenger, we will share Poland. The same day Stalin began a secret mobilization of the Red Army and mobilization of the entire country for war.

The mobilization was general and total. Industry, , transport, science, culture, all the resources of the vast country and all sections of the population were involved in the grand process, including scientists and collective farmers, writers and journalists, locomotive engineers and loggers, fighters and commanders, Chekists and diplomats, prisoners from jails and camps, teachers and doctors, adolescents, women, old people and everyone, everyone, everyone.

The scale of the Red Army's mobilisation was clearly beyond the needs of the eventual partition of Poland.

Thirty years after the end of the war, the Soviet leadership officially acknowledged that a deployment of the Armed Forces had taken place. It is true, moreover, that the date of the beginning of the process was ordered to be recognized as September 1, , when the 4th Extraordinary Session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR adopted the new law "On Universal Conscription." This somehow leaves out one small detail: the session was *an extraordinary one*. It was not known about in advance. The order to assemble in the Kremlin the Kuban Cossacks, Donetsk miners and Chukotka reindeer herders to approve the new law was issued on August 19, 1939. It was from here that the mobilization began.

Moreover, without waiting for the Chukchi to reach Moscow, Comrade Stalin issued orders to form dozens of new divisions and corps on the same day, August 19.

Mobilisation is disruptive. You don't just start something like that. The purpose of the mobilization is obvious: Stalin was preparing a crushing blow on Europe. So far no one has given other

explanations of Stalin's actions. Nor can you justify it by preparing to repel future aggression: in August 1939 no one was threatening the Soviet Union, at that moment Hitler was not making any plans to attack Stalin, Germany was not ready for war at all. Even official communist propaganda was forced to admit this: "In the autumn of 1939 the German armed forces could not yet enter a decisive skirmish in the west" *("Великая Отечественная война Советского Союза. 1941-1945. A Short History". M., Voenizdat, 1970, p. 24)*.

The official history immediately gives the reason: at that time Hitler did not have weapons and ammunition prepared, the industry was not put on a wartime regime, it did not cope with the execution of military orders.

In the autumn of 1939 Hitler was not ready to overrun Denmark, Norway, Belgium, Holland, France and Luxembourg, but he had no strength at all to defeat the Soviet Union.

And how, after all this, are we to understand the declarations of official propaganda that Stalin wanted to gain time and postpone the war? He sought to postpone a war which Hitler at that moment had not even contemplated? Or was he trying to postpone the war until Hitler could get his industry on the war rails and stock up on guns, tanks, planes, shells and bombs?

2

In the Red Army in less than two years the number of rifle and mountain-rifle divisions alone had increased from 96 to 198, and of rifle corps from 25 to 62. I told about all this in my book "M-Day." I gave the 186th Rifle Division as an example. This division was one of a long list of twins whose birthday was that fateful date, August 19, . I chose the number for a reason. Until December 1938, the largest number of an Rifle Division was 100. And wouldn't you know it, in peacetime the formation of a huge number of divisions began at once, up to and including the 186th...

"The Icebreaker" took a lot of merciless hits, but no one pinned "M-Day": it's not easy to quarrel with this book at all. Yet 15 years after its release, my old adversary Vladimir Nowakowski dealt it a sudden and crushing blow. He found the memoirs of Lt. Gen. И. Biryukov, who in 1939 was a colonel, commander of the 186th Rifle Division.

Biryukov's book was published in 1972 in Volgograd. The general reports that he was a delegate to the XVIII Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (b). He left for Moscow and while on the train received a message that he had been appointed commander of the 186th Rifle Division. He arrived at the division
"in the spring of 1939". The division, if we believe General Biryukov, was territorial, i.e. it had no soldiers. They were assembled only in the summer for exercises.

Finding my opponent is a ferocious blow. A blow below the belt.

If everything in General Biryukov's book is true, "M-Day" is totally disproved: no Red Army deployment began in the fall of 1939, the division I have given as an example existed before that.

My critic refers to a specific source, and I have reported that the 186th Rifle Division's birthday is in August, but I have not provided a source. That's where he groped me. It appears that I make up my own various stories, without relying on the testimony and

documents, and he hits me over the head with a general's memoir like a candlestick.

When I told the story of August 19, 1939, I could have chosen any of the many divisions whose orders to form were signed that day. I chose the 186th. And I burned. Since the division given as an example did not begin to form on that day, but had existed earlier, what to speak of the other divisions which I did not give as an example?

I heard the charges. I begin to justify myself.

3

To anyone who has been interested in the history of the Red Army, it is absolutely clear that Gen. И. Biryukov was wrong. Until 1939, there were divisions of two types in the Red Army - territorial and cadre. To maintain territorial divisions was much cheaper: you did not have to feed thousands of men all year round, you did not have to provide them with accommodation, you did not have to heat their homes, you did not have to treat fighters and commanders. Most importantly, you don't have to tear thousands of people away from creative work. In the division there is a small core of commanders, let the rest create the material and technical base for the future victory. You gather the fighters once a year from the neighboring areas in the district, fight for a while against plywood enemies and let them go. you don't even have to change the soles of their boots.

Good system. But in early 1939 the Red Army completely abandoned the territorial principle of troop manning. All territorial divisions became cadre divisions.

By 1 January 1938 there were 34 territorial rifle divisions in the Red Army, by 1 January 1939 there were none left. Anyone wishing can learn this from whichever sources, starting with the most official ones possible. For example from
"History of World War ." Volume 3, pp. 199.

Could Nikolai Ivanovich Biryukov have commanded a territorial rifle division in 1939, since there were none in the Red Army at that time?

The source from which I have drawn my information about the 186th Rifle Division is also completely official - Military Historical Journal, 1980, No. 12, pp. 76-77. But why have I not named it in my book? Well, because in the glorious years of Communist rule there were only two official and open sources from which one could draw information about Soviet divisions, corps and armies: the Military Historical Journal and the Soviet Military Encyclopedia. And there was nothing else in sight. I decided thus: a man who

seriously studies the early period of the war, he is simply obliged to keep a card-book, to leaf through all the volumes of the "VISION" and all the volumes of the "SVE," to enter the information of all the divisions, corps, and armies in his card-books. In a word, he who is interested has information on the 186th and all the other divisions mentioned in these treasure-books. A person who is not interested does not need my accuracy.

I think my source "VIEW" is more reliable than General Biryukov's memoirs.

In his book N. И. Biryukov does not report exact dates. Instead he writes: "when I was travelling to Moscow" and "the spring of 1939".

A "VISION" names the numbers of all the regiments that at various times were part of the 186th Red Banner Brest Rifle Division, winner of the "Suvorov" and
"Kutuzov", from the moment of its formation until the end of the war and the exact dates of the entry into office of all commanders of this division also from the moment of its formation until the end of the war. For each commander, the exact date when he took over the division and when he handed it over to another is given. The first commander of the 186th Rifle Division, N. И. Biryukov accepted the division on August 19, 1939, handed it over on September 12, 1941.

For future critics, I list all the commanders of this division up to and including 9 May 1945:

— Colonel (since 4 June 1940 Major-General) N. И. Biryukov;
— Col. П. Pilipenko;
— Maj. Gen. И. Zigin;
— Major (from 19 May 1942 Lieutenant Colonel) M. И. Nikitin;
— Maj. . K. Urbanovich;
— Colonel N. П. Yatskevich;
— Colonel (from 1 September 1943 Major-General) G. B. Revunenkov;
— Colonel S. C. Velichko.

"The Military Historical Journal is the official organ of the Ministry of Defence of the USSR. The information about the 186th Rifle Division is not someone's article, but an official response to an official inquiry.

A book by General N. И. Biryukov was published in a regional book publishing house. This means that it was published by civilians. Even with all the atrocities of Soviet censorship, a regional publishing house was under no obligation at all to check whether a division in 1939 was territorial or cadre, whether it existed in the spring or was created in the summer of the year in question.

My source is fresher. First General Biryukov's book was published, then, 8 years later, the official organ of the USSR Ministry of Defense published completely different information.

And no one objected.

These days, military history buffs have far outstripped official historians in matters of war studies. The best guide to the Red Army has been compiled by K. Kalashnikov, V. Feskov, A. Chmikhalo and V. Golikov *("The Red Army in June 1941". Novosibirsk, Siberian Chronograph, 2003)*. The Russian Academy of Sciences, the Ministry of Defense, the General Staff, the Academy of Military Sciences, the Institute of Military History, and other equally prestigious organizations are neither individually nor collectively capable of accomplishing even one hundredth of what four provincial heroes were able to do.

The reference book "Krasnaya Armiya v июне 1941 года" is a living rebuke to all our order-bearers and titled idlers connected with military history. Our generals and academicians smear a small amount of information over many volumes. And here in one volume, in a rather small volume, is concentrated a colossal quantity and quality of information which in its character and significance surpasses anything that all Soviet and Russian official historians have been able to produce in 60 years of hard work. Most importantly, in the case of official historians, the statistical material is always (and absolutely deliberately) laid out without any system. And here all the information is systematized. Here everything is concise, clear, precise, military-style.

There is also a place in this guide for the 186th Rifle Division. It was formed in August 1939.

4

General Biryukov was wrong in his recollections. But let us to explain the reason for such an obvious mistake.

To this end, we will take two paths.

First we will go left and imagine that Comrade Stalin was a complete idiot.

And here the idiot Stalin on August 19 ordered to form a new division. Immediately, the Personnel Directorate of the NKO began looking for a promising colonel whom they could appoint to this post. They found him and appointed him. Inevitably, an avalanche of reshuffles in the command staff followed. If one new position is created in the Red Army - division commander, how many people will get promoted? Correct: ten. Some colonel from the post of deputy commander is promoted to the newly created post of division commander and vacates his place. Some regimental commander rises to that place. In his place comes his deputy. And next the battalion commander, the battalion chief of staff (who in those years was called the senior battalion adjutant), the company commander and his deputy are promoted. Eventually, a platoon leader became a deputy company commander or even a company commander, vacating his place to a newly minted lieutenant who also received a promotion by taking command of a platoon.

But the new 186th Rifle Division needs not only a commander, but also a deputy division commander, a chief of staff, a rear chief, a chief of artillery, a chief of intelligence, etc., etc. The personnel authorities should immediately find worthy candidates from among the promising colonels and majors and appoint them to the posts.

But the elevation of one regimental commander to be appointed as the new division's second-in-command also shuffles 7-8 other officers up to and including the platoon commander. And all the other appointments entail a whole flurry of reshuffles. And should to find and five commanders of regiments, their

deputies, chiefs of staff, etc., etc. There are 23 battalions and artillery divisions in the division. And for them commanders must be found. And their deputies. And company ones. And battery commanders...

And we have to think where to accommodate the comrades in command with their families. And where to accommodate the soldiers. And what to feed 10-12, even 15 thousand throats. And with what to feed 3 thousand horses. And where to keep 558 vehicles. And where to repair them. And where to hold battalion and regimental exercises. Where to take the batteries, divisions and artillery regiments out for live firing. Where to train tank and armoured car drivers. And how these troops should be dressed and shod. With what sticks and carrots to keep them under control.

By all this I mean that if Stalin had been an idiot, he would have issued the order to form the division in the first place, and then he would have started to solve the thousand questions connected with its birth.

Now let's go right and imagine that Stalin wasn't a complete idiot. In this case, he was beginning preparations in advance for the deployment of both the 186th Rifle Division and the entire Red Army. And that is exactly how it was. Preparations for the deployment of the Red Army had begun as early as 1927, when the country proceeded to implement the plan under Stalin's 1st Five-Year Plan. Preparations for the deployment continued in the course of the 2nd Five-Year Plan. And already in the course of the 3rd this deployment itself had begun.

In the 1st Five-Year Plan Stalin created the industrial base: he built metallurgical plants, mines, mines, power stations. These are the things without which a military-industrial complex cannot live and develop. The next step was purely military factories: artillery, tank, aviation, cartridge, shipbuilding. And only after that came the deployment of the Red Army, and not all at once, but, so to speak, with a zero cycle.

Imagine building an industrial giant. There is essentially no construction yet, but a director has already been appointed, a railway line is being laid to the construction site, sheds are already being rigged and fenced with barbed wire, dogs are already barking and convoys are already swearing all around. And don't think that the life of the director of the future combine is easy before its construction begins.

On the contrary: he cares three times as much - because nothing is organized yet.

So it is in the Red Army. The order to form a whole number of divisions was issued on August 19, 1939. But long before that, promising colonels had been earmarked for promotion, relieved of their old duties, and assigned new ones. In March, April, and May 1939 they already knew that they would be commanders of divisions that did not yet exist. They had already received the men, organized the headquarters, built warehouses and hangars, filled them with arms, ammunition, equipment and footwear, with food, conducted trial calls of reservists and army exercises.

To deploy an army with no prior training, zero cycle, you have to be a complete idiot. And didn't Comrade Stalin create a division... The wise and very serious historian is free to say and write whatever he wants about Stalin, he just shouldn't think Stalin was stupider than he was.

Taking that into account, let's agree that there was a zero cycle of deployment. By calling himself a division commander, Nikolai Ivanovich Biryukov did not deviate much from the truth, even though in March there was still no division. In the spring and summer of 1939 he had too much on his mind. This preparatory cycle is too close to the concept of a territorial division: either there is a division or there is not. If they issue an order - it will appear...

The order was issued on August 19.

5

The practice of appointing commanders of formations and units before these combat units come into existence is generally accepted not only in the army but also in the navy, not only in this country but also in other countries.

Here is an example. On September 15, 1954, Lieutenant-Commander Lev Mikhailovich Zhiltsov was appointed to the post of senior assistant of the first Soviet nuclear submarine K-3.

On 10 June 1955, Captain 2nd Rank Leonid Gavrilovich Osipenko was appointed commander of this submarine.

On September 24, 1955 was the official ceremony to begin construction of the ship. (There are varying accounts on this. In my opinion, the most accurate information is that published by Rear Admiral Georgy Georgievich Kostev, an experienced submariner, naval historian, professor, corresponding member of the Academy of Military Sciences.)

On August 9, 1957, the submarine K-3 was launched. On July 3,

1958 the running trials began.

On December 17, 1958, the act of the government committee accepting the K-3 was signed with a whole list of deficiencies that had to be corrected.

On 10 April 1959, after all noted deficiencies had been corrected, K-3 entered the Northern Fleet.

Lesson: for almost 4 years, Captain 2nd Rank Osipenko commanded a nuclear submarine that was not listed in the Navy. He stepped in as commander when no submarine existed. Does that mean he was not a commander?

No, it doesn't.

He was a commander. And his life as such was not . It was not a sweet service. His service to the Fatherland during those long hard years was appreciated on the highest scale. The commander of the at first non-existent and then (seemingly) inoperative nuclear submarine was awarded the rank of Captain 1st rank. Before this the commanders of submarines not were

honored with such a high military rank. On July 23, 1959, by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Captain 1st Rank L. Г. Osipenko was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union and he was awarded the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star Medal (№ 11083).

And Captain-Lieutenant Zhiltsov, later Rear Admiral, Hero of the Soviet , was for more than a year the senior assistant of a submarine that existed only on paper, then for three and a half years they built and tested it.

Taking the above into account, let us agree that the appointment of Colonel Biryukov to the post of commander of the 186th Rifle Division was far from meaning that such a division already existed.

The mention of the XVIII Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (b) in connection with the new appointment of Colonel Biryukov clarifies many things. The materials of the congress should be read. They cannot be retold. Under the thunderous applause and animal-enthusiastic laughter in the hall, such declarations have poured from the rostrum like copper coins from a broken casket: "Our army will be the most offensive army that ever attacked!", "The Red Army will fall like a hurricane on the enemy's land!", "There is no power in the whole world that can stop us!".

If we are going to defend our land, who is going to stop us and why?

After reading the transcripts of the congress, the St Petersburg historian Alexander Gogun concluded, "With the speeches and the atmosphere of this congress, Stalin and his closest associates have made the party and the country understand: the Soviet Union is preparing a great war."

And for this congress were selected far from random people.

The people who were to bring the party's plans to life were selected. More precisely - in death.

The previous, XVII Congress was called the Congress of Winners.

And we have good reason to call the XVIII the Congress of Arsonists.

* * *

On August 19, 1939, Stalin decided to begin a secret mobilization of the Red Army and the entire Soviet economy. This decision meant inevitable war in Europe. This decision meant that Stalin had signed the death warrant of all countries surrounding the Union.

No one could have known what was going on behind the walls of the Kremlin. But on this day, the great Russian poet Anna Akhmatova wrote one of her most terrifying poems. It was entitled "TO DEATH." Under it she wrote the date: August 19, 1939.

Stalin signed Europe's death warrant but failed to enforce it. 52 years later, on August 19, 1991, the Kremlin leaders, like Hitler, threw their tanks to take Moscow. Having failed to overrun the entire world with tanks, they were forced to turn them on their own people in order to maintain their power.

But they failed.

CHAPTER 18
WELL, WHERE ARE THE PLANS?

Did our mobilization plan have such a specifically defensive option? I doubt . Judging from the recollections of the senior military leadership, there was no such option. And Zhukov's words that "it seemed that everything within our power was being done to meet the looming military threat as prepared as possible" do not liquidate my doubts.

Major General Y. Solnishkov
"Rossiya", 1993, No. 26

1

Since we have already mentioned the 186th Rifle Division, let's follow its further history. In the fate of this division, as in a piece of broken mirror, was reflected the sad fate of the entire Second Strategic Echelon of the Red Army, that is, of the seven armies which, on the eve of the war, Stalin was secretly moving to the western frontiers from Transbaikalia, Siberia, the Urals, the Volga, the North Caucasus and other areas of the Soviet Union.

If we turn to the memoirs of the decorated, laurel-crowned commanders of victory who, while remaining loyal to the anti-people regime, ended the war high command, the reasons for the defeat of every division, corps, army, of the entire Second Strategic Echelon will become absolutely clear to us. But for variety's sake, let's see the beginning of the 186th Rifle Division's combat path from a diametrically opposed point of view.

For once, let our witness not be a career military man, but a civilian called from the reserves.

Not a general, a second lieutenant.

Let a man who ended the war not as a victor but as a prisoner in the Norilsk nickel mines tell the story of the war's beginning.

The name of the witness is L. A. Samutin. He wrote his memoirs in the late 1970s without any hope of them. Because he did not put any title on his memoirs, in 2002, many years after the author's death, the St. Petersburg publishing house "Black and White" published them under the title "I was a Volsovian...".

In the ROA, the Russian Liberation Army, under the tricolor Russian flag Samutin did not fall by chance. He considered the power of the Kremlin occupiers to be bandit and criminal. His choice was conscious. Deeply conscious. But at first he served in the Red Army and was captured by the Germans.

In his memoirs, Samutin asks no questions and draws no conclusions. He simply recounts what he experienced personally.

At the very end of the book is his unwritten autobiography, the story of his life only up to . The book ends like this:
"The first signs of an approaching storm: after graduation, the three-month courses continued indefinitely. I was awarded a command rank - second lieutenant. At the graduation assembly, the course commissioner, an old regimental commander, transparently hinted that there would soon be war" *(p. 316)*.

2

So, at the beginning of July 1940 L. A. Samutin (age - 25, profession - a teacher at an institute) was summoned for three-month retraining courses. He was to be released at the end of September, but was released at the beginning of December, and given the rank of junior lieutenant. And they almost openly warned him: we don't give out ranks here.

Hitler signed Directive No. 21 to attack the Soviet Union on December 18, 1940. And in early December, when Hitler had not yet signed the directive, a regimental commissar in the distant Ural province already knew: there would be war. And some big Moscow chiefs, who in September 1940 had taken the decision to extend the period of training in the courses with the consequent awarding of officer's ranks to all cadets, understood everything perfectly.

On June 22, 1941, already after the German troops had delivered the first crushing blow, Comrade Stalin refused to believe it. Whereas in December 1940 even the junior lieutenants of the reserve were quite transparently told what they had be ready for in the very near future.

And don't tell me the damn fief made it all up. Read the memoirs of Soviet generals and marshals: they all talk about the same thing, they all knew that the work was going towards an inevitable and approaching war. They knew it as early as . And they knew it in 1939. And they all didn't expect a German attack. For all the Soviet people the attack had come like a bolt from the blue.

Here is not a Volsovian, but a Soviet commander - Hero of the Soviet Union, Army General A. B. Gorbatov. We were all expecting it, and there were not many in the military who still harbored a timid hope that war could be avoided. But when it was reported about the sudden attack of the enemy aviation on Zhitomir, Kiev, Sevastopol, Kaunas,

Minsk, over railway junctions and airfields, and that divisions of the enemy had crossed our frontier, this message struck everyone" *("Годы и войны". M., Voenizdat, 1965, p. 172)*.

I've collected a whole box of standard quotes like, "It smelled like a storm in the air," and then a page or two later in the same books, "like a bolt from the blue."

Anyone can find plenty of published evidence that the people knew of the coming war. And at the same time the German attack had struck everyone, starting with Comrade Stalin, like a sudden thunderbolt.

At first glance there is a contradiction: everyone knew there would be war, openly talked about it, but no one, starting with Stalin, expected a German attack.

But there is no contradiction: everyone knew there would be a war. But without a German attack.

3

Now - to the beginning of the book.

In 1940, the lecturer at the Samutin Institute spent not three months in the courses, as is normal, but five. In December they let him go, but after three months, at the beginning of April , they took him again, and again in a three-month (supposedly) reserve. At the end of May they suddenly appointed the lieutenant from the reserve Samutin as the commander of the machine-gun and mortar company of the 1st Battalion of the 238th Rifle Regiment under the 186th Rifle Division.

They took him stock to teach him something, and after teaching him, they ordered him to take over a company and command it. They gave Samutin a sergeant major and three lieutenants as subordinates. The lieutenants were released early, without exams from the schools and without leave were sent to the troops. There were to be 120 soldiers in Samutin's machine-gun company. But there were not that many yet. Then they showed up.

"In mid-May, suddenly new people started arriving in large groups, replenishment. They turned out to be reservists. We learned from them that people from 15 recruits had been called up, all had been told that the rank and file had been called up to conduct 45-day exercises...

In our regiment, when we were already in the camps near Yumatovo station, these reservists poured in literally in droves..."*(p. 16)*.

Mid-May was not chosen by chance. One month, from mid-May to mid-June, lasts the intensive training of reservists, the units are formed. Then the TASS announcement thundered over the country and the world that no transfer of troops to the western frontiers was taking place or planned in the Soviet Union, immediately after which came the order for the 186th Rifle Division to load up the cars and hit the road.

"Yesterday we heard another TASS rebuttal, quietly saying all sorts of things, getting restless around... And the gathering of such a large number of reservists, and the early, two months earlier graduation of lieutenants from military schools - everything is probably not accidental, something is being prepared..." *(p. 18)*.

"Orders have been received from the District for our division to leave camp immediately and engage in large corps, and perhaps army, manoeuvres... Today is the fourteenth, we will load from the morning of the sixteenth... Captain Nikitin, the commander of the second battalion, tried to ask where we were going, but immediately bit his tongue. The major did not get angry, but just waved his hand from the door on the way out - and nobody in the division knows...".

"The locomotive is not attached. This is a very mysterious and intriguing circumstance. It depends on this - on which side they attach the locomotive - on whom they send us against. If they hitch the locomotive on the side going to Ufa, it means we'll be going east, settling scores with Japan. We expect exactly that.

On the other , this war in Europe, which has been going on for the second year now, these strange TASS refutations, which are raining one after another, make us assume something else (...).

The division commander, Major General N. И. Biryukov. He is accompanied by several commanders... The general and his retinue look towards that side of the train where Chishmi station is, we quickly grasp the meaning of these glances... A locomotive is slowly approaching the western end of the echelon. That's what is understood. We head west. There is no other direction here...' *(pp. 18-20)*.

"The thought pierces through me, which along the turmoil of the last two days had simply not occurred to me. Amidst all this mess, empty and hectic, I hadn't had time to think quietly, not a spare minute, and now it's all settled down and something has started to sort itself out in my head. How come - two weeks to go until the end of my (our!) reserve, and we were being led away for some army manoeuvres. How long will they last? It certainly won't be two weeks..." *(p. 21)*.

"Our train is running off schedule..." *(p. 23)*.

4

Let us pause, rest and think.

So the junior lieutenant of the reserve was called up for three months' training in early April 1941. Therefore, he should have been released in early July.

Platoon commanders come straight from the schools. were supposed to graduate in July, but two months early, in May 1941, by order of the USSR Defense Commissar, 70,000 officers were let out of the schools without examinations. All without leave were sent straight to the troops.

Comrade Stalin (we are told) had no intention of attacking anyone.

Comrade Stalin (as we all know) did not expect a German attack and did not believe in such an attack.

What is to explain the early graduation of young officers?

But not only do we have that completion, we have the mobilization of 15 sets of reservists at the same time. In May, 807,000 reserve privates and sergeants aged 22 to 37 inclusive were called up for training.

Before harvest.

And we didn't expect an attack. And we did not intend to attack anyone.

If they called up 15 recruits in mid-May for 45 days, therefore they should have released them in early July...

But as we can see, no one had any intention of letting them go, instead they sent them on exercises. And over the echelons there were some strange TASS announcements. The Kremlin historians, who knows why, remember only the TASS message of June 13, 1941, calling it for ignorance the TASS Declaration of June 14. But in those days, weeks and months there were several such communications. And the citizens of the Soviet , who were accustomed to reading

between the lines and to hear between the phrases, they clearly understood: there was something behind it.

Our witness Samutin saw only his echelon of the 186th Rifle Division being dispatched. But the division needs many echelons. And the division was not one. They were many. A whole army had set out from the Urals "on exercises." the 22nd. And not only from the Urals. From the internal military districts one army, the 18th, was transferred to the First Strategic Echelon. Seven other armies from Transbaikalia, from Siberia, the Urals, the Volga region, from the North Caucasus, from other regions have formed the Second Strategic Echelon.

Hundreds of thousands of people have been reported as being driven to the exercises. But why should armies from Transbaikalia, the Urals and Siberia be transferred for exercises to the western borders of the Soviet Union? Is there no place for exercises in the wild steppes of Transbaikalia? Is there nowhere in the Volga region for them to deploy? What about the Southern Urals! Is any foreigner able to imagine the sweep of the steppes around Orenburg?

It is interesting that commanders and soldiers even at the lowest clearly understood that they were not being driven to exercises at all, but to war. Only at first they wondered: against Japan or against Germany.

But it was soon understood.

5

Let us return to the witness's account.

"The whole station of Velikiye Luki appeared crowded with military trains. Echelons with people, with military equipment: cannons, tanks, trucks, trains with sealed freight cars, super-long compositions of fuel tanks - some arrived, others left at very short intervals. We waited our turn.

Here, in Velikiye Luki, came the end of our carefree mood. Now we were no longer just anticipating - we could see with our eyes that something serious was afoot and we were about to take part in it.

It was the morning of June 20. But we needed another day and a half to reach the old western border, although it was not that far...

On the evening of the 21st we arrived at some station... They passed a command along the wagons:

- Get ready to unload!

In the distance a building was glimmering, on which was written IDRICA... It was about 10 o'clock in the evening when they were building a general

and told us that we were going to the stores to re-equip and rearm. The warehouses turned out to be very close and surprisingly quickly - in a way - we were all given brand new sets of equipment, including underwear, and - most importantly - our shoes with partens were also replaced with boots...

They also replaced our small arms. Instead of the old rickety rifles we had brought, they gave us new ones, as well as light machine guns...

But what surprised us the most was that they gave us ammunition. And this was not only surprising, but also unpleasant, because after no more than an hour we left and the ammunition significantly increased the weight of the portable loads. We were ordered to tell the personnel that the ammunition had been distributed to us because the manoeuvres would take place in the

the area of the state border, and each military unit located in the area of the border must be supplied with ammunition.

Shortly after midnight, under the pale June sky, we set out in column north of Idritsa..."*(pp. 28-30)*.

And so the morning came.

"On the way I heard the word WAR!" from the unknown officers running past us.

6

Let us pause once .

At the beginning of July they had to let both the privates and the reserve officers go to their homes. Why, then, had they given them new boots? Why had they replaced all their equipment with brand new?

If they had to leave after two weeks or even after a month or two, they would have had to spend the rest of the time with the old bunch. And the country would have been on a shoestring.

Well, why a new weapon? On exercises the soldiers could run with the old rifles. And the new weapon could wait, well oiled, a possible war. When the time comes to fight, then give the soldiers the new rifles and machine guns!

Why did they give them ammunition? Exercises near the border, eh? But from Idritsa to the border is 407 kilometers as the crow flies. Look, in the divisions that were really on the border, at the same time they were collecting the ammunition and handing it over to the depots. Lest they should accidentally frighten Hitler with accidental shooting.

Not one division, not one corps and not one army, but millions of reservists were being re-dressed, re-equipped, re-armed. Piles of new boots are remembered by soldiers of both the First and Second Strategic Echelons. And all this - before the German attack. Without it being expected.

And because of what?

"For two days we huddled in that clearing on the banks of the Velika. I had already learned from local villagers that this creek was indeed the Velika. It was not until the third day after the war began that the order came to move west, in the direction of the old state border...

As I learned later, we were standing in the forests beyond Idritsa because the division never got an assignment of its own during those first days. And we left only when it became necessary to quickly organize a defense in front of the approaching Germans along the line Sebierz-Drissa-Vitebsk...

For two more days we went back and forth in the area between Sebezh and the old state border. The tasks facing the regiment changed before we could proceed to each previous one. At last the order came to return to Sebej and load up the echelons again...

Sad thoughts conjured up images of disorder, confusion, lawlessness and stampeding among senior commanders.

On the second day of our deployment in the area of the old frontier, we received orders to unload and occupy part of the fortifications in the Sebezhik fortification area. It turned out that in connection with the moving of the state frontier in the fortieth year the fortifications had been dismantled. And when had they managed to so thoroughly demolish everything! No connection between firing points, no inventory in the DOTs. Even for water containers we had to run and ask the collective farmers in the nearby village... Again, it was good that people understood us and helped us with whatever they could.

No sooner had we managed to complete our new positions than a new order followed. Everyone was so frazzled by the mess of the first days of the war that we cursed openly. It turned out that the 170th Division, our former neighbor from the Yumatov camp, had to take our place...

At dusk we were already in Sebej. The sun was setting. The evening was quiet and peaceful, but there was no sense of peace among the people. At the station we found such an unimaginable hustle and bustle that for our loading the echelons were pulled out of the station on tracks in the direction of the border, where trains were no longer running. Again we had to tramp several miles back along the road we had just passed.

Loading was difficult. Without a platform, over the traverses, we hauled the guns, loaded the chests of ammunition and rations, and had the hardest time with those damned horses that wouldn't and wouldn't get into the wagons. It was not until late at night that we finished loading and trotted off to sleep like dead men.

We wake up in the morning and look - we are still where we loaded! We haven't moved during the night! What a job! What war!"*(p. 32-33)*.

"Without letting us wait for the Germans to approach the Sebeg fortification, they picked us up and transferred us near Vitebsk. On the way, barely off, we came under the bombs of a single German plane-it dropped three. One exploded on the tracks at Idritsa Station, where we had stopped, between our echelon and another which stood within a dozen empty tracks of us. Two of our nimble dunce hawks, which popped out from somewhere behind the woods, chased the German away, he dropped two more bombs somewhere now beyond the station and flew off. But from that single bomb, which fell on the tracks, at first a carriage in the middle of that, the second consist, caught fire, and , after a few minutes, whole consist disappeared, a sort of lake of fire forming in its place, the fire not going up, as the explosions in the pictures painted, but ran along the ground for the whole echelon, 20-30 yards to the right and left of it, engulfing the nearest tracks and our commando platoon, which, headed by the captain, the commander of the echelon, had shovelled to put out a burning wagon with sand. We did not hear a sound of the explosion, only something blew with terrific force towards us, and we piled on top of each other, not understanding what was happening. Deafened, I jumped up from the floor of our wagon and saw the sun hidden in the cloud of dust and smoke rising from the ground into the air, the doors and roofs of wagons tossed to the ground by the blast like sheets of cardboard in the wind... That echelon was loaded with ammunition. Now shrapnel, now whole unexploded shells were pouring on the ground. Some were already exploding on the ground. People were running from everywhere, opening their mouths, and then I realized that I was stunned, I couldn't hear, and I ran away with them. Occasionally those running beside me would rush faster and look back. I turned back as well. There, at the station, one after the other, geysers of fire were erupting, and yet I could hear some blows like a thud on wet underwear - the fuel tanks were exploding, and their particularly loud and ringing explosions increased our panic even more. And in the settlement near the station, all made of wooden houses, a terrifying Russian conflagration was already raging" *(p. 37)*.

"July 9. The Germans have not attacked the railway station of Vitebsk. The whole territory of the station, all the tracks were crammed with military echelons with men, equipment, ammunition. The casualties then would have

to be just awful. But fate protected us then - we passed by Vitebsk safely.

During the night we almost fell right into the Germans' mouth - thanks to the unknown railwayman, the cantonier, who had stopped the train with firecrackers 2-3 kilometers from the station, already occupied by the Germans.

Only after a quarter of a century did I learn some details of the combat situation in those days from General Biryukov's memoirs.

Then, 10-15 miles northwest of where we had been stopped and thrown from the train, the main force of our division was surrounded and preparing to break out of the first encirclement. And they had us entrenched at the edge of a wood and nobody knew where the enemy might actually show up.

But even this position we had not been able to equip completely when the order came in the evening to march in column eastwards, towards the huge barrage rising on the horizon - the bombed and set on fire Vitebsk was burning 25 kilometres to our rear. No one knew what task we had - where we were moving, what awaited us, what everyone should do when meeting the Germans...

We were moving slowly along the road, with incomprehensible stops and delays, the column had rolled unimaginably, the front had disappeared somewhere ahead in the mist under the moon of the summer night. I sent forward a couple of fighters one after the other for liaison - to get at least some semblance of clear directions, but none returned. At last the front passed along the chain - the company to turn inland into the woods, to drive the transport into its bowels, and we to take up a defensive position at the rear. No firing was heard from anywhere, only the dawn over Vitebsk was growing brighter...

The morning has come. All the time the days were beautiful and sunny. I walked around the edge of the forest, counting my fighters and junior commanders - I was perplexed to find that many were missing. To the questions - what shall we do? what shall happen next - I could answer nothing, no orders were left. There was no sign of our main column anywhere near. I was still hoping that at any moment someone would come running and give us orders to continue on our way.

Towards noon I finished my round of the grove in which we had stopped for the night - it turned out to be quite small and I met none of my people any more, coming across many absolutely demoralized people from

other parts unknown to me. Nobody was aware of the surroundings, everybody's eyes were widened by the various horrors, and there was no understanding at all - of real or imaginary horrors.

I hurried back to my people. Overwhelmed with anxiety and bad forebodings, I ran to our place. Yes, my presentiment had not deceived me; the men were even fewer now, fifteen or twenty in number, no more, the unsung horses were tossing about and trying to free themselves from the reins tied to the cargo-breeches, a considerable portion of which had already been looted. The riders were nowhere to be seen. There was nothing for me to do but make up my own mind. I ordered the horses to be unhitched and let loose to look for water and food. Then the collective farmers would collect them. I had seen a village not far from the forest. In the woods were left the breeches full of food - rusks, sugar, boxes of butter, already melted by the July heat...".

For a few days, Second Lieutenant Samutin and the remnants of his company wandered through the forests. The men were dripping with fatigue. They find shelter. And everyone falls asleep.

"The reckoning was not late. 2-3 hours, no more. Our sweet sleep in the warm shelter on the fresh hay was interrupted in a very unpleasant way - they hit us on the legs with sticks... As they poked us in the ribs and on our backs with sticks and carbine barrels and shouted some incomprehensible commands to us, the Germans did not let us come to our senses, immediately cut off our way to the pit where we had left our weapons, and chased us forward towards the street of some village. There were already more than a hundred other unfortunates like ourselves captured and gathered in a crowd. It turned out that twenty or thirty German motorcycles with baskets had invaded the village, and not meeting a single shot, and not firing once themselves, they immediately began to capture and gather into a heap, like a flock of sheep, our people. Such was the degree of demoralization and complete misunderstanding of the real situation... I was not the only one like this, there were many fools like me who fell into the clutches of the Germans..."*(p. 41)*.

The streams of captives merged into rivulets and great rivers. The Germans drove crowds of captured Red Army fighters from across the border.

"Farewell, Motherland! We are all turning back. There are no border signs on the roads, the Germans have destroyed them, but to the right and

on the left you can see unfinished powerful DOTs, reinforced concrete mounds with gaping dark embrasures, not yet covered with earth. No signs of fighting are visible" *(p. 53)*.

What follows is the ominous darkness of the Hitlerite camps.

7

So, on 21 June 1941, the 186th Rifle Division arrived at Idrica and proceeded to unload and rearm. Up to this point everything had gone well. Even very well. Lots of troops, new weapons, and the commanders knew what to do.

But suddenly the war starts and everything turns upside down.

From 21 June to 7 July, i.e., for more than two weeks, the 186th Rifle Division (this is confirmed by the general's memoirs) roamed around aimlessly. It unloaded and reloaded again. Again it unloads and again it loads. Idritsa-Sebezh-Idritsa-Sebezh. The division has occupied a fortified area. Then it was abandoned. It was digging trenches. It has abandoned them and continued on its way. Loaded with ammunition, food and what not.

You should read Samutin's memoirs. Because I do not quote the most interesting. You should read how the soldiers, realizing the futility and stupidity of the idiotic movements, threw away both weapons and ammunition. How the division was melting down with fatigue and confusion. How at the first opportunity the soldiers dispersed into forests and villages.

Junior Lieutenant Samutin hadn't thought of surrendering to captivity, hadn't wanted to. But exhausted to the extreme, he had fallen asleep with the remnants of his company. He had fallen asleep in a village hayloft, without appointing a guard: the men were dripping with the frenzied snooping to and fro. And nearby there was a fortified area unoccupied by anyone!

For this carelessness the junior lieutenant may be blamed. Or the Genius General, who was at the General Staff creating his ingenious plans. For it was not only the 186th Division that had wandered aimlessly and disastrously lost its strength even before meeting the enemy. And the entire 62nd Rifle Corps, which included this division, also wandered aimlessly. And the whole of the 22nd Army, whose composition included the 62nd Rifle Corps, was circling in the

the space, now occupying fortified areas, now abandoning them, now digging trenches, now loading into the echelons again. And then it unloaded.

And all seven armies of the Second Strategic Echelon made similar pirouettes.

We have seen above that in the First Strategic Echelon, too, such strange things were done: the giant mechanized corps would run down the roads until they had used up all their fuel and motor resources.

* * *

The commander of a rifle squad, who prepares his subordinate six-seven-nine fighters to repel the enemy's attack, draws up a graphic document - a shelling card. On a small sheet of paper he plots the North-South arrow, the landmarks and their distances, the position of the detachment and firing line, the position of the machine gun, the main and reserve sectors of the barrage, the positions of the neighbors and the direction of their fire in front of the detachment's front, the area of concentrated fire of the platoon, the engineer enclosures in front of the front and along the flanks.

Every military plan, especially the defense plan, has a graphic expression. Such plans are prepared at all levels from squad, platoon, company and above.

Show me, show us, show the country, the people and the world the map with Zhukov's ingenious plan to repel the German attack.

Zhukov was preparing an impregnable defense? With what forces? On what frontiers? Where is the document? Where is the map?

Zhukov was preparing counterstrikes? From what areas, with what forces, in what direction? Where is this plot reflected? And if there was, why were divisions, corps, and entire armies dancing across space like figure skaters on ice?

While the great generals and their successors have not presented us with a graphic depiction of the design to repel the

the German attack, all their words must be regarded as idle chatter, and Zhukov as a boaster and a swindler.

CHAPTER 19
WITH COMRADE STALIN AND OTHER COMRADES

A directive came to urgently preserve the old UR[1], to take the military units out on the San, and to assign the guarding of the facilities to freelance armed guards.

Col. Г. Umansky

"On the front lines." M., Voenizdat, 1960, p. 35.

1

The "Stalin Line" was first 13 and then 8 more fortified areas along the western borders of the Soviet Union. Their numbering began with the number 1.

But with fortified areas not only the western but also the eastern borders of the country were reinforced. From Blagoveshchensk to Vladivostok there was a strip of 13 UR. Their numbering began with the number 101.

All fortified areas were built according to uniform standard designs, their organizational structure was determined in accordance with uniform requirements according to a uniform methodology, they were armed with the same weapons. Only their fates were different.

I have a special love for fortified areas, I have a special relationship with them.

It so happened that I was born in Barabash, Hasan district of the Primorsky Krai. Barabash is the center of the 107th UR. I went to the first grade in the village of Slavyanka. And it is the centre of the 110th UR. Then I lived in Barabash again. All my childhood games passed near the reinforced concrete rocks. I studied in different places, including Kiev. I studied tactics in the Rzhishchev camps and in the fields around Kiev. Where earlier were the nodes of defense of the Kiev UR. I also served in various places, including Chernivtsi. Close to this city was the 11th UR.

In a word, I am not indifferent.

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[1] Fortified areas - B.pr↕

In each case, the organizational structure of the UR was determined separately, depending on the importance of the direction, the conditions of the terrain, and the availability of forces and resources. Before World War II, the UR usually included a headquarters and headquarters, 3-4 separate machine-gun battalions, several separate machine-gun companies and capon artillery platoons, a sapper battalion, a liaison battalion, and a motor transport company. In the event of a threat the number of machine-gun-artillery battalions could have been increased to 8. In a number of cases a UR could have included 1-2 artillery divisions or even an artillery regiment. There were deviations from the standard organization. For example, the combat composition of four URs in the Far East included not only machine-gun-artillery battalions, but also special UR regiments.

With its own forces, a UR garrison is capable of waging a sustained, tenacious defense.

But the power of a fortified area increases manifold if its permanent garrison is reinforced by so-called field fill. In simpler , the UR should serve as the support base of a compound. In every UR, in addition to the permanent garrison, it is desirable to have an artillery division, or better still, an artillery corps.

In such an interaction, long-range firing facilities with permanent UR garrisons serve as a steel skeleton for the troops' field defense. Rifle battalions and divisions tear out several lines of trenches and trench lines, covering the approaches to the long-range facilities and keeping enemy infantry and sappers out, and the long-range facilities provide impenetrable strength and powerful fire support to the rifle battalions, regiments, and divisions.

In cases where an artillery division or corps receives a fortified area as a support base, the opportunity arises to deploy command posts and liaison units of regiments, divisions,

and the higher command instances practically in complete safety. Their ability to exercise constant and firm leadership of the troops under their command increases sharply. Inside the fortified area are located the regimental, divisional, corps stores and depots, infirmaries, repair bases. All this is no longer threatened by the danger of suddenly coming under the caterpillars of enemy tanks.

Once they have located their most vulnerable controls and rearguards in the fortified area, the division or corps can deliver powerful blows to the enemy, going far beyond the UR. They do not need much transportation, so it is not difficult to resupply them because virtually inexhaustible supplies of ammunition, food, fuel and lubricants, and everything else can be established in advance in the fortified area. Combat units operate with ease because they are not encumbered by heavy rearguards and cantonments. They do not have to carry their gear and supplies with them. Evacuation of wounded, damaged equipment and weapons is carried out in stationary well protected infirmaries and repair bases. In case of failure, regiments and divisions can quickly withdraw to previously prepared positions.

This is how everything was organized.

In the Far East in each UR there was not only a permanent garrison, but *in* addition a rifle division. In the mentioned Slavyanka, for example, before the war stood the 32nd Rifle Division of Col. И. Polosukhin, which in the critical situation in the autumn of 1941 was transferred near Moscow, directly to the Borodino field.

In the minds of millions, the mistaken notion has been implanted that Siberian divisions saved Moscow. Not so. Moscow was saved by Far Eastern divisions. There were few troops in Siberia because no serious threat loomed over it. And beyond the Amur and in the Primorye, the Far Eastern Front was deployed in peacetime. It was from it that they tore when the need arose. But in exchange for the divisions that left, new ones were immediately formed.

Each UR represented not only garrisons that wasted their time in defensive installations, but also a supporting fortified base for the

actions of a large compound far beyond the limits of the defensive nodes of the fortified area.

This was the situation in the Far East until August 1945, when the Red Army went on the offensive.

Lt. Gen. П. Potapov served all the time as a political leader in those parts. His testimony:

"Every large UR had to be supported by a manoeuvre division. The depth of defence was 50-60 kilometres" *("Krasnaya Zvezda", 11 February 2006)*.

So it was on the western borders. Examples. In the Polotsk UR, for example, in addition to its units and units was the 4th Rifle Corps. The UR was divided into two sections. In the northern one was the 50th Rifle Division. In the south - the 5th.

In the Minsk UR in addition to its units was the 16th Rifle Corps. In the northern section - the 100th Rifle Division, in the southern - the 13th *("Main Military Council of the RKKA. 13 marta 1938 g. - 20 junija 1941 g. Documents and materials". M., R OSSPEN[1](), 2004, p. 383)*.

All this was so until 1939. Until the signing of the pact.

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[1] Russian Political Encyclopedia - B.pr↕

3

After the conclusion of the fraternal alliance with Hitler and the establishment of a common border with Germany on the old state frontier, not only the permanent garrisons but also the field troops were withdrawn from the fortified areas.

On November 15, 1939, the Narkom of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union K. E. Voroshilov, submitted to the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (b) of Comrade Stalin and to the Council of People's Commissars of Comrade Molotov a report on the basics of the development of the Red Army.

Clause 6 of this document refers to troops in fortified areas. The Narkom proposes: "The special commands of the fortified areas and the troops for 1940 shall remain only for the Far East, the Karelian fortified area of LVO[1] and the fortified areas of the Dniester, and the rest shall be curtailed" *("Glavny воен совет RKKA. 13 marta 1938 г. - 20 czerwca 1941 г. Documents and materials".*
M., ROSSPEN, , p. 446).

This is the same document on the basis of which the Stalin Line ceased to exist forever. In accordance with the proposal of the narc, the number of garrisons of the UR in peacetime was reduced from 74 thousand fighters to 48 thousand. Only 14 UR headquarters were retained, one in Karelia, 13 in the Far East.

On the border with Romania along the Dniester, the fortified areas were preserved, but their administrations were disbanded and parts of the UR were partially withdrawn from them.

In the territories that could have been the arena of a German attack, the fortified areas were completely liquidated.

Strange: Stalin, it is said, feared war, tried to postpone it and take advantage of the brief respite to strengthen the defenses. But here's your illustration to that claim. On the border with Korea and Manchuria, the fortified areas were maintained and reinforced. On the border with Finland, too. On the border with Romania they are maintained, albeit in a reduced form.

And the areas bordering Germany are being removed!

In the autumn of 1939, the Defense Narkom did not even have any proposals for the engineering equipment of future defensive lines on the western frontier. Everything existing was abandoned. Period.

Comrade Stalin, Comrade Molotov and the other comrades did not object. But if they were afraid of Hitler, they should have immediately tied up Voroshilov and sent him to an insane asylum or to an inquisition cell because of these harmful proposals.

But they didn't send it. They have listened to him favorably and have approved the plan. They did not even strip Voroshilov of title. Although was clear that there was a clear inconsistency here: what kind of a *defense* commander is this, who does not care about defense, does not strengthen it, and destroys the defense already built?

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[1] Leningrad Military District - B.pr↑

4

One of the participants in the construction of the Stalin Line, Col. Г. Umansky. How much strength and energy were invested in the construction of reinforced concrete DOTs, in arming and equipping them. What about the wonderful kilometre-long underground engineering facilities "Serebria", "Gul mines" - should we abandon them too, cover them with earth?" *("Na wojвых рубеzах". M., 1960, p. 35)*.

In the Colonel's memoirs, the question is posed. But where is the answer: did they cover the DOTs with dust, or didn't they? The answer is found on p. 51. Here we read the account of the rebuilding of the Kiev UR in July 1941: 'Brigades of shlosers mounted machine guns in the DOTs cleared of earth and immediately handed them over to the arriving UR units'.

There is ample confirmation that DOTs have been blown up or covered with dirt. The most authoritative testimonies are those of the Soviet Union Marshal K. K. Rokossovsky. I have already quoted them. There are also testimonies of soldiers and generals. Here is the account of Lt. Gen. B. "From the first days of the war, measures were taken to bring the Novograd-Volynskiy UR to combat readiness: The earth-filled DOTs were being dug up (...) The frontal defensive node, due to the lack of plate armament and staff units at the UR, was occupied by the rifle battalions of the 206th Rifle Division... This knot, occupied since the morning of 5 July by the retreating units of the 19th Mechanized Corps and by the rifle battalions of the 206th Rifle Division, was broken the same day by units of the enemy's 14th Panzer Division" *("Na Kyivskom направлении", pp. 140)*.

Destroying is not like building. In the autumn of 1939
The "Stalin line" has been liquidated. And at the very beginning of June 1940, the army general G. K. Zhukov was appointed commander of the troops of the Kiev Special Military District. He arrived in Kiev and welded such a picture.

There are no fortifications on the new Soviet-German border.

But 170-300 kilometers from the border, practically across the entire territory of the Kiev Special Military District, there is a chain of four URs: the Shepetov, Starokonstantinov, Izyaslav and Kamenets-Podol.

A second, more powerful line of fortified districts stretched 20-80 kilometres behind this line: the Korosten, Novograd-Volyn, Ostropol, Letychiv and Mogilev-Podol districts.

The second line of the UR was drawn from the marshes of Polesie to the foothills of the Carpathians, from the borders of Belorussia to the borders of Moldavia, i.e. the entire Kiev Special Military District was barricaded by two impregnable defensive strips.

And behind, 500 kilometers from the border, is the most powerful UR in the Soviet Union. UR No. 1 (or KiUR) covers Kiev like a giant horseshoe, with both flanks resting on the Dnieper. It is impossible to get around. From the rear, the city and the UR are protected by the Dnieper. The Dnieper is home to the most powerful river flotilla in the world.

The front end of the Kamenets-Podol and Mogilev-Podol UR is protected by a water barrier - the Dniester. The front edge of the Novograd-Volyn and Ostropol URs is located along the Sluch River. In front of most defensive nodes of the Kiev UR is the Irpen River.

Of the 21 URs on the country's western borders, 10, including the most powerful, are located in the Kiev district. Only here, but nowhere else, are they built in two lines, and behind the two lines is another UR. Only here, but nowhere else, behind all these fortifications is the mighty Dnieper water barrier.

All conditions for defense. The county commander can enjoy life.

Except...

Except that all the 10 URs in the KOWO have been abandoned, destroyed, the firing points covered with earth. There are neither garrisons nor field troops in them. The Dnieper flotilla has been disbanded. Because it is unnecessary.

5

Let me once more quote Zhukov's account of how he left Moscow for Kiev to receive the district. I have quoted this account in another book, but it will be useful to repeat it:

"I was appointed to a responsible post - to command one of the most important border districts. In my conversations with Stalin, Kalinin and other members of the Politburo, I was finally convinced that war was coming, it inevitable... But what kind of would it be? Are we ready for it? And so it was with a sense of approaching tragedy that I watched my relatives and friends carelessly sending me off, Moscow, the joyful faces of Muscovites, and thought: what is to become of us? Many people did not understand this. I felt a little sick, I couldn't contain myself. I thought that the war had already started for me. But when I got on the wagon, I immediately dismissed sentimental feelings. From then on my personal life was subordinated to the coming war, although peace still reigned on our soil..."

And so Zhukov, with a sense of impending tragedy, arrives in Kiev to find a complete and deliberate (!) breakdown in the defences. In the Kiev Special Military District was concentrated the most powerful grouping of Red Army troops. It is also the most powerful troop grouping in the entire world. Why are so many here? Zhukov has explained: both he and Stalin expected the main blow of the enemy here.

Let us compare the Great Composer's accounts with what we know.

In Zhukov's words:

a) Stalin was terribly afraid of war;

b) Stalin was trying by all means to postpone the war in order to gain time and prepare to repel an attack;

c) Stalin expected the main blow of the German troops to be through the territory of Ukraine, i.e. through the territory of the KOV;

d) Zhukov himself clearly understood that the war was approaching and inevitable, that tragedy was coming, that the Red Army had no strength even

for border protection.

And so Comrade Stalin sent Zhukov to command the Kiev Special Military District.

And Zhukov does !

Col. Г. Umansky before the war was Capt. In the 1930s he took part in the construction of four different fortified areas in the COWO. In the early spring of 1941, after Zhukov had left for his new post in Moscow, Umansky inspected the condition of the Kiev UR. "Bad job. The yards are flooded with water, and it has penetrated the facilities. The camouflage scaffolding is completely rotten and needs urgent replacement, the machine-gun tables are rusted, the Krasnyy Fakel pumps are not working, and the ventilators. We did not encounter security patrols anywhere all day. So where to meet them, since they were all in all 20 people for the whole UR, and most of them old, invalids" *("Na wojвых рубeżax", p. 36)*.

For 7 months and 7 days the Kiev Special Military District was commanded by a very Great Chief whose personal life was subordinated to the coming war. A first-class fortified district with twenty invalids and old men - this is what he left behind. What, then, had the Colonel been doing all these days and months?

He was harassed by doubts: but what will this war be like? Are we ready for it? Will we be able to do everything? What happen to us?

6

In the last days of December 1940, a meeting of the senior leadership of the Red Army took place in Moscow. The commander of the 1st Red Army of the Far Eastern Front, Lieutenant General (and future Army General) Makryan Mikhailovich Popov, spoke: "During this summer, the units of the 1st Red Army almost 100 per cent fulfilled the plan for defensive works, literally transformed the old fortified areas and, where possible, built solid prefronts, created several new fortified areas and significantly transformed the coastal frontier as a whole. I, anticipating things a little, would like to ask that we be allowed for the Primorye Theater in the future, in in particular, to work on the improvement of its theater, on the improvement of the fortification of the frontiers, of the roads - this work can be absorbed by the army without harming its combat training" *("On the Eve of War. Materialy soveщания высшего руководящего состава RKKA 23-31 grudnia 1940". M., Terra, 1993, p. 87)*.

The general is absolutely right. Defense preparation does not damage combat readiness. On the contrary, it helps it. To clarify. Imagine the huge training ground of the division. A platoon commander has taken his platoon out and is teaching it to attack. No problems arise here. Then he teaches them how to prepare a defense. The 30 soldiers dig hard for seven days, 10-12 hours a day. Imagine how many trenches, trenches and communication moves they will dig.

Next to him another platoon is doing the same. And a third. And there are many, many in the division. And so for years.

The result. Nothing to show the soldiers. The whole field to the horizon is strewn with heaps of earth. Everything has been dug over as when the foundations of the new city of Komsomolsk were laid. And around the polygon

- rough collective farm fields. But we do not go there. Again and again we have to fill in the trenches and trenches of our range and

immediately dig them up again. Where whose hole it is, who dug them and why - it is not clear.

However, if war is expected, the fields are no obstacle for us. We are building defensive lines! The district commander and the chief of staff have to decide where to meet the enemy, to coordinate their plans with Moscow, to set stripes for the army commanders, who in turn allocate the sections to the corps and divisions. The objectives are clear, the tasks are defined - to work, comrades!

Where the line of fortified areas passes, everything is already decided and agreed in advance. Units and units should be brought out and the task should be set: here we, guys, are going to meet the enemy, the platoon stronghold should be built like this... On the one hand - real combat training. On the other

- engineering equipment of the terrain in the areas of the upcoming battles. Trenches and trenches have been dug. Good. The next topic is: this is how we should fortify and conceal the trenches... This is how we should camouflage them. And the anti-tank trench should have curves so that the approaches to it can be comfortably shot through with flank fire...

This is what was done in the 1st Red Army on the Far Eastern Front. And not only in it, but also in the other armies of this front.

And under Zhukov in the Kiev Special Military District, where, as he tells us, the main blow of the German troops was expected, during those same days, weeks and months nothing was done for the defense.

7

The next day after Lieutenant General Popov's speech at the meeting of the senior command staff of the Red Army, the main report was delivered by the commander of the KAVO, Army General G. K. Zhukov.

And about this - how he prepares the defense of Ukraine - not a word.

After the war Zhukov told military historians that he did not dare to object to Stalin, he was afraid lest Stalin would wink at Beria and he would take the Strategist to his dungeon.

To believe him. But here's an opportunity Zhukov had in December 1940. He should have timidly asked immediately after Popov: and could not we also in my case in the KOVO reconcile the combat training of troops with the process of engineering equipment of the theater of possible hostilities? If Popov in the Far East can, why can't I in Ukraine?

Zhukov had to get his bearings: had Beria dragged the commander of the 1st Red Army into his dungeon after his statement? Had Stalin dismissed Popov, had he made him a colonel, captain, or private? Well, nothing of the sort. Immediately after the meeting, the commander of the 1st Red Army, Lieutenant General Popov, was appointed commander of the Leningrad Military District. This is a very high official take-off - from the army, skipping the post of deputy commander of a district, straight to the commander of a district. And not an ordinary district, but a very important one. This is not your Ural, nor Siberian, nor North Caucasus district.

A wonderful moment for Zhukov to realize that Stalin was not beating commanders to prepare troops to mount a tenacious defense, nor was Beria dragging them off to his dungeon. Had he asked himself: what was going on? A new attack on Finland we supposedly do not expect, but on the border with her we keep the UR with management and corresponding units. We have little to fear from Romania. But the fortified areas on the Romanian border are being as well. In the Far East we also do not expect

Assault. We're transferring troops from the Far East to the KAVO. But there is heavy defensive construction going on.

We expect the main strike against the troops of the KOB. Well, then, why are we destroying everything built earlier here? Why are we not preserving and improving what is already in place?

I will be reminded that in 1940 construction began new fortified areas along the new border with Germany. don't need to be reminded of that. I do not forget it. I have yet to talk about the new fortified areas. I will only say now that they were being built too close to the border. Their location was extremely unfortunate.

The stretch of the Stalin Line in the KOVO strip is 500 kilometers from north to south. This section of the "Stalin Line" completely defends all enemy roads to the east.

And the new border has blown up like a bubble, like a spinnaker sail over a yacht at "full ahead". The length of the new border in the COVO strip is now 860 kilometers. If there are no forces, if the enemy is stronger, it is better to pull back a little and keep a fortified front of
500 kilometers than to place our main forces near the frontier pillars and hold an unfortified front of 860 kilometers where there are no fortifications yet. And few new fortifications have been built in the Kiev district. On the new frontier, fortifications were being built not on all 860 frontier kilometres, but only on the
170. And 690 kilometers represented a real expanse for the attacker.

* * *

June 1940 was the moment when Germany defeated France.

On 15 June 1940, even before the end of hostilities in France, Hitler issued orders to reduce the number of German divisions from 156 to 120. At that time Hitler was not making any plans to attack the Soviet Union. In our time, this has been documented. Nobody is arguing about this.

One week before, on June 8, 1940, Zhukov had left Moscow for Kiev. From where the Great Commander in Chief could have

knew that "war was coming, it was inevitable", since Hitler had decided at that time to end the war and to cut his army? Why did Zhukov suddenly subordinate his personal life to the impending war if Hitler at that time still had no plans or designs to attack the Soviet Union? How could Zhukov have sensed the inevitable approach of war if all German troops were fighting in France at the time? As long as there were only ten (10) German divisions on the Soviet border without heavy artillery and without a single tank?

Let's go back to Zhukov's account that we just read. As emerges from his memoirs, he, the Grand Strategist, himself realised that war was approaching and was inevitable. And having talked in the Kremlin with Comrade Stalin and with other comrades, he finally accepted this thought...

CHAPTER 20
TOO CLOSE TO THE BORDER...

It's no secret that the first strategic echelon consisted mostly of offensive groups that immediately had to defend themselves. In fact, it was not until 27-30 June that the fronts were tasked with switching to strategic defence.

Col. Gen. Volkogonov

"Triumph and Tragedy." M., APN, 1989. Book 3, Part 1, pp. 180

1

In January 1941, in the course of debating the strategic game on maps, the commander of the troops of the Kiev Special Military District, Army General Zhukov, in the presence of Stalin and the entire senior command staff of the Red Army, stated that in Belorussia fortified areas were being built too close to the border and had an extremely disadvantageous operational configuration. Zhukov had clearly understood that the enemy could strike from the Suvalka and Brest areas at the rear of the troops on the Western Front and encircle three armies simultaneously. Half a year before the attack, Zhukov saw as on an X-ray the whole design of the German blitzkrieg. He clearly laid out this design to Stalin and the entire senior military leadership of the country.

The commander of the troops of the Western Special Military District, Colonel General of the Tank Troops Pavlov, obviously offended that Zhukov criticized the situation in his district, objected: and in your Kiev district far from the border are you building them?

To which Zhukov replied with dignity that even in the Kiev Special Military District they were being built close to the border, that this was incorrect, but he was not the one who chose the place of construction.

After reading this excerpt from the Great General's memoirs, we immediately and deeply insight into the reason for the defeat of the Red Army in the summer of 1941. From the given excerpt it follows quite definitely that Zhukov was not to blame for the defeat. The fortified areas were not built where they should have been, but Zhukov had nothing to do with this idiocy. The decision to build the fortified areas along the new state border was made before he was appointed commander of the KOVO.

2

A small snippet of text - only half a page. But what deep meaning, how concentrated content!

And how rightly this little sketch is presented: Zhukov made a correct point, the stupid Pavlov objected, and then Zhukov cut him off: it's not my decision and I didn't choose the seats!

Under Pavlov in Zapoevo, the new fortified areas were built too close to the border.

But even with Zhukov in the KOWO it was too close to the border.

Only Zhukov is not to blame for that. He stated it right in the face of Pavlov. What can Pavlov object to? There was nothing to object to.

One to zero: Zhukov is smart, Pavlov is a fool.

And it is all to us: the defeat happened because of stupidity.
And it is clear whose. While Stalin was silent and looked through his fingers.

Everything here is beautiful and right, only why did the authors of Zhukov's memoirs worry about the shadow of Dmitry Grigorievich Pavlov, who died martyr's death in the inquisitorial dungeons of the Sukhanov Investigative Confinement without pleading guilty?

And Zhukov's behavior in the given situation, if we look at it, is not at all a decisive defiance of a coward, but a disgusting slip of a coward and a coward.

Let's think then. In the Soviet Union a problem of the utmost importance has arisen. Since the mid-1940s, hundreds of thousands of people had been building a defensive line along the new borders. Vast masses of people, including engineers and workers of the highest qualifications, prisoners, prisoners of war, and local inhabitants, were thrown upon the gigantic construction from the Baltic to the mouth of Danube. In addition - 58 construction battalions. This not enough. And then, from the composition of the rifle divisions and rifle corps of both the border military districts and those that were located in the inland regions of the country up to the Urals and

Siberia included, have taken 167 sapper battalions. Sapper battalions were transferred for this construction even from the Far East.

The Rifle Divisions and Corps were left not only without the tanks which Zhukov had deprived them of because of the formation of his idiotic mechanized corps, not only without artillery which, not without Zhukov's knowledge, was on the ranges far from its compounds, but also without the sappers without whom the units and compounds were left without arms in the most direct sense.

Hundreds of thousands and millions of the most expensive and scarce materials were thrown into the construction of fortifications, including reinforcing and armour steel, granite, and the strongest fortification concrete. A vast amount of machinery was employed for the construction.

But it all went to the wind! Useless labour. The fortified areas grew up not where they should have! There could have been no for them. On the eve of war, when every man with a shovel, every cubic meter of concrete and every ton of steel was valuable, hundreds of thousands of people were sent to do meaningless work that no one needed.

And nobody understood that!

Only Zhukov understood it.

But if so, he should have shouted in protest at every convenient and inconvenient opportunity that fortified areas should be built elsewhere. Zhukov should have communicated his position to Stalin, to the entire political and military leadership of the country. He should have to end the foolish fuss along the frontiers, and sent men, equipment and materials to prepare defensive lines where they belonged.

And in his memoirs, Zhukov had to tell of his struggle in a very different way. Because what comes out? Zhukov threw his remark in somehow in passing, exchanged two or three sharp phrases with Pavlov without any result and continuation - and so on.

3

If Zhukov had understood everything so correctly, as early as the summer of 1940, after he had taken command of the Kiev Special Military District, he should have sent reports to Stalin every week: I see in the construction of new fortified areas manifest stupidity, if not harm! Construction near the frontiers must be urgently stopped, construction organizations and units withdrawn from the frontiers, defensive lines erected in completely different places hundreds of kilometers from the frontiers.

After Stalin's death, he had to find these reports in the archives and present them to grateful descendants. If possible
- with Stalin's resolutions. These reports would become the ornament of the memoirs.

But Zhukov did not write reports. There is nothing to look for in the archives. Dig as much as you will - you will not find. So there is nothing to embellish Zhukov's memoirs with except helpless lies, never confirmed by anyone.

In December 1940 in the course of the meeting of the senior command staff of the Red Army Zhukov delivered the main report
"The nature of modern offensive operations". Here is another opportunity to express his pain for the fate of the country and its people. All he had to do was to toss out one phrase among the general herd. Like a pavé on a crystal display case. Something like: we are only tweeting here about strategic offensive operations, and we are not at all ready for defence, we are building fortified areas not where they belong.

Then, decades later, having found the transcript of the meeting under the archival dust, the descendants would wipe tears of gratitude from their faces. I confess: such a find would have made angry too. Too bad, the Great Commander-in-Chief has left me no reason to be upset.

After the analysis of the strategic games Zhukov was appointed Chief of the General Staff. Here's the moment! A great opportunity to tell Stalin: fortified areas are being built in the wrong place!

Or stop this nonsense, this useless waste of energy and resources
- or he will not accept the post of Chief of the General Staff.

But Zhukov obediently accepted the post, did not protest, did not put into words his bold ideas.

Now he had often communicated with Stalin. You and I once already calculated how many hours the Grand Strategist spent in his office. But he also talked to Stalin on the telephone. He also, as Zhukov himself reports, went to Stalin's villas, and the two of them drank and ate together. He should have calmly asked Comrade Stalin - who made the foolish decision and what motivated it. A quarter of a century later in his memoirs he could have quoted Stalin's answer. Then he would not have needed to present his right-wing neighbour General Pavlov as a fool.

He could have hinted in his memoirs: I did not send reports and reports to Stalin, but on occasion I told him everything that had pained me. Stalin was afraid of war, and I, taking advantage of his fear, advised him what should be built and where.

But there is no such in the memories of the commander in chief.

What then did the infinitely wise and all-understanding Zhukov do?

You think he didn't do anything? You are wrong. He sent orders to commanders of all ranks: go, go! He insisted that construction plans be carried out on time.

Understanding that this construction is useless and harmful.

4

The fortified areas along the new Soviet-German border were built unnaturally close to the border posts. This was absolutely correct if an invasion of Europe was being prepared. But it is utterly absurd if the chiefs and strategists were preparing to repel an enemy invasion.

The fortifications are moved to the frontier in order that in the course of conducting strategic offensive operations the enemy may be stiffened along the secondary lines, so that at the expense of building long-range defences the maximum amount of troops may be released on the passive lines for action where the main blow is struck.

After the war, and after Stalin, the liberation and offensive orientation of construction along the new frontier had to be from future generations. To this end, an explanation had to be presented: who and for what purpose decided to build fortified areas where there was no need in a defensive war.

Zhukov has found a standard explanation for all cases: it was done out of stupidity. And he immediately pointed the finger at Pavlov.

It would be fair to say that in Zhukov's memoirs Pavlov is not directly named as the culprit. Zhukov's wisdom is simply shown, it is explained that the fortified areas were built in the wrong place, and Pavlov, who had nothing to object to Zhukov's clever remarks, is named.

Since no other culprits are named in the book for such an idiotic situation, three facts are deeply etched in every reader's memory: the clever Zhukov, the idiotic construction, and the stupid, arrogant Pavlov, who refused to accept fair criticism and tried to challenge the remarkable commander's simple and correct remarks.

5

Zhukov has declared that he did not choose the locations for the construction of fortified areas. If we do not look into the details, we can easily believe this statement - after all, Zhukov commanded the Kiev Special Military District for only 7 months...

But we'll get the details.

When was the construction of the UR on the new border started?

Lest I be suspected of anything dishonest, I will refer to the work of Academician V. A. Anfilov, one of the fiercest defenders of Zhukov's genius. "The directives for the construction of the UR were sent by the Commissar of Defense to the military councils of the Byelorussian (later Western) and Kiev special military districts on June 26, 1940. These districts were instructed to begin the construction of a number of fortified areas in 1940" *("Bessmertnyy подвиg". M., Nauka, 1971, p. 162)*.

And when was Zhukov appointed commander of the KAVO? On June 7, 1940. NKO Order No. 02 469.

It is possible that on 26 June an order was issued to build new fortified areas, starting the cycle from scratch, i.e. from the designation of the construction site.

It is possible that the sites for the fortified areas were chosen earlier, and that on 26 June orders were received to start work.

But in any case there was no construction of new fortified areas in Ukraine and Belarus until 26 June. The directive to build new fortified areas had arrived in Kiev when Zhukov had already accepted the post of commander.

The directive came from Moscow. It was signed by the Soviet Defense Commissar Marshal S. K. Timoshenko. For Zhukov, Timoshenko was an old battle comrade. Almost from the very end of the Civil War, Zhukov had served under Timoshenko's command: as a regimental and brigade commander in Timoshenko's division, as a division commander in Timoshenko's corps, as a cavalry commander

Corps under the Deputy Commander of the District for Cavalry Timoshenko.

Zhukov has walked right in footsteps. Timoshenko had commanded the 4th Cavalry Division, then the 3rd Cavalry Corps, served in Moscow in the Cavalry Inspection, and was Deputy Commander of the Belarusian Military District. It was in these footsteps, only in a slightly different order, that Zhukov followed: the Cavalry Inspection, the 4th Cavalry Division, the 3rd Cavalry Corps, Deputy Commander of the Belarusian Cavalry District.

And so it went on. Timoshenko handed over the Kiev Special Military District, Zhukov accepted it. Zhukov's daughters remember that in Kiev they lived in the house just vacated by Tymoshenko.

When, on 26 June 1940, he received the directive from his old battle comrade and commander to build the URs not where they should be, Zhukov should have grabbed the internal telephone and yelled, "Semyon! Are you crazy? What directives are you sending me? Fifteen years I served with you in Byelorussia, we dug it all up in exercises and maneuvers. Do you think at all about where fortified areas should and should not be built? And the Kiev district just handed it over, you should be aware of where you can and should build and where you shouldn't and shouldn't!"

If he couldn't convince him by phone, if he couldn't do it by written messages, he should have run to Moscow to the narc. Construction had not yet begun! Everything can still be stopped, undone, changed!

In all times, the execution of an obviously foolish order has not adorned a single commander, not a single commander-in-chief. Colonels have become great precisely at moments when they refused to carry out the criminal orders of their superiors.

So Zhukov should have told the USSR Defense Commissar, Marshal of the Soviet Union S. K. Timoshenko: the places were chosen incorrectly. Built on these places, they would not be suitable for the defense of the state. That is why the directive to build them is stupid or criminal. I will not carry out stupid and criminal orders. Cut the lappets from my trousers, remove me from office,

sue me, jail me, shoot me! I won't answer for other people's crimes!

If that doesn't help - to Stalin: Timoshenko is my friend, but the Motherland is dearer to me.

6

Zhukov was sworn in. Zhukov has sworn to defend the Motherland manfully, skillfully, with dignity and honor, without sparing his blood and his life. Here is your battlefield! Defend! Go to the attack alone! Against the stupid Pavlov! Against Timoshenko! Against Stalin if you must! Against everyone! Spare neither your blood nor your life! Lay down your life on the altar of the Fatherland! Prove them wrong. If you do not stand up in defense of the Motherland now, then because of the foolish location of the fortified areas, the front will be broken, the cadre Red Army will perish, gigantic reserves, facilities and territories will be seized, the country will be ruined and thrown out of the way of its development. And who knows how it will end in the end.

If Stalin, Marshal Timoshenko, the country's defense commander, the army leaders, the narcos, the marshals and generals did not understand where fortified areas should be built, they could be forgiven. They did not understand!

And Zhukov understood everything, but kept silent. Only once he muttered to his neighbour Pavlov: you are not building where you should! And he himself in building not where he should: what am I? Soldier. Storm. They ordered me and I carry out. And I will build where I am ordered. If I will and at the pole. If I will on the bottom of the Sea of Azov.

People have long noticed that pretending to be a fool is useful and beneficial, while pretending to be smart is dangerous and foolish.

Zhukov pretended all his life to be clever, to be a strategist, a commander and a sage. And he got trapped. If no one grasped the danger, and he saw it clearly, if he understood everything but was not alarmed, then he had changed his oath, then the millions killed and the ruin of the country lay on his conscience. So he is a scoundrel, a traitor, a traitor and a coward.

The strategist arrives in Kiev and after two weeks receives a directive: build fortified areas, but ones that are not needed at all in a defensive war, and don't build ones that are . And the Great Commander, with a sense of impending

tragedy just kisses and rushes to build where he is ordered. Without disturbing either his battle comrade Timoshenko or comrade Stalin with unnecessary talk.

And it was only in January 1941 that he rebuked his neighbour from Zapoevo: why do you bother with nonsense, Pavlov, such a bad boy? You've pushed the fortified areas right up to the border pillars!

7

By the way, the situation was even worse under Zhukov in the KOBO than under Pavlov in the Zapoevo. Lt. Gen. B. Vladimirovsky was a lieutenant-colonel, deputy head of the operations department at the headquarters of the 5th Army of the KOVO: "The main (long-range) defensive strip of the Vladimir-Volyn and Strumilov URs was created 1-3 km from the border, and in separate sections it was adjacent to it" *("Na Kievskom направлении". M., Voenizdat, 1989, p. 40)*.

Zhukov says that the main forces of the Red Army were concentrated in the Kiev Special Military District, because it was here that the main blow of the Germans was expected. Let's look at the map and agree: if Hitler's Field Marshals were preparing the main blow not against Belorussia, but against Ukraine, then it was between Kovel and Peremyshl. To the north is Polesie, to the south - the Carpathians.

Therefore, the first, the main, the most frightening blow should have been on the 5th and 6th Army of the KOVO.

The 5th Army is on a more dangerous course. German tank incursions through the undeveloped fortified areas and battle lines of 5th Army divisions and corps would open up a wide range of possibilities.

This is the most direct and shortest route to Kiev.

And they could have turned south in the Zhytomyr area and hit all four armies in the rear.

It was possible to drive along the Dnieper to Dnepropetrovsk and Zaporozhye, and there was the most powerful steel foundry of the Soviet Union and the production of almost all Soviet aluminium, without which there could be neither aircraft nor tank engines.

They could have gone from Zhitomir to Odessa or to the Crimea, where there were poorly protected from land bases of the Black Sea Fleet.

Or by forcing the Dnieper, invading Donbas, then moving on to Rostov, Grozny and Stalingrad.

If Zhukov expected the main blow to be on Ukraine, he should have immediately stopped the construction of the reinforced concrete cliffs two or three, even one kilometer from the border! For the enemy sees every section of the construction, every single firing point, knows the direction of fire from every ambuscade. The enemy in peacetime will make the most accurate calculations and at the first moment of war will defeat the DOTs without any delay. He wouldn't even need to destroy them - with mortar fire he could disperse all those trying to occupy strong points according to the battle schedule.

In some places, there was not a kilometre between the border and the strip of long-range fire. The strip, as Lieutenant-General Wladimirski testifies, and as anyone can see himself if he goes to those places, was simply adjacent to the frontier. There was no need for mortars here either. Model 1898 rifles would have sufficed here.

Here's what's weird.

If the commander of the troops of the Kiev Special Military District, Army General Zhukov, thought that it was here that the main blow would be struck, he should have first of all raised the question of how to prepare the defense of the direction that had been identified as the main and most dangerous.

Instead, however, the wise KOBO commander has rebuked his neighbor: your fortified areas are in a bad place! Although he considered Pavlov's direction to be secondary. And only in response to Pavlov's retort did Zhukov remember that all was not well with him in KOVO either. But having agreed, he did nothing. The most important thing for Zhukov is: he is not guilty.

Imagine getting an unfinished house where your predecessor screwed the chandeliers to the floor and nailed the carpets to the ceiling.

Are you not going to change anything? Are you going to keep screwing the chandeliers to the floor and making excuses: well, I didn't choose their places...

8

Now allow me to gently prick this dirty bladder with a pin.

The sharp exchange of lines with Pavlov, so vividly described in "the most truthful book about the war", never happened. This can be proved without even resorting to complicated calculations. On June 7, 1940, the colonel-general of tank troops Д. Г. Pavlov was appointed commander of the troops of the Byelorussian Special Military District by order of NCO 02469. (On July 11, 1940 the BOVO was transformed into the ZapOVO.)

Had Zhukov in January 1941 proudly thrown in Pavlov's face the ringing phrase that he had not chosen the sites for the construction the fortified areas in the Kiev district, Pavlov would have cut him off with an equally ringing reply: he had not chosen the sites in Belorussia either, since he had received his assignment to Minsk on the same day that Zhukov had received it for Kiev. Both were appointed by the same order.

Zhukov's book contains no such reply to Pavlov. It follows that the exchange of lines with Pavlov was either cardinally distorted or invented from the end.

Well, why then did the compilers of the "most truthful book" describe Pavlov as a fool, when they knew that Pavlov was in exactly the same situation as Zhukov?

To justify themselves beautifully. To highlight Zhukov's wisdom against Pavlov's stupidity.

There is a more serious reason for Pavlov's appearance at the moment in question.

Before The Composers e stood the task to get rid of Zhukov from a criminal case for the criminal construction of fortified areas not where e he should,в case that be e prepared Defenceof the sacred borders of the Fatherland. To this end, they had to show that: a) Zhukov clearly understood how disastrous the option adopted for the Construction;

b) but he did not remain cowardly silent, but honestly and directly defended his opinion, even in the presence of Stalin.

But here a new problem has arisen for the compilers. If they write that Zhukov told Stalin in person that the fortified areas were being built in the wrong place, then they have to report what Stalin replied to that. They should have put some nonsense in Stalin's mouth. They should have reported that Stalin didn't anything, was afraid of war, but built useless fortifications where they were not needed at all for the defence of the country.

Stalin can be credited with anything, but he was no fool. And whenever he undertook something, he clearly understood what it was and what he was doing it for. If the compilers had presented Stalin as a complete moron who ordered a titanic effort, resources and funds to be thrown into construction in the area of the borders without understanding what it was for and what danger it posed, the readers might not have believed such a description.

So they had to invent a scene where Zhukov defends his opinion, but Stalin doesn't utter any nonsense in response. Therefore the most convenient and apparently only possible move was to depict an exchange of lines between Zhukov and some coward, but in the presence of Stalin.

And the wolf is full, and the lamb whole.

In order not to turn Stalin into a buffoon, they needed someone else more suitable. That is why the form of dialogue with Pavlov was chosen.

And that's it. The blame is taken off Zhukov, and Pavlov is once again shamed.

* * *

Zhukov, as the commander of the most powerful military district of the Soviet Union, should not have quarreled with Pavlov, but demanded a cardinal solution of the problem from the top leadership of the country.

When he rose to the dizzying position of Chief of the General in January 1941, he was obliged, above all, to stand up for the reversal of foolish decisions made by someone and to impose correct ones on the country's leadership instead.

In the last resort, if he did not achieve the set goal, he was obliged to take the responsibility for the foolish waste of energy and resources by resigning from his high office. But Zhukov has cowardly remained silent.

And after the war, and after Stalin, suddenly after the rain hood has become smarter and more pompous. He attributed his cowardice, his criminal inaction, his betrayal of the Motherland to a man who could no longer respond.

Such actions in Russia have long been called meanness.

CHAPTER 21
MORE SERIOUS REASON

The entire system of frontier defenses, including the 80-90 percent equipped securing strip and the unfinished main strip of UR, despite all its shortcomings, constituted a fairly developed engineering basis for the conduct of a tenacious defense by troops in the divisions of the first echelon of the army, provided, however, that they had occupied the prepared facilities in a timely manner.

Lt. Gen. B. Vladimirovsky

"In the Kiev direction." M., Voenizdat, 1989, p. 41.

1

Zhukov was appointed commander of the KOWO on 7 June 1940, and received the directive to build new fortified areas on 26 June. Comparing these dates, any researcher is entitled to assume that Zhukov did take part in the selection of the construction sites.

But even if these locations had been determined by a committee headed by Zhukov's predecessor as COAF commander, Commander 1st Rank Timoshenko, once he received the directive, Zhukov had both the moral and the official right to object at any level: my predecessor had chosen the locations not where it was necessary for the defense. If war broke out tomorrow, I would be primarily responsible for the defence of Ukraine. That is why I ask you to give me the opportunity to appoint a new commission, to determine the places myself and to present my decision for the confirmation of the Defence Minister and the Government. Otherwise, I cannot guarantee the repulsion of aggression.

So much for that. No hysteria, no scandal. A business proposal from a businessman who holds dear his own honour, the lives of millions of his fellow countrymen and the fate of the Motherland.

And who would object to that?

But even if Stalin had objected, at least Zhukov would have had something to justify himself to posterity.

When he was elevated to the position of Chief of the General Staff, Zhukov had to repeat his demand: I am in charge of all plans for the war, the situation of the fortified areas along the new frontier does not correspond to the interests of the country's defense, please insist that the construction be stopped immediately and elsewhere according to the attached diagrams, maps and plans.

And that would also be a smart general's business proposition.

Everything could have been settled without uttering loud phrases, without using rude epithets.

Zhukov had other opportunities to correct and save the situation.

On April 15, 1941, the Military Council of the KOVO approached the Government of Ukraine with a request to provide it with an additional 105,000 local population for the construction of fortified areas *("VIEW", 1976, No. 5, p. 90)*. But wasn't the construction being conducted according to the plans of the General Staff. Zhukov had just surrendered the Kiev district and had been accepted by the General Staff. He knew perfectly well that in the Kiev District the strip of new fortified areas was being built right along the frontier line. And here now, in addition to all those thousands of natives, to the hordes of prisoners and captives, the construction and sapper battalions were directing more

105,000 people. And only on Ukrainian soil. But intensive construction was carried out in Karelia, Lithuania, Belarus, Moldova. And there, in addition to those already working, new thousands, tens and hundreds of thousands of people were sent to the borders.

Fate has given Zhukov another unique chance. Here was the moment for the Chief of the General Staff, Army General Zhukov, to gently suggest to the foolish Stalin that the new thousands should not be sent to the frontier itself. To build fortifications a hundred kilometers from it. Two or three hundred kilometers away!

But the wise Strategos has kept silent. Only once he allegedly rebuked Pavlov: you are building in a bad place! And kept silent.

2

The declaration that fortified areas were being built too close to the border was Zhukov's foolish attempt to absolve himself of responsibility for the Soviet defeat in World War II.

The new fortified areas were indeed prepared too close to the borders. But the main reason for handing them over to the Hitlerites without any resistance at all did not depend on their distance from the border; the main reason was that they were not occupied by Red Army troops. Zhukov forgot to tell about this. He didn't remember about it, he didn't think about it. Because he was personally responsible for it. And in this matter he cannot push his guilt on someone else.

Zhukov himself has opened the word about the UR in Belarus, then let's do the analysis through them.

The furthest west were the 64th Zambrowski and 66th Osowiecki UR. In the vicinity of Bialystok, Soviet territory cut like a deep wedge into Hitler's domain. On this protrusion was located one of the most powerful Soviet armies - the 10th. Its composition included these fortified areas.

The 64th UR is 70 kilometers along the front, 5-6 kilometers in depth. There are 10 defensive nodes in the fortified area. The total number of constructed long-range firing facilities (LRFs) is 53, with 550 more under construction.

53 VSA is not very small. Through every kilometer-kilometer and a half - a monolithic rock of fortification reinforced concrete. Would that the Soviet troops on the Kursk arc in 1943, in addition to the trenches covered with corn stalks and lashna straw or not covered or fortified with anything at all, had at least one real DOS every ten kilometers! But there were none. Hundreds of kilometres from the front.

And in 1941 in the 64th UR they were 53 by 70 kilometers.

And the 550 unfinished are not small at all. So this is concrete! It is not some three kata aspen rods. In unfinished DOS soldiers can also defend themselves. Isn't the rubble in Stalingrad easier to defend than bare steppe. But in the rubble you can get crushed by a collapsed wall, you can get hit from the direction where there are no walls. In an unbuilt DOS you won't get crushed by a wall and you are protected from all sides by shells, bombs, mines, shrapnel and bullets. Besides, the power of an unbuilt UR is not only determined by the number of DOS. In each UR, besides the DOS, engineer enclosures were erected, concrete underground galleries were built between the facilities, warehouses and storage facilities were protected, cable lines for communication were laid, and water supply points were organized. There were engineers and workers where the URs were built, there were stocks of building materials and engineering equipment that could be used at the last moment or even already in the course of the fighting to reinforce the defences.

Except...

Only that on 22 June 1941, the 64th UR had a total of 2 (TWO!) battalions.

On a 70 (SEVENTY!) kilometer front.

3

66th Osovetskiy UR - 60 kilometers along the front, 5-6 in depth, 8 defensive nodes, 59 finished DOS, 594 - under construction.

There is one completed DOS and ten under construction for every kilometer of front here. But that's not all. The 66th UR was a kind of addition and further development of the first-class Osowiecka Fortress, built in the late 19th century.

At the beginning of the 20th century the Osovetsk fortress was the most modern fortress in Europe and in the world, it was a kind of transitional stage from a fortress to a fortified area - 60 kilometers along the front, 15 kilometers in depth (in the central part). In September 1914, the Osovet fortress withstood an assault conducted with the forces of one German division supported by 8 siege batteries (60 150mm and 210mm guns). The assault was repulsed. The Osowiec Fortress then endured a half-year siege, from 30 January to 8 August 1915. The fortress was besieged by a specially formed corps. It consisted of 40 infantry battalions and 17 siege batteries (68 guns, including 4 420-mm, 16 350-mm, 16 210-
mm, 20 150 mm, 12 107 mm).

On August 6, 1915, German troops conducted a gas attack with a force of 30 gas batteries. The gas cloud, which had traveled 10 kilometers, reached a width of 8 kilometers. It was 10-15 meters high.

The Osovet fortress could have continued the resistance even after that. It was abandoned by the troops only by order of the higher command due to the general withdrawal of the Russian army.

And here's the thing: on June 22, 1941, the Germans in this area had neither siege guns nor gas batteries, nor tanks. But there was 1 (ONE!) battalion in the Osovetskiy fortress and in the 66th Osovetskiy UR.

On a 60-kilometer front.

The resistance was terminated on 23 June.

4

Well thats because Zhukov had no powers!

He didn't just have the strength to attack! It had no forces for defense! What defense! He didn't even have the strength to defend the border, to help the border guards.

So this is what is written in the memoirs of the Great Strategist!

The strategist has really written this down. But there's an old rule: don't believe what's written.

Earlier we have already seen the forces of the Kiev Special Military District as of June 21, 1941: 907,046 fighters and commanders. Guns and mortars in the field artillery - 14 756. Anti-aircraft guns - 2221. Tanks - 5,465. Aircraft - 2,059.

If the 860-kilometer border is defended, you get a thousand soldiers for every kilometer, a lot of artillery and tanks.

If, on the other hand, the troops do not sit on the banks of the frontier rivers themselves, but retreat to the line of the old frontier, it will be necessary to defend not an arc of 860 kilometres, but a direct front of 500 kilometres. And here there are two solid lines of fortified areas! Every kilometer
- almost two thousand fighters and commanders in concrete fortifications, provided with communications, ammunition, food and everything else. And 10 tanks per kilometer! And 30 guns and mortars!

And that's not counting the 16th and 19th armies, one of which had already landed on the KOVO territory, and the other was arriving and unloading. If we count them, then the fighters will be 160 thousand more. Then the number of guns and mortars will increase to 2639 barrels, and tanks - by 1580 pieces.

Not counting the NKVD troops.

And all this BEFORE the mobilization started!

What have they gathered such huge troops in the Kiev Special Military District for?

This was explained to us a long time ago. And they keep repeating it: the wise Kremlin strategists did not expect the main blow of the German army to be on Belorussia. "We expected it on the Kiev

direction, so the most powerful group of Soviet troops was concentrated in Ukraine (...). And Stalin was sure that Germany would first of all try to conquer Ukraine and the Donetsk basin" *("Krasnaya Zvezda", 3-9 December 2008)*.

Everything is clear. Everything is understandable. They got their tail out. They explained the reason for concentrating enormous power in the Kiev district.

But their head stuck.

If both the Grand Strategist and Stalin himself expected the main blow of the German troops to be on Kiev, what was the Grand Strategist doing in that same Kiev from June 1940 to February 1941 inclusive, seeing that the Kiev fortified area was covered with earth and flooded with rain water, the armaments dismantled, and the internal equipment of the long-standing facilities rusted? What was the remarkable Colonel thinking, knowing that both the field troops and the permanent garrisons of the UR had been withdrawn from the Kiev fortified area? How was he planning the war when nine more URs were positioned in two strips in front of the Kiev fortified area, but all were in the same condition?

And what was he thinking about when he became Chief of ? And where on earth did he expect a strike on Kiev, since - according to his accounts - he had foreseen in the strategic games that the main German the strike will be on Baranovichi, i.e. not on Kiev, but around Minsk?

The solution to this conundrum was suggested by Krasnaya Zvezda *(December 3-9, 2008)*. K. Timoshenko, Chief of the General Staff G. K. Zhukov, his first deputy N. Ф. Vatutin, Chief of the General Staff Operational Department G. K. Malandin)".

And after such a statement of "Krasnaya Zvezda" will anyone dare to prove that Zhukov's head was filled not with sawdust, but with something else?!

What strategic wisdom, eh! The strategist had come to the General Staff from Kiev, so he thought Hitler would strike his main blow at Kiev. And if he had come to the General Staff straight from Mongolia,

then he would have apparently announced that Hitler was preparing his attack on the Soviet Union through Mongolia...

Citizen defenders of Zhukov, in Kiev Zhukov served 7 months, and in Belarus - intermittently - fifteen years. Why then did he forget about Belarus? Why did he not assume that the main blow could be struck here as well?

And if he expected the main blow to be on Kiev, and did not expect the main blow to be on Belorussia, why did he, in Stalin's presence, reprimand Pavlov for building his fortified areas too close to the border?

5

As a result of the liberation marches, the border in Belorussia was also issued to Germany and inflated like a balloon. Its length has become 470 kilometers.

If on this frontier by order of the Chief of the General Staff G. K. Zhukov had been left only mobile shelters, and the main forces taken a little back to the line of the fortified areas of the old border, the defensive strip would have been reduced twice, to 220-250 kilometers. And the density of troops would have doubled accordingly.

There were also forces in Belarus. And to protect the border. And for defense. And for the offensive.

In the composition of the Western Special Military District on 21 June 1941 there were 599,450 combatants and commanders, and in addition 71,715 conscripted reservists. Total - 671 165 combatants and commanders.

The rifles and carbines here were 773,445. Cartridge guns

- 24 237.

The cardholders - 27 672.

Guns and mortars - 14 170.

Combat aircraft - 1771. In this number 1539 serviceable.

Tanks - 2900. In this number - 2192 Spaniards *("Command and command staff of the Red Army in 1940-1941. Structure and personnel of the central apparatus of the NKO of the USSR, military districts and all-military armies. Documents and materials". M., 2005, p. 243)*.

Divide that power by 470 kilometres. Better yet, 220 or 250.

That's without counting the NKVD troops, their planes, tanks, cannons, machine guns, armored trains.

And not counting the 20th, 21st, 22nd, 24th, and in the nearest prospect the 28th Army, which either had already landed on the territory of Byelorussia, or were moving in echelons, or were loading in the distant provinces.

The 20th Army had 113,193 soldiers and commanders, 2,076 guns and mortars, and 959 tanks.

The other armies had similar forces. I will not torture you with figures. It's all published in the most official reference books. So the 250-kilometer front could have been held somehow with such forces.

And all this is, I repeat, before the mobilization begins.

If Chief of the General Staff Zhukov had ordered Pavlov to place the 700 malfunctioning Zapoevo tanks in ambushes near the bridges, in the woods by the railroad tracks, if he had ordered these tanks to be buried in the ground next to the domes themselves, to camouflage them, to provide them with crews, ammunition, food, if 5-7 infantry fighters had been placed next to every tank dug into the ground, any blitzkrieg would have been choked before it reached Smolensk.

If the whole power of Zaporozhye was oriented towards defence, if the troops had covered the whole of Belorussia with trenches and this defence was connected with the already prepared fortified areas...

But why did happen?

This was because no one put them on the defensive or issued any orders to defend either before the German attack or in the first days of the German offensive.

One of the most powerful Soviet armies, the 10th, was concentrated on the Bialystok salient. I state at once that neither Hitler nor anyone in the world had so powerful an army in 1941 or in any other year.

Here is the picture.

On 21 June 1941 the 10th Army consisted of two (6th and 13th) Mechanized, one (6th) Cavalry and two (1st and 5th) Rifle Corps, one separate (155th) Rifle and one (9th) Composite Aviation Division.

In addition, the 6th Artillery Anti-Tank Brigade, the 124th and 375th Howitzer Artillery Regiments of the RGC, the 311th Cannon Artillery Regiment of the RGC, the 10th Engineer Regiment and two, if you haven't forgotten, fortified areas.

All in all there were 15 divisions in the 10th Army. Including tank 4, motorized 2, cavalry 2, aviation 1, rifle 6.

The 6th Mechanized Corps of the 10th Army was one of the most powerful in the Red Army - 1,021 tanks, including 114 KVs and 238 T-34s. This is the same corps whose commander reported that on exercises he was made march into a breach 5-6 kilometers wide into which he had to somehow cram 6,800 machines.

The 13th Mechanized Corps was not manned. There were only 282 tanks in it. But the presence in the composition of the 10th Army of only the 6th Mechanized Corps raised it to such a level that no one in the world could compare with this army.

There were four fighter regiments and one bomber regiment in the 9th Combined Aviation Division. The total number of aircraft was 409. This included 233 MiG-3s and 41 Pe-2s. In all German large armies and in all tank groups there was not a single combat aircraft. But the airfields of the 9th Combined Air Division under the 10th Army, as we are wont to express it at home, were misplaced. And the planes on them - too densely.

Tarnovo airport - over 100 aircraft, including 52 MiG-3s - is 12 km from the border.

Dolubovo - 77 aircraft, including 56 MiG-3s - 22 km from the border.

Vysokoye-Mazovetsk - 99 aircraft, including 70 MiG-3 - 39 km from the border.

Etc.

Some airfields of the 10th Army, as indeed of other armies, were shellable by German artillery without its crossing the frontier.

In the event of a sudden attack, with such a quantity of aircraft at each airport, it was impossible to get them airborne.

In all, there were 27 artillery regiments in the 10th Army. Of particular interest were the howitzer regiments of the RGC, each with 24 203mm howitzers, and the gun regiment of the RGC with 24 152mm guns.

The 203 mm B-4 howitzer weighs 17.7 tons and fires projectiles weighing 100 kg at a range of 18 km. In a defensive war, such guns are not needed. To be rescued by them in a sudden attack seems improbable. To drop their shells and charges from the border forests is impossible.

The 152-mm Br-2 gun weighs 18.2 tons, fires projectiles weighing 48.8 kg at a range of 25.7 km. In a defensive war it is also unnecessary and marginally vulnerable.

But it is indispensable in offensive warfare.

Many more interesting things can be said about the 10th Army.
We had something to defend ourselves with. Only...

Except that the main forces of the 10th Army were deployed 4 to 15 kilometers *west* of the front edge of the new fortified areas, which, as a great commander observed quite correctly, were as close to the border as possible anyway. How and by whom the fortified areas themselves were to be occupied - this was not said in the directives of the higher command *("VISION", 1989, №3, c. 69)*.

The enormous forces of the super-powerful army, including its headquarters, communications nodes, depots and depots, airfields, the main forces of the tank, motorized, cavalry and rifle divisions were in front of the fortified areas, and behind all this power were the fortified areas without troops.

At the time of the beginning of the war, the most famous division of the Red Army was called thus: the 6th Changor, Kuban-Ter, Cavalry Division "S. M. Budyoni", winner of the Orders of the
"Lenin", "Red Flag" and "Red Star". No other division of the Red Army, and there were 303 of them at that time, could boast of such a glorious history and such a lavish title. What had become of this magnificently prepared division? It perished on the Bialystok salient. Very close to the border. And what was it doing there? Was she preparing the defences? But what good is cavalry in defence? Anyway, she was in front of the fortified areas.

6

This was a very wise decision - to move the powerful army of the bulge that loomed over the entire German group in the area of Tilsit and Königsberg. From the vicinity of Bialystok, at any moment, Danzig could have been struck in the flank and rear of the German troops, cutting off all of East Prussia from the main German territory. The Baltic coast was 200 kilometres away.

But from a defensive point of view the situation of the 10th Soviet Army on the Bialystok salient was disastrous.

Maj. Gen. И. Lyapin in 1941 was Chief of Staff of the 10th Army of the Western Front. He was ordered to keep the main forces of the army in front of the fortified areas that were under construction, but who would occupy the fortified areas themselves in the course of the war - this was not explained to him. After the war, General Lyapin testified to rather stern accusers, "The fortified areas themselves had 1-2 battalions and no forces even to guard the already built facilities, let alone to fight a defensive battle in them. Our persistent attempts to get clarification on this matter from the district headquarters remained unsuccessful" *("VISION", 1989, No. 3, p. 69)*.

Let's assume that only idiots sat in the headquarters of the Western Special Military District. Let's assume that the commander of Zaporozhye Army General D. Г. Pavlov was a complete moron. But where was the genial Chief of the General looking? He, if we believe him, knew that on the Bialystok salient the fortified areas were too close to the border. And he was bound to know where the divisions, corps and armies were deployed. His duty was such.

Well, where did the Genius of Strategy look then, since he knew that the fortified areas were not only unacceptably close to the border, but also not occupied by troops? And what was the Great Commander in Chief thinking of, since he saw that under the foolish Pavlov the most powerful army was disposed even beyond the line of the fortified areas? So that in the fortified districts, though unfinished, the army would be combatable. And on the border itself, where there are no fortifications, the soldiers will not

even manage to put on their boots in case of an attack. And the pilots would not be able to reach their planes and the caterpillars of the German tanks would overrun them.

By the way, there were no German tanks here either.

The airfields of the 10th Army were captured by the German infantry.

7

It is explained to us that Zhukov was afraid of provoking the Germans, so the firing facilities of the fortified areas were not occupied by garrisons.

Admirable explanation.

Having stationed masses of aircraft at the frontier airfields, Zhukov was not afraid of provoking Hitler. Nor was he afraid that he would provoke him by concentrating along the borders untold numbers of tanks, artillery, cavalry, and infantry. Having piled all this in front of the front edge of the fortified areas, he was not afraid that he would provoke Hitler, however, to occupy the firing facilities behind all these groupings he did not dare.

Both I and other researchers have cited a mass of evidence saying that by mid-June 1941 many, even unfinished, firing facilities were occupied by troops. Until June 13, Zhukov was not afraid of provoking Hitler, and then suddenly he got scared and ordered the garrisons out of the fortifications.

Yeah, but here's the thing: if the troops had built an impregnable field defense with a dozen lines of trenches, impassable minefields, and a spider web of barbed wire, and with powerful DOTs occupied by troops, Hitler would have seriously considered attacking.

And DOTs without troops and troops without fortifications - that is exactly what a provocation is, exactly what an invitation to the aggressor to attack is.

After 22 June, it was urgent to find the culprits. "Today the former commandant of the Novograd-Volinsky fortified district was shot by the sentence of the Military Tribunal. For cowardice" *(Umansky, R. G. "On the battle lines", p. 53)*.

The Novograd-Volynskiy UR at KOVO, like all the others on the old frontier, was abandoned in 1939. There were no field troops, no UR units, no management, and no commandant. The commandant was appointed after the German attack.

Earlier, we have already met Lieutenant General Vladimirovsky's account of the Novograd-Volynskiy UR, in which after the beginning of the war the DOTs began to be poisoned. This means that by the time the Germans appeared there were piles of fresh earth lying around the firing facilities, pointing out to the German artillerymen exactly where they should fire. But a DOS must not only poison and camouflage itself, it must arm itself. Without guns and machine guns, the effectiveness of long-range fire declines sharply. DOSs must be supplied with ammunition and food for many days of fighting. Communications systems must be restored. For mighty walls drown out all noise. The garrison may simply miss something important. Trenches and trenches must be dug around each DOS to protect it from the directions that cannot be seen and shot from its ambushes. Much more needs to be done to enable concrete monoliths to serve to their full potential.

And most importantly, the defensive facilities must be manned by permanent garrisons that are trained in the rather specific tactics of fighting in a fortified area.

There were not enough garnisons. The fortified areas were hastily filled with ordinary infantry, worn out by the retreat, who had failed to get used to the situation and to organize a defense. The frontal node of resistance of the Novograd-Volynskiy UR did not stand a day.

Who is to blame? Clearly - the just appointed commandant. He lacked courage. Which is exactly why he was shot.

But it is not the fault of the Strategist, who commanded the troops of the KOB for 7 months, but did not take care to do at least something to prepare to repel an attack.

* * *

Every day and every hour, we are being tossed the idea that the Ordnance writers were in the business of brainwashing millions of readers.

There is no such thing, citizens. Let's not give in to illusions. No flushing! With increasing persistence, a reverse process is underway which, if we do not use non-normative vocabulary, we can mildly call brain pollution. Or, as Mark Solonin put it, a process of brainwashing is under way.

All the explanations of the sad fate of the fortified areas in Zhukov's memoirs are fine examples of this.

CHAPTER 22
NOT TOO CLOSE TO THE BORDER

Neither near the border of the advantageous natural frontiers nor deep in the territory of the western frontier districts were there previously prepared defensive strips and frontiers. The strip of fortified areas that existed on the old state frontier was also unprepared for defense.

"History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945". M., Voenizdat, 1961. Vol. 2, p. 49

1

Zhukov declared that the defeat had occurred because the fortified areas were too close to the border.

We will not protest. We will .

But let us not forget that behind the line of fortified areas, since June 1940 had been being built along the new state border, there was another, or two, or even three lines of fortified areas already built long ago. They were located 200-300, that is 400 kilometers away from the new border.

Examples:

61st Polotsk UR - 370 km from the border. 55 km along the front. 202 finished DOS. But in this fortified area is located 1 (one) battalion.

63rd Minsk UR - 250 km from the border. 160 km along the front. 206 finished DOS. "At the beginning of the war there was only one machine-gun battalion in the Minsk UR, which guarded the facilities and warehouses" *("Krasnaya Zvezda", November 25, 2005)*. Have you ever tried with one battalion to shore up a front 160 kilometres wide?

65th Mosir UR - 380 km from the border. 128 km along the front. 155 finished DOS. 1 battalion.

25th Pskov-Ostrovskiy UR - 500 km from the border. 85 km along the front, 147 fully finished DOS. Including gun caponiers of state-of-the-art construction, built in 1939. How to explain its sad fate? Unacceptable proximity to the border is no here. The tragedy is explained by the fact that there were no troops at all in this fortified area.

2

Let us consider the situation created by the example of the Pskov-Ostrovskiy UR.

The importance of this fortified area is extremely great. The strategic Warsaw-Vilnius-Daugavpils-Ostrov-Pskov-Leningrad railway runs through it. From the border it was along this highway that the Germans advanced. With fighting they reached Leningrad and blockaded it.

It took them 18 days.

So much time because the main forces of the army group "North" were infantry divisions with horse-drawn carts. 700 kilometers on foot with the boots, with the carbine on the back, to exhaustion - a hard way. And the troops were not moving in a straight line. They are fighting, maneuvering. Thus, a whole thousand kilometers are accumulated. That's why the Germans have been moving to Lenin's city so slowly, so long. And they didn't notice any fortified areas on their way.

But they had no forces to storm Leningrad. They were forced to stop, to entrench, to entrench. The front line stretched from the Baltic through the Novgorod and Pskov lands to Kalinin and Moscow, further south.

In the Pskov region, the Germans, under Red Army fire, built the Panther defensive line, Soviet regiments and divisions continually attacked, the Germans repulsed the attacks and continued to build. They used the beams to make something like a Russian wooden house, only instead of windows, they used wide slits to guide fire. Around the house, retreating a metre and a half, they erected another. The space between the two rows of beams was filled with earth and stones. On top, three to five kata of beams and a one-metre layer of stones. All this was filled with earth. The result was a hill with embrasures. Between these hills - trenches...

Here is the opinion of enthusiast-researchers from the 21st century:

"The distance from Velikiye Luki to Idritsa we covered by car in about two hours. The Red Army, while destroying the Hitlerite

The Panther defence line has been fighting fierce battles here for a year and a half" *("Krasnaya Zvezda", 23 May 2008)*.

Germans - 700 kilometers from the border to Pieter in 18 days. Ours - 100 kilometers in a year and a half.

Why?

Because the Germans stood on the defensive, and nobody gave the Red Army in the summer of 1941 the task of defense or prepared it for defense. It had other tasks before it.

While breaking through the Panther defensive line, the Red Army divisions suffered certain losses.

Which ones?

Answer from the same article, "The fighting in many areas of Pskov was prolonged and no one knows exactly how many soldiers died. Officially it was thought that over half a million were buried here, but now that access to the archives has been opened it is clear that there were many more."

The German Panther defensive line consisted of simple trenches and wood-and-ground firing points and pillboxes.

And the German army in the summer of 1941 had passed in these same areas through Soviet defensive lines. Without encountering resistance and suffering losses.

About one of the strongholds of the Pskov-Ostrovskiy UR tells the lieutenant-general of the engineer troops B. B. Bichevsky:

"On July 5, units of the Northwest Front left the town of Ostrov. When I learned of this, I was perplexed at first - I didn't even believe the reports. What about the fortified area? Was it surrendered without a fight? With what strain during the summer and autumn of 1939 had we established strong strong points there, defending the main roads and approaches to that town. On a 15-kilometer front of the border, 20 two-story reinforced concrete artillery installations for 40 76-mm antitank guns and 17 machine gun installations for 30-40 machine guns were built. So the outstanding, and then cancelled in 1940, installation of weapons in these DOTs could have been filled with field weapons! If this frontier was captured so quickly, then it was not occupied by our troops. Or maybe they had bypassed it? It was only much later that I learned just some of the reasons for the so rapid breaching of the fortified areas of the older

state borders. By the way, very little has been written about this. I will remind only one characteristic touch. The 111th Rifle Division was urgently dispatched to the town of Ostrov, but having failed to take a defensive line, it was forced under pressure from the numerically superior enemy to retreat to our Ruzhki Frontier" *("VIEW", 1963, No. 1, p. 65)*.

And the reason is still the same. Too many troops were west of all the lines of fortified areas. When the going got rough, the divisions of the 41st Rifle Corps were unable to occupy the Pskov-Ostrovskiy UR and prepare for defense.

3

The Germans were stopped a little further east and north of these places. They dug in. Using earth, beams and stones, under Red Army fire they managed to build a defensive line and maintained it for a year and a half, killing hundreds of thousands of Soviet soldiers.

The Germans didn't have two-story gun emplacements interconnected by reinforced concrete underground galleries.

The Red Army had 20 years to prepare its country for defense. If the two-storey reinforced concrete caponiers were occupied by permanent garrisons, and a field defence of the troops was organised between them, the divisions of the Red Army could have held out here not a year and a half, but much longer. And to kill the Germans by the hundreds of thousands. But they didn't kill them. And they didn't hold out. They just weren't here.

In January 1941 the Grand Strategist had told Stalin in front of the entire senior command staff that in Belorussia fortified areas were being built too close to the border. But the Strategist, who knows why, had forgotten to remind Stalin that behind these fortified areas there was a second and third UR line, already ready but unoccupied by troops.

Had Zhukov before the war withdrawn an Rifle Corps, or better still the whole 10th Army, from the Bialystok area and placed its divisions in the fortifications of the new and old frontiers, the course of the war would have been quite different.

4

Colonel-General Y. Gorkov has declared that the plans of the war, the plans for the defense of the great state consisted in the defense of the border, that is, in the allocation from the composition of the divisions, corps and armies of the First Strategic Echelon of frontline battalions to help the border guards.

If the whole strategic plan consisted in this, it is reasonable to ask the question: why hasn't Gorkov been promoted to private yet?

If he really thinks that the plan for the defence of the country could have been reduced to a plan to allocate frontline battalions to reinforce the frontier outposts, then he has nothing to flaunt by the leggings on his trousers.

But if Gorkov understands that the strategic plan of a war cannot be reduced to defending the border, but publicly spouts such nonsense in front of the whole world and disgraces the senior command staff of the Russian army with his pompous ignorance, then he has nothing to do in the general ranks at all.

But even if we agree with the wise strategist Gorkov and his statements that the entire plan for the defense of the state was reduced to a plan for the defense of the state border with the forces of the leading battalions of the divisions of the First Strategic Echelon, let us ask him the question: and where are the plans for the use of the seven armies of the Second Strategic Echelon?

Along the old frontier lay a chain of fortified areas unoccupied by anyone, and it was on this line that seven armies were hanging around without any plans.

You didn't have to be a Grand Strategist to issue simple and clear orders before the war. We were talking about the 186th Rifle Division of the 62nd Rifle Corps under the 22nd Army, which was secretly moving to the western borders from the Ural Military District. On the example of this army, let us consider the possible variants of combat

task for the army, corps and divisions that were part of it.

Was it hard for the Grand Strategist even before the war started to scratch something like:

"To the commander of the 22nd, Lieutenant General Ershakov.

With the forces of one corps occupy the Sebezhskaya UR, with the forces of another - the Polotskskaya UR. Prepare a defence. Defend to the death. Not a step back. Zhukov."

Using the example of the 22nd Army again, let us see what would happen next in this situation. Having received orders from Zhukov to defend along the old state border line, the 22nd Army commander, Lieutenant General Ershakov, would have been able to quickly issue orders to the corps commanders. Something like:

"The commander of the 51st Rifle Corps, Comdr Povetkin, with the forces of two rifle divisions and two corps artillery regiments to occupy Polotsk UR, to prepare a defense. One rifle division to be set aside as army reserve. Commander of the 62nd Rifle Corps, Cmdr Kartanov, with the forces of two divisions and two corps artillery regiments, to occupy the Sebiz UR. With one rifle division to take up defense where the two URs meet. Commander of the 22nd Ershakov."

By the way about the combris. The ones who have not read "The Icebreaker", I recommend the chapter "For the Combris and co mdives[1(])". There were two corps in the 22nd Army. Both were commanded by Kombris, although they had divisional commanders with the rank of Major General under them.

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[1] Divisional commander. - B.pr↑

Had they received such orders, the army commander, corps and division commanders would have known what to do. The 22nd Army would have occupied the two fortified areas and defended them. In two weeks an impregnable defence could have been organised.

Here is an example: 'Every village was turned into a fortress. Trenches connected house to house. Anti-tank ditches were prepared in all directions accessible to tanks. The depth of the trenches reached several meters and many of them were filled with water. All this was supplemented by almost dense minefields and wire fences." Thus the Marshal of the Soviet Union S. C. Biryuzov described the German defenses in the area of Melitopol in the summer of 1943 *("When Rifles Thundered". M., Voenizdat, 1962, p. 204)*.

On this frontier the remnants of the defeated 6th German Army near Stalingrad retreated. Marshal Biryuzov continues, "These troops were, of course, quite overwhelmed, but in the presence of good defensive positions they also offered stubborn resistance."

Let us compare the two examples. Remnants and pieces of the defeated German 6th Army defending in the middle of the bare steppe. Everything is as if in the palm of your hand. There is no forest here. There is little water here. Almost no natural obstacles. The defensive positions are difficult to camouflage, there is nothing to fortify and cover the trenches with, there are no beams to build pillboxes and dugouts. But the Germans turned every village into a fortress. Every house - into a stronghold.

The fresh Soviet 22nd Army, on the other hand, had landed in an area with two fortified districts in the summer of 1941. Here there are reinforced concrete defences. This is not your adobe house with a thatched roof adapted for defense. The Sebezhsky UR is construction, but in Polotsk on a front of 55 kilometers there are 202 finished DOS. There are many natural obstacles here: lakes, swamps, creeks and rivers. Here the enemy's way is blocked by powerful water obstacles - the Western Dvina and the Velikaya. They flow in the right direction - hard on the main offensive routes of the

the enemy. In addition, there are many forests here. They are sufficient both for camouflaging troops, headquarters and army rearguards, and as building material for field defense. Most , every forest is an anti-tank area. In the woods, tanks are no threat to infantry. And neither is aviation.

As long as the troops had been issued a defense order...

But we now know from the words of Army General Kvashnin that his distant predecessor as Chief of the General Staff, Army General Zhukov, had assessed the situation correctly. But not quite... So he didn't issue a defence order, instead he delivered into Hitlerite captivity millions of Soviet soldiers, tens and hundreds of towns, thousands of villages, hundreds of thousands and millions of square kilometres of native land.

6

Those fortified areas which the Hitlerites had failed to seize had already in the course of the war to be occupied by troops who were not at all prepared for action in them, did not know the strengths and weaknesses of the defensive installations, were not tactically trained. All that was at hand was thrown to the defence of the fortified areas.

Col. Gen. A. Belov testifies that the abandoned Tiraspol fortified area had to be held by the forces of the 5th Cavalry Division... "This is probably the only case in history when cavalry was used as field reinforcements between long-range fire installations of a fortified area" *("VIZH", 1959, №1, p. 61)*.

The Shepetov UR was occupied by the combatants and commanders of various units and units left behind by the 16th Army, the Mogilev-Podol - by construction battalions and NKVD units. The Kiev UR was defended by paratroopers from the 2nd Airborne Corps, the 4th separate motorized rifle regiment of the NKVD, volunteers, cadets from the infantry and artillery schools, and even a detachment of cadets from the district intendant courses.

But even this more-than-three organized defense has produced results.

The battle- and campaign-weary 5th Army of Major-General Potapov's Panzer Troops, after losing three-fourths of its strength, nearly all its tanks and artillery, and experiencing acute shortages of ammunition, fuel and lubricants, and food supplies, withdrew to the Korosten UR and held it from 12 July to 21 August. It could have held it longer, but the adjacent Western Front collapsed and the enemy covered the Southwestern Front in a huge arc. The order was therefore given for the 5th Army to leave the UR and withdraw beyond the Dnieper.

Hem the Korosten UR before the war was abandoned, the garrisons taken out of it, the armaments, the ammunition,

equipment - exported.

If this UR had been in fighting condition before the war, if the garrisons had not abandoned it, and if it had contained one or two rifle divisions - this frontier could have been held for a very long time.

A little further south the Kiev UR was in literally the same, i.e. neglected, state. It was held by the urgently formed from everything that came to hand, the 37th Army headed by Maj. Gen. A. Vlasov. On the approaches to Kiev the divisions of the 1st Panzer Group and of the 6th Army, i.e. the main shock group of the German troops, which were operating south of Polesie, had gone out.

The 37th Army held the defence of Kiev from 11 July to 18 September 1941 inclusive. In those days, the terms "General Vlasov's army" and "Vlasov's men" had a different, unaccustomed to modern man meaning.

The Kiev UR was never broken. Vlasov's army could have held it longer, but the Germans broke through the Red Army front much further north and much further south of Kiev and closed the encirclement ring around the Southwest Front like a giant pincer.

If all the Soviet fortified areas on the old frontier before the war had been occupied with appropriate units and field troops, the German army would never have reached not only Moscow, Leningrad and Stalingrad, but also Smolensk and Kiev.

7

The junior lieutenant, later an ROA fighter, had told of the abandoned mounds of reinforced concrete firing facilities in the area with no signs of war or fighting visible. But also the communist lieutenant-general of the engineers B. B. Bychevsky has reported the same.

The story of junior lieutenant Samutin, who at the end of the war voluntarily, fully consciously joined the ROA - the Russian Liberation Army - and fought valiantly against the anti-people power, is no different from the story of army general Kvashnin, who 60 years after those events headed the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces.

The picture is entirely the same. The troops of the Red Army in the first days and weeks of the war fought without any plans. No one gave them orders to defend themselves. Zhukov did not bother to set them defensive tasks.

The only difference is that in the junior lieutenant's account there are more details and he calls things by their proper names.

And the army general twists it.

They will object to me that the junior lieutenant has changed his oath... Can he be trusted then? I have no answer to that question. Do as you like. But bear in mind that Army General Kvashnin, like all Soviet generals by the way, also changed his oath. He swore to his last breath to keep his allegiance to the Soviet people and the Soviet Government, but he broke his oath, he betrayed his Soviet Motherland, he sides with those who were destroying the Soviet Union.

The difference is that the junior lieutenant, when he realised that the regime was anti-people, took up his weapon and went to war against that regime, while the army general did not go to war either for or against the communist power.

He waited to see who would win and then he switched sides.

* * *

Some "anti-Suvorov" declared that Zhukov could be considered great if only for having saved Moscow and Leningrad.

But Zhukov saved neither Moscow nor Leningrad.

Before the war, Zhukov had taken troops to the western frontiers beyond the few lines of fortified areas, leaving the troops without fortifications and the fortifications without troops, and thus opened the way for Gott, Guderian, Kleist, Manstein to Minsk, Kiev, Odessa, Vilnius, Riga, Tallinn, Sevastopol, Kharkov, Leningrad, Smolensk, Orel, Kursk, Moscow, and eventually to Stalingrad.

CHAPTER 23
WHY DELAY?

Just as suddenly and quickly as the non-aggression treaty was concluded between Germany and the Soviet Union, war then broke out in Europe.

Admiral of the Navy of the Soviet Union N. Г. Kuznetsov
"The day before." M., Voenizdat, 1966, p. 237.

1

The generally accepted version: that Stalin sought to postpone the war... The reasoning about postponement is easily broken by a single question.

And the question is: WHY?

If desired, this matter can be decomposed into a myriad of ingredients. Including:

What specifically was the Soviet Union's unpreparedness for war in the summer of 1939, i.e. why did it have to be postponed?

What exactly should have been done to increase preparedness?

How long did take?

How was the time from August 1939 to June 1941 used, which according to Stalin's statement he had won?

What have they managed to do in that time? What was left to do?

In June 1941, how much more time was needed to complete the preparations of the country and the army to repel an enemy invasion?

Attempts to find answers to these questions immediately bring us to a dead end, because the actions of the Kremlin leaders do not resemble a postponement of the war for the sake of preparing to repel possible aggression.

Let us remember: by September 1939, the distance between the borders of the Soviet Union and East Prussia was about 300 kilometres. And between the Soviet Union and the main territory of Germany - 600-800 kilometers. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact reduced these distances to zero. I do not grasp easily. I am dumbfounded, to put it bluntly. Even my first teacher noticed it. Well, such a fool needs clarification: how does the convergence of the borders of likely adversaries and the establishment of a common border fit into the quest to postpone war between them? When are you more relaxed - when

the crocodile is a hundred meters away from you behind an obstacle or when you are in the same cage with him, when nothing separates you?

The postponement did not end with the establishment of common borders with Germany on the land of torn Poland. On the last day of November 1939, the Red Army undertook a liberation march to Finland. The foolish Finns do not grasp that they are trying to liberate them from the Prangs, so they resist the happiness that has befallen them. Quite violently. The liberation march turns into the Winter War. After its conclusion it was announced that the Red Army had run on, not to rid the Finns of bourgeois oppression, but only to ensure the safety of Lenin's city.

And somehow it is forgotten that the liberation march began with the proclamation of the Finnish Democratic Republic and the signing of a treaty of friendship and mutual assistance with it on December 2, 1939. The government of the FDR was established in Moscow. It was staffed by Lubyanka investigators of Finnish origin. At the request of the FDR government, in accordance with the signed treaty, the Red Army extended a helping hand to the people of Finland.

After the collapse of communism, the Soviet Union's treaty with FDR became available to researchers. A terribly ridiculous document. For example, every treaty between the two countries is drawn up in two languages, with the two texts being equivalent. And the treaty with FDR was printed only in Russian. It was more convenient for both sides that way: the Moscow Finns had long since gotten lame.

There are many more funny quirks in this document, but no one has yet paid attention to one little thing. The document was signed by Comrade Molotov as head of the Soviet government and Comrade Kuusinen, president of the FDR.

Comrade Kuusinen is a Moscow official of very considerable rank. Appreciate this: he had an apartment in the building on the street
"Granowski!" At that time Kuusinen had already risen very high, after the Second World War under Khrushchev he had reached the top - he entered the top ten communist leaders of the Soviet Union.

So, under the contract with FDR, Comrade Molotov wrote his name (more precisely, his pseudonym) in Russian letters, which is understandable - he wouldn't sign in Chinese characters, ya. And Comrade Kuusinen...

also with Russian. The president of the independent democratic Finland has long ago learned in the Kremlin corridors to speak and write in his native language.

2

With the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, Stalin established a common border with Germany that was just over 500 kilometres long. If the Red Army was not prepared to fight against Germany, if Stalin was only concerned about future resistance, he put his army on the defensive where the common border with Germany was formed. Prepare the country and the army to repel aggression! Why do you occupy your troops with any side business? Why should you turn neutral Finland into your enemy? Why should you extend the front of possible collision by another 1670 kilometres?

But here I am being told that if we had not attacked Finland, Hitler would have attacked it, would have taken it and turned it into a bridgehead for an attack on the Soviet Union.

We will object to the concerned citizens: it is not so easy to take over Finland. The Red Army has convinced itself of this three times. Germany, which has no common border with Finland, would have found it even more difficult. To take over, it would have to conduct a naval landing operation and then supply its troops in Finland via the Baltic Sea.

The consequences of Hitler's eventual conquest of Finland we can also appreciate through the example of Norway. Germany attacked Norway. Norway has defended itself. And defended itself valiantly. Example.
September 20, 1939, the brand new heavy cruiser Blucher entered the German Navy. On 9 April 1940, units of the Norwegian Coast Guard submerged it. By comparison, the Soviet Navy had not sunk a single cruiser during World War II - neither German nor Japanese, heavy nor light. And in its entire history, the Soviet Navy has never done anything similar or equal to the sinking of the Blucher.

Incidentally, that same month the unfinished "Lüttsov", the sibling of the "Blucher", was towed by tug to Pieter. For oil and cotton, for vanadium and molybdenum, Hitler had to settle with Stalin

with a brand new heavy cruiser that was badly needed by Hitler himself for his fight against Britain's superior naval forces. If Stalin had halted the supply of strategic raw materials, Hitler would have begun to fade away in 1940. Or he would have sued for peace.

And what did Stalin need a heavy cruiser in the Baltic for if our country was spread over the continent? As long as we are not dependent on the Baltic sea lanes? Since Stalin had a huge front on the Baltic anyway?

3

Hitler succeeded in taking over Norway, and paid dearly for it. Norway's army, navy, and air force were disbanded. Few people agreed to serve Hitler. The people despised these renegades. A resistance movement was born in Norway. For control of Norway Hitler had forced himself to keep ten divisions there, i.e. a whole full-blooded army. Hitler could not use this army against either Britain or the Soviet Union.

If Hitler had taken Finland at the same cost, it would have been a waste of forces for Germany, because advancing from Finland towards the Soviet Union was not convenient. If Hitler had taken Finland by force, the people and army of Finland would have become Germany's enemies. A resistance movement like in neighbouring Norway would have arisen.

But Finland was attacked by the Soviet Union, so the Red Army became the enemy of the people and army of Finland, and Hitler became their defender.

In Finland, everything has gone the other way around. The Soviet Union had to pay dearly for its 1939 liberation campaign. Finland voluntarily allied itself with Hitler. The government of Finland invited German troops into their country. But even in this case in June 1941 Finland, forgetting its grievances, did not declare war on the Soviet Union and did not give permission for German troops to fight from its territory. For the second time the Red Army committed aggression against Finland and Finland had to fight back... Including with the blockade of Leningrad.

In Norway, after Hitler left, renegades were formed into small infantry units of the SS. But the vast majority of Norwegians were against Hitler. In neighbouring Finland, the whole nation was against the Red Army. The whole nation, with the exception of Comrade Kuusinen, was on the side of Germany. The whole army of Finland was fighting against the Red Army. Between

On the other hand, Finnish fighter pilots are third in the world in terms of performance after the Germans and the Japanese.

For the war against Finland Stalin had to throw huge forces. This included the Karelian Front, which had two armies - the 7th and 14th - before the war began. But then the 19th, 26th, 32nd All-Army and 7th Air Army were added to them.

In addition, the 23rd Army of the Leningrad Front, the Onega and Ladoga Flotillas, and the Baltic Fleet forces fought against Finland throughout the war.

Stalin declared that he had gained a year and a half with the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. This time should have been used to improve relations with neighbouring countries so that they became our allies in the fight against Hitler, or at least to make every effort to ensure their neutrality in the coming war.

The Kremlin comrades, however, have not been interested in this at all.

4

And comrade Stalin in 1939 continued to postpone the war, for this purpose he inserted his garrisons in Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia. The sovereignty of these countries was immediately violated. Here is just one touch: Comdr. П. Kravchenko, one of the first two two-time Heroes of the Soviet Union, was sent to Estonia in 1939 as commander of a special aviation group that included six fighter and bomber aviation regiments. In the course of the Winter War of December 1939, this aviation group operated against Finland from the territory of Estonia, which was then still a sovereign country.

In April 1940, the Central Committee held a meeting to discuss the results of the Winter War. In the of this meeting on April 15, Kravchenko reported to Stalin on the actions of his aviation group, including the bombing of Finnish cities. He expressed the thought that diplomatic relations with Finland were being restored, so it would not be amiss to take this opportunity to look at the result of the work of the Red Star bombers...

The Red Army stationed garrisons in Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia ostensibly to protect these countries from German aggression, but used their territory as a bridgehead for aggression against neutral Finland. Stalin's Falcons bombed the cities of Finland for fear of Finland becoming a beachhead for an attack on the Soviet Union. But precisely because of these barbaric bombardments it really becomes such a beachhead.

Soon after, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia voluntarily asked to join the Soviet Union. At once, all three. Hardly on the same day.

We are told that Soviet troops were present in these three countries to ensure the safety of the Soviet Union. We will not argue. But why did we have to include these countries in our country? What was the need for mass repression

relative to their population? Why did they have to plant collective farms and the other charms of socialism?

The accession of the sovereign Baltic states to the Soviet Union liquidated another buffer between the USSR and Germany, widened the front of possible invasion, and turned the population of these neutral countries into enemies of the Soviet Union. Stalin became for them an enslaver, Hitler a potential liberator.

Stalin did not have enough of that and in the summer of 1940 he tore off a piece of Romania, turning it into his enemy and Hitler's ally. Now the front of possible invasion had spread from the Transpolar to the Black Sea. In the event of war, the Red Army now had to defend an unprecedented front thousands of miles long, spreading its forces over gigantic territories and enabling the German command to strike where the density of defenses was lowest.

5

In 1920 Soviet Russia was not in a position to wage war against Japan. It did not have the strength to fight on so many fronts and for so many years. Famine. Typhus. Ruin.

What to ?

To postpone the war against Japan. But

how?

Well, very simple. A large chunk has been cut off from Russia: Trans-Baikalia, the Amur region, Primorye. On these territories a supposedly independent state - the Far Eastern Republic - was created. A powerful buffer was formed between Russia and Japan. No points of contact remained, so the very basis for conflict disappeared. There were no longer any disputed territories between the two countries. But did Japan claim anything there? No problem: get along with the DIA. And the DPR government (as instructed by Moscow) agreed to all sorts of concessions and privileges for the other side, signed all sorts of agreements.

Then Soviet Russia gained strength and incorporated the DIA into its fold. But Japan had signed something there with the DPR? We don't know what it was about and we don't want to know. There is no such country. We may not have recognized it either. And you Japanese gentlemen have signed nothing with Moscow, Moscow has promised you nothing and owes you nothing.

That's how time was won. By creating an artificial buffer state, they were able not only to postpone war with Japan, but to avoid it altogether.

Here everything is clear: we are (supposedly) cutting off territory from ourselves, thus avoiding contact with a likely adversary and thus buying time or avoiding war altogether.

But from 1939 to 1941 Stalin acted in exactly the opposite way. The Soviet Union was separated from Germany by a chain of buffer states. In order to buy time and postpone a possible German attack, there was no need at all to create buffer states in the way Hitler had done. They already existed. It was necessary to

Support. It should have bolstered their defense. In all these countries it should have found anti-German forces and supported them. On Soviet territory it should have set up partisan units of people who were ready to defend Poland, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Finland, Romania from German invasion in peacetime.

But Stalin did the opposite.

And here's the question: what was he buying time for, then, if all that time was being used not to back away from Hitler, but the other way around - to get closer to Germany?

6

By the autumn of 1939 in the western regions of the Soviet Union all bridges, up to and including the Dnieper, were prepared for blowing up. And not only bridges, but also tunnels, railway junctions, water supply systems of railway stations, locomotive depots, switches, etc., etc.

The German tanks could have gone ahead, but without a supply of everything they needed by rail they could not have gone far. And had they gone, they would have had to be abandoned somewhere in the Smolensk and Konotop areas without fuel and ammunition. Hundreds of bridges, tunnels and transport hubs take years to rebuild. Only a massive blowing up of the railway facilities could have stopped the blitzkrieg.

Through the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, Stalin, by his own claim, had gained a year and a half. How was this time used to strengthen the system of state self-defence?

It has been liquidated.

Now explain to me why Stalin needed to buy time and delay the war?

Without this time-gaining, the country was able to defend itself.

Behold, they have gained time, but they have used that time not to develop and strengthen defenses, but to destroy them.

By the autumn of 1939, a network of secret partisan bases existed in the Soviet Union, established in peacetime. Partisan detachments and sabotage groups were ready to join the fight against the aggressor from the first minutes of the war.

Stalin postponed the war, gained a year and a half, and during that time he dispersed the partisan formations and destroyed their bases.

The western border of the Soviet Union was protected by a chain of fortified areas. Once you've bought time, reinforce your fortified areas. Put permanent garrisons in them, stockpile

in concrete shelters ammunition, , food and everything else needed for a long and tenacious defence. But Stalin ordered his fortified areas disarmed, abandoned, and covered with earth.

There was a powerful river flotilla on the Dnieper which could have hindered or at least seriously hampered a possible Dnieper advance. Stalin gained a year and a half, postponed the war, and liquidated the Dnieper flotilla in that time.

We have already talked about all this in previous books. I am compelled to repeat it just to emphasize once again the monstrous insolence and stupidity of the Kremlin propaganda, which repeats the legends of how Stalin was buying time to strengthen the country's defenses. He bought time by destroying multiple first-class defences, each of which could have stopped any invasion, even individually.

Stalin gained a year and a half and used that time to destroy everything that was intended for defense. Instead of defensive systems and structures, airborne corps, mountain-rifle divisions were formed, airfields were built near the frontiers, millions of tons of strategic materials were exported to the frontiers, from thousands of tons of spare parts for tanks to prefabricated bridges, from mountains of coal at railway stations and thousands of tons of spare rails and sleepers to millions of sets of topographic maps of the frontier territories and Russian-German phrasebooks.

Look at the newsreel footage: a few Germans are herding captured Soviet fighters. In fact, it's all Soviet infantry. Well, but by September 1939, every Soviet rifle division had its own tank battalion. The German infantry had no tanks, the Soviet infantry had their own tanks. Each Soviet rifle division commander could have used his own tank battalion as an armored fist with which he could defend himself against any attack. Or as a steel skeleton around which, in any critical situation, the division could instantly organize a defensive area and stop any strike.

Stalin had gained a year and a half and in that time had liquidated the tank battalions of the rifle divisions, leaving the Soviet infantry without tank support. This is where one must look for the sources of the human flows obediently driven into German captivity.

* * *

The ballads of postponement are one of the fundamental bases of official Kremlin propaganda. Our wise marshals, generals, academicians and doctors of various sciences explained the actions of the Soviet leaders from the beginning of 1939 to June 22, 1941, simply and accessibly: Stalin sought to postpone the war to gain time, to strengthen the defenses, to prepare to repel an enemy invasion.

These explanations of anti-science. There are numerous facts that do not fit such an interpretation of events. These facts are known to all, but our esteemed chiefs, strategists, generals and scientific luminaries have skillfully circumvented them for almost 70 years.

And after reading their multi-volume writings, looking at the evidence, delving into their thoughtful reasoning, any normal person suddenly discovers something amazing. The thing is, sometimes the jugglers in science pick out only those facts that fit their theories, and what doesn't fit they just ignore and dismiss. But in Russian historical science everything is much more serious. Facts supporting the official interpretation of events are missing altogether! On the contrary - all the facts contradict the official "scientific" reports. Stalin, like his great strategists, was not preparing to repel a possible near invasion, he was not reinforcing the country's defenses, he was destroying them. What, then, was he buying time for?

It follows inexorably from this vexatious question, which has never yet been answered, that the heroic recollections and reflections of the various marshals of all sorts of victories represent too

Failed chatter prepared for a crowd that is incapable of independent thought.

CHAPTER 24
WHAT THREAT DID THE DELAY POSE?

Stalin distrusted people - but at the same time he trusted logic implicitly.

Mark Solonin

" 23: M-Day." M., Yauza. Exmo, 2007, p. 301

1

Let us now look at the situation from another direction. Suppose Hitler had not attacked us on June 22. And decided not to attack us at all for the time being. How much more time would Stalin have needed to delay? And what might have come of that delay?

The options for possible developments are countless. Three of them seem key to me.

Option one. Stalin still postpones the war, America is busy with its own affairs, the sluggish quarrel between Britain and Germany continues. Nothing new on the Western Front. Meanwhile...

In the spring of 1941, the Me-163 jet made a planning flight without turning on its engine. In the fall of 1941 it began flying with its engine on.

On April 18, 1941, Flug-Captain Fritz Wendel lifts the Me-262 into the sky. True, the aircraft was piston-engined, as production of turbojets was slowing. On March 13, 1942, the Me-262 made its first flight with turbojet engines. The engines met the requirements. But the opportunity arose to fit more powerful engines (Jumo-004). Since there were so many to choose from, the first flight of the Me-262 with these engines took place on July 18, 1942. It was with them that the serial production of the Me-262 was started.

In the spring of 1941 in Germany began the creation of a heavy tank.

Germany was significantly ahead of the Soviet Union in a number of military-technical areas. For example, in the field of piston aircraft engines, not to mention jet engines. And in the field of torpedo armament. Germany was a world leader in nuclear research. And in rocketry. By the second half of the war, Germany was the first in the world to develop first cruise and then ballistic missiles. Germany was the first in the world to create anti-aircraft missiles. All that remained was to put them into series production. Night vision devices for tanks were being developed in Germany. A number of German

military-technical developments do not fit at all into our notions of 20th century weaponry. German engineers simply failed to put them into practice. Too little time history has allotted them.

If Comrade Stalin had continued to wait and delay, in very next year 1942, and even more so in 1943, he would have met a completely different German army.

2

The list of German innovations is endless. And in the field of radar. And in the field of connectors. And in the field of cipher technology, optics, light anti-tank weapons, artillery guns with conical barrels, fire-control devices, computing, etc., etc. How many times have I heard bitter sighs: ah, if Stalin had bought time and re-equipped his army...

It is impossible to rearm an army. The process of rearmament is continuous and never-ending. As long as you replace 10,000 T-26s with T-50s, a new tank will be created and rearmament will continue. As long as you supply all your assault regiments with Il-2s, the Il-10 will be created. As you rearm them with Il-10s, more perfect aircraft will emerge...

And the moaning does not stop: ah, if we could have won another year! And even better - two! Or three.

Those who speak like this clearly see before them a sweet picture: the Soviet Union is saturating its army with new weapons, while Germany sits and patiently waits for the Red Army to overtake it more and more.

What are these illusions due to?

The Treaty of Versailles held back Germany's economic and military development. Hitler had wrested Germany from the chains of Versailles, then Germany was rapidly catching up. Technical progress in Germany was advancing at a much more rapid pace than in the Soviet Union. If Stalin had continued to delay the war, he could have driven his army into a quagmire. In a year, two or three, the armies of the Soviet Union and Germany could have found themselves at different levels of technological progress.

Example: in 1945 the main participants in the war - Germany, Great Britain, the USA and Japan - had their own jet planes and engines. I will immediately clarify: in varying degrees of readiness and security. But all these countries were moving

on the right path of development. In the course of the war, three types of jet fighters and the Ar-234 jet bomber were mass-produced in Germany. The number of experimental jet aircraft was large, and the number of projects incalculable (Ju-287 in five variants, E-560 in ten variants, Ho-VIII in two variants, Ho-XVIII in three variants, Ta-400, He-343 in seven variants, Me P-1108 in five variants, EF-116 in three variants, EF-130, EF-132, etc., etc.).

The only exception among the major participants in the war was the Soviet Union, which at the end of the war had neither jets, nor engines, nor reserves for the future. The stillborn B-1 proved to be a branch leading to a dead end. Nothing new was in prospect. This so deplorable condition had not created itself. Here it was not without the personal contribution to the development of aviation of the "grey cardinal" - Stalin's reference on aviation Alexander Sergeyevich Yakovlev, Colonel-General, twice Hero of Socialist Labor, Knight of eight Lenin Orders, full member of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, winner of Lenin, State and six Stalin awards, etc., etc., etc.

3

The second consequence of postponing the war could have been even more unfortunate.

Roosevelt had long itched to crush Germany. Behind Roosevelt were the interests of American bankers and industrialists. Germany had to be crushed as a dangerous competitor. If only a pretext could be found. Well, they would have found a pretext in Washington.

Seeing that Britain was weakened and losing interest in the war, and the Soviet Union was waiting and delaying too long, the United States could have taken the decisive step of siding with Britain. This could have abruptly changed the situation favorable to the Red Army's liberation march to Berlin and Paris. In that situation, the Second World War would have lost all meaning for Stalin altogether. Why start it if he was not going to be able to incorporate all of Europe into the unbreakable union of republics anyway?

4

But America in the early 1940s could have stayed out of the European war and turned its gaze to the Pacific. And then the third, most probable and most unpleasant for Comrade Stalin version of events would have occurred.

The British government clearly saw a strategic impasse in the war with Germany. Britain did not have the kind of army to land troops on the Continent and defeat Germany. Germany did not have such an air force and such a navy to land troops in the British Isles and defeat Britain. Continuing the war was useless and pointless for both sides. The war was ruining and weakening both Britain and Germany. Britain was trying with all her might to entice the Soviet Union into joining the war against Germany. But Comrade Stalin had procrastinated, assuring the whole world of his peacefulness. Some believed this...

In this situation, Britain's leadership had the dawning realisation that it was time to end the war. Britain was the first to declare war on Germany, she could have handed over the palm branch. And Hitler had already offered Britain peace after both the defeat of Poland and the defeat of France. More than once. And Hess's strange flight in a fighter plane to the British lion's den must have given Comrade Stalin very unpleasant thoughts.

If Britain, appreciating the disastrous consequences of the protracted military crisis and the whole hopelessness of the situation, had suddenly decided to withdraw from the war, then Stalin would suddenly have found himself in a very unenviable position. Alone. Without allies. Pressed under his heel by millions of embittered people both in the recently liberated lands and in the Soviet camps back home, and tens of millions in the Soviet collective farms. These millions, under certain circumstances, could have reminded the native power of some of its not fully judged actions.

Britain's withdrawal from the war would also have threatened Stalin with purely military trouble.

During the entire war, the German navy, in general, did not fight against the Soviet Union. It fought against Britain, and then against the US Navy. In the event of Britain's withdrawal from the war, the full might of the German navy would have fallen on the Soviet Union. Hitler would have sharply curtailed production of submarines (the largest in the world), instead he would have sharply increased production of tanks, artillery, ammunition.

Throughout the war, the bulk of German aviation fought in Western Europe, repelling air raids by British and then American aircraft. In the event of a British withdrawal from the war (and America had not yet joined in), the entire might of German aviation would have turned against the Soviet Union.

In the course of the war, the aviation of the Western Allies had turned German industry into piles of shapeless metal and German cities into oceans of stone. It is said that Germany was never able to recover from the bombs. Right. But let's imagine that those bombings had stopped in 1941 without gaining momentum, and German industry had operated without a hitch, and all its output had been directed against the Soviet Union. What would Comrade Stalin have done then?

5

While World War II was being fought on the continent, Stalin's interest was in waiting for the European states to exhaust themselves in the war. Stalin wanted all participants in the war
"nice to get together". It was with these words that he expressed his intention in the circle of his closest associates.

But in the summer of 1940, Hitler suddenly overran France and threw British troops out of Western Europe. No one had foreseen such a stunning blow. Not even Hitler himself.

But it was at this point that the stalemate in the war between Britain and Germany arose. Both in Berlin and in London understood this. And they understood it in Moscow. It was from that moment that the possibility and the probability of peace between Germany and Britain arose. Neither side expected victory. At any moment, therefore, the parties could have agreed to a draw. This is what worried Stalin most.

The optimal option for Stalin was to strike Germany in June 1940 at the moment when Germany had defeated France. All the tanks were there. All the heavy artillery. The most talented generals. All the best troops. By the end of the operation, the German rearguards were stretched thin, equipment needed repair, fuel and lubricant and ammunition stocks were almost completely depleted... And there were only ten German infantry divisions on the Soviet border. And not a single tank. And no one defending the Romanian oil.

But even Stalin did not expect France to fall so quickly. The timing was perfect for an attack on Germany. But he had to secretly mobilize and move to the border the divisions, corps and armies of the First Strategic Echelon, to deploy in the border area 250 new airfields, command posts, communications hubs, hospital facilities, to bring in and unload hundreds of thousands of tons of ammunition, spare parts, engineer assets, to move to the borders bases for fuel and lubricants materials, to redeploy

aviation, to provide the troops with topographical maps, plans of the first operations, to bring industry and the railways to wartime regime, to mobilize and withdraw the Second Strategic Echelon from the interior, to print posters in time with the Motherland calling, to order Shostakovich's "The Great Day Has Come" and Alexandrov's "Holy War," to solve a mass of all sorts of other problems. It's like launching a rocket to Mars. If you don't foresee the stupidest little thing - it might collapse at launch.

One day is not enough in such a grand undertaking. And two months are not. And autumn and winter are coming. With the rotten airports, the rains, the fogs, the bad flying weather. And Stalin decides: not now, but at the first opportune moment.

But the first opportune moment was not before May .

6

In 1938, the leaders of Britain, France, Italy and Germany met in Munich and quickly resolved the problems.

In 1940, the round of players was cut to a minimum, and the continuation of the game did not bode well for the two players. Who could have guaranteed that in the new environment the leaders of Germany and Britain would not meet again and solve the problems that had arisen? Who could Molotov, Beria, Dekanozov, Fitin, Proskurov, or Golikov have guaranteed to Comrade Stalin that here, right now, in July , in some neutral Madrid, British and German generals dressed in civilian clothes were not stationed around a table and drawing the map for sharing the interests of the two countries? Who could have guaranteed that two gentlemen of pleasant appearance had not met in some cozy suburban mansion in neutral Geneva and arranged terms of truce? Who could have guaranteed that Churchill was not secretly negotiating with Hitler?

If in August 1939 the leaders of the Soviet Union and Germany could have come to an understanding in a few hours with an interruption to attend the first act of Swan Lake at the Bolshoi Theatre, why in July 1940 could not the leaders of Great Britain and Germany have come to an understanding just as quickly? That's what gave Stalin no peace.

* * *

At any moment, like a bolt from the blue, the terrible news could have broken: the war between Britain and Germany had ended in an honourable peace! In the light of such a prospect, postponing the war was mortally dangerous for Stalin. After

the defeat of France, the postponement of the war could have turned into disaster and doom for the Soviet Union.

Stalin understood this better than anyone.

CHAPTER 25
FROM PIONEER TO PENSIONER

And without Suvorov there is elementary logic and common sense. It's just that Suvorov, he, I don't know exactly how to express it, is some kind of a standard for someone. Obvious things exist whether Suvorov was there or not.

Д. Zakharov

Echo of Moscow Radio, 6 February 2006

1

Many people have tried to disprove "The Icebreaker". Without success.

But a deadly argument was still found: what about Suvorov not being the discoverer! We knew all that without him! And if that's so, we don't need to read his books. And there is nothing to argue about.

One of my earliest rebuttals, Russian presidential adviser Col. Gen. A. Volkogonov, declared caustically.

"known to everyone from the pioneer to the retiree."

This argument is like an iceberg in the ocean. And an icebreaker, as popular wisdom holds, does not break an iceberg. When faced with such an argument, you need to launch lifeboats urgently. And you don't want to argue any more. Why should I argue, when everything has long been clear and known without me?

If I think soberly, I have nothing to object to. Right! That's the way it was. All the facts lay on the surface, had long been known to all. But I never declared myself a discoverer. Everything I wrote about crunched under our shoes every day. Everything I wrote about was known to millions. I simply called things by their proper names. I did something anyone could have done. Marshals, generals and admirals, prime ministers, presidents and their brave advisers, academics and doctors, pioneers and pensioners dared not speak. And I dared.

That is my merit. This is my discovery.

But the critics did not relent. Here's one of the early cases where this argument was used: 'The book of the week is Viktor Suvorov's The Icebreaker... I'll tell you what my main feeling was: there was no sensation. The book is overdue! Proving to the smart people in Russia that communism is "more guilty" than fascism is ridiculous. Yes, Stalin was preparing for an invasion war, not a defensive war. Rivers of people's have been spilled because of it. Yes, the official Soviet story

lying. But this is precisely a "sensation", not a new idea. And new ideas for making sense of the twentieth century are really lacking right now" *("Ogonyok", 1993, No. 9)*.

So so. Funny little book I wrote. Smart people and without The "icebreaker" knew everything. Better for smart people to rethink the 20th century, get new ideas from somewhere. However, how annoying: there is nowhere. Only boredom and boredom. Nothing new for the searching mind and the burning heart.

So said "Ogonyok".

And it started.

2

Lazar Lazarev says: "Stalin's imperial appetites were insatiable. For him there were no forbidden means, no moral and political restraints. He was ready to harvest everything that was not well protected. Stalin's military doctrine was, by its inner nature, offensive, aggressive. All this is common knowledge today (...). None of V. Suvorov's arguments, I would like to stress - none of them - have been confirmed by facts, but each has been refuted" *("Novaya Gazeta", 29 October 1993)*.

This is a model for the logic of the serious historian. If Lazar Lazarev says that Stalin's military doctrine was aggressive, this is a common fact. But if I say the same, it is a vile falsification.

And here is the editorial of Krasnaya Zvezda of March 20, 1996: "Hiding by the Thames from his native justice, Rezun has amassed and added to his rich collection of evidence that the Red Army was preparing for offensive war, for war on enemy territory. But no one has ever denied this either. This "secret" were revealed even the songs of that time before the storm".

Wonderful. But if everything I write about is a long-known truth, why should I be persecuted?

In every debunking article I find the common sense: we knew that without you! And immediately: all this was invented by Goebbels? And British intelligence!

Says Colonel Vitaly Ivanovich Moroz: "That the Soviet Union, our army, was preparing for offensive war - this is an axiom. (...) We were preparing to advance, to overwhelm the aggressor on his territory, and without shedding much blood, we were building the whole process of training and educating the troops in accordance with this vision of the future war, and the reality turned out to be quite different" *("Krasnaya Zvezda", March 28, 2000)*.

The Red Army was preparing for an offensive, but the reality was quite different. The Red Army was forced to defend itself, but it wasn't even thinking about defense. If such revelations are recorded in official history, in the Marshal's memoirs, or in the book on adolescence published by the Ministry of Defence, then it is axiomatic and a fact long known to all. But if I repeat the same, they immediately declare that it is only James Bond's dirty speculation and Goebbels' sordid fabrications.

The first to remember Goebbels was again the same adviser to the President of Russia, Col. Gen. Volkogonov. And he immediately stated decisively that "The Icebreaker" contained nothing new. Suvorov that the system that emerged after October 1917 had as its strategic goal the realization of a world proletarian revolution... The Central Committee of the RCP, with the help of the Comintern, sent all over the world enormous sums of money to establish communist parties and initiate revolutionary manifestations. This is now documented... The thinking of Soviet leaders until recently remained Comintern-like... Stalin, I am sure of it, was constantly thinking not only about the threat from the West, but was also thinking through his own offensive options" *("Izvestiya", January 16, 1993)*.

To put it simply, all that I write about is not fiction, but already stale truths known to Volkogonov and to all smart people. And the General, with belated bravery, speaks simply and clearly about Stalin's plans to overrun Europe.

Bravo, General!

But it follows inexorably from the general's statement that Goebbels was not lying and had not discovered anything new. Goebbels had said something obvious and . He has said what everyone in our knew, including the generals in question, academics, presidents with their wise advisers, pioneers and pensioners. It appears that Goebbels did not lie, but only told the world something that was already known.

I cannot and do not reconcile one with the other:

— or to admit that there are no all-known facts, but ideological diversions of enemy intelligence and Goebbels' lies;

— or to admit that there are known indisputable facts, but why then should we associate the indisputable facts with Goebbels and James Bond, to adjust them to them?

3

Major General Y. "Turning to Viktor Suvorov, I would like to note: we know many of the things he wrote" *("Nezavisimaya Gazeta", 31 December 1993)*.

And shortly before that General Solnyshkov blurted out a whole treatise. Please excuse me for the abundance of quotes. This is just a tiny excerpt from the big article, which took up two whole newspaper pages:

"The Defence Secretary, Marshal S. Timoshenko, in his closing speech, when setting the tasks of all the troops, said nothing about the need to prepare to repel a sudden attack by the enemy. But he did speak of an unstoppable forward momentum "with the aim of fulfilling the tasks set at all costs" (...) According to the terms of the games, the "Westerners" attacked first. But options for repelling this attack were not considered. Why were the participants not offered to act in a situation that might be created in the initial period of the war? The conclusion is one - Stalin did not want this. Clearly, he did not intend to prepare the army and the country for a sudden attack by the fascists... In the directive of the Commissar of Defense of May 5, 1941, the leadership of the Kiev Special Military District was offered "to be ready, as directed by the General Command, to strike swift blows to defeat the enemy, to carry the fighting into his territory and seize advantageous lines" (...) Yes, four armies were redeployed from east to west, and some 800,000 men were called up from the reserves. But they were preparing for an offensive, not a defence. That's the worst of it. (...) As for our preparations for the offensive, that hardly needs to be proved..." *("Rossiya", June 23-29, 1993)*.

Citizen General, are these facts common knowledge, or have you been secretly listening to Goebbels at night? Or perhaps the cheeky boys at the British Embassy have gently recruited you, paid you thirty pieces of silver and now, using your name as a cover,

instill their nefarious thoughts in the insufficiently conscious and informed citizens of Russia?

But even that was not for the general. He even said that
"the German-Fascist command literally in the last two weeks before the war managed to overtake our troops, completed the deployment and thus created favorable conditions to take the strategic initiative at the beginning of the war" *("Rossiya", June 23-29, 1993)*.

Great! Delightful!

I read the General's writings with enthusiasm. I feel a kindred spirit. I recognize the familiar approach, handwriting and style. It is as if I am leafing through my own books. Citizen General and I think mirror-image. You, General, should have published this treatise before me. There would have been no price.

But here's the question peace does not give me: if Hitler had not beaten Stalin by two weeks, if the Red Army had managed to complete its concentration and strategic deployment before the German army, what would have happened next?

4

What is the concentration and deployment of an army around state borders and what inevitably follows? Let's think about it: a foaming stallion gallops straight towards us, ridden by a ferocious man. Just like the one who once almost mowed down the red commander Zhukov. Here he is, the enemy thug, with a clang and a whistle he pulls the check from its sheath, with curses he raises it above his head and cuts the frosty blueness.

And then what?

Then - it cuts! In cavalry there is an unbreakable principle: I will cut you to the m...te - then you will dismember yourself!

Does it make sense to raise the checker to the sky, to stretch the reins so that the flying stallion digs furrows with his front hooves and freezes, and you freeze in anticipation, giving the enemy the right of first strike?

After the completion of the concentration and strategic deployment, the Red Army theoretically had only two options for action. I repeat: theoretically.

The first option: to take advantage of the "favourable conditions for taking the strategic initiative at the beginning of the war". This, by the way, was prescribed by the official military doctrine of the RKKA and the directive of the Narkom of Defense of May 5, 1941.

The second option: to halt at the borders in humble expectation until the Hitlerites finish all their preparations and strike the Red Army first with their axe between the ears.

Not long ago the supreme power of Russia officially recommended to the leaders of the Russian regions for reading and reflection the wise essay of two foreign thinkers, in which the thought was pushed that Comrade Stalin was terribly stupid. He was about to push an absolutely bizarre option for joining the war: let them stick a knife in my liver, then everyone will see that I am a good . Let them stab me with a dagger in a pub brawl, then everyone will realise I'm a victim, and then I

I'll start defending myself. Let Hitler stab me with his tank wedges all the way to the saddle, maybe I won't get unhorsed.

Comrade Stalin had deliberately put his troops under attack because of this option, he had packed the border airfields with planes for this purpose, and the border forests with hundreds of thousands of tons of shells, that is why our border guards had removed the wire, that is why we had mined the bridges: let the cadre army perish, let eight-tenths of the entire military industry and tens of millions of citizens remain in the occupied territories - then we will somehow manage.

Comrade Stalin had deliberately dumped 20,000 tanks and betrayed 4 million of his best cadre fighters, including his own son, into captivity - in order to convince America of his peacefulness and get its help.

Stalin's strategy was simple Caucasian cunning: now I will dump my tanks, guns, planes, millions of tons of strategic supplies - maybe later, one day, the Americans will send us new ones.

Some comrades in the Kremlin today are terribly eager to present Comrade Stalin as a cretin so that they themselves shine with their statesmanlike wisdom against the background of his strategic stupidity.

But let the official Kremlin propaganda paint Stalin as a cowardly fool. In doing so, the official Kremlin ideologues only undermine their credibility. And I mentioned the two options for the development of the strategic situation after the concentration of troops in the border areas only to show: there were not two options.

Mobilizing, concentrating and deploying the army along state borders cannot simply end. When vast masses of troops are assembled, either a blow must be struck, or the enemy will strike it, overtaking us but a little, and in one stroke destroy the best of what the country has for warfare.

5

And Army Gen. A. Gareev did not deprive Goebbels of his attention. But this version to justify Hitlerist aggression was invented at the time by Goebbels. Rhesus and his followers merely paraphrase it in their own way. Although it is refuted by the course of history itself" *("Krasnaya Zvezda", February 2, 2000)*.

To this, Mahmut Akhmetovich, I will answer you with a quote. Listen and see that you don't fall: 'The main blow on the Cracow axis in the flank of the enemy's main group allowed Germany to cut herself off from the Balkan at the very beginning of the war, to deprive her of the Romanian oil and to divide the Allies.

And delivering the main blow on the flanks of the Western and North-Western Fronts led to a frontal assault in the difficult terrain against the heavily fortified defensive positions in East Prussia, where the German army could have offered fiercer resistance.

And quite different conditions, and therefore considerations, might have arisen if the strategic design had envisaged the conduct of defensive operations at the outset of the war to repel aggression. In that case it would undoubtedly have been more advantageous to apply the main effort to the Western Front. But such a course of strategic action was not then envisaged."

You think I made that up? Or did I get it from Goebbels? Or did a bunch of super-smart British intelligence experts make it up? No, no. Mahmut Akhmetovich Gareyev, this is your own creation. It was you under your own name who published this in the collection "Manhood", No. 5, in 1991 *(p. 253)*.

There is no way to say it better than that.

Since you have accused me of repeating Goebbels' fabrications, basic scientific integrity demands that you find a quote from the Goebbels in question and place it next to mine so that everyone can see: here is continuity!

But no Goebbels could rise above your wisdom. In the short excerpt you have explained the essence of the 1941 failure:

— Comrade Stalin did not think that the country had to defend itself from anyone, he did not prepare to repel aggression, and it did not cross his mind;

— and concentrated the Red Army's main forces south of the Polesie in order to cut the link between Germany and Romania.

How do and I differ, Citizen Chief?

Here is more: 'The disadvantageous position of our troops was aggravated by the fact that the troops of the border military districts had tasks not for defensive operations, but only for covering the deployment of troops'.

Well, who made up such a mess? Goebbels? Groups of British experts? Or the traitor to the Fatherland, the traitor and forger Rezun, to please Russia's detractors?

No, citizens. This is the work of the Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Army General M. Gareev. It was published in the same collection "Muzhnosti" *(1991, No. 5, p. 256)*.

Let's say I'm fooling myself because I've sold out to all the imperialist intelligence. But who is inciting Gareev?

I first published these ideas in 1985, and he repeated them 6 years after that. Well, why does the Russian state shower Gareev with titles, titles, positions, orders and awards because of these revelations? Where are my orders and awards? And where are my lapis lazuli?

And when will the serious historians finally publish, an exposing treatise "The lie of Mahmut Gareev"? And why don't they expose him with a series of angry articles under the general title "The End of the Global Lie"?

6

Stalin banned all publications about the initial period of the war for a reason. It was allowed to tell only about how the private of an unknown division Ivanov in the area of an unnamed settlement with a bundle of grenades threw himself under a German tank of unknown type, how the fighter pilot Petrov rammed an enemy bomber, how the lieutenant-granichar Sidorov defended himself for three days by shooting from the advancing enemies, and how the heroes of the Komsomol raised a red flag over an enemy-occupied village. Individual heroic deeds were emphasized. It was desirable to glorify the exploits of people who had died. For they were told not by the participants in the fighting and battles themselves, but on behalf of the fallen - specially authorized members of the Union of Soviet Writers. And the fallen heroes were no longer able to confirm, nor to object, nor to clarify, nor to correct the accounts.

Stalin understood that the memories of living soldiers, officers, generals and marshals, underground and partisans, Chekists and weapons designers, were the manifestation. Without knowing what they were doing, the fighters and commanders would unwittingly but inevitably have told something that would give away Stalin's whole design and the reasons for its failure.

The accounts of eyewitnesses and participants in the events are a scattered mosaic which, when put together, will give a vivid dazzling picture.

Therefore, by Stalin's order, everything concerning the war was classified, especially for its initial period: from the number of troops to the organizational structure of units and subdivisions, from the combat composition of military districts to the number of tanks, from the availability of strategic stocks to the losses of personnel. And no one was advised to remember the details.

And after Stalin the prohibitions on memories and reflections were gradually relaxed. From year to year our generals felt more and more free. The recognition of the Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Army of the

USSR Army General M. A. Gareyev in the central body of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR three weeks before the collapse of the Soviet Union: "The direction of concentration of the main effort was chosen by the Soviet command not in the interests of strategic defense (such an operation was simply not foreseen and not planned...), but for quite different courses of action (...) The main strike to the southwest was determined to be more advantageous terrain, cut Germany off from her main allies, from oil, brought our troops to the flank and rear of the main enemy grouping..." *("Krasnaya Zvezda", July 27, 1991)*.

Shortly after that, The Icebreaker came out in Russian. And the citizen generals, the serious historians and their bosses were alarmed. All of them began to blame the British intelligence for their reckless and unreasonable bravado. Just then they remembered Goebbels: we were not the ones who got the drop on Stalin's plans. Goebbels made it all up.

* * *

And the thought that Hitler was just a little bit ahead of Stalin, in this case *("Rossiya", 23-29 June 1993),* was expressed not by me, repeating Goebbels, but by Major General Y. Solnyshkov, echoing Army General S. П. Ivanov.

CHAPTER 26
FOR THE DISCOVERERS

Who, treading in my footsteps, will bother to read the astounding stories of our century, distorted, disfigured, tainted by paid liars?

Theodore Agrippa d'Aubigny (1552-1630)

1

The years merge into decades, and the same songs ring over the country and the world.

On the one , they say, "The Icebreaker" is a compilation universally known facts, Suvorov did not reveal anything new to us, we are smart, literate people, and without him we know all this. So there are elementary logic and common sense. There are obvious things, no matter if Suvorov ever existed, or never existed. On the other hand, they answer: there are no facts and there never were any facts, there obvious things, the whole contents of "The Icebreaker" e Goebbels' fabrications.

For many years now, the merry boys of the Echo of Moscow radio station have been living their lives on the ideas of The Icebreaker, announcing loudly, insistently and constantly that Stalin was preparing an attack on Germany.

Dmitry Zakharov and Elena Sayanova had independently reached this conclusion on the basis of a careful analysis of a vast amount of historical facts contained in the memoirs of Soviet generals, admirals and marshals, in speeches by Soviet leaders, in official multi-volume descriptions of the war, and in pre-war Soviet publications.

Says D. "We can quote a mass of our sources - statements of marshals and statements in the Soviet press of that period. Starting from something elementary: if you are preparing for defense, you deploy minefields in front of your troops. There were practically no mines being produced in the Soviet Union in the Munitions Commissariat at that time, and there were no Soviet minefields along the line of deployment of Soviet and German troops, once you use the thesis of Soviet defense doctrine, because minefields are prepared to stop an advancing enemy. If you were going to attack, of course you wouldn't prepare any minefields in front of your troops. Well, there are a mass of other

Factors. On the location of depots for fuel and lubricants, ammunition, troop rations. If the troops intend to advance, these depots are located at a relatively short distance from the troop mass. If you intend to defend, they naturally - the most significant depots - retreat deeper into the rear of your own territory. The warehouses were located immediately behind the fighting positions of the troops."

Sojanova welcomes these statements of citizen Zakharov with approving exclamations and generously adds new facts that undeniably testify: Stalin was preparing an attack!

But every now and then there is a sneaky listener who asks with some bewilderment on air: but, citizens, haven't you copied all this from Suvorov?

To which they confidently repeat: but we haven't read any Suvorov! These are universally known facts!

At the same time, these same discoverers in the same programs vehemently state: Stalin was not preparing any attack on Germany! There are no facts, there is no evidence! These are all fabrications of Goebbels and Rosenbert. The stupid Rhesus repeats the fabrications of Nazi propaganda.

Sings D. "I confess to you something even more terrible - I didn't finish reading Rezun. I started the book, read fifty pages and my soul exhausted its resources...

E. Soyanova. I have not read Mr Suvorov at all, if you will believe me. To be more precise, when I started reading it, I was struck by the degree of unscrupulousness of the author, who did not bother to at least change the style of Rosenberg and Goebbels. Goebbels's style is particularly recognizable.

No, there is simply explicit language proving that the Soviet Union was preparing a strike on the Reich. However, it seems to me that he should have executed the order of the time a little more precisely. It seems to me that this is pure pseudo-history...".

2

Until the late 1980s, it was impossible to get my books on World War II published. In any language. In the UK alone, I was turned down by 26 companies, from tiny to the biggest. There were also many Russian publishers in the West who published books without heeding the recommendations of the ideological department of the CPSU Central Committee. But to publish "The Icebreaker" in the Russian language did not decide anyone. By the way, outside the borders of Russia
"The Icebreaker was never published as a separate book in Russian. There were no braves.

But I did not up. Since the full text cannot be published, I will print it in excerpts. In May 1985 in the Paris newspaper
"Russkaya Mysl" published the first chapters. Even then these chapters contained everything that two decades later the great researchers of Echo of Moscow told the astonished public. There was also about the minefields that were missing for some unknown reason in front of the Soviet troops' positions in the border areas, about the piles of ammunition on the ground, about the barbed wire rolled into balls by skillful border guards. I referred not to Goebbels and Rosenberg, but to Zhukov and Konev, to Golikov, Rokossovsky and Meretskov, Voroshilov and Vasilevsky, to Batov and Gorbatov, to Goltsov and Agaltsov.

3

My good readers, viewers and listeners, thank you all for your support. If a program comes out against me, some annoying person will always get on the air with a reminder to the various Sojanov-Zakharovs from which spring they get their wisdom.

Munich Conspiracy programme, 28 November 2005:

"Listener. Vitaly from Moscow. I would like to remind you that there is a concept of Suvorov about the position of the Soviet Union, the position of Stalin on the eve of the Second World War, that he deliberately wanted Hitler to take over Europe so that he would then come as a liberator.

Д. Zakharov: Well, this concept existed without Suvorov, and it was repeatedly stated that it would have been better if the war had been directed to the west."

Zakharov's revelations alternate with statements that the whole system of argumentation in Suvorov is rather weak.

"Д. It is weak, one could say tendentious. That is, truth and fiction are very cleverly mixed there."

The reasoning follows that "there is a type of historian who draws up the scheme and then starts filling it in with facts. They accept the facts that fit them, and reject those that don't."

4

All the discoveries of the attackers of the "Echo of Moscow" can be found by anyone who wishes in "The Icebreaker", "M-Day", "The Last Republic", in my other books published in many languages 10, 15, even 20 years before the righteous efforts of Zakharov-Sjanov were crowned with insight. When they told how Stalin prepared his attack on Hitler, they did not refer to a single fact of their own. Not a single one. Never.

The various Zakharov-Sjanovs declare that my books were a mixture of truth and falsehood, that my whole argument was weak and tendentious, but no one ever bothered to back up their accusations with an example.

And I am forced to puzzle fellow parasites with a question (don't take it as an insult, it's just the medical term): how do you know my books are a mixture of truth and fiction, how do you know my argumentation is weak and tendentious? Who told you I ignore facts that don't fit my version of history? Have you not read my books. D. Zakharov has repeatedly stated that his fragile soul cannot bear reading my books. I urge him to do the same with Sayanova.

Hem radio station "Echo of Moscow" was once very respected and loved by the people. Question. So this is the style of the Kagebist agitators: I have not read the book, but I will say...

The arrogant critics of Echo of Moscow have not read my books, which they brazenly flaunt, and immediately pronounce categorical judgments about them. And directly - on air. Commendable. But the question arises: and where do these judgments come from?

There are two options:

— from gossip;

— Someone omnipresent and competent tells them exactly which books they should pour sloppy water over without reading.

The first option does not exclude the second, the second - the first.

5

Once upon a time, long ago, one of my detractors, having perceived that everything in my books lines up like the chips from a broken kettle, declared: yes, everything fits, everything matches, but this cunning Suvorov uses only the facts that fit his theory, and rejects those that don't.

This has been echoed by many critics. Naturally, the citizens of Echo of Moscow could not have passed this argument by. And they did not pass it by. Zakharov and Sayanova amicably repeated it.

And I declare: there are no facts to contradict my theory!

Stalin was preparing an attack on Germany. Find a fact that doesn't fit this assumption.

I gave many examples of the country not preparing for defence. Examples, that so so-called counterstrikes and counterattacks via the first days At of the war are were an improvisation, that they not are been prepared и planned in advance, I have also brought enough.

But where are the examples that Stalin did not prepare the country and the army for an offensive towards Europe?

I am the chief critic of my books. My interest is to find all possible errors and inaccuracies. I remove them and correct them. I get rid of them. It got to the point where I composed a whole book
"I take my words back" to purge myself of the delusions of youth.

Come on, find a fact that contradicts the basic idea of the
"The Icebreaker", and I'll either do my best to explain it, or disown my theories.

Well, where are the myriad facts that block the way of the
The "icebreaker"?

Echo, , Moscow echo!

But let's imagine there are facts that don't fit my theory. Suppose I ignore them. In this

case the denouncers of "Echo" fall into a very unpleasant situation.

The thing is that the theory which Zakharov and Sojanova, on their own, without reading my books, in contradiction to the world's conventional view, heroically present is exactly like mine: that Stalin was preparing an attack on Germany. But if there are facts that contradict my conclusions, the same facts must their conclusions. The traitors at Echo of Moscow think they've got me beat. No, dear, you have spanked yourselves. To say no more.

My reasoning was weak and tendentious. But the Echo's argumentation is much weaker - you have made public only a fraction of the evidence I used ten, if not twenty years before you.

Every researcher has the opportunity to deepen, refine and develop theories published by someone before him. This is the scientific process. And often the one following the trail rises to new heights of knowledge untouchable by his predecessor. There are masses of examples of this. Already after the publication of my books, other authors have unearthed many new archival treasures, previously unknown to anyone, and have expressed a mass of astonishing judgments. The limits of our knowledge of the war have long and far passed the horizons beyond which
The "icebreaker" has never sailed or made its way.

The Sojanov-Zakharovs, however, have found and invented nothing new, have added nothing to what has long since penetrated the minds of the broad popular masses.

In science and art, such acts are called plagiarism. Latin term. Translated - theft. But theft is also different. You stole something, you appropriated it - keep quiet. But that's not enough for these people. They want both to steal, to appropriate, and to spit on the robbed.

But let's agree with the history hijackers for a few moments: I've come up with the scheme, and then I fit only the convenient facts to and reject the inconvenient ones. But do the Echo's discoverers act otherwise? Do the valiant debunkers use in their broadcasts both facts that fit their theory facts that don't fit their revolutionary concept?

My books were a tossed salad, with both truth and lies boldly mixed in. I won't argue. But in proving the same theory, have the Seyanov-Zaharovs deviated from my recipes even once in mixing their mixed salads?

6

While Sojanova and Zakharov cling to The Icebreaker like a blind man to a wall, it all works out very neatly for them - they've concocted an original theory on their own that overturns the world's established ideas about war. Well, I wouldn't skimp on a Nobel for such achievements!

But if the discoverers take even a step ...

On September 26, 2005, Dmitry Zakharov said on air, not for the first time, that my books are not worth reading. When I read in Mr. Suvorov's book that the U-2 plane was a killer plane, I laughed for a few minutes, then I put the book down."

An outburst of infectious laughter followed. Zakharov summed up with a quote that Soviet propaganda attributed to Goebbels: the more monstrous a lie is, the more convincing it is.

I haven't read all of Goebbels' works, I haven't come across that quote. But I don't think Goebbels was so stupid as to expose the work of his department and his personal contribution with such statements.

Look, I'm responsible for my books. That's why I say I never used the term "killer plane". I've accumulated some interesting material on the U-2, but so far in all my books I've mentioned the U-2 once, in "The Last Republic", in the chapter
"Guardian Miracles." There I said, "Besides, there were P-5 and U-2 aircraft in the Soviet Union." And that's it. No estimates. No comments. No descriptions and epithets.

Where have my valiant debunkers read about the killer plane? Why did they call the U-2 that? I don't know. But I guess.

I have written about the Su-2 in my books. The guys from "Echo" have had enough of reading "The Last Republic" until the chapters "About Ivanov" and "The Winged Genghis Khan".

I agree, the U-2 and Su-2 indices are consonant. But it is perfectly clear to anyone who has bothered to read the book independently that it is talking about the light bomber of the remarkable aircraft designer Pavel Osipovich Sukhoi, not the aircraft of the equally remarkable designer Nikolai Nikolaevich Polikarpov.

The confusion may have arisen just in case the ignorant debunkers of The Icebreaker were taking the information hearsay from the words of an equally ignorant curator.

I pointed out to Zakharov the obvious stupidity, but he found defenders. It turned out that Zakharov meant Su-2, that's what he had said on air. But the careless girls who printed the text after the broadcast and made it available to the public had made a mistake and written U-2.

The defenders had better not have said that. If that's all it was, then the situation gets even sillier. There is nothing funny in the Su-2 chapter. It appears that citizen Zakharov laughed for several minutes for no reason.

This is quite a dangerous symptom.

7

25 August 2008. On the air again is the magnificent team of strikers... Up comes E. "A listener asks - tell me one fact that can be considered indisputable, and another listener answers him - there is such a fact. Well, I understand that this is a mistake - on the occasion of the declaration of war...".

Zakharov does not object.

Here is a situation: the listener has given a really indisputable historical fact - Germany declared war on the Soviet Union. Everybody in our country - from the pioneer to the pensioner - really knows this.

At this, the Echo of Moscow radio station, in the voice of its best historian of the Third Reich, Elena Sayanova, declares to the whole world: the listener is wrong, he has uttered nonsense without thinking: Germany did not declare war on the Soviet Union...

We don't to be historians know the facts.

On June 22, 1941 at 4 a.m. the Imperial Minister of Foreign Affairs J. von Ribbentrop summoned the Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, the USSR Ambassador to V. Г. Dekanozov, and handed him a memorandum setting out the reasons for Germany's attack on the USSR.

In addition to the "Note from the German Foreign Office to the Soviet Government", three annexes were handed over:

"Report of the Minister of the Interior of Germany, the Reichsführer of the SS and the Chief of the German Police to the German Government on the subversive work of the USSR against Germany and National Socialism".

"Report of the German Foreign Office on the Propaganda and Political Agitation of the Soviet Government".

"Report of the High Command of the German Army to the German Government on the Concentration of Soviet Troops against Germany".

The handing over of this set of documents constituted a declaration of war.

At the same moment in Moscow, the German Ambassador to the USSR, Count F. von der Schulenburg, requested an immediate meeting with the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, V. M. Molotov and handed him the same memorandum and accompanying documents.

In other words, war was declared on the Soviet Union simultaneously through two channels.

But if the Echo denouncers do not know this, I recommend them to read the writings of the leading Soviet specialist on the history of World War II: "Schulenburg told the Soviet government that Germany declared war on the Soviet Union in connection with the concentration of the Red Army near the eastern German border" *(Deborin, G. A. "The Second World War". M., Voenizdat, 1958, p. 124)*.

This was stated 50 years ago. To appreciate this sentence alone, we must remember what Deborin was like and what heights he occupied in Soviet science. Here is contained not only the admission that war had been declared, but the reason is named. Because of these revelations, Academician Deborin was not only not dismissed to the rank of private, was appointed head of the author collective of the first volume of the official "History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union. 1941-1945".

Here's more: "The German ambassador in Moscow, von Schulenburg, has submitted a declaration to the Soviet government about Germany's entry into war with the Soviet Union" *(Telpukhovsky, B. S. "The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union. 1941-1945". M., State Publishing House of Political Literature, 1959, p. 33)*.

To appreciate this, we need to remember what Lieutenant General Telpukhovsky was like in Soviet military history scholarship.

If that's not , I recommend G's memoirs. K. Zhukov. During the war Stalin was Supreme Commander, Zhukov was his only deputy. Stalin did not write a memoir. That is why Zhukov was the most senior witness to what was going on in the senior military leadership of the country during the war.

Zhukov's memoirs have been published many times and translated into dozens of languages. The circulation is in millions. The memoirs contain startling revelations. For example:

"Into the office quickly entered V. M. Molotov:

- The German government has declared war on us.

Й. В. Stalin relaxed in his chair and thought deeply" *(Zhukov, G. K. "Memories and Reflections". M., APN, 1969, p. 248)*.

This was published 40 ago. The memoirs have since been republished again and again.

Since then, the idea that war had been declared has been repeated regularly in the pages of the official press. Here's the latest example: 'Neither Stalin nor Molotov doubted anymore that war had been declared on us. Moreover, the German ambassador Schulenburg had already early in the morning officially conveyed the relevant declaration" *("Krasnaya Zvezda". 25 June - 1 July 2008)*.

For 50 years at the highest official level the simple thought has been repeated: war has been declared.

I wonder if my fierce detractors have bothered to read Zhukov's memoirs, the works of the coryphaeans of Soviet military thought? Do they read newspapers? Or is the same unshakable principle of Soviet propaganda at work here too: I haven't read it, but I'll say?

* * *

What does quack mean?

Scientific definition: a lay person who holds himself out as a specialist. Here is an example: eminent historians of the Second World War do not know that on 22 June 1941 Ribbentrop handed over the documents declaring war to Dekanozov and Schulenburg to Molotov, they have not read the official Soviet historians of the highest rank, as well as Zhukov's memoirs, they have not read either the Military Historical Journal or Krasnaya Zvezda, they have no idea of the existence of the great aviation designer P. O. Sukhoi and of his Su-index aircraft. They express strong opinions about books they have not read, and on top of that they are proud of it.

Going on air on a show about the war with that level knowledge... That's only possible in our great country.

I don't any other country like that.

CHAPTER 27
BUT WHERE ARE THE SPECIALISTS?

How can one ignore the fact that the "Barbarossa Plan", the plan to attack the Soviet Union, was drawn up in January 1940, a year and a half before the war began. In this plan, as I have already pointed out, Hitler personally wrote down that the aim of the war would be the physical destruction of almost the entire population of Russia.

M. Krol

"Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 5 August 1994

1

The deniers hide another trump card in a secret pocket: all this Renzun-Suvorov's theories work only on ignorant people. He is powerful until he has met a real serious historian on his way. Even a middle-of-the-road specialist will easily smash this icebreaker firebrand with all his theories. But it may not become necessary to smash him. Clearly, the coward Suvorov will try to avoid a fight with a real expert, and that is what will be the victory over his pseudo-historical tales.

The newspaper with the holy name "Pravda" was the first to express this salutary thought on February 18, 1993: "Rezun-Suvorov understands perfectly well that he could not sustain a serious polemic with specialists."

Lesson: pay no attention to his writings - on the horizon will appear a specialist on a white boat and will plunge "Icebreaker" with its very first torpedo.

And a roar went up over the country: as soon as a specialist appeared... But no specialist appeared.

And among the united ranks of concerned citizens there was a puzzled murmur: but where are the specialists? Why are they silent?

Many luminaries of thought, including the famous writer, Hero of the Soviet Union V. B. Karpov:

"- The reading public was even more shocked by V. Renzun (Suvorov), which sold out in insane numbers all over Russia on the eve of the Victory anniversary. It is extremely strange that none of the writers and historians seriously criticized the writings of the traitor from GR W[1].

- Well, nobody wants to deal with this garbage," the writer replied angrily. He is not a writer either. He is a petty politician, and a very dirty one at that. Having been a pawn in the GRU, he fled to the West and couldn't even sell any of our secrets - he just didn't them. That's why he started making up

nasty things to please the 'slanderers of Russia'" *("Knizhne Obozrenie", 9 May 1995)*.

My detractors are running from a fight by maneuvering in two moves.

The first move: suggesting to the nation that The Icebreaker was written specifically for illiterate and ignorant people, but could in no way stand a duel with serious historians. Serious historians would make a fool of him.

And to the question why the serious ones have not done it yet, the answer follows: well, because they don't want to get their hands dirty with this garbage.

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[1] Full : Main Intelligence Department of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces. ↥

2

Citizen Karpov somehow did not take into account that the journalists' question was a pebble in his garden. For the authorities once appointed Comrade Karpov to the post of Soviet writer, allotted him a plot on the ideological front - to glorify Zhukov's greatness, to thunder the falsifiers of our heroic history. For special merits Comrade Karpov was placed in the position of cop above all writers in the USSR. He was in the nomenklatura of the Politburo, occupied key positions in the system of rousing the people, directed the tumultuous financial flows allocated by the authorities to conduct offensive operations in the ideological war. Karpov had access to all kinds of archives, and he received substantial benefits for his work.

The journalists' question, if we take off the diplomatic camouflage, was: but where, citizen-composer, are the results of your work? Why don't you threaten the various Resunovites? Where is your answer to Chamberlain? A reproach was hurled in Karpov's face at all the engineers of the human soul: why have you thus silenced yourselves, citizen-writers? And if Karpov can't break aboard the icebreaker himself, let him assemble a group of experts. Because we are terribly fond of many-headed, Dragon Goryanin-like committees and commissions. And the authorities will spare no expense for such an undertaking.

But the Light of Thought Karpov made a bold move: no one, see, wants to get their dirty. Who knows why, Karpov talked about "someone." And why didn't he say about himself? If you think that some scoundrel has encroached on your most sacred and holy, why don't you stand up in defense of your dishonored honor? And don't tell me you don't want to get your hands dirty. The adversary is always loathsome and vile. Your duty as a fighter is to crush the accursed monster, to destroy it, to burn it. And the more hideous that monster is, the more honors there will be for you, the greater will be your merit.

I don't want to get my hands dirty, so I refuse to fight - it's a coward's philosophy.

3

But still attempts were made to lure me into the Strait of Tsushima and to drown there. At the end of 1997, on the initiative of the Foreign Intelligence Service (maiden name - the First Main Directorate of the KGB of the USSR), a Moscow-London TV bridge was organized. I was in London, and in Moscow - groups of experts and serious historians. The commander of the serious was Major-General Yuri Kaboladze. At the disposal of the serious were all the resources of Russia - financial, intellectual, agency, archival and what not.

Besides, they had the main thing in their hands - the TV center with all its management, staff, secret horde of cops, informers and "volunteer helpers". The transmission was recorded. Everything was under their . And they seized the opportunity. They cut almost everything. They left their most insidious, most vicious questions, attacks, statements and remarks and my most neutral and toothless responses.

And yet...

"The television discussion, for a number of reasons, did not turn into a convincing refutation of the false concept of the traitor writer" *("Krasnaya Zvezda", December 16, 1997)*.

Aleksei Simonov, one of the fighters on the attacking side, admitted three years after the battle, "During the Moscow-London teleconference, military historians, writers, generals from the military and intelligence, and from the other - the author of the The "ice-breaker", the spy-substitute Rezun with the pseudonym Suvorov (...) We outwitted him, but did not defeat him. And this was not only my feeling. A lot of people watched the broadcast and this was the assessment of most" *("Krasnaya Zvezda", November 28, 2000)*.

The Kiev court newspaper Fakty (*1998, No. 10)* expressed surprise that my opponents had failed to sink me. To which the KGB colonel Igor Prelin replied, "Such happened to the opponents."

The KGB colonel, as was customary in their office, tilted the picture in the direction he needed. If we are to believe him, this is how things stood: my opponents in this battle were a bunch of random passers-by from the street. They all happened to be some kind of jerks. However, if real experts were brought out...

Citizen Colonel, I didn't "make" my opponents happen. The GB leadership put their national team against me. It was a tightly knit bunch of kagebist generals and colonels and their learned minions, handpicked from the highest level, crowned with lavish titles of doctors and academicians. The group was headed by the most loquacious general of the GB, and at his right hand sat the president of the Association of Historians of the Second World War, the head of the department of the history of war and geopolitics at the Institute of Universal History of the Russian Academy of Sciences, a doctor of historical sciences, a professor, etc., etc. The rest of the gaggle were worthy of their leaders. And if this was not the cream of GB and the Academy of Sciences, do not justify yourself with talk that some cowards were accidentally presented, but hold the high leadership responsible: why do they leave incapable and unworthy people in positions of responsibility?

Vadim Sopryakov, the former commander of the KGB's Kaskad sabotage squad, shared his impression of what he saw: 'In early 1998, one of the Russian TV programmes broadcast a strange show - the London-Moscow telebridge. At one end of this bridge was located a group of our citizens, united by the program
"National Interest". At the other end - in London - the mediocre traitor to the Motherland Rhesus (...) And this traitor was well prepared for the conversation. The English masters of this Judas are eating their well-deserved bread and butter. Our country, to our great regret, was simply not ready for an open and frank conversation with the traitor to the Motherland" *(Sopryakov. "Vostok - дело топкое". M., Sovremennik, 1999, pp. 200-201)*.

The saboteur Sopryakov has the military rank of captain 1st rank.
He is a sailor.

The wicked Lubyanka flunky has also distorted the picture. I will repeat again: what Sopryakov modestly called "a group of our citizens", in fact not was a group of idlers from the

Square, but a cohesive command of generals from the Lubyanka department and from the howling academic military-historical elite of Russia. Only army general Gareyev was missing from it. I had previously trained him to argue with me in front of a television camera. He avoided duels.

And everyone else is the real stinker. And the program was prepared on their , according to their scripts, it was prepared from afar with the help of all the means available at that time to the Russian state and its faithful guards from Lubyanka and Yasenevo. And I was invited at the last moment. I was not given any time to prepare.

But I had been preparing for this show my whole .

They aired the ruthlessly truncated show in late 1997. After the scandal erupted, they cut it once more and now shamelessly broadcast it at the beginning of 1998. So the sailor Sopryakov has seen only pitiful remains.

But if it had ...

4

They had to pick through the scandalous mess. And there was the old tried and tested excuse: "But why," the participants in the TV discussion asked themselves, "don't our historians denounce it? I think that serious scholars just don't want to go down to the level of his books and speculations - there are too many superficial, obviously unsubstantiated things in them" *("Krasnaya Zvezda", December 3, 1997)*.

There you see how simple it is. The leadership of GB initiates a brawl. At the head of the gang of bouncers was placed the head of the press office of the SVR[1], Maj. Gen. Kaboladze and his accomplices, the highest Russian authorities in the field of military history, even the president of the Association of Historians of the Second World War himself, Rzheshevsky. But they decided not to beat me.

To not go down to the ...

Fleetmaster Sopryakov's thought about the "English masters of this Judas" who had supposedly prepared me for the event is remarkable. If we unfold a Soviet hundred-ruble note against the light, we see Grandpa Lenin. Good, kind, affectionate. And if we unfold the statement of the sailor Sopryakov against the light, we see Grandpa Freud there snickering. All who know Sopryakov are of one opinion: he is neither able to speak nor to think independently. His speeches and orders were always prepared in advance; he read them from a piece of paper. That's why he thinks that all other people cannot live and act without someone telling them.

It is a pity that the citizen Sopryakov has not managed to draw logical conclusions from the obvious facts. And if someone at Lubyanka thinks that theoretically I have been nailed by the British intelligence, and there is no one to prepare the RAS academics and the GB generals for the defense of the Motherland, why don't they take spare British professionals to the process of raising the intellectual level of the senior leadership of the SVR, FSB[2], the Ministry of

Defense, the Academy of Sciences, and higher instances in the Russian Federation?

Russia is choking on money. There is so much that the leaders of Russia are forced to export it by the billions, by tens and hundreds of billions of dollars.

They export them to America. To protect Russia from inflation. Brilliant idea: drain all the Russian oil and gas to flood America with money. So let them see! That malignant America be bursting with our resources and money! And then - without the oil, without the gas and without the money - we will have a wonderful life. The bright future.

Well, why don't they allocate some other billion to recruit commands of reserve British intelligence officers to help the gobby generals and the too-wise impotent academics? Russian money exported to America will sink into a bottomless pit in the coming and inevitable American financial crisis.

If behind my back the vigilant Lubyanka sailors have spotted groups of British experts, why don't you impotent, competent citizens also build behind your backs, as a protection squad, such groups of smart Brits. Might pour you some wisdom.

Because so without prompting from behind your backs you rattle such nonsense that the masses of the people begin to show concern. It has come to the point of statements by some military men that the "Barbarossa Plan" was drawn up in January 1940 and that Hitler personally added to this purely military plan something which had no connection with it.

I wrote a whole book about the stupidity of Hitler and his entourage. Yet Hitler was not as dull-witted as he is portrayed by certain civilian scholar comrades.

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[1] Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian . - B.pr. ↥

[2] Federal Security Service - B.pr↥

5

The Major General of the GB, comrade Kaboladze, and other comrades, because they could not object anything of substance to my books, sank into a dark quagmire, proving that behind my back were groups of British specialists. This step proved suicidal for them. It is a pity that the fellow televangelists cut off my response to this.

Because you don't have to be very smart to infer from the general's statement that you can also hit him over the head with his own stick. If British specialists, without having access to the closed Soviet archives, are able to explain accessibly incomprehensible moments in the history of the war, and the generals of the GB and the academics of the RAS, having all the archives, can neither object nor give their own explanation, is it not time that these generals and academics were expelled from their high offices? Isn't it time to replace the illiterate Lubyanka profane with trained professionals capable of giving a decent answer to any fabrications?

And then the Ghebichar warlords, in the course of the televised battle, drew their last reserve: well, you're a traitor! Thou hast changed thy oath!

Honestly, I wasn't expecting that. They are supposedly smart people. On the face of it. They've all taken the oath themselves. They themselves have sworn to keep their allegiance to the Soviet government and the Soviet people until their last breath. They were all members not only of the Communist Party but also of the nomenklatura of the Central Committee of the CPSU. All of them were bragging from high platforms the nonsense that soon there would be a bright tomorrow in which everyone would live according to his needs.

But is it possible to satisfy the material needs of at least one GB informer? No matter how many billions you give him, he is still dissatisfied. No matter how many yachts and palaces you build him, he wants more.

The very comrades in charge who sat in front of the TV cameras in Moscow in Soviet times did not believe the fairy tales that

one day everyone will have everything according to their needs, but for decades they have harassed in prisons and shot in Lubyanka dungeons people who had the courage to express their doubts openly.

But when the time came, with arms in their hands, to defend this abomination, all those Kaboladze and Prelini, Anfilov, Gorkov and Gareyev, who had broken their oath, proved themselves traitors and traitors. They all betrayed the Soviet people and the Soviet Government.

Too bad my replies were cut off. It would have been good for the sailor Sopryakov to hear them. Perhaps then he would not have hurled accusations of treason at me. For Sopryakov himself is a pathetic coward and a sell-out traitor.

But the accusations of betrayal from the mouth of the traitor Vladimir Karpov sound especially spicy. The luminary of thought has shown himself to be a coward not only on the ideological front. He also ran away from the real struggle. The Soviet Union, to which Karpov had sworn allegiance but found no need to defend, was crumbling. He ran away. He deserted the front.

Now he almost seriously states that in a sense we should consider him a "hero" of the Soviet Union. No, dear comrade, a Hero of the Soviet Union is one who is not afraid to stand up in defence of that Soviet Union. And where was your heroism in 1991, sir?

Among my opponents, the number of so-called "heroes" is quite large. And I will ask: you all count yourselves among the "heroes" of the Soviet Union, but where is your Soviet Union? Well, that you have flushed it with vouchers.

Some of my adversaries continue to sign themselves with loud titles: I am Marshal of the Soviet Union. They continue to appear on ceremonial occasions in parade uniforms with the coat of arms of the USSR on their shoulders. Of which Union are they marshals and heroes? The one that is gone. The one in whose defence they did not dare to shout.

In my opinion, only those who did not live to see 1991 can be considered marshals and heroes of the Soviet Union. The rest are former heroes of the former Union, for which they lacked the courage to defend it.

And don't call me a traitor. You are such. The difference is that I left the Soviet Union first, realizing what I was doing, and you, Lubyanka strategists and sailors, rushed after me out of the same Union without even realizing that you were betraying the ideals you had sworn to serve until your last breath. I am an icebreaker to you. I have blazed a path that you have all taken. И If my choice e crime, why you, Gentlemen Karpov-Sopryakovs, rushed after me like a herd?

6

The years go by, and the idea of facing a seasoned professional is revived again and again.

My rebuttals from Echo of Moscow remembered it too. On July 21, 2008 E. "As for Suvorov, we should put him on live TV, give him a good opponent in the person of a solid, knowledgeable military historian. That would be the only productive conversation."

There was nothing left and nothing at all: to find the stable and knowledgeable one in question. And while they seek him, we will puzzle with question the citizens

Zakharov-Sjanov: well, what you? For several years now you have been tweeting on air about the war, about its various aspects. Like cuckoos and roosters you praise each other's merits. According to you, you are experts in military history, you not only talk about the war, but on your own, without reading my books, on the basis of a deep study of open Soviet sources, you have come to the conclusion that Stalin was preparing an attack on Germany. What do you need a sound and knowledgeable historian for? Are you not a chilavian illiterate?

And your work will not be difficult. You yourself have suggested to radio listeners that my system of argumentation is rather weak and tendentious, that my books blatantly mix truth and fiction. You were saying that there is a type of historian who draws up a scheme and then starts to put facts into it and accepts those facts that fit it and simply rejects those that don't. And my books - in your words - are the most brilliant possible example of such a hallucination.

Well, it's not clear to me: if you are so smart and I am so bad, why did you need another bystander to help you? Can't you handle yourself? Don't you also need to have a group of experts behind you instead of a foreign Chekist squad?

7

Gambling in the game dizzying, clouds the mind. And sometimes one can do a lot of stupid things.

"Echo of , 21 July 2008.

E. Soyanova states that if I am invited to a show, I will naturally be scared and will not go.

But it is not. My interest is to get rid of epigones. Very unpleasant creatures, you will know. To that end, I would not miss a single opportunity. And what could be better than a live broadcast? From all the above, I hope, it follows clearly enough that I have a way of ignoring the too literate researchers of the
"Echoes of Moscow". Moreover, they themselves have not made much effort to enter the fray. They intend to enter the fray from behind the back of someone steady and knowledgeable.

I've gone on air dozens and even hundreds of times on many different radio stations: Russian, Ukrainian, British, American, Polish, Bulgarian, Italian, Israeli, Czech, German, and the BBC is like my home. I have never refused anyone. I have never taken part in Zakharov's or Sojanova's programmes. Only because nobody has invited me to them.

And you, Citizen Sojanova, scare me. But not much. Don't scare me, dear. I've been frightened by far scarier people.

I once got into a live confrontation with the most important chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. He didn't dare contradict my figures and facts, because he knew I would smash him. Instead, he emphasized my moral character, the misdeeds I had committed. And then I cut him off with a question: and what had the Citizen General personally done for the collapse and disintegration of the Soviet Union?

Oh, how the chief raged. Oh, how he burst out, "Well, I...! Well, we...! Officer's honor! The oath!

Then I reassured him with a second question: the citizen chief did nothing about the collapse of the Soviet Union... Well about

saving him?

And the commander gossiped. Then I expressed my respect to him: thou art a tulip, I said to him.

In a hole in the ice.

The multi-star general, like thousands of his colleagues, did nothing to either bring about the collapse or save the regime that was leading the country and its people towards a precipice. He was willing to anyone. Whoever would win. This is the camp morality of the demoralized: he who is stronger is right. This strategist was waiting to side with whoever would take the upper hand. He has been waiting to see where the mudslingers will take him.

He was swinging like a flower between the ice.

Many people have heard my assessment of the general's wisdom. And the great chief instantly toppled from his post so high.

I had not expected or foreseen such an outcome. But the chief was looking for it himself.

So if fate meets me and you, Citizen Sojanova, I would do my best to knock you out.

* * *

What I don't understand is this. The Echo of Moscow discoverers have independently concluded that Stalin was preparing an attack on Germany. They also provided evidence. And I came to exactly the same conclusion. True, forty years earlier and almost a quarter of a century ago I began to publish my evidence. Why then should you refute me? Why should you put a stable and knowledgeable person opposite me?

What is your interest? If this steady and knowledgeable man refutes me, my place as discoverer will be vacated for you. But why should you kick and stomp me?

Is it only the jealousy of epigones that guides your actions?

CHAPTER 28
AND THEN WHERE IS THE OFFICIAL STORY?

Putting off "for later" the analysis of the actual causes and results of World War II allowed our government, with the resources of working people, to engage in dozens of conflicts, hostilities, and plots against legitimate leaders in various regions of the world during the period 1946-1990, including China, Korea, Laos, Cuba, Vietnam, Cambodia, Somalia, Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, South Yemen, Nicaragua, Grenada, and Afghanistan. Inside the country, unrest was suppressed in Novocherkassk, Baku, Tbilisi, Vilnius, resettlement of "unreliable" peoples from the Caucasus, of Germans from the Volga region, of Kalmyks and Tatars was carried out, unrest of workers from Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, the GDR was drenched in blood. And all in the name of fraternal internationalism.

A. B. Baraboshin

"Victory that became defeat. The USSR in the Second World War". Vologda, 2004, p. 5

1

While Stalin was alive, the history of the war was replaced by his public appearances.

On July 3, 1941, Stalin addressed the people by radio with the call to defeat the enemy. That very day the speech was published in a multi-million circulation.

On November 6, 1941, Stalin spoke at a solemn assembly at the Mayakovskaya metro station. These two short speeches were combined in a tiny booklet and republished in a huge print run, and repeatedly. In 1942 these two speeches were reprinted 13 times in Russian and 28 times in other languages.

Stalin spoke in public very rarely, he spoke little and about the simplest things. After each new speech, the book was supplemented and immediately republished. It was called "On the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union."

The content of the book is quite simple: 'During the 4 months of the war we lost 350,000 killed and 378 , and the wounded numbered 1 million and 20 thousand. During the same period the enemy lost over 4 1/2 million killed, wounded and captured...".

This is from Stalin's speech on November 6, .

Further - in the same spirit: we must be brave! We must destroy the enemy! We must take example from our great ancestors! We must master the art of war! We must defeat the enemy on land, at sea and in the air!

And the conclusion of the book is: yay! We won!

This book is studied in all military academies and schools, in all schools, institutes and universities. The contents of this book have been retold in the pages of newspapers, magazines, and scientific works.

But Stalin is dead. Or they helped him to die. And the descendants of the great leader and teacher are astonished to discover that he was the greatest criminal of all time. Earlier they had not

knew it. The thousands of monuments and the millions of portraits of Stalin were taken down and destroyed. The genius creations of the Leader were seized from libraries and burned.

And then it was realized that a spectacular war had ended, which had taken millions of lives uncounted by anyone from the peoples of the Soviet Union, had caused unheard of destruction and suffering, but only one book had been published about this war, and it too should be urgently seized and immediately destroyed. There was a war, but not a history of the war.

They urgently began to make up history during the Khrushchev-Zhukov dynasty. After the overthrow of Zhukov they interrupted the work.

Then they made up an official story on Khrushchev's orders. But after the overthrow of Khrushchev it became shameful to show it to foreigners as well as to their own people.

They made up another official story at Brezhnev's behest. But it too could only be considered decent while Brezhnev was alive.

An attempt to write a new official history was undertaken under Gorbachev. He personally announced, "It must be an honest, manly, engaging book, revealing the heroic path of the country and the Party in all its greatness - the path of the pioneers. A book that does not bypass the drama of events and human destinies, in which there are no white pages, no subjectivist preferences and antipathies, and whose value does not depend on conjunctural considerations" *("Krasnaya Zvezda", 1 December 1987)*.

At the head of the Main Editorial Committee was placed the candidate-member of the Politburo, the Minister of Defense of the USSR Army General D. T. Yazov, who soon after received the rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union. The Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Institute of History under the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, the Institute of Universal History under the Academy of Sciences of the USSR were involved in writing the work. In addition - military leaders, scientists-historians, representatives of the All-Union Council of War and Labor Veterans, etc., etc.

At Gorbachev's request, unlimited funds have been set aside for the creation of an official history of the war on the : as much as we need, so much we will give. Otherwise is disgraceful: the great country is

experienced a war that is ordered to be called great, but this country is unable to compose a history of the war.

It is clear that this time too, huge amounts of people's money have been spent and no result has been obtained. Round zero.

2

In 1991 it was exactly half a century since the moment of the German attack and the magazine "Rodina" *(1991, № 6-7, p. 90)* asked one of the leading historians of the Soviet Union, Lt. Gen. Г. Pavlenko. Your attitude to this undertaking?"

To this the general replies, without thinking, "An absolutely unreal undertaking."

This answer just broke me. I couldn't come to my senses for a few days. There are countless herds of military historians in Moscow, festooned with general's uniforms, decorated with state awards, awarded with thunderous ranks and titles. These are not groups of experts, but whole hordes. Under them are grandiose scientific institutes and simply titanic amounts of archival material. They have bottomless budgets at their disposal. In this country, no expense has ever been spared in educating the masses.

Scholarly men have been unsuccessfully remaking the history of war for more than half a century. leaders, including up to members of the Politburo, have been enlisted to compile this history. Thousands of generals and admirals, an incredible number of historians have labored at this level, but they have all failed to compose anything, and have now come to the conclusion that it is impossible to write a history of the Great Patriotic War at all! In any terms. The undertaking was absolutely unreal.

But what comes out then, citizens?

Some nonsense comes out.

It's a task of wits: there has been war, casualties, participants and witnesses number in the hundreds of millions, losses and destruction are unheard of, documents are thousands of tons, researchers studying the war are lush herds, the budget is unlimited, the time to work - 10, 20, 25, 50, 60... years. But to write the history of this war is impossible. Basically.

What follows from this?

If I'm wrong, I accept objections.

But I think it follows that the war that the scholarly comrades are trying to portray without a shred of success simply never happened.

There was a war, of course. But they make up a completely different story that has nothing to do with this war. That is why serious historians can do nothing. And they won't.

3

But they are .

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, another attempt was made to formulate the official view of the history of the war. A four-volume work was published, The Great Patriotic War 1941-1945. Военно- Исторические очерки" *(M., Nauka, 1998- 1999)*.

Again, a huge team worked on the four-volume work: the Institute of Military History under the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, the History Department under the Russian Academy of Sciences, various chiefs, including the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Army Gen. B. Kvashnin...

The great and very serious chiefs of historical scholarship have called their creation "essays." For they understood from the beginning that no concept binds this work into a unified structure. Something like this: fragments, scraps, debris, flakes, bits, and pieces.

Instead of the recreated dinosaur skeleton, we were presented with four chests of bones from an unknown beast, without bothering to clean the finds of clay, mud and fossilized excrement. The stamp of haste, superficiality, temporariness, carelessness and fear lest even one of the many myths of communist historiography should be shaken lies over the whole "study".

This "study" was an attempt to write at least something after the failure of the ten-volume undertaking, work on which was to have been completed in 1995 on the 50th anniversary of the defeat of Germany. It didn't. Then it was at the request of the workers that they wrote a four-volume book to mark the 55th anniversary. But because of fear, because of state ideological censorship and internal self-censorship, because of communist prejudices and shortened deadlines for the submission of the work, many historical issues causing disagreements in the large author collective were simply "dropped."

The reason for yet another failure is the same: a complete lack of scientific approach. Our serious historians simply do not master the methodology of scientific research. First of all, one should study the phenomenon, and only then give it a name. And in all their attempts they repeat the same mistake: at first they declare in the title of the work that the war was great, that it was patriotic, that it began in 1941.

By announcing all this in the headline, the learned companions are then forced to adjust the facts to fit the proclaimed concept. So does the second-year double-jockey who has peeked into someone else's checkbook and seen the answer to the problem, and adjusts the solution to the finished answer.

That is why nothing can and will come out of these efforts.

But why do serious historians behave so strangely?

Well, because in case the archives are opened, if they are studied and analyzed by real specialists, it may turn out like anything that the war was conceived by the Kremlin leaders not for the protection of the homeland, but for world domination, for spreading their power across the globe, as it is represented on the state coat of arms of the USSR. A closer look might reveal that this war did not start in 1941 at all...

4

The head of state, after seeing these wanderings, in 2003 ordered an end to the outrages and an official history to be made.

It's been 5 years...

And it was understood: citizens serious historians have not yet begun...

Says Academy of Military Science President Army Gen. A. Gareev: "Five years ago Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin blessed this work, setting the task to the government, to the Ministry of Finance, to our department. In general, he did everything in his own style. To our shame, then all sorts of delays and discrepancies started" *("Krasnaya Zvezda", 23-29 July 2008)*.

For : ten years ago, the Moscow regional branch of the Academy of Military Sciences alone numbered 257 PhDs and 436 candidates of science *("Krasnaya Zvezda", January 10, 1998)*. Hem this is just one regional branch of just one academy. In recent years it has proliferated even more. Reports the irreplaceable president of the Academy of Military Sciences, Army Gen. Gareyev: "At present there are 665 full members, 312 corresponding members, 29 honorary members and 1395 professors in the AVN" *("Krasnaya Zvezda", December 24-30, 2008)*.

If you ask me, an actual member of the Academy is Sergei Pavlovich Korolyov, the chief designer of the rocket that put the first artificial satellite into Earth orbit. Academician Korolyov was the chief designer of the rocket that made the first ever human space flight.

If you ask me, an actual member of the Academy is Igor Vasilievich Kurchatov, under whose leadership the cyclotron was in 1944 and the first atomic reactor in Europe in 1946. Under his leadership in 1949 the atomic bomb was created, in 1953 - the world's first thermonuclear bomb. In 1954

Under his leadership, the world's first industrial nuclear power plant was built. Under Academician Kurchatov's leadership, work began on the most powerful bomb of all time. It became the famous "Kuzkina ma t"[1], recorded in all record books.

And here it turns out that today there are 665 active members in the Academy of Military Science alone! Again, we are first on the planet! I want to believe that all the full members have received their titles for spectacular deeds, which are in no way inferior to the achievements of Korolyov and Kurchatov.

In the years when Tupolev and Sukhoi, Korolyov and Kurchatov, Dukhov and Grushin were creating, the academicians were counted on fingers, and now only in the AVN the actual members are enough to complete two motorized rifle battalions and one tank company. That left even for one motorized rifle battalion. Honorary members are enough for two reinforced tank platoons. And professors - as much as for a whole motorized rifle regiment.

Hem it's only in one academy.

And has anyone counted how many different academies have sprung up in Moscow alone? Absolutely unlimited funds are spent on their maintenance. It is interesting that the head of all military scientists does not complain about lack of money. On the contrary - he emphasizes that the head of state has given appropriate instructions to both the government and the Ministry of Finance...

Five years have passed. But during these five years the work has not moved. Absolutely nothing was done. And here Academician A. O. "This year the president signed a decree on the preparation of a new ten-volume work on the history of the Great Patriotic War" *("Krasnaya Zvezda", September 24-30, 2008)*.

Well, now, it is known, the work will proceed!

It's just not clear what happened to the previous injunction from 2003. Why was it not implemented? Who is to blame? Where did the people's money go? Who bore the penalty for the waste and what exactly?

The wall-pressed master of all serious historians, army general Gareyev, announces: well, now the work is boiling.

It's a familiar picture: a brigade of hustlers are groped for playing cards, and all of a sudden they rush to imitate the seething activity. The five-year scientific break for on cigarette is interrupted and Gareev reports:
"The work has progressed. But I think it will be obstructed by people who do not like the truth about the war" *("Krasnaya Zvezda", 23-29 July 2008)*.

In Russia, when such statements are made, we usually think of some t antzer[2].

* * *

Our serious historians have been hindered by something for 60 years.

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[1] The crudely prosaic expression "Pokaż kuзькину мать" means in general: "To let someone know", "To make someone into a mate and a masquerade", and "Узнать кузькину мать" - "To see stars in the middle of the day", etc. - B.pr. ↥

[2] An allusion to the Russian proverb "A bad dancer has the floor in his way." ↥

CHAPTER 29
BE KEPT FOREVER!

We have never lived otherwise. Either we have been at war or we have been preparing for war. We simply have no other experience.

Svetlana Alexievich

"Moskovskie Novosti, 30 April - 7 May 1995

1

Here's another reason the Icebreaker hasn't yet.

The President of the Association of Historians of the Second World War, the head of the Department of the History of Wars and Geopolitics at the Institute of Universal History of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Doctor of Historical Sciences Professor Oleg Aleksandrovich Rzheshevsky, explained clearly and understandably, "Dismissed as untenable by most Russian and Western historians, this version nevertheless sprouted on home soil primarily due to the fact that the mass media do not actually give us the opportunity to counter it with the available reliable documents and fact.

Here are the culprits! It turns out that serious historians had both documents and facts, only that the press, radio, and television in Russia were under foreign rule. Apparently British intelligence bought up all the newspapers, radio and TV channels and did not give the serious ones the opportunity to present the correct version to the public. If they had been given the opportunity, the serious ones would have explained how things stood long ago.

It has been 7 years since the day of that statement, a lot of water has flowed and a lot has changed. The press, radio, television in Russia are now in the right hands. And again a question to Rzeshevsky: well, where is your response to the slanderers, pseudo-historians and forgers? Where are the promised facts and documents?

Rzheshevsky, however, and he is not yesterday: well, that they are secret!

On April 22, 2008, the FSB Cultural Center hosted a roundtable discussion on "The Problems of Publishing Sources on the Great Patriotic War. A critique of attempts to falsify history". They gave the floor to Rrzeshevsky and he stated, "Some documents will remain inaccessible for centuries if they are state or personal secrets."

This is stated by a man who, through an oversight, is numbered among the glorious tribe of historians.

2

In all normal countries, the historian's job is to reveal secrets. And in our wonderful homeland, the job of the Lubyanka historians of the FSB is to keep anyone away from the secrets of history.

The aspiration of every scientist is to make a discovery, that is, to open people's eyes to some event or phenomenon.

The ambition of the Lubyanka scientists, led by Rrzeshevsky, is to make a closure. For centuries.

The war was great, sacred, patriotic. This must be

believed without proof.

And the documentary evidence of these simple truths should not be shown to anyone for now. State secret. In 300, 500 or 700 years, as the president of the World War II Historians Association reports, some secrets may be revealed. And they may not be revealed.

In all times the high and proud rank of historian had to be earned by hard work. To me the ideal of the historian-researcher is the worker who has shut himself up in his little cubicle for many years, deciphered Egyptian hieroglyphics, and died at his desk from the terrible strain of sheer physical and nervous exhaustion.

And in our country they sell the rank of historian to people who crush and drown the overly curious and inquisitive people. With this rank they reward the watchdogs who hide their own history from the people.

The position of Academician A. O. "We cannot hope to find documents that would overturn our ideas about the war" *("Krasnaya Zvezda", 24-30 September 2008)*.

We should understand these words in this way: there is no point in delving into the archives, we won't be able to find anything new and interesting there anyway.

Messrs Chubaryansky-Rzeshevsky state that notions about the war can only be overturned if archival documents are produced... To which they intend to deny access for centuries.

But it is clear to any sane person that only traces of a crime are hidden so fiercely. A criminal is not only one who has committed the wrongdoing, but also one who has helped the wrongdoer to evade justice.

But even if there really is nothing interesting in these archives, the eternal keeping of some archival secrets is still a violation of Russia's laws. And then Chubaryan and Rzheshevsky are criminals.

3

Now try to think what are these military secrets that should not be revealed to anyone for centuries? I just can't imagine such secrets. We are talking about not a hundred, but several hundred years.

I cannot look into the future - not even into the next hour. What will happen a year from now - I don't dare to guess. Ahead is utter darkness.

Therefore, in order to appreciate the periods of time to which the president of the Association of Historians of the Second World refers, in order to compare the scales he has in mind, let us not peer into the future - which we will not be able to do anyway,

- and let's go back two hundred years.

Where will we end up? Right. Straight into the age of Bonaparte. And were ruled by Alexander I. Come on, tell me, do we now, in the 21st century, need to keep any secrets of Emperor Alexander at the state level? Well, he was doing his thing there, who cares about that now? Or maybe we should keep his military secrets? But which secrets? Where were his cavalrymen, hussars and grenadiers hiding in ambush? How many machine guns and guillotines had he prepared? How should a flintlock rifle be loaded? Or how many poods of gunpowder were piled up in the arsenals?

If we rewind history three hundred years, we will be right in the morning of the execution. Peter condemned someone to death, pardoned another. He made up some idiotic edicts, shaved his beard, drank vodka, put a light girl from the regimental stable on the throne. He incited sycophancy, slavery and denunciation. Peter's comrades by the cup ruined and plundered the country.

Something we know, something we guess, and something we will never know. But will anyone today think of keeping the secrets of bad Peter with all the might of the Russian state?

But if we look back four hundred years, there is complete darkness and deadness. Perhaps Boris Godunov killed the Tsar's son Dmitri.

He may or may not have killed him. Academic interest. There might be Mosfilm-Hollywood interest (if they give money). But why keep secrets if they are known to someone? That and to elevate that keeping to the rank of state policy?

And in our own country such a trend is evident: we will keep them for centuries!

Ah, how dirty and filthy these secrets must be, if the Russian state takes such (unheard of and unheard of anywhere) measures to protect them!

4

The history of the Soviet Union is a nuclear reactor blown up due to drunkenness. No use for it, just terrible damage to everything around. Doom for all. From bedbugs and cockroaches to human offspring. It shouldn't be allowed to grow like this. Never. It's dangerous approaching three goose-stepping flights. For the sake of preserving public tranquility around our history, a vigilant guard has been posted: Chubaryani, Rrzeshevsky, Kvitzinsky. And an innumerable host behind their backs.

So that's a story.

About military and diplomatic secrets - whatever, but why does our home country consider keeping someone's personal secrets for centuries?

So what are these secrets? I wake up at night, banging my head, and I can't think of a personal secret that needs to be guarded with the strength of an entire country.

What is her interest? And

what would that secret be?

Here, for example, Lenin was a traitor and a German spy. Okay, let's keep that a secret for a hundred years. But why should such a secret be kept for two hundred years? Or three hundred? And it is not a personal secret at all. If, during a terrible war, the head of a great country turned out to be a spy of an enemy state, it affects us all. And not just the citizens of that generation. It affects all those who follow. Keeping such a secret is not protecting the interests of the state, but treason, complicity in treason.

And we are told that Lenin was not a German spy. If so, this is again no personal secret. This must be known by all, because in his hands are the lives of tens and hundreds of citizens subject to him and the future of the country in which he carried out a coup d'état. Citizens have every right to know whether this syphilitic vagabond will be robust enough to rule an empire that has stretched from the taiga to the British seas.

But if Lenin was not a syphilitic, then there is no secret. Whose personal secrets, then, does the Russian state intend to keep forever? What rubbish do our academics grind with a dirty broom under a rotten carpet?

On December 16, 1997, a group of serious historians, led by Rrzeshevsky, published in Krasnaya Zvezda the passionate article "Does everyone need the truth?".

The answer to the question ten years later was given by Rrzeshevsky himself: as long as he lives, he will hide the truth from the people. Neither he nor the state needs it. And his followers will keep the truth forever.

5

"Russian society today needs a reliable scientific history of the Great Patriotic War. Without knowing the full historical truth, however bitter it may be, without understanding and learning the lessons of the past, the success of the transformation of our country is impossible." This was stated by First Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation Army Gen. Belousov *("Krasnaya Zvezda", October 20, 2005)*.

This thought is repeated again and again, by everyone and at all levels: 'But we need, we have the right to know how the tragedy of 22 June really happened, why, and also who was to blame and for what. Although it is the most bitter, the most unpleasant, but we have the right to know the whole truth! Because the 70th anniversary of the tragedy of 22 June is approaching, and it still hurts like an unhealed wound in the historical memory of society" *("Krasnaya Zvezda", 25 May - 1 June 2008)*.

It seems to me that no one is managing our generals and academics, no one is setting their general course, coordinating their plans and actions.

A statesman declares that a truthful history must be written, otherwise our country cannot expect any transformation and a bright future.

Another statesman declares that we have a right to know the truth about the war.

A third replies that the archives hold terrible secrets about the war, but these secrets will never (or at least in the next hundred years) be revealed to anyone. So you will see, citizens, neither a credible scientific history, nor a making sense of the past, and don't hope for learning the lessons either. So no bright future for you either. You have not earned it.

It is interesting that with such different opinions in the higher echelons of power, with such a plus and such a minus, with such a difference in potentials, no thunder rumbles and no lightning flashes.

Russia's first deputy defense minister has no disagreements with the president of the Association of World War II Historians. The multi-star general believes that a credible scientific history of the Great War must be compiled, reflecting the full historical truth, bitter as it may be, and is not outraged by statements that the secrets of the war will remain secret for centuries.

The learned comrades will one day make up some story, but they know and hide from no one that something is kept in the inaccessible hiding places that does not fit the official version and is contrary to it. If the official story, which the various Chubaryans and Rrzeshevskis threaten to push on us in the coming years, has been confirmed by archival documents, why do they plan to hide these documents for centuries?

They ask me: well, you make up books, but where is the evidence for your theories? Where is the document?

I answer: here is your document!

The country's secret police openly proclaimed their intention to guard the secrets of the Soviet Union forever, first and foremost, the secrets of World War II. This is documentary confirmation that in the 20th century our country had the most terrible, the most shameful regime in all of human history. The regime committed such atrocities as no one has ever committed. The regime has waged nothing but criminal wars so dirty that it is better not to know the details. At the head of the criminal regime have been the worst criminals. Their secrets are so terrible that it is better to hide these secrets from the whole world, forever.

6

And here's an example of what they're hiding there.

Everyone calls the 1938 negotiations between Germany, Italy, France and Britain the Munich Agreement or the Munich Betrayal. The Western democracies betrayed Czechoslovakia to Hitler and only the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics spoke out strongly and consistently against this dirty deal. The Soviet Government was ready to give every assistance, including military, to the Government and peoples of Czechoslovakia.

Everything is . But where are the documents?

Independent historian Mark Solonin decided to back up all this beautiful heroic history with references to archival documents.

The director of the Yauza publishing house, which publishes Solonin's books, approached the Russian Foreign Ministry with a request. And received, as Grandfather Shchukar used to express it, a fart.

There is no Soviet Union. There is no Czechoslovakia. Seventy years have passed since those events. What state secret of Russia can be the relationship between two long-defunct countries? Hem is not talking about war, but about the heroic attempts of the Soviet Union to preserve the freedom of Czechoslovakia, the peace of Europe and to prevent the Second World War.

If everything was clean and honest, why should the documents be hidden? And where are the legislative and law enforcement authorities of the state looking when it comes to such a blatant violation of current legislation by the Russian Foreign Minister and his subordinate office?

The official reply under the Russian State's coat of arms contains the justification for the refusal: 'Documents that may be of interest to the author have been published in a number of documentary collections'. And a list of six books is given, one of which was published after the collapse of the Soviet and five in

1971-1981, i.e. in the times of Comrade Brezhnev's rule, in the era called stagnation.

Among historian Solonin's recommended masterpieces of scholarly thought is History of the Second World War. 1939-1945, which presents the personal contribution of the political daredevil Brezhnev to the course and results of fighting and battles as a major event in the global confrontation.

No less famous is another creation offered to the researcher Solonin - "The USSR in the struggle for peace on the eve of the Second World War (September 1938 - August)". This scholarly work is a typical example of the work of the Agitation and Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU: a political slogan is put on the cover, then only those facts and documents that fit into the stated concept and support it are selected in tune with it.

Solonin asked if he could personally go through the cupboards. To which a decisive reply followed: eat what they give you! True, the answer was composed with diplomatic decorum. After all, the Foreign Office...

Most interestingly, the ministry's response contains the absolutely idiotic statement that "documents already published are not made available to users".

The meaning of this phrase is that most of the material has not yet been declassified and it is not known whether it will ever be disclosed. But Foreign Office officials have deigned to publish one or other of their choosing. No one, however, will be allowed to check the published material against the original.

Come on, explain to me: why is the topic "The USSR in the struggle for peace on the eve of World War II" secret?

The deception, and therefore the destruction of the peoples of Russia is being carried out in many directions. One of them is: depriving the people of their own history. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation is also involved in this.

7

On the military-historical front of the Russian state an emergency situation has arisen. Here, for a quarter of a century, the native authorities have been in hysterics: there are, you see, people who disagree with the official version of the war!

Thank God, there are ministries to solve all kinds of problems, all kinds of emergencies. One is called exactly that - the Ministry of Emergency Situations. Having exhausted all possibilities of defence, the native government decided to throw this force into the battle for historical truth. In early 2009, the minister of the Emergencies Ministry, with the rank of army general (though he never went to the barracks), proposed a radical solution: those who disagreed with the official Kremlin version of the war should be legislatively recognized as criminals and ruthlessly imprisoned. In short: a step away from the general historical line is considered an escape. The convoy fired without warning.

Admirable decision.

Too bad the country's fire chief didn't anticipate one small detail: there is no official version of the war in Russia. The state is incapable of composing a history of the war, declared to be great, sacred, liberating, patriotic, the most just in the history of mankind. The study of war is forbidden in Russia. For centuries to come the people will not be admitted to the secrets of war. And this has been officially and openly declared.

Calling the official version of the war, i.e., something that never existed and never will exist, to be defended in fire order is capitulation. It is an acknowledgement by the authorities of the sad fact that Russia's own ideological machine doesn't beat it for anything. The Kremlin leaders, ideologues and politicians have no arguments except arrests and jails. The ministers and generals themselves can't think of anything clever, all they can do is scare the people with terror and gag them with police batons.

* * *

The pretty girl does not hide her beauty. On the contrary, she shortens her skirt to show more charms. And she hides her syphilitic boils with a layer of powder.

Citizens serious scientists, generals, marshals, politicians, diplomats, ministers, are you not powdering our history with too thick a layer of powder?

CHAPTER 30
PORTRAIT OF AN ACADEMIC

The complicated thing is that the declassification process is moving extremely slowly in our country. It cannot be said that it is not going - it is going, but it is going so slowly and it is dragging on so much that it seems to me that it has become a serious state problem that requires a state solution as quickly as possible. This, by the way, even undermines the credibility of our research work.

A. O. Chubaryan, Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Director of the Institute of Universal History at the Russian Academy of Sciences

"Krasnaya Zvezda", 24-30 September 2008

1

Official Kremlin historians have no authority. They have made no discoveries in the last 70 years. No one disputes their opinions. But no one supports them either. No controversy arises around their writings. No one quotes them. Because no one has read their works. No one considers them experts. Their opinions don't excite or interest anyone.

And this is beginning to worry serious historians. But their fate is hard. Their main duty is to hide the crimes of the regime. On the other hand, they too would like to stand before the crowd not only in the guise of guards with bardons in front of a warehouse for secondary raw materials, but to shine before their contemporaries in the rays of scientific glory. And they timidly mutter that it is time to open the archives. They mumble quietly and caressingly, lest the authorities accidentally overhear them and take offence.

The archives need to be opened urgently, because until it knows its own history, the nation is rapidly and irreversibly turning into a herd of monkeys.

And the serious historians have another argument: the archives must be opened, or rather , otherwise nobody trusts them, the serious ones.

But nobody will ever believe the Kremlin's Chubaryanovs anyway. Because any sane person understands: these people are incapable of doing independent research. They are entirely dependent on power. The authorities will give them another batch of binders and the serious ones will be content with this dusty chamber. Although it is to everyone: the authorities will only allow them access to documents, the opening of which does not harm the ruling , does not cast a shadow on the previous generations of rulers.

In a word: official historians act within the framework set by the current government. A new authority will draw another circle, will set other barriers, and the Chubaryanovs will obediently dance only within that circle. It is not in their character to jump barriers.

A true historian is a scout of the past. As is proper for an intelligence officer, the historian must make it clear to himself: no one will reveal the safes to him. His job is either to break into those safes himself or to calculate what is contained in them.

The honest man is obliged to say to the authorities: lock up your criminal secrets with your giant catans, the true explorer needs only one bone to reconstruct the skeleton of the dinosaur. I'll do without your repositories. There are words in the inaccessible archives. And I see your deeds, acts, misdeeds. And the results of those misdeeds. There is enough information to ponder. I will content myself with it.

2

Watercolor painting: power hides the history of war. By breaking its own laws.

He who transgresses the law is a criminal. Vagabonding, to say the least.

What should be the relationship between the historian and the criminal power? There are no problems here: the historian and the criminal have no business together. But if the historian does not sever his relations with the criminals, he himself becomes a criminal and an accomplice to crime.

Imagine a witness in a court of law who hides what happened, who tells things that did not happen. Such a person is called a false witness. For his lies he receives abundant reward from the evildoers he thus defends.

But his actions are a sin of the soul and a transgression.

Now let's try to paint a psychological portrait of one Chubaryan, an academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences, director of the Institute of Universal History at the Russian Academy of Sciences. He is one of those who have been tasked by the authorities to compose a new version of the history of the Second World War. He is one of the deputy chairmen of the General Editorial Committee of the new ten- or twelve-volume nonsense.

The task is to come up with a new version that does not reveal the secrets. The powerful gang of the Chubaryanovites is obliged to invent such a version that no one learns what really happened and why.

Shouting "I obey!", Chubarian has rushed to carry out the order.

But if the authorities have decided not to disclose the truth about the war, if it is forbidden to tell the truth, if they have been hiding it for centuries, how does Academician Chubarian intend to fill ten or twelve volumes? If the truth falls away, what is left then?

But let me explain the role of the Russian Academy of Sciences in the crime being committed. The professional *groper*, i.e. the pickpocket

with high qualifications, works with a group of partners: *the screen makes a curtain*, i.e. covers the thief's hand with something from the eyes of strangers, the *spinner balms the client*, i.e. with talk or movements makes the victim take a comfortable position or posture for the thief, *the cleaner* instantly accepts the stolen *purse* from the thief, freeing him from the evidence, and *the petty-artists headline the shmatta*, i.e. attract the victim's attention to themselves.

These are terms that are forty years old. In 1967, on the 50th anniversary of the coup d'état, an amnesty was declared. The army was growing rapidly due to the sudden sharpening of friendship with brotherly China. The amnestied of the subject age were brought under the banners. I have met soldiers like Leosha Shchegolev, for example, who had served a sentence as a minor and were now lying down anew as adults, but their imprisonment was interrupted by the amnesty. In order to somehow manage this rabble, we commanders had to understand their language. Because they definitely did not understand and did not want to understand ours.

These terms are changing rapidly. I am sure that very different words and expressions are in use now. New ones will soon replace them.

But the principle action is inviolable.

Precisely according to these principles, the authorities with a gentle gesture take away from the people their own history, and the petty academic Chubarian-Rzheshevik gamenaria distract the attention of the people with their writings.

The authorities hide what it was, but then gaping chasms and moats appear in the story. The Chubaryanov-Rzheshevskis have a duty to fill in the gullies and chasms.

If the past and future writings of Chubarian and his ilk are confirmed by archival data, why not open the archives? But there's the thing, the content of the archives and the content of Chubaryan's fabrications diverge, and diverge cardinally. The government is ready to allocate huge funds so that the contents of the archives are not known to anyone. And the same authority is ready to allocate such huge funds to make Chubaryan's writings known to the whole world.

Now answer me what the composition of heroic ballads, which certainly contradict

of what is preserved in the archives, of what actually happened, of what the authorities intend to keep secret?

3

Let's try with some mental effort to reconcile whether there is a difference between Chubarian and the perjurer in court who lies at the behest of the mafia and defends murderers, sadists, crooks, rapists and racketeers.

There is a difference.

It is in the incommensurable scale of harm done.

As a result of the perjurer's lies, criminals will remain at large, continue to commit atrocities, and then dozens, hundreds, even thousands of people will die again.

And as a result of Chubarian's lies, the people of Russia and all the other former republics of the Soviet Union will never know the truth about the war. As a result of the criminal activities of the perjurer Chubaryan, of the various Rzheshevskis and Kvitzinskis, the peoples of the former Soviet Union are doomed to repeat the mistakes and crimes of the past.

The road Russia took in 1917 led to a precipice. Russia has long since collapsed into the Third World, its people are dying. And Chubaryan has been bribed by criminals. He has been given the task of preventing the nations from ending up on the path of suicidal stupidity.

By dumbing down the peoples, by stealing their history, by distorting it and not allowing millions to correct the mistakes and fallacies of the past, Chubaryan is destroying entire nations.

4

Of course, you've seen something like this in Hollywood movies, and maybe in real life: a horrible crime is committed, the furniture in a huge apartment is smashed, cabinets are overturned, shelves and curtains roll on the ground, dishes are broken, walls, furniture, mirrors are splattered with horrible blood stains. The crime has not been solved. The criminals have not been found. And here the police seal all doors and hang warnings: "Crime scene! No entry!"

When I see such a thing on the screen, I feel jealousy and envy: hey, people live their lives! In their home they have cut off a man's arms and legs, they have cut off his head. They've sealed up their home...

And my country is all sealed up. And all its history.

The country I was born and grew up in was called the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. This country is a place of terrible crime. The whole country is stained with horrible bloodstains, the history of this country, as the classic put it, is the history of a disease. And in my opinion, the history of this country is not only the history of a disease, but also a chain of terrible unsolved crimes.

Perhaps we should talk not even about an endless chain of crimes, but about one spectacular misdeed. The scene of the atrocity is sealed. And someone has set up a guard of many thousands of mercenaries in the person of all sorts of Rrzeshevskis and Karpovs, Isaevs and Kvitzinskis, Martirossianovs and Chubaryanovs, Prelini, Pereslegins and assorted Sopryakovs. They themselves do not investigate the crimes, but they do not let others to the scene of the crime.

The police in the Hollywood movie are unable to solve the crime and find the guilty. Someone has to come forward who will get to the truth. Until he has appeared, the crime scene is under guard. The guards are put in place lest someone accidentally or on purpose destroy the traces of the crime and the evidence.

And in our country, the security around the crime scene is put in place in order to prevent those who could reconstruct the true picture of what happened from getting to the evidence.

* * *

In order not to call the guards accomplices in crimes and perjurers before the court of history, they disguise themselves as associate professors and candidates, as generals and ministers, as doctors and academics.

CHAPTER 31 IS GOING TO BE A SERIOUS STRUGGLE

Our historians don't tell us anything crucial - they just vent. And then, absolutely inevitably, a logical nonsense arises, such as all our historical studies are filled with.

И. Solonevich

"The People's Monarchy." Minsk, Luchi Sofia, 1998, p. 253

1

Colonel Aleksandr Yuliyevich Bondarenko, a member of the editorial board of the Central Organ of the Ministry of Defense the Russian Federation, describes the situation in the native military-historical science: 'Our officials - those who should actually conduct not only counterpropaganda (to remember the old term), but also active offensive ideological work, are totally inactive. Already how many years ago the President of Russia decided to create a 10-volume history of the Great Patriotic War, but where is it, the history of our Victory? We need it like air! By the way, the Japanese - the representatives of the losing side - have long ago issued almost a hundred-volume history, where every platoon is described. And the many our historians their enough only again and again to
"expose" the notorious Rezun-Suvorov. But the number of "reza chits"[1] harvesting their crops from the unplanted "historical field" is only increasing" *("Krasnaya Zvezda", 19-25 March 2008)*.

Colonel Bondarenko, as is customary in our country, embellishes the situation a little. The serious ones, you see, had no other job than to expose all sorts of cutters. But the serious ones are not only incapable of making up an official story, they can't and won't run over the Rezun in question. Nothing new on the icebreaker front. So far, serious historians have come up with nothing more than insults and slanders.

And Colonel Bondarenko himself is preoccupied with the same thing that the officials he implicates are: kicking the notorious Rezun-Suvorov. Here is a sample: 'This version belongs to the specialists of the special operations department of the British intelligence Mi-6, and Rezun only
"voices"" *("Krasnaya Zvezda", April 10, 2001)*.

At the same time, the brave colonel, in his search for historical truth, has long ago found a convenient and beaten path, cut by someone among the ice. Here he is talking to the former first deputy foreign minister of the USSR, and today first deputy chairman of the

Committee on International Affairs of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation - Yuliy Aleksandrovich Kvitzinsky. The two interlocutors are unanimous. And they have come to the following:
"Stalin has succeeded by concluding the treaty to make Hitler start a war not against us, but against the West" *("Krasnaya Zvezda", 30 July - 5 August 2008)*.

Such a wise leader we had, Comrade Stalin: he concluded the pact that resulted in the outbreak of World War II, Hitler rushed to smash the West, and the Soviet Union stayed on the sidelines.

All this is . With this statement I fully agree.
In this sentence lies the main thought of "The Icebreaker".

But it is not everything. The next phrase beats it even more: 'When he made the treaty, he probably reckoned that Germany would get involved in a protracted war with the Anglo-French bloc - as in the First World War - and that would give us a sufficiently long peace. And then he could see the results and act as we needed. It didn't work out that way."

Here is expressed not only the basic thought of The Icebreaker, but also that of The Last Republic: through the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, Stalin had pushed Hitler towards war against Britain and France by staying on the sidelines and waiting for an opportune moment... But as a result, Comrade Stalin failed. It didn't work out for him. It was all in vain. A complete failure.

Alexander Yuliyevich and Yuli Alexandrovich, my books are nothing but "a big lie of a little man". This is how Kremlin officials judge them. But you are not little men. How big and truthful you are! You speak only the truth. The high and pure.

Well, I have a question: how much did British intelligence sneeze at your revelations?

And don't complain that the number of cutters is skyrocketing! You are purebred cutters yourselves! Without impurities. Welcome to our deck!

---

[1] Suvorov's real surname can be translated as
"cutter" - B.pr↥

2

Colonel Bondarenko always finds clever interlocutors who explain to all honest people the most complicated and incomprehensible aspects of the past war. If the question is put cleverly, an appropriate answer can be obtained. Bondarenko asks a question of Arsen Martirosyan, who has introduced himself to readers as a "research historian" who served all his life in the KGB. The question to him is about the reasons for the defeat of the Red Army in the summer of . Martirosyan gives an answer that stuns with originality and courage:

"Here they began to prepare the repulse of the aggression of Hitler's Germany, to put it in military language, by the method of carrying out strategic front-line offensive operations" *("Krasnaya Zvezda", May 25 - June 1, 2008)*.

Simply put, they were not preparing for defense. They were preparing for grand offensive operations.

Colonel Bondarenko does not object. He fully . So do I. That's what I keep trumpeting about. All my life I have been proving this so (now) obvious fact.

Everything is supposedly being out. Only...

Only on the same page the Lubyanka historian-researcher Martirosyan deals me a crushing blow: "I have every documentary reason to declare that what Rezun wrote is a vile lie. His whole conception is easily refuted by strictly documentary evidence (...) There was no trace in the USSR of any plans to attack anyone (...) What, whose other evidence do we need to throw the fabrications of an escaped traitor paid by British intelligence into the dustbin?".

Colonel Bondarenko agrees with this as well, "Yes, Rezun was writing lies."

3

Let's do the preliminary assessment.

Bondarenko is a representative of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation who expresses the official opinion of the military department.

Kwiwinski is a diplomat of the highest rank and a deputy of the State Duma, responsible for foreign state policy issues.

Martirosyan is a Chekist. There are no former Chekists, as everyone knows.

In their talks they came to the clear understanding that "by concluding the treaty Stalin had succeeded in making Hitler start a war in the West", i.e. by concluding the treaty Stalin had succeeded in causing a war in Europe between the three most powerful countries in Central and Western Europe - Britain, France and Germany. But a major war in Europe could not but turn into a world war. And it immediately became one. In simpler terms, by concluding the treaty, Stalin had succeeded in triggering the Second World War.

Bondarenko, Kvitzinsky, and Martirosyan also agree that Stalin was counting on a protracted war between Germany, Britain, and France and planned to exploit the results of that war.

At the same time, Krasnaya Zvezda and the rest of the official press, radio and television, and moreover, statesmen of the highest rank, have been proving for a quarter of a century that all these ideas are lies, slander, distortions of historical truth, ideological subversion against the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation.

Repeatedly, from the highest tribunes, the highest leaders of the state have stated that no former Soviet person is capable of drawing such conclusions on his own because of his natural dullness, inability to think and to read what is written in an open text in Russian. Only groups of British intelligence experts could do that. The ex-Soviet was only getting up to repeat foreign slanders, selling his soul for pounds sterling.

Only one conclusion can be drawn from these facts: the organs of state power in Russia - the State Duma, the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the FSB and the SVR - are so saturated with British agents that individual British spies such as Kvitzinsky, Martirosyan, Bondarenko, Zakharov, Sayanova and the like do not even consider it necessary to disguise themselves. These traitors openly preach the fabrications of ideological enemies and undermine the foundations of the Russian state. To this end, they use the state press, including the military press. Simply put, they use funds from Russia's military budget to undermine its power.

Gentlemen great chiefs, serious scientists, ideologues, you are faced with a choice.

Or admit you are English spies. Or agree that I'm

right.

4

The historian-researcher Martirosyan's assertion that "there was no memory in the USSR of any plans to attack anyone" is astonishing.

Colonel Bondarenko's agreement with such a bold statement is no less surprising.

This firm confidence in their own rightness betrays the sad fact that neither Martirosyan nor Bondarenko have a command of the material and that they are not interested in the war at all.

A full text of the plan for the attack on Finland, for example, not only existed but was openly published in the collection 1941 *(M., Democracy, 1998. Book One, pp. 418-423)*.

On November 25, 1940, the People's Commissar for Defense of the USSR, Marshal of the Soviet Union S. K. Timoshenko, and the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, Army Gen. A. Meretskov, sent a directive to the headquarters of the Leningrad Military District. The document was executed in one copy. It is classified "OV", i.e. top secret of special importance.

The plan was tentatively named "C.3-20".

The plan was to be put into action upon receipt of an encrypted telegram with the following content: 'Proceed with execution of C.3-20'.

There is no suggestion in this plan that hostilities should be launched in response to an enemy attack. Here everything is simpler: at any moment an encrypted telegram will arrive from Moscow at the headquarters of the Leningrad Military District, and the Soviet troops will march forward to the Gulf of Bothnia, to the borders of Sweden, to the Åland Islands.

Every copy of 1941 is literally torn from reading. Anyone interested in the war has read it from the title on the cover to the printer's address on the last page. And has read it more than once.

Only the serious historians have not had enough time and have not been willing to read something that has long been known to the broad popular masses.

But that's not all. We have long been told that Hitler and his band of bluedolzis attacked the peacefully sleeping Soviet Union. Among the bluedolizers they listed Germany's satellites. Including Finland. Here is a sample: 'On 22 June 1941, fascist Germany treacherously attacked the USSR. Mobilized, pre-armed with modern combat equipment, 190 enemy divisions invaded the Soviet Union's borders with the aim of destroying it and enslaving the Soviet people. Together with Hitler's Germany, Italy, Romania, Hungary and Finland joined the war against the Soviet Union in defiance of the will of their peoples" *(Telpukhovsky, B. C. "Великая Отечественная война Sovietского Sajunga. 1941-1945". M., State Publishing House of Political Literature, 1959, p. 33)*.

And 10 years later in the Military Historical Journal *(1969, № 1, p. 62)* echoed the astonishing phrase of Air Chief Marshal A. Novikov, who in the summer of 1941 was Major General of aviation, Commander of aviation of the Northern Front:

"Logic told us that we should not wait for the enemy to bring all his aircraft into action, but should ourselves take the initiative in the air and be the first to launch massive strikes on his airfields...".

It is about June 25, 1941.

I drew attention to this phrase. I even used it as a motto for one of the chapters in the book M-Day.

But to pay attention and to see the meaning - these, as they say in Odessa, are two big differences.

I didn't get the point.

Mark Solonin has grasped the meaning. And he pointed out to the reading public a small inconspicuous detail: on June 22, 1941, Finland had not attacked the Soviet Union and had not declared war on it. Finland was invaded by the Soviet Union three days after the German invasion began. Solonin confirmed his conclusions with a whole book of irrefutable evidence.

So comrade Stalin not only had plans to attack
"over ," but he has begun to carry out those plans. In a situation where he had to repel a German invasion.

And in 1941, Stalin had failed to conquer Finland. But from all this it does not follow at all that he did not contemplate attacking it.

If one tries to write a truthful history of the war, one will not be able to overlook the fact that the Soviet Union attacked Finland in 1941. He will have to remember that logic dictated that the Soviet generals "should be the first to strike massive blows at its airfields...". Which they did. Admittedly, without much brilliance. And then the honest historian will have to explain to the reading public why they did so.

In 1939, the Red Army ran to Finland to help the rebellious workers and peasants in response to the request of the new free Finland government formed in Moscow.

In 1940, everyone was ordered to forget about the uprising of the Finnish workers and peasants, as well as the request of the new government. As well as the government itself. It was announced that the Red Army had run to Finland to ensure the safety of Lenin's city.

Have completed the task. Ensured safety.

But why did they attack Finland once more in 1941?

Any answer to this question is a bone in the throat of official historical scholarship. Because any answer tarnishes the reputation of our great and just war.

5

Hem this is just one of many war episodes. Official historians have not ploughed these fields. But what are they doing? They are solving problems.

Here is one of the tasks facing Russian historical science that the scientific community has yet to solve. Reports the president of the Academy of Military Sciences, Army General Gareyev: "A hard struggle lies ahead. Further research on a whole range of issues is ahead of us in order to give a decent answer to the falsifications. For example, related to the fact that the USSR and England secretly intended to attack Germany. Is it not topical to put things in their place?" *("Krasnaya Zvezda", 23-29 July 2008)*.

Hundreds of learned men are prepared to keep eating government bread to put things in their place to prove: in 1941 Britain did not intend to attack Germany.

And it is known to me personally, and not only to me, but to the whole world without further research by Gareev, that Britain was not preparing an attack on Germany in the summer of 1941.

As early as 3 September 1939, Britain had openly declared war on Germany. And it fought that . By the summer of 1941 Britain had repulsed all attempts by German aviation to gain air supremacy over the islands and straits. British aviation had turned the tide of the war in its favour. In 1940 German aviation had bombed British cities, industrial centres and ports relentlessly. But an end was put to this crime. Having thwarted German aviation's attempts to "bomb Britain out of the war," British aviation had itself launched an air war against German cities and industrial centers. Incidentally, by June 1941 British strategic aviation had already dropped more bombs on German cities and factories than all the Stalinist falcons had

were to pour down on the industrial sites of Germany and her allies by May 1945.

By the summer of 1941, the strategic situation at sea was also broken. In May 1941, the British Navy sank the Bismarck, the largest German liner. The Soviet Navy had not sunk a single liner in its entire history. And I don't recall the Soviet Navy's combat record including a single submerged cruiser.

The destruction of the Bismarck put an end to the outrages that German surface ships had committed in the Atlantic. A little earlier, in March 1941, the Royal Navy had accomplished the defeat of the Italian fleet off Cape Matapan and secured its dominance of the Mediterranean.

And Britain's ground troops were weak. At the time they were fighting German panzer divisions in Africa. There was not then, and could not have been, any question of British divisions landing on the European continent: the evacuation of British troops from Crete was completed on 1 June 1941. They barely managed to escape from Greece and its islands.

And now the scientific tribe under the leadership of the academic, the doctor of all sorts of sciences, etc., etc., has decided to conduct further research and prove that in the summer of 1941 Britain was not preparing a sudden attack on Germany.

But to whom is this not clear without any further research?

* * *

Our serious historians deliberately muddle the simplest issues. They falsify history so that they can then successfully debunk their own fabrications.

But why did they need this? Because

they are not capable of more.

CONCLUSION
WHAT TO DO WITH THE TRAITORS?

Because they are unable either to construct a truthful history of the war or to refute the conclusions of independent researchers or to explain the many inconsistencies and oddities in its outbreak, development and outcome, serious historians are increasingly inclined to solve the problem radically. Increasingly, the call is sounded: and is it not time to shake in the stocks all those who do not keep pace with the collective, who deviate from the general course?

Here in the editorial office of the main military newspaper Col. Ю. Bondarenko talked with the last Chairman of the KGB of the USSR V. A. Kryuchkov. Both of them in August 1991, showing unheard-of cowardice, betrayed the Soviet homeland, the Soviet government, the Soviet people and their military oath.

True, Kryuchkov tried to do something, but his hands, like those of all his , were shaking. And not only his hands. Without a single attempt at resistance, he and his accomplices immediately to the victor. All too quickly these last lovers of communism switched sides to the new government and are safely receiving from it grand pensions, allowances and privileges unseen anywhere in the world.

And Bondarenko didn't even try to stay true to his oath. In those glorious days of '91, he hid from his people and was in no hurry to shed blood for his beloved government.

After 13 years, they have gotten better, they have gotten drunker, and they both remember their native communist regime under which they lived so beautifully. They both remember that they had to defend it, but there were people, you see, who were afraid to defend the Soviet Motherland. And Colonel Bondarenko asks a question of his more senior comrade: "And what do you think we should do with the traitors?" *("Krasnaya Zvezda", February 28, 2004)*.

To this the former chairman of the KGB of the USSR, who abandoned his post at the first sign of danger, replied, "I think we should do what was done under Soviet rule... Many of the traitors were put on trial, most of them were sentenced to death."

Golden words.

Comrade traitors, Bondarenko and Kryuchkov, why didn't you start with yourselves? You should have issued your sentences right there in the newsroom and asked someone present to carry them out.

And you could have wound up without foreign help.

If the power of the Leninist Guard was acceptable to our people (which does not exclude individual shortcomings), you had to be faithful to it, to fight for it.

And if it was unacceptable, then you had to fight against
Her.

I agree with citizen Kryuchkov: traitors must be
shoot. Or to be hanged.

But let every convert to Soviet power begin with .

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